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Abstract 
 
For several decades now, Metro Manila’s Baclaran district has been home to thousands of 
street vendors who have capitalised on its functions as a commercial centre, a transport 
node, and a Filipino Catholic devotional site. This presence of informal hawkers, which some 
government officials consider as an urban blight, has generated a range of policies that seek 
to manage, if not eradicate, the informal hawkers. Years of street occupancy, however, have 
enabled the tenacious vendors to enforce grassroots mechanisms to appropriate 
streetscapes. I refer to this interplay of state interventions and grassroots practices as the 
formal-informal interface. Seen from an urban planning perspective, the Baclaran context 
offers an opportunity for scholarly inquiry into how the complex spatio-political ordering and 
socio-economic realities unsettle the essentialist formal-versus-informal categories of work 
and state interventions. 
 
Indeed, as many global South cities face poverty and unemployment, poor people 
continuously engage in informal economy. Over 50% of urban labour force in developing 
countries is informal and street vending is seen as the most visible informal livelihood. 
Despite the growing recognition of informality, it has often been linked to ungovernable 
practices. Ungovernability, however, is never devoid of state intervention. The literature 
shows how state institutions use formal and informal approaches to manage livelihoods like 
street vending. Yet, there is limited empirical research that investigates the formal-informal 
interface in governing and appropriating contested vending spaces. 
 
My thesis addresses this gap. Building on a combination of theories from planning, 
sociology, and political science, I problematize the question ‘How can the interface of formal 
systems and informal mechanisms to govern and appropriate contested vending spaces be 
explained?’ Employing documentary review, observation, in-depth interviews, focus group 
discussions, and life-history accounts in gathering data, this qualitative research focuses on 
street vending in Baclaran, one of the Philippines’ largest informal hawking districts.  
 
In this thesis I argue, first, that understanding the formal-informal interface in contested 
vending spaces requires situating the location of informal vending in the broader historical, 
spatial, political and economic trajectories of the surrounding environment. Second, 
problematizing the formal-informal interface demands what I call a post-dualist lens. Post-
dualist lens contends that structural factors and agency expressions underpin the formal 
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and informal economic practices. It seeks to interrogate the factors, forces, and frictions 
(relations) involved in the formal-informal interface. Third, examining the formal-informal 
interface entails unpacking five governance dimensions: a) players, b) policies, c) practices, 
d) governing relations, and e) planning implications.  The analysis of these dimensions 
shows how the co-optation and contestation in state policies and informal arrangements are 
rooted in multi-layered and unequal socio-spatial relations. Thus, rather than merely 
documenting the growing ‘informalization’, these empirical results call for a rearticulation of 
how, and to what extent, state interventions and/or institutional neglect deepen the 
precarious conditions of informal workers like street vendors.  
 
In sum, these findings reveal how understanding the formal-informal interface contributes to 
the evolving conceptual and empirical conversations on worlding cities. The Baclaran case 
shows how worlding practices arise from the interplay of global North-oriented planning 
ideals and policy approaches, the unequal socio-spatial relations, and the continuing 
struggle of marginalized street vendors in the global South. These issues require rethinking 
of policy direction and planning trajectory. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. “We are APECtado too”: Research Context and Background 
In November 2015, the Philippine government hosted the annual Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC)1 Leaders’ Meeting.  Days before the November 18-19 gathering, local 
television news reported how different sectors complained about the traffic jam caused by the 
closure of key road networks in Metro Manila. Many commuters took to online social media 
their sentiments about the event’s impacts using the hashtag #APECtado (affected). Besides 
the irritated commuters, the news featured the eviction of vendors in Baclaran, one of the 
Philippines’ largest informal hawking districts and the case study area for this thesis. To monitor 
the situation as part of my data collection, I visited Baclaran three times throughout what was 
dubbed as APEC week – November 12 to 19.  
 
Although Baclaran streets were not totally vendor-free as few ambulant hawkers were still 
roaming around the area, the improvised stalls disappeared - see  Figure 1-1, on page 2. In 
brief conversations with some itinerant vendors, they echoed the netizens’ sentiment: “We are 
APECtado too”. As I walked down the then expansive but usually crowded Taft Avenue 
Extension, old vendor, Hannah2, whom I had previously interviewed for this research, 
approached me. “Look, we are APECtado as well. We’ve been unable to sell for almost a week 
now... We were told the streets have to be clear until November 20 when this APEC event is 
over. We have lost PhP200 (US$ 4) of our daily income,” she shared.  
 
I have heard Hannah’s account about their precarious street life a number of times. In our past 
talks, she recounted how the government drove them away when Barrack Obama and Pope 
Francis visited the country in 2014 and 2015, respectively. State officials often tell them they 
need to abandon the streets because they aggravate congestion or they might pose security 
and terrorism threats during special events. Whatever the government reasons might be, 
Hannah’s and her fellow Baclaran vendors’ plea - We are APECtado too - is an appeal for 
attention to their highly insecure condition. Ironically, as the APEC leaders talked about the 
                                            
1 The APEC is a regional economic forum of 21 member countries. Formed in 1989, it aims to generate “prosperity 
for the people of the region by promoting balanced, inclusive, sustainable, innovative and secure growth and by 
accelerating regional economic integration” (www.apec.org). 
2 I follow the standard anonymization practice for qualitative research. All the names that appear in this thesis, 
except for some elected public officials, are pseudonyms I use to protect the identity of the research participants.  
2 
 
Meeting’s theme ‘Building Inclusive Economies’, informal economic workers like Hannah had 
to vacate their livelihood spaces so the state could project a secure and orderly image of the 
metropolis. This paradox highlights the need to examine the links between the government’s 
responses to informal livelihoods and the grassroots self-help mechanisms often perceived to 
be beyond state control. Such entwined relations are the key problematic that I tackle in this 
thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure3 1-1  A Baclaran Scene before (left) and during (right) the 2015 APEC Meeting  
 
Interrogating such relations sheds light on how Hannah’s situation, a common plight among 
those who rely on uncertain informal employment, is rooted in what I refer to as the formal-
informal interface. By formal-informal interface, I adopt Hansen and Vaa’s (2004) idea of 
interface as the “encounters between entities or processes that are governed by different rules; 
the outcomes may be neutral, implying non-recognition or accommodation, or they may entail 
conflict or cooperation” (Hansen & Vaa, 2004, p. 9). The literature reveals how the formal-
informal interface occurs in global South cities where many urban poor engage in informal 
economy to grapple with acute poverty. The employment in the informal economy reaches 58–
70% of non-agricultural employment4 at regional level (Charmes, 2012). In developing Asian 
                                            
3 Unless stated otherwise, I have copyright ownership over the pictures in this thesis.  
4 An earlier estimate indicates that over 70 per cent of the workforce in developing countries and around 4.3 billion 
persons worldwide rely on the informal economy to survive (CLEP & UNDP, 2008). 
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countries, over 50% of urban labour force is informal – from 82% in South Asia to 65% in East 
and Southeast Asia (Vanek, Chen, Carré, Heintz, & Hussmanns, 2014). In the Philippines, 
where the case study area for this thesis is located, informal workers constitute around 75% of 
total employment (World Bank, 2013b). With the increasing magnitude of informality, scholars 
have linked informal work to formal economy and globalization (Bacchetta, Ernst, & 
Bustamante, 2009; Biles, 2009; Roy, 2005, 2009), which has marked the rise of emerging 
economies and their integration into the global economy.  
 
Despite its prevalence in the global South, informality has often been associated with 
dismissive metonyms such as creative chaos (UN Habitat, 2016) and ungovernable practices 
(Gandy, 2005; Heymans, 1993; Kapsali & Tsavdaroglou, 2014). By ungovernable, some 
authors have viewed informality as “the uncontrollable dark aspect of the cities” (Kapsali & 
Tsavdaroglou, 2014, p. 3) and “a wild zone of the urban imagination… beyond the reach of 
human agency or any realistic prospects of improvement” (Gandy, 2005, p. 38). Such a 
dystopian framing masks the state role in informal economy and entrenches the dominant 
dualist paradigm (Geertz, 1963; Hanser, 2016; Rukmana, 2011; Santos, 1979; Sethuraman, 
1981), which has long promoted a dichotomous view of the formal and informal processes.  
 
Some planning scholars challenge this dystopian and dualist perspective by looking into the 
formal-informal nexus in relation to planning and policy-making (Dovey, 2012; Friedmann, 
2005; Hackenbroch, 2011; Marx, 2009; McFarlane, 2012; Miraftab, 2009; Porter, 2011; Roy, 
2009; Yiftachel, 2006). In the Asia-Pacific region, for instance, the United Nations has 
recognized how workers and enterprises move along the formal-informal continuum (UN 
Habitat & UN ESCAP, 2015). Even governments in some countries have resorted to formal and 
informal approaches in dealing with livelihoods like street vending (Batréau & Bonnet, 2016; 
Etemadi, 2004; Hlela, 2003; Peña, 1999; Recio & Gomez, 2013; Shuaib, 2007). In the face of 
persistent apocalyptic view of informality and the increasing attention to the formal-informal 
links, it is crucial to ask, who governs the seemingly ‘ungovernable’ practices in urban 
informality? This amplifies the need to analyse the formal-informal interface as an urban 
planning challenge.  
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But, why focus on street vending? Among urban informal employment, street vending is seen 
as the most visible livelihood (Brown & Mackie, 2017; Chen, Roever, & Skinner, 2016) and a 
major planning concern because hawking often occurs on public spaces (Pratt, 2006). Street 
vending5 involves people who offer goods or services for sale from public spaces like streets 
and pavements (McGee, 1970). The vendors may be stationary or mobile as they move from 
place to place by carrying their wares on push carts or in baskets (Bhowmik, 2005). The heavy 
presence of street vendors is critical in developing countries where various stakeholders share 
and/or compete for limited spaces. Tensions arising from the informal nature of vending spaces 
have led to congested public spaces, forced evictions, riots, and loss of lives and livelihoods 
(Hlela, 2003; Okello, 2017; Peña, 1999; Recio, 2010).   
 
In addition, although many studies have focused separately on formal rules governing street 
vending and on how informal vendor groups have engaged with state agencies (Etemadi, 2004; 
Hlela, 2003; Recio & Gomez, 2013; Roever, 2006), there is a gap in problematizing how the 
formal-informal interface operates in contested vending spaces6. For instance, street vendor 
associations engage with government agencies and simultaneously develop informal 
mechanisms to govern public spaces (Etemadi, 2004; Hlela, 2003; Peña, 1999; Recio & 
Gomez, 2013; Shuaib, 2007). Yet, there is a dearth of empirical research that investigates the 
formal-informal interface, particularly in the context of governing and appropriating contested 
vending spaces7. I address this gap in the literature and contribute to knowledge by examining 
the formal-informal interface in governing and appropriating contested vending spaces in the 
Philippines. Although the findings are rooted in Metro Manila, similar issues may take place in 
other global South metropolises. 
                                            
5 In this thesis, I use ‘vending’ and ‘hawking’ interchangeably to refer to the same concept. I recognize how some 
authors use local terms to explain the nature of street vending activities in different contexts. For instance, Yatmo 
(2008) classifies informal vendors in Indonesian cities based on the level of mobility and flexibility.  
6 While Hackenbroch’s (2011) notion of negotiated space reveals the co-existence and link between statutory 
(formal) and informal spaces, it has not been applied to governing relations in contested vending spaces.  
7 A recent volume on street trading – Rebel Streets and the Informal Economy (Brown, 2017d) - is an important 
contribution that provides insights into the dynamics of legality and informality in street vending. I refer to relevant 
arguments in that book in examining my own findings in this research. In addition, some authors such as Roy 
(2005) and Hansen & Vaa (2004) discuss the relations of formal rules and informal arrangements but with specific 
reference to informal housing and settlements. Shuaib (2007) also emphasizes the need to investigate the links 
between formal sector and urban informal sector. He mentions the ‘complementary’ as well as ‘conflicting’ 
characteristics of formal and informal rules affecting street vendors in Colombo, Sri Lanka. Yet, he does not dwell 
on the causes and consequences of these issues and how they impact on planning. Lastly, Batreau & Bonnet 
(2016) provide a good work on what they call ‘managed informality’ where local district administrators implement 
a set of informal rules, which runs parallel with the formal policies. But there is inadequate discussion on how the 
legal environment shapes and/or is affected by the informal arrangements.	
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1.2. Research Questions and Significance 
As the statistics in the previous section indicate, street vending provides employment to many 
urban poor in the global South. Despite this role, the common policy environment prohibits 
street vending in cities. In many cases, however, state authorities have different governing 
arrangements with informal vendors who have devised grassroots mechanisms to use the 
streets. I refer to this interplay of state interventions and grassroots mechanisms as the formal-
informal interface. I problematize this interface by answering the question ‘How can the 
interface of formal systems and informal mechanisms to govern and appropriate contested 
vending spaces be explained?’ Addressing this question illuminates how the complex 
interaction of formal systems and informal mechanisms in governing and appropriating 
contested vending spaces affects and is influenced by urban planning processes. To analyse 
this interface, I tackle five sub-questions below, which serve as key components of the main 
inquiry.  
1. Who are the key players that drive formal systems and informal mechanisms, as well as 
their interface, in governing and appropriating contested vending spaces?  
2. Under what government rules do these players use streets and assert their claims?  
3. What practices and norms do street vendors observe in relation to street use and 
informal hawking? 
4. What relational logics and entrenched arrangements influence the governing processes 
and interactions of the different players?  
5. What are the implications of the formal-informal interface for urban planning processes, 
particularly in the context of governing and appropriating contested vending spaces? 
 
In addressing sub-question 1, I identify the players and explain their roles in undertaking formal 
systems and informal mechanisms in governing and appropriating vending spaces. In this 
thesis, the formal systems refer to the government laws, policies, and programs on street use 
and informal vending. Informal mechanisms are the individual and collective action practices 
and arrangements initiated by organized and unorganized street vendors and other 
stakeholders (e.g. private sector, civil society groups) to govern and/or appropriate their 
vending spaces. These include organizational policies, programs, and agreements to occupy 
and control vending areas. The written and verbal agreements between vendors and other 
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stakeholders with state authorities – national, local and street level bureaucrats – are also part 
of the informal mechanisms. In describing ‘contested vending spaces’, I follow Brown’s (2006b, 
p.10) notion of urban public space, which refers to “the physical space and social relations that 
determine the use of that space within the non-private realm of cities”. Thus, I define contested 
vending spaces as those public spaces in cities where street hawking operates in conflict with 
other claims like the car owners’ need for mobility channels and parking areas, the state’s desire 
to impose order, and the formal businesses’ demand for exclusive use of their stall façades, 
among others. These spaces include streets, roads, sidewalks, parking spaces, transport 
terminals, and squares.  
 
In sub-question 2, I tackle how state policies affect street use and informal vending. Here, I 
examine the factors, issues and implications of government policies on informality and street 
vending. To answer sub-question 3, I problematize how practices and routines in contested 
vending spaces get normalized and institutionalized to the extent that they gain legitimacy and 
influence the formal-informal interface in governing and appropriating vending spaces. In 
addressing sub-question 4, I seek to understand the governing relations of different players as 
they employ formal systems and informal mechanisms to govern and appropriate the contested 
vending spaces. These pertain to broader systemic arrangements and micro socio-spatial 
modes of engagements that lie beneath the rules, interactions, norms, and actions in Baclaran 
vending spaces. Lastly, in sub-question 5, I analyse the implications of the formal-informal 
interface for urban planning processes. I also delve here into how planning contributes to the 
interlocking formal and informal arrangements. These are critical insights for urban planners 
and policy-makers who constantly need to engage with street vendors. 
 
Admittedly, different stakeholders can problematize the causes, processes, and outcomes of 
the formal-informal interface using their own institutional mandates (for state players), 
conceptual prisms (for researchers and academics), and lived realities (for vendors and 
stallholders). Each player can construct and offer diverse explanations of the interface. This is 
consistent with the thesis’ critical realist ontological stance, which recognizes “the possibility of 
alternative valid accounts of any phenomenon” (Maxwell, 2012, p. 5). Thus, this research, 
though mediated by my own interpretations, offers an account of the formal-informal interface 
by incorporating and examining the views of multiple stakeholders. As I will explain in Chapter 
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4 (Methodology), while this research is informed by my own conceptual and contextual 
perspectives, the way of seeing is also contingent on the social contexts of the stakeholders - 
government officials, street vendors and other players - who took part in the research as 
informants. 
 
By addressing the main research question and its sub-questions, I offer a theoretically-informed 
and empirically-grounded understanding of the formal-informal interface. My notion of post-
dualist analytical framework lends a conceptual underpinning that moves beyond the binary 
formal-versus-informal view of urban informality. The post-dualist lens builds on three strands 
of academic thought. First, it follows the enmeshed reading of informality issues, as evident in 
the work of McGee (1973), Roy (2005), and Dovey (2012), among others. In other words, I view 
informal economic activities as inherently linked to formal and state-regulated economic 
transactions (Recio, Mateo-Babiano, & Roitman, 2017). I thus treat the formal and informal 
dichotomy as a heuristic device. Second, the post-dualist lens builds on the discourses on 
structure-agency nexus, as can be gleaned from Giddens (1984), Bourdieu (1990), and Archer 
(1995). Among the ideas of these authors, I espouse Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory which 
regards humans as reflexive agents who can produce and reproduce structures. Drawing on 
the structuration theory, I argue that structural factors and agency expressions underpin the 
formal and informal economic practices in urban spaces. This structure-agency nexus enables 
me to examine the complexity of informality issues, a departure from many studies that look at 
both dimensions separately. Third, the post-dualist framework links the first two concepts to 
planning by adhering to relational and institutionalist standpoint.  Here, my view is grounded in 
how Healey (1997, 2007b) frames planning as a governance practice concerned with managing 
co-existence in shared spaces and relations in collective action.  
 
Following Healey8, I look at planning as relational in that it is situated within the evolving, 
complex, socio-spatial interactions in urban areas. By institutionalist9, I see planning issues 
involving urban informal employment like street vending as embedded in contrasting interests, 
                                            
8 In developing her ‘relational planning’ perspective, Healey (2007b) builds on Amin’s (2002, 2004) and Massey’s 
(2005) work on relational geography. They both see the interactions that occur in specific social or nodal 'sites' as 
complex and embedded in past trajectories and wider contexts.  
9 I employ the sociological variant of institutionalism, which looks at “interests and preferences, transaction 
processes and costs as multi-faceted and interests and preferences, transaction processes and costs as multi-
faceted and socially constructed…” (Healey, 2007a, p. 66). 
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transactions, costs, rules, norms and broader social contexts in an urban area. I argue that the 
trajectories of these processes are multi-faceted and socially constructed which may be 
questioned and challenged (Healey, 2007b). In Section 2.3.4, I discuss how these concepts 
are re-conceptualized and applied in the thesis.  
 
I deploy the post-dualist lens in examining how three policy epistemologies - hostile, tolerant, 
and accommodating - have informed state approaches to street vending in the global South. I 
adopt the term policy epistemology from Roy (2005) who argues that policy approaches are not 
just techniques of implementation but also ways of knowing. In Chapter 2, I address how the 
varying policy epistemologies are embedded in structural issues and agency expressions. As I 
unpack the conceptual dimensions and practical implications of these policy epistemologies, 
they also serve as a take-off point in questioning the highly structuralist and/or reductionist 
views of informality.  
 
In terms of relevance to policy-making, the thesis’ empirical findings draw attention to the 
dilemmas that state officials, planners, and scholars face in dealing with informality. The 
dominant literature shows how international organizations and national governments promote 
formalization as a key approach to informal economy (ILO, 2014; Tucker, 2016). Yet, in 
examining the roles of national government agencies, I have unravelled the constraints in state 
policy framework and program processes, which are meant to respond to informality issues. 
The Philippine national government agencies are saddled with issues like institutional 
fragmentation, unresponsive tools and processes, dualist and developmentalist approach to 
informality (see Chapter 6). Formalization is therefore unlikely to work in this kind of institutional 
environment. 
 
Further, the literature on urban governance emphasizes how various players like state 
institutions, business groups, non-government organizations and community associations 
collaborate and/or compete to pursue their respective interests (Minnery, 2007; Molotch, 1993; 
Porio, 2012; Stone, 1989). Decentralization also figures prominently in discourses that 
problematize urban governance and local empowerment (Capuno, 2007; McGranahan, 
Schensul, & Singh, 2016; Porio, 2012; 2016). In this context, creating participatory spaces 
where the marginalized groups can take part in shaping decisions that affect them is seen as 
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a crucial step (Etemadi, 2004; Recio, 2015; Roever, 2016). The analysis in this thesis, however, 
has revealed that decentralization agenda and participatory processes enshrined in legal 
instruments are insufficient to address the vendors’ insecure conditions in the context of strong 
discretionary power of local executives, entrenched elite capture of local governments, and 
depoliticized planning approach.  
 
Another strand of literature on urban governance has noted the key role that non-government 
organizations (NGOs) play in facilitating processes and championing the cause of vulnerable 
groups (Bornstein, 2005; de Souza, 2006; Etemadi, 2004; Shatkin, 2004). In examining the 
presence of NGOs in Baclaran, the findings point to their limited role due to a number of factors 
(see Chapter 6). Instead, the analytical insights affirm some arguments in the literature 
(Piliavsky, 2014; Routray, 2014) on how local intermediaries - political operators and vendor 
organizers - could either sustain or undermine informal vendors’ collective action for democratic 
political organizing.  
 
Also, while the diverse and multi-layered forms and spaces of power (Gaventa, 2011; Lukes, 
2005) have somehow enabled vendors to persist in an exclusionary and unequal socio-spatial 
environment, those with political and economic power remain dominant in the scramble for 
contested spaces. These complex socio-spatial interactions manifest in how Baclaran vendors 
devise their own strategies to use streetscapes, engage the state, and cope with financial 
distress. I examine these practices using conceptual constructs such as haging occupancy, 
evictionist regulatory regime, Bermonths routine, and multiple financial schemes (see Chapter 
7).  
 
On a broader scale, some literatures that interrogate informality see informal economic actors 
as rational individuals who exit from the formal system after cost-benefit calculations (Rapley, 
2002) and/or when they feel burdened by state regulation (Schneider & Enste, 2000). After 
examining the governing relations in Baclaran, I move beyond this neo-liberal explanation of 
informal economic transactions. Drawing on the Baclaran context, I argue that informal 
economic transactions are embedded in four enmeshed governing relations, namely:  
disjunctive urban governance, strong kinship ties, clientelist politics, and grassroots democratic 
entanglements (see Chapter 8). These relations tap into economic, socio-cultural and political 
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dimensions of informality.  Understanding the different issues tied to each relation will therefore 
aid the players, particularly the state officials, planners, and street vendors, in determining how 
the various interests get legitimized, co-opted, contested, marginalized and embedded in their 
daily socio-spatial practices and interactions. In other words, I contend that these entangled 
relations are more than institutional or political affiliations operating in space; rather, they are 
involved in the production of space (Lefebvre, 1991; Oriard, 2015).  
 
With respect to research methodology, I employed qualitative approach using case study 
strategy to examine “concrete, context-dependent knowledge” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 221) of the 
formal-informal interface.  Between 2015 and 2016, I conducted 11 months of fieldwork where 
I gathered documents, conducted interviews with over 80 respondents, and convened focus 
groups discussions with 20 participants. I also undertook series of people and site observations 
and documented life-histories of seven street vendors, some of whom welcomed me into their 
houses.  I used the Nvivo software in coding and analysing the primary and secondary data 
derived from the chosen methods.  
 
The case study focused on Baclaran vending district, located on the borders of two cities - 
Pasay and Parañaque - in Metropolitan Manila, Philippines. Three criteria guided the selection 
of Baclaran for this thesis: a) the magnitude of informal vending activity; b) the informal 
mechanisms employed to govern and/or use vending spaces; c) the vendors’ engagement with 
state authorities. In Chapter 5, I provide a detailed description of the study area. 
 
1.3. Description of the Succeeding Sections 
This thesis is organized in nine chapters. After this introductory chapter, I critically review the 
relevant literatures in the next two chapters to theoretically ground the research problem and 
develop the thesis’ conceptual framework. In Chapter 2, I revisit the evolution of informality 
discourses and explains how policy epistemologies (Roy, 2005) have informed state 
approaches to street vending in many global South cities. Besides framing the policy 
orientations, I explain in this chapter my notion of post-dualist lens as a counterpoint to the 
dualist paradigm (formal versus informal), which has dominated much of policy and scholarly 
framing of informality issues.  
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In Chapter 3, I explain the connections between informality, planning and governance. Here, I 
argue that informality is embedded in planning praxis as the latter inscribes and influences 
informal practices. I then situate planning as a governance dimension involved in managing co-
existence in shared and contested spaces. Since appropriation of urban spaces entails 
relational issues, I discuss next the importance of discourses on power and grassroots 
collective action. I end with the thesis’ conceptual framework where I expound on how the post-
dualist lens links informality to planning and the identified governance dimensions. 
 
In Chapter 4, I lay down the thesis’ methodological framework. I first clarify why I espouse 
critical realist ontology and constructivist epistemology as reflexive vantage points from which 
I problematize the dynamics of the formal-informal interface. I then explain how the combined 
retroductive and abductive inferential approaches, which are common analytical tools in critical 
realist research, have enabled me to be flexible in employing and modifying conceptual 
constructs as I examine empirical findings that fall outside the initial theoretical frames. In the 
subsequent sections, I explain case study as the thesis’ research inquiry strategy, the criteria 
for case study area selection, the research methods employed, who the research participants 
were, how they were chosen, the strategies for contacting them, and the data analysis 
approaches and software used.  
 
To emphasize the importance of the broader contexts, which contribute to understanding the 
formal-informal interface, I explain in Chapter 5 the implications of historical issues in the 
Philippines and Metropolitan Manila for Baclaran as an urban informal vending area. Five key 
themes emerge: a) the Philippine economy’s link to international trade, b) the unabated rural-
to-urban migration, c) Manila’s prominence as urban centre, d) the unequal and elite-dominated 
political economy, and e) the presence of varied forms of agency and resistance. These themes 
underscore how the current Baclaran’s socio-spatial functions are situated within the larger 
structural dimensions (historical, geographical, and socio-political) and agency expressions of 
urban relations. On whole, this chapter serves as an important milieu in examining the issues 
presented in the succeeding chapters.  
 
In Chapter 6, I tackle the thesis sub-question 1: Who are the key players that drive formal 
systems and informal mechanisms, as well as their interface, in governing and appropriating 
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contested vending spaces? To address this query, I delve into four groups of actors whose 
formal mandates (in the case of state institutions) and/or everyday actions are implicated in 
informality. The analysis shows how national government agencies face several institutional 
constraints in performing their mandates. One thread that runs through those issues is the 
importance of policy epistemology (Roy, 2005) and spatial positionality (Lemanski & Marx, 
2015) of those charged with addressing informality. I also explain how the discretionary power 
of local executives has enabled the Mayors’ personnel to dominate the appropriation of 
Baclaran streets through the formal and informal structures of power. This occurs as local 
planners resort to a depoliticized planning, which puts premium on gentrification as an 
approach to street vending. In the remainder of Chapter 6, I examine how local non-state actors 
– NGOs, private sector, street vendors, grassroots intermediaries – collaborate and compete 
against each other, as well as engage with local governments, to advance their interests in 
using Baclaran streets.   
 
In Chapter 7, I address the sub-questions 2 and 3: Under what government rules do the players 
use streets and assert their claims? What practices and norms do informal vendors observe in 
relation to street use and informal hawking? In answering the sub-question 2, I use three policy 
epistemologies – hostile, tolerant, and accommodating - which adhere to the post-dualist lens 
laid out in Chapter 2. Here, I touch on how the hostile policies treat streets as a public property 
which should primarily function as a mobility channel for automobiles and pedestrians. With 
respect to tolerant political atmosphere, I illustrate how the interplay of economic issues 
(poverty and unemployment), cultural values (Christmas season appeal) and agency 
expressions (building political ties) underpin the lenient arrangements. When it comes to 
accommodating policies, the analysis has unveiled the constraints of the favourable laws when 
linked to the broader issues of neoliberal-oriented policies and decentralization agenda.  
 
In response to the sub-question 3, I examine four practices – the haging occupancy, the 
engagement with evictionist regulatory regime, the Bermonths routine, and the multiple finance-
generating mechanisms. The notion of haging occupancy captures the vendors’ precarious and 
resilient access to hawking spaces. Vendors’ engagement with the evictionist regulatory 
regime, meanwhile, shows how eviction has been a spatio-political tool normalized by the 
interplay of broader socio-economic problems, local political dynamics, contending state 
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policies, and the continuing grassroots agency. The discussion of Bermonths routine dwells on 
the socio-temporal dimension of informality along with issues attached to this season. In 
multiple finance-generating schemes, the analysis highlights the problems that constrain 
vendors as they initiate paluwagan (to ease) mutual-savings, borrow from local lenders, and 
sell/rent out their claimed vending spaces.  
 
In Chapter 8, I stitch together the key arguments in the three previous chapters by tackling the 
sub-questions 4 and 5: What relational logics and/or entrenched arrangements influence the 
governing processes and interactions of the different players? What are the implications of the 
formal-informal interface for urban planning processes, particularly in the context of governing 
and appropriating contested vending spaces? In the first part of the chapter, I analyse four 
overlapping relations: a) disjunctive urban governance, b) strong kinship ties, c) clientelist 
political relations, and d) grassroots democratic entanglements. By explaining the causes and 
implications of each relation, I shed light on how institutional issues (disjunctive governance), 
socio-cultural and political ties (kinship bonds and clientelism), and grassroots agency 
(grassroots democratic entanglements) intersect and generate the complex formal-informal 
interface in governing and appropriating contested vending spaces. In the second part, I 
discuss the implications of the formal-informal interface for urban planning. Here, I rearticulate 
how and why the thesis’ post-dualist lens is a sound analytical approach in examining the 
formal-informal interface from a planning perspective. I then explain how the socio-spatial 
patterns and their interactions (land use, informality) are linked to broader planning issues 
(globalization, gentrification). Lastly, I underscore why planners should deal with the complex 
formal-informal interface through inclusive urban governance. 
 
In the final chapter (Chapter 9), I provide the concluding discussion and address the main 
research question. I argue that the formal-informal interface can be explained by unpacking the 
conceptual prisms that frame how formal systems and urban informality are understood and by 
examining the links between the structural dimensions of informality (e.g. state policies, socio-
economic conditions) and the agency expressions of street vendors (e.g. grassroots responses 
to government regulation). I also summarise the thesis’ key contributions and explain some 
policy recommendations arising from the findings. In the last part, I discuss the limitations of 
the thesis and identify relevant themes for future studies. 
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After presenting all the chapters, the remainder of the thesis includes the bibliography and the 
appendices. Five appendices are attached: a) Interview guide questions (government officials; 
b) Interview guide questions (vendor leaders); c) FGD guide questions (vendors); d) 
Anonymized list of research participants quoted in the thesis; and e) Ethics approval letter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
CHAPTER 2. REVISITING INFORMALITY DISCOURSES  
 
2.1. Introduction 
The informality literature has tackled two streams of thought on formal and informal economic 
activities. While the prevalent perspective highlights the contrasting features between formality 
and informality (Flock & Breitung, 2016; Geertz, 1963; Hanser, 2016; Rukmana, 2011; Santos, 
1979; Sethuraman, 1981), the alternative view contends that these two constitute an 
interlocking system (Dovey, 2012; McGee, 1973; Portes, 1983; Roever, 2016; Stavenhagen, 
1965). These divergent ideas affect, and are manifested in, policies on urban informality, 
particularly in the context of street hawking in the global South.  
 
Street hawking refers to an activity where individuals offer “goods for sale to the public without 
having a permanent built-up structure from which to sell” (Bhowmik, 2005, p. 2256). While there 
have been studies on government policies and street hawking, the literature mainly focuses on 
the nature and purpose of the rules and how they impact on street vendors (Hlela, 2003; Illy, 
1986; Peña, 1999; Setšabi & Leduka, 2008; Xue & Huang, 2015). Beyond the policy 
discourses, the question on how formal state rules on street vending relate to the notions of 
informality remains unexamined.  
 
I address this puzzle in this first part of the literature review by dwelling on concepts, policy 
approaches, issues, and cases relevant to informality and street vending. These themes have 
helped me trace the evolution of informality discourses. I employed a critical approach in 
presenting the ideas in the literature10. This entails approaching the literature survey in a three-
staged manner. I first summarised different thoughts and linked their relevance to the thesis. 
Then I assessed how certain concepts relate to some chosen theoretical constructs. This 
allowed me to situate the research gaps and develop the thesis’ conceptual framework. In what 
                                            
10 In building up the scholarly references for this chapter as well as the next one (Chapter 3), I used desktop 
research and library work as the two strategies. I resorted to the iterative process of going through the list of 
references in the previous article/book and choosing those relevant to the research topic. The desktop review 
helped identify and explain journal articles and books that are significant to the thesis. Three online sites were 
particularly useful in this regard. These are sciencedirect website, scholar.google.com, and google.com. For 
instance, a sciencedirect search for the subject ‘interface’ and ‘urban informality’ yields over 4800 and 1200 
results, respectively. Of these, I browsed through more than 200 articles and reviewed them according to the 
degree of relevance to the topic. I also read through over 100 books on urban planning, governance, informality, 
urbanization, agency, collective action and informal vendors to determine their contribution to the thesis.  
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follows, I examine how informality discourses have evolved. Then I present three policy 
epistemologies that have informed how various states have approached street vending in select 
global South cities.   
 
2.2. Informality Discourses 
Presenting the different conceptions of informality is important to this thesis as it unveils how 
conceptual ideas relate planning and policy approaches to informality. This is consistent with 
the thesis’ critical realist position. As Jones (2004, p. 155) argues, “ideas matter because in 
informing practice ideas are casually efficacious, making a real difference to social outcomes”. 
In this regard, I address in this section the question ‘how do conceptual discourses and policy 
perspectives on informality relate to each other?’ Investigating this query provides insights on 
the formal-informal interface and how it relates to discourses in each arrangement. 
 
I employ three theoretical lenses in categorizing and framing the diverse conceptions of 
informality. These social theories are the structuralist approach, neo-liberalism paradigm, and 
the structuration theory. Each of these social and economic theories is briefly discussed below. 
 
2.2.1. Applying Social Theories to Understand Informality 
Structuralist approach puts premium on the “importance of social and economic relations in 
shaping political processes and policies” (Digaetano & Strom, 2003, p. 357). An analyst using 
this framework looks at “historically-rooted and materially-based processes of distribution, 
conflict, power, and domination, thought to drive social order and social change” (Lichbach, 
1997, p. 248). One dominant structuralist approach to comparative urban politics is political 
economy. This perspective seeks to explain how the interaction of government power and 
private resources limits or conditions political decision making (Digaetano & Strom, 2003; 
Gottdiener & Feagin, 1988). Essentially, a structuralist standpoint emphasizes the need to dwell 
on macro-economic and political factors that influence how urban governance operates. This 
perspective frames informality as a product of economic, political, and cultural processes. 
 
While some authors look at informality as an offshoot of social structures, some ideas indicate 
the importance of organizational and individual agency to understand informal practices. A 
related framework in this regard is neoliberalism. It builds on the economic principle that 
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individuals are rational and maximize their utility or benefits from a commodity. Neoliberals 
assume that individuals are allowed the utmost freedom to engage in the market and to receive 
the full rewards of this participation (Rapley, 2002). Neo-liberalism thus manifests in some 
mental images, which depict informality as driven by individuals’ rational decisions. Although 
neo-liberalism captures some policy perspectives, I contend that this is a rather reductionist 
view on informality and governance. As will be discussed in Section 2.3, policy approaches and 
governance issues influencing informality stem from a complex interaction of structural forces 
and different agents. This underscores the need for a theoretical framework that considers both 
the structure and agency. 
 
A useful paradigm in looking at the role of structure and human agency in informality is Giddens’ 
(1984) structuration theory11. This theory emphasizes the value of both the social structures as 
well as the human agency. For Giddens (1998, p. 77), society “… only has form, and that form 
only has effects on people, in so far as structure is produced and reproduced in what people 
do”. This interlinked view and equal recognition of the structure and agency is important in 
capturing how social structures and human actions are implicated in informal economic 
processes. In the next section, I revisit how informality discourses have evolved.  
 
2.2.2. Informal Sector: Roots and Trajectories 
Scholarly attention to the informal sector is attributed in literature to Keith Hart’s studies in the 
1970s. He described the informal as those urban poor who engaged in petty capitalism, as a 
substitute for the wage employment, to increase their incomes (Hart, 1973). However, informal 
economic players had already been present long before Hart coined the term as individuals 
lived on one’s wits and survived even without jobs officially recorded by the state (Cooper, 
1987). As a result, some authors have regarded the informal economy as an urban poor’s 
survival technique involving economic activities that could not be strictly tagged as modern 
(Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991).  
 
                                            
11 I recognize the complex debates surrounding Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory. For instance, Archer (2003) 
argues that a consequent concern of Giddens’ (1984) embedded view of structure and agency is the question on 
where the structure begins or ends and where the agency begins or ends. Since I never intend to resolve this 
conceptual issue in this thesis, it is enough to acknowledge that both Giddens and Archer hold that structure and 
agency are related – the structure constrains agency which produces it (Parker, 2000). In this sense, I treat the 
structure and agency as a heuristic device.  
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These early descriptions indicate the tendency to contrast informal initiatives against formal 
practices. This is apparent in Hart’s allusion to urban poor initiatives as a substitute to wage 
employment (meaning formal) and in Cooper’s assertion of people’s ability to survive despite 
the absence of state-documented jobs. The International Labour Office’s (ILO) explanation at 
that time also emphasized that the informal sector is outside the formal system with its small-
scale operations and skills acquired outside the formal school system and unregulated and 
competitive markets (ILO, 1973). This framing represents a dualistic conception, which 
pervaded the scholarly thinking in the past12.  
 
In the last half of the 20th century, a number of scholars came up with labels that reflect a 
dichotomous picture of economic transactions. Concepts such as firm-centred and bazaar 
economies (Geertz, 1963), upper and lower circuits of urban economy (Santos, 1979), 
enumerated and un-enumerated sectors (Sethuraman, 1981) constitute contrasting 
categorizations. Arguably, these constructs represent the contemporary delineation between 
formal and informal economies. On the one hand, the firm-centred, upper circuit and 
enumerated sectors broadly fit in Daniels’ (2004, p. 502) formal economy definition as “the 
employment of waged labour within a framework of rules and regulations, usually devised and 
implemented by the state”. On the other hand, Portes’ (1983) informal economy description 
captures key features of bazaar, lower circuit, and un-enumerated sector. He defines informal 
economy as the sum total of income-producing activities (e.g. production and exchange of 
goods by the self-employed) and the employment in unprotected waged labour.  
 
The divergence in contemporary conceptions of formal and informal economic activities hinges 
on the role of state rules. While the formal economy is assumed to be within government 
regulations, the informal is placed outside the mantle of state policies. Yet, in developing 
countries, there is an increasing acceptance of informal institutions as legitimate (Jenkins, 
2001). What is not acknowledged, Jenkins (2001) argues, is that this basis of mental models 
and institutions are embedded in the socio-economic and political conditions and are coping 
with the global North-oriented formal rule of law.  
 
                                            
12 This is seen even in the earlier works of Boeke (1953) and Lewis (1954) where dualistic approach influenced 
their ideas about economic development. 
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Jenkins’ contention draws attention to the structural roots of the formal-informal divide. It hints 
at the co-existence of both practices as they are embedded in the socio-economic, cultural and 
political relations. Consequently, the dualistic labels appear to be subtle expressions of a 
complex web of structural relations. In fact, earlier writers also pointed out that the ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’ sectors are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are intricately related (Stavenhagen, 
1965) and interlaced (McGee, 1973) as the manufacture and flow of goods are generated in 
both sectors.  
 
This view connects to a growing perspective that regards informality not as a separate sector 
but rather a series of transactions that link different economies, spaces, and relations to one 
another (Donovan, 2008; Dovey, 2012; Roy, 2005). Informality, Roy and AlSayyad (2004) 
claim, indicates an organizing logic, a system of norms that governs the process of urban 
transformation itself. This stance dovetails with the interlocking relations of formal-informal 
arrangements and actors as evident in the statement below. 
The perceived difference between the formal and informal economy is, in reality, artificial 
in nature. There exists only one national economy with formal and informal livelihood 
approaches. Those that are seen as formal economies are capital-intensive and growth 
based, while those that are seen as informal economies are labour-oriented and people-
centred. However, the truth is that these basically interact with one another under a 
single economy. The perceived difference lies in the fact that there is a lack of awareness 
and/or understanding of the mutual dependency of these two aspects of the economy. 
(ESCR-Asia, 2002, para. 3) 
 
Aside from challenging the formal-informal dualistic lens, the enmeshed perspective 
underscores how the structural factors intersect with collective and individual agents, which 
arguably generate the formal and informal schemes. Ideas that elaborate on structures and 
agents have been associated with Giddens (1984), Bourdieu (1990), and Archer (1995), among 
others. As stated in the previous section above, Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory, in 
particular, offers a space for analysing the role of social structures and human agency in 
informality. His embedded view of structures and agency emphasises the capacity of humans 
as reflexive agents13 to create and recreate social structures even if they are also shaped by 
the latter. Describing how the structuration framework operates, Stones (2005, p. 4) claims that 
                                            
13 While Giddens (1998) refers to agents as human individuals, he recognizes organizations as possible agents 
depending on the context. In this thesis, I view both individuals and organizations as actors with capacity to act as 
agents. Following Ling and Dale (2014, p. 4), I refer to agency as “an individual, an organization, networks or a 
community that can enact a process that drives change”. 
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“[s]ocial structures almost always either have agents within them and/or are the product 
of the past practices of agents. And agents, for their part, have social structures within 
them, not least in the guise of particular forms of phenomenological and hermeneutic 
inheritance. (p. 4) 
 
This structure-agency nexus frames how social structures (e.g. economic policies) and human 
actions (e.g. resistance) shape the causes, consequences, practices and benefits of informal 
economic transactions. As the succeeding sections will illustrate, the policy approaches and 
issues influencing informality emanate from a complex interaction of structural forces with 
organizational and individual agents. 
 
Several interpretations of informality relate to the structure-agency interaction. One is Cooper’s 
(1987) assertion on the ability of informal economic activities to challenge state hegemony and 
develop social relationships outside the normative principles of commoditization and 
bureaucratization. This argument offers a vantage point where the informal-formal discourse is 
treated with attention to the capacity of agents to form arrangements that respond to and/or 
move beyond what is structurally given. Portes (1983) particularly zeroes in on this agent-
structure link when he traces the origin of the informal sector. Noting that the formal versus 
informal distinction did not exist in the nineteenth-century capitalism, he contends that the 
“absence was not due to the fact that activities labelled today ‘informal’ did not exist then, but 
rather to the lack of a suitable point of contrast” (Portes, 1983, p. 159). The activities regarded 
today as informal were common during the period of classic capitalism in industrialized 
countries. The emergence of the formal sector, which has served as the contrasting point, 
originated from the state institutionalization of the working-class struggle to have regular and 
tenured work and non-wage benefits (Portes, 1983). What is new, therefore, is the rise of the 
formal sector and not the opposite (Portes, 1983). This contention captures the agent-structure 
interplay in the context of formal-informal dynamics - the working class (as agents) demanding 
better working conditions and the state institutionalization as part of the consequent structural 
elements.  
 
Besides Cooper and Portes, Perry et. al. (2007) claim that informal players voluntarily exit from 
the formal system; they then choose the informal economy after cost-benefit rational 
calculation. This neo-liberal calculation recognizes the capacity of individual actors to predict 
the directions of government policies and adjust their behaviour accordingly (Rapley, 2002). 
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Seen in this lens, informality becomes a rational economic strategy for informal players and the 
individual decisions signify a form of agency, which interacts with structural forces such as state 
policies or market demands. In the case of street vending, hawkers embrace informality, out of 
rational calculations, to respond or adjust to macro-economic and formal regulatory systems 
(Lyons, 2013). In other words, understanding the formal-informal embeddedness requires 
examining the dynamic interaction between agents and social systems.  
 
In street vending literature, agency14 represents an array of spontaneous and planned 
encroachments of vendors on public spaces (Bayat, 1997, 2000; Hanser, 2016; Musoni, 2010), 
varied forms of resistance (Crossa, 2009; Flock & Breitung, 2016; Swider, 2015; Turner & 
Schoenberger, 2012), and engagement mechanisms with government units (Brown, Lyons, & 
Dankoco, 2010; Cross, 1998b; Peña, 1999; Swider, 2015). Meanwhile, social systems often 
refer to socio-economic conditions – poverty, unemployment, migration (Musoni, 2010; Xue & 
Huang, 2015) and state policies aimed at regulating, controlling or purging informal hawkers 
(Batréau & Bonnet, 2016; Hlela, 2003; Illy, 1986; Setšabi & Leduka, 2008).  Indeed, this growing 
body of literature has alluded to the dynamic agent-social systems interaction, which is evident 
in how vendors respond to state policies and even in how the state acts as agent in inscribing 
what is illegal and informal. One argument even contends that informality is produced by the 
state (Roy, 2005) and “there is no pre-defined boundary between formal and informal practices” 
(Xue & Huang, 2015, p. 156). The next section builds on these streams of scholarly work and 
analyses state rules on informal hawking in relation to the preceding conceptual discussion.  
 
2.3. Policy Epistemologies on Informality  
Examining state rules is critical in understanding how the ideas presented above relate to 
policies and enforcement practices. As Williams (1977, p. 11) notes, the “meaning of ideas is 
forged in social practices”. Apart from thematic consideration, the literature review ensured that 
relevant cases represent different geographical locations in the global South. While the chosen 
cases are far from exhaustive and the contexts are unarguably diverse, several recurrent issues 
echo the need to surface what Sanyal (2010) calls ‘global social commons’, which are critical 
to understand the rules, relations and interests in urban informality. The discussion below 
depicts how policy approaches resemble the mental images of informality. It reveals some 
                                            
14 In Section 3.3.2 (Chapter 3), I discuss in detail the informal vendors’ collective action as a form of agency. 
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emerging patterns in the form of three policy epistemologies – the hostile orientation, the 
tolerant atmosphere, and the accommodating environment. 
 
2.3.1. The Hostile Orientation 
Numerous studies on urban informality, and street vending in particular, illustrate a spectrum 
of policy approaches across different contexts (Bromley, 2000; Gibbings, 2013; Roever, 2006; 
Rukmana, 2011; Yatmo, 2008). A common policy demonstrates a hostile handling of informality 
as an urban phenomenon. The cases below illustrate how different governments have enforced 
this policy orientation. 
 
In Bogotá, Colombia, the government implemented the ‘recuperation’ policy, a relocation effort 
meant to spatially segregate the street vendors and orient them on market mentalities. This 
`recovery' of Bogotá's public space focused solely on regaining it from street vendors while 
ignoring the illegal invasion by cars and private formal businesses (Hunt, 2009). For Donovan 
(2008), the introduction of municipal elections in Bogotá, which produced mayors who were 
eager to impose the rule of law, and the weakening of street vendor unions, resulted in the 
series of relocations. In Mexico City, the Programa de Rescate (Rescue Program) sought to 
revitalize and beautify Mexico City's Historic Centre by improving the area's physical shape and 
image. One aspect of the program entailed removing certain activities, including street vending, 
which was perceived to be threatening the general vitality of the area (Crossa, 2009). In Belo 
Horizonte, Brazil, this type of urban revitalization locally called Gestão de Cidades 
(Management of Cities) enabled the government to build an indoor market for the relocation of 
street vendors (Carrieri & Murta, 2011). In the guise of reinvigorating the city centre, the vendor 
relocation actually aimed at maximizing profit through a neo-liberal kind of management 
(Carrieri & Murta, 2011).  
 
In three African areas, the governments adopted the same approach. In Zimbabwe, a law 
prohibited any kind of cooking or selling of cooked food on the sidewalks close to Harare's main 
markets and favoured new equipment based on official restaurants controlled by the state 
(Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991). In the process, the law ignored “the efficacy of the existing 
arrangement, which was quick, well adapted to the market, cheap for the consumer, and 
profitable for the producer” (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991, p. 72). More recently, the Zimbabwean 
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government launched in 2005 the Operation Murambatsvina or Operation Restore Order, a 
government strategy to regain control of the informal economy (Musoni, 2010). This Operation 
has led to evictions of informal settlements and loss of livelihood opportunities like street trading 
(Musoni, 2010). Another case is Johannesburg City's policy to reshape the inner-city 
appearance and transform power relationships. The policy seeks to remove traders from the 
streets and place them in government-provided markets with appropriate infrastructure and 
services. Relocating hawkers to state-regulated facilities aims to end the negative 
consequences of street hawking and attain a ‘world-class’ city image of Johannesburg by 2030 
(Hlela, 2003). In Maseru, Lesotho, the government evicted street vendors under the guise of 
public health and urban aesthetics. Behind this façade, Setšabi and Leduka (2008) argue that 
the reason for eviction is the state's intent to protect the interests of formal businesses and to 
mask state failure to enforce inclusive and sustainable urban policies.  
 
In some Asian countries, vendors in Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia constantly 
experience eviction and harassment from the government (Bhowmik, 2005). The authorities 
even burned down their stalls without providing alternative places to do vending. In Vietnam, 
the drive to develop Hanoi as a more ‘civilized and modern city’ has prompted the local 
government to ban street vendors from occupying 62 streets and 42 public spaces (Turner & 
Schoenberger, 2012). In the Philippines, while there has been some degree of political 
accommodation of street hawkers, there are national laws prohibiting vending activities in public 
spaces like streets and sidewalks (Etemadi, 2004; Recio, 2010). In China, the ‘global city’ and 
modern space aspirations of urban leaders have resulted in abusive policing-measures and 
violent encounters between street vendors and the chengguan, the enforcers of municipal 
policies (Hanser, 2016). In Chengdu, the city street appearance served as “an important 
indicator of the city's well-being” (Wang, 2003, p. 133) and police enforced policies on “hygiene, 
traffic and commercial activity on the street, including where and when street vendors could 
operate” (Hanser, 2016, p. 6). In Guangzhou, the government has shifted from a more 
sympathetic treatment of vendors to a hostile approach in line with its goal of promoting a 
competitive city and attaining economic growth. In the process, the state downplayed, if not 
totally neglected, the initially appreciated poverty-alleviation contribution of informal vending 
(Xue & Huang, 2015). 
 
24 
 
The foregoing cases reveal several crucial points. First, the hostile attitude towards informal 
activities is often coupled with a preference for formal or state-controlled arrangements (Flock 
& Breitung, 2016; Gibbings, 2013; Yatmo, 2008) to promote a ‘global city’ image (Donovan, 
2008; Hanser, 2016; Xue & Huang, 2015). To a great extent, this policy reflects the dualistic 
framing discussed in the earlier section. In most cases, the bias for the formal set-up occurs in 
situations of poverty (Lyons, 2013; Musoni, 2010; Turner & Schoenberger, 2012), urban 
migration (Alva, 2014; Bose & Mishra, 2013; Swider, 2015) and inequality where the formal 
employment is unable to absorb a large number of workers. The usual context also 
demonstrates how poor people rely on informal economic activities such as street vending 
(Musoni, 2010; Xue & Huang, 2015) to earn a living. 
 
Second, eviction and relocation appear to be a common recourse of the policies critical of 
informal vending (Donovan, 2008; Gibbings, 2013; Hanser, 2016; Yatmo, 2008). This has a 
spatial implication as the hawkers need to vacate their vending areas and move to designated 
places where the state could regulate them. In many instances, relocation has led to declining 
income levels with mixed working conditions (Carrieri & Murta, 2011; Donovan, 2008). In the 
long run, vendors abandon the formalised market spaces and then return to vending areas, as 
in the case of cities across Africa (Hansen, 2004), Asia (Smart, 1986) and Latin America 
(Carrieri & Murta, 2011; Cross, 1998a; Donovan, 2008; Middleton, 2003). In some cases, 
relocation has failed due to ill-conceived location, bureaucratic and costly regulations, and the 
lack of customer drawing power of the chosen spaces (Donovan, 2008; Weng & Kim, 2016). 
As Bromley (2000, p. 19) noted, “[w]hen customers fail to follow, the vendors have little choice 
but to return to the streets”. Amid these issues, the hostile policies prefer a governing norm that 
puts premium on legality, image building, efficiency, and order at the expense of economic 
needs and welfare of the affected populations. 
 
Third, the habitual excuse for eviction and relocation emanates from the state's desire to 
enforce order, which the informal vendors purportedly disrupt (Donovan, 2008; Hanser, 2016; 
Musoni, 2010; Rukmana & Purbadi, 2013; Yatmo, 2008). This reasoning appeals to those who 
look at urban informality as the realm of irrationality and potential ground for crime activities. It 
relates to Kelling and Coles' (1996) “fixing broken windows” theory of law and order, which 
holds that “small, highly-visible forms of urban disorder quickly lead to breakdowns in 
community standards and to the rapid proliferation of blight, vandalism and crime” (Bromley, 
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2000, p. 12). Paradoxically, to attain this orderly condition, the state resorts to harassment and 
violent eviction. 
 
With these patterns, the hostile orientation becomes a policy approach anchored on a 
modernist dualistic framing and neo-liberal agenda, which favours formal arrangements and 
embraces control and order. Informal vending is seen as a ‘blemish’ (Hanser, 2016), ‘eyesore’ 
(Rukmana & Purbadi, 2013), ‘out of place’ (Yatmo, 2008) and treated as part of the unruly 
practices. Alas, this policy model fails to identify and root out the causes of the ‘disruptive’ 
vending activities. It does not recognize how formal systems (e.g. economic policies) contribute 
to informal and ‘unorderly’ practices, which has been a subject of critical inquiry by authors 
such as Yiftachel (2006) and Roy (2005), among others. 
 
The fixation with the idealized formal and orderly arrangement resonates with Holston's (1998) 
critique of the modernist planning ideology. He asserts that the utopian vision of planning never 
stems from its aim to disrupt taken-for-granted norms. Instead, “it is utopian because its notion 
of alternative futures is based on absent causes and its methods on a theory of total 
decontextualization” (Holston, 1998, p. 41). In a way, the hostile rules peddle a 
decontextualized city image and a narrative of order to be able to impose a certain type of urban 
experience. This creates a policy environment that exalts the modern and rational formal 
arrangements and marginalizes, if not obliterates, the flexible informal practices (Roy, 2009; 
Yiftachel, 2006). The hostile legal orientation, therefore, deepens the dualistic formal-informal 
framing, which ignores the structural roots of the formal-informal divide and the agency of 
various actors involved. 
 
The decontextualized policy framing shows the tendency of state processes such as planning 
to be detached from social conditions and power relations that underpin how economic 
transactions operate. It poses a critical challenge for planners and policy-makers since “[t]he 
problems associated with vending reflect a conflict between the official vision of urban 
environment and the realities of urban life” (Yatmo, 2008, pp. 397-398). Even the mere 
presence of street vendors illustrates the limits and the contested nature of the government's 
top-down production of space (Flock & Breitung, 2016). In fact, amid the strict enforcement of 
the hostile policies, street vendors have shown a strong sense of agency as they exhibit 
different forms of resistance. Through verbal confrontation, protest actions (Gibbings, 2013), 
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feigned submission, adaptive resistance (Musoni, 2010), and the struggle for right to the city 
(Swider, 2015), hawkers demonstrate that resilience and resistance enable them to grapple 
with the hostile policy environment. In some cases, vendors' sustained resistance generates a 
sympathetic and tolerant attitude from the policy-makers. The section that follows examines the 
prospects and limits of this lenient orientation. 
 
2.3.2. The Tolerant Atmosphere 
Several authors have recognised how informality contributes to the transformation of cities and 
urban centres (McGee & Yeung, 1977; de Soto, 1988; Chakrabarty, 2001; Alcazaren, Ferrer, 
& Icamina, 2011). Because of its enduring presence and the palpable benefits amid poverty 
and unemployment issues, some local government officials take a liberal stance towards 
informal practices like street vending. 
 
In Yogyakarta, Indonesia, street vendors gained tolerance to use spaces in the mid-1980s, a 
period when informal vending was considered illegal in the area (Timothy & Wall, 1997). Of 
late, hawkers who are not part of the government's ‘formalization’ obtain tacit approval by 
paying daily fees to city administration (Rukmana & Purbadi, 2013) and/or bribing local officials. 
In the Philippines, where the dominant national policy prohibits informal vending, some city 
officials have a tolerant attitude towards street hawking due in part to poverty issues and the 
conflicting national policies governing the activity (Recio & Gomez, 2013). In Cebu City, a 
metropolitan area in central Philippines, local authorities tolerate hawking, even if it violates 
certain national and local legislations, as a result of political leverage created by sustained 
organizing and lobbying efforts by vendors associations in the urban centre (Etemadi, 2004). 
In Caloocan, a component city of Metropolitan Manila, the local government allows street 
hawking during Christmas season (from November to January) out of humanitarian cause 
(Recio, 2010). 
 
In Mexico City, Cross (1998b) identifies one category of street vendors as legally tolerated. This 
is composed of vendors in residential areas that provide the same services, tiangge or weekly 
rotating street markets, markets on wheels, and ambulant vendors with fixed or semi-fixed 
stalls. Peña (1999) also documents the tendency of government officials in Mexico City to 
tolerate informal vending when vendor associations bribe them. 
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In China, despite the episodic crackdowns and clearing operations, the everyday street 
encroachment of vendors has gained a degree of tolerance from the local authorities (Hanser, 
2016). In 2010, for instance, the Guangzhou authorities resorted to ‘soft approach’ partly due 
to the recognition that vending enables street hawkers to cope with the economic crisis (Flock 
& Breitung, 2016). The tolerant approach led to a condition where local government officials 
designate prime spaces as zero-vendor zone and certain corners where hawkers can 
occasionally sell their goods (Flock & Breitung, 2016). 
 
A scrutiny of these cases indicates that several factors contribute to a tolerant attitude towards 
street vending. The first factor has to do with the ability of vendors to engage in the ‘politics of 
the streets’ (Bayat, 1997, 2000; Hanser, 2016; Musoni, 2010) and/or build associations to 
employ engagement strategies – from bribery schemes to collective political pressure (Brown 
et al., 2010; Cross, 1998b; Peña, 1999; Recio & Gomez, 2013). In a number of cases, the 
everyday interactions, resistance and collective actions enable state engagement, which allows 
the hawkers to occupy certain spaces without the threat of eviction.  
 
Another component that generates a tolerant atmosphere is the discretionary power of local 
officials and street level bureaucrats (Bromley, 2000; Hanser, 2016; Peña, 1999; Swider, 2015). 
Government officials who have direct contact with vendors allow the latter to continue their 
activities within certain bounds (Batréau & Bonnet, 2016; Etemadi, 2004; Recio, 2010; Turner 
& Schoenberger, 2012). The parameters are defined through dialogues and agreements 
between hawkers and government heads. However, it is important to recognize the limitations 
of this tolerant approach. Often, this is contingent on the orientation of heads of local 
government units or state agencies in-charge of policing street vendors. The sympathetic 
attitude sometimes comes from leaders who have developmental approach to policy-making 
and/or those who understand the complexity of informal economic activities in relation to 
poverty and unemployment. Yet, in the absence of a legal instrument that explicitly permits 
hawking, the temporary agreements between vendors and government officials may prove 
unsustainable in the long run. Worse, in some cases, the tolerant attitude of government 
officials engenders, if not entrenches the existing, clientelist or patronage relations and corrupt 
practices (Turner & Schoenberger, 2012) involving devious government officials. 
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These different contextual factors indicate that the strength of the tolerant atmosphere rests on 
the nature and extent of vendors' practices, which enable them to overcome the unfavourable 
policies. In addition, the vendor's individual manoeuvres and collective initiatives require 
government allies who can support their actions. Essentially, this points to the critical role of 
organizational and individual agents – vendor associations, government champions – in 
creating and sustaining a tolerant atmosphere. In exploring the contribution of agents, however, 
it is equally crucial to be conscious of the structural dimensions that influence the actors' 
interests and behaviour. This is important since a tolerant position is also tied to ambiguous 
national policies on informal vending (Itikawa, 2004; Recio, 2010) in the face of harsh economic 
conditions (Brown et al., 2010; Flock & Breitung, 2016; Roever, 2006; Turner & Schoenberger, 
2012; Xue & Huang, 2015). The institutional ambivalence generated by complex policies 
renders some local government executives indecisive on how to approach street vending. 
When linked to economic circumstances that breed poverty and unemployment, this policy 
context impels some local governments to have a considerate position on informal hawking. In 
the Philippines, for example, some local government officials argue that poverty and the lack 
of economic opportunities compel them to be more lenient on enforcing laws critical of street 
vending (Recio, 2010).  
 
Thus, while the tolerant atmosphere primarily results from the actions and discretion of 
organizations and individuals – vendors and government officials – certain structural conditions 
enable these agents to accept a relaxed treatment of informal vending. This reflects how a 
structure-agency interface links the tolerant atmosphere to formal-informal processes. Beyond 
this tolerant attitude, however, is there a prospect for a more strategic and responsive policy 
approach to street vending? The subsequent section confronts this question. 
 
2.3.3. The Accommodating Environment 
Contrary to the antagonistic view of urban informality, some institutions have approached it not 
as a problem for eradication, but as a phenomenon to be managed. For instance, the United 
Nations Development Program or UNDP (CLEP & UNDP, 2008) came up with the Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor (LEP) initiative, which builds on de Soto's (2000) assertion that poor 
informal players simply need assistance from the government to be able to unlock their 
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potentials and participate in socio-economic and political processes. While this tenet has 
gained criticisms (Brown & Mackie, 2017; Lyons, 2013; Roy, 2009) for its neo-liberal rhetoric 
and for failing to consider fundamental issues such as power relations and market limitations, 
the UNDP has used the LEP to advocate for recognition of informal workers' rights in countries 
like Indonesia, the Philippines, and Tanzania (Lyons, 2013; Recio, 2010), among others. In 
Tanzania, Lyons (2013) pointed out the importance of amending and repealing existing laws to 
address legal obstacles and realize LEP's goal of empowering small traders such as informal 
vendors. Yet, no study has so far determined whether the LEP has contributed to improving the 
lives of informal workers or if it has led to a more efficient institutional architecture for governing 
informality. 
 
Prior to the UNDP's LEP paradigm, several countries had already acknowledged informal 
vending in their legislations. A good example is how the municipal government of Santiago de 
Chile a century ago recognized street vending as a legitimate economic undertaking. In 1915, 
the local authority developed the city's first planned street market, two decades after the 
creation of private markets (Salazar, 2003, cited in Roever, 2006). In 1938, street markets 
already gained formal institutional status with the formally recognized right to operate in public 
space (Aliaga, 2004, cited in Roever, 2006). By the mid-twentieth century, street vending in 
Santiago had earned recognition as a legitimate economic activity and peddlers had become a 
permanent fixture in the city (Salazar, 2003, cited in Roever, 2006).  
 
In Lima, Perú, the local government provided a space for street vendor participation in 
designing an ordinance on street vending. As a result, the crafted ordinance contains the rights 
of leaders of vending organizations to represent hawkers. The ordinance has a structure, 
dubbed as Tripartite Consultation Commission, whose mandate is to develop plans and 
programs with vendors' democratic participation (Roever, 2016). 
 
In Mozambique, the government recognizes the existence of illegal but legitimate practices and 
intends to align the legitimate, but informal, to conform to the legal position. This trend somehow 
mirrors the earlier situation in China, when the initial state recognition of the ‘individual 
economy’, as a support to the planned economy, opened the door to legitimate street vending 
(Salazar, 2003).  
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In Yogyakarta, Indonesia, while some vendors thrive on tolerance, others have become part of 
the state's formalization effort, which legally recognizes most street vendors. One way to 
‘formalize’ is through an agreement with or fee payment to owners of buildings and vacant lots 
where vending activities take place (Rukmana & Purbadi, 2013). At the national level, the 
Indonesian policy paradigm shifted from a Suharto-era hostile legal framework, where local 
authorities had to evict street vendors, to a more sensitive approach. The post-Suharto Spatial 
Planning Law requires the inclusion of the informal sector in the local plans and mandates 
public participation in spatial planning (Rukmana, 2011). 
 
The situations of street vendors in Thailand and Malaysia are similarly encouraging. They are 
officially recognized and provided vending spaces. Authorities in Bangkok (Thailand) have 
allocated 287 demarcated sites where vendors can operate. In Malaysia, the government 
established a department to ensure that the vendors never obstruct the pedestrian and keep 
their places clean. The assigned office also organizes training courses on food, personal 
hygiene and nutrition (Bhowmik, 2005). 
 
Besides the aforementioned policy measures, the passage of the national street vending law 
in India epitomizes the accommodating environment that acknowledges the legitimacy of 
informal hawking as an economic activity. Enacted in 2014 after years of campaigning by street 
vendor associations (WIEGO, n.d.), the law has important provisions on space allocation, 
government structure, eviction and relocation procedures, taxation system, grievance and 
redress mechanisms, planning norms and processes, social audit, and vendor participation. 
While it is never devoid of criticisms (see Alva, 2014), this first national legal instrument is a 
critical step in recognizing the rights and roles of vendors in urban economy. 
 
These exemplars offer several insights that can inform policy formulation and planning 
processes involving informal vendors. First, the official recognition stems from the increasing 
realization that informal economic activities have a great contribution to how the political and 
economic processes operate (Hanser, 2016; Jenkins, 2001). This is essentially an acceptance 
of the link between the formal and informal economic practices. In this sense, the 
accommodating environment arises from an enmeshed image of the formal-informal relation. 
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With the state recognition comes a license or permit as proof of legitimacy. This affirms the 
ideas mentioned above on the state role in legitimizing or making certain activities acceptable 
as an economic undertaking. Once legitimacy is accorded, the legal accommodation then 
entails provision of designated spaces that the vendors typically use to make a living (Aliaga, 
2004; Bhowmik, 2005; Rukmana, 2011). This spatial allocation shows that government plans 
could actually accommodate informal activities such as street vending, often maligned as 
chaotic. 
 
Additionally, the favourable legal environment underscores how policies can accommodate 
informal practices. That some of these friendly laws were crafted after long and arduous 
campaigns by vendor organizations highlights the structure-agency interaction, which the 
previous section tackled. What is unclear though is whether the vendors and their associations 
still employ informal mechanisms to govern the spaces and how these intersect with the formal 
rules. This remains a major gap even if the cases present a good starting point on legal 
recognition and secure vending areas.  
 
At this point, the discussion on the three policy epistemologies – hostile, tolerant and 
accommodating – has illustrated how the two conceptions of informality (dualistic vs. 
enmeshed) are manifested in state rules on street vending. It has demonstrated the importance 
of unpacking the structural factors and agency expressions in creating, maintaining, contesting, 
and transforming state rules. Thus, it is crucial to emphasize that the policy epistemologies are 
not mutually exclusive, as they even co-exist in different cities of a country. They represent the 
overlapping governing norms by which local officials and street level bureaucrats deal with 
vendors by implementing or modifying the legal instruments on urban spaces (Cross, 1998; 
Bromley, 2000; Etemadi, 2004; Recio, 2010; Hanser, 2016). 
 
A number of arrangements show how the appropriation of spaces is fluid and contingent on 
structural factors and agent interventions. This is seen in layered zones with corresponding 
enforcement mechanisms (Swider, 2015; Xue & Huang, 2015). Spaces are designated as off-
limit-heavily-policed territories, areas of tolerance and zones of contestation (Swider, 2015). In 
Guangzhou, for instance, evictions concentrate on prime city spaces while the regulation is less 
32 
 
acute in the outlying districts. Local officials tolerate the street vendors in insignificant places 
within the central districts (Xue & Huang, 2015). This leniency also occurs in Bangkok and 
Yogyakarta, where local administrators tolerate the presence of unregistered hawkers despite 
the existence of a law that enables vendors to occupy legally some designated spaces 
(Rukmana & Purbadi, 2013; Batréau & Bonnet, 2016). The layered and calculated mechanisms 
indicate a spatial hierarchy in policy enforcement, which may arguably result in a condition 
where the more affluent hawkers, who are able to afford the high rent, occupy the best vending 
locations. It also depicts an uneven and fluctuating strength of state control over urban spaces 
(Xue & Huang, 2015). More importantly, the spatial hierarchy enables street vendors to subsist 
in an exclusionary space (Xue & Huang, 2015) through varied forms of manoeuvre (Rukmana 
& Purbadi, 2013) and resistance (Musoni, 2010; Turner & Schoenberger, 2012). 
 
With these interlocking policy orientations, spatialized enforcement mechanisms, and varied 
agency expressions, it is no longer sufficient to analyse the practices and players in urban 
economic activities using a dichotomous lens. At a time when the artificial divide between the 
formal and informal continuously gets blurred by structural relations and adaptive human 
actions, it may be more conceptually and empirically useful to examine how social conditions 
shape and are transformed by the varying, if not competing, needs and interests of actors 
involved in the formal-informal interface. This is explored in the section that follows. 
  
2.4. The Post-Dualist Lens: Conceptual and Empirical Implications 
The preceding discussion has presented how each policy epistemology relates to a certain 
conception of informality and how it arises from the structure-agency interaction. For instance, 
the features of hostile policy orientation dovetail with the dualistic image of informality. They 
both underscore the capacity of the state to impose its will. While the hostile policy manifests 
in the government's ability to assert an orderly image of the city by eliminating those that deviate 
from the legal and institutional norms, the dualistic view reflects the state power to inscribe 
certain activities as legitimate while others are unacceptable. In both framing, there is 
inadequate discussion of the structural links of formal and informal mechanisms. There is no 
attention given to the role of individual and collective agents in shaping policies and/or 
legitimizing certain practices. 
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This is where an enmeshed image of formal-informal nexus becomes critical. It urges a post-
dualist framing of activities, actors, relations and interests in urban informality. Post-dualist 
framing, as I propose here, refers to an approach that is conscious of the inherent relations 
between the formal and informal economic activities. It seeks to interrogate the factors, forces, 
and frictions (relations) involved in the formal-informal interface. While cognizant of the 
immense influence of the dualist (formal versus informal) paradigm, which has shaped much 
of scholarly and policy formulation, the post-dualist lens treats the dichotomy as a mere 
heuristic device and stresses the need to go beyond the constraints generated by its fixed 
categories. 
 
In developing the post-dualist lens, I build on three strands of academic thought. First, I follow 
the enmeshed reading of informality issues - as evident in the work of McGee (1973), Roy 
(2005), and Dovey (2012), among others – which were presented in Section 2.2.2 above. In 
other words, post dualist lens sees informal economic activities as inherently linked to formal 
and state-regulated economic transactions (Recio et al., 2017). I thus treat the formal and 
informal dichotomy as a heuristic device. Second, I draw on the discourses on structure-agency 
nexus, as can be gleaned from Giddens (1984), Bourdieu (1990), and Archer (1995). Among 
the ideas of these authors, I espouse Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory, which regards 
humans as reflexive agents who can produce and reproduce structures. Building on Giddens’ 
structuration theory, the post-dualist lens contends that structural factors and agency 
expressions underpin the formal and informal economic practices in urban spaces. It 
problematizes the contours of structural elements (e.g. socio-economic conditions, political 
structures) and the forms of agency (e.g. resistance, collective action constraints) that drive the 
perceived duality and relations between formal and informal schemes. In this framing, post-
dualist approach goes beyond a reductionist neo-liberal formulation that treats informal 
economic activities as an outcome of cost-benefit calculations of rational individual actors. It 
eschews the highly structuralist argument that informal economic schemes are primarily an 
offshoot of processes of social structures. Third, the post-dualist framework links the first two 
concepts to planning by adhering to relational and institutionalist15 standpoint.  Here, my view 
                                            
15 I employ the sociological variant of institutionalism, which looks at “interests and preferences, transaction 
processes and costs as multi-faceted and interests and preferences, transaction processes and costs as multi-
faceted and socially constructed…” (Healey, 2007a, p. 66). This attention to multi-faceted issues resonates with 
the mixed embeddedness’ (Kloosterman & Rath, 2001; Ram, Theodorakopoulos, & Jones, 2008; Trupp, 2015) 
argument on linking economic transactions to legal policies, and political relations in an urban environment. 
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is grounded in how Patsy Healey (1997, 2007b) frames planning as a governance practice 
concerned with managing co-existence in shared spaces and relations in collective action16. 
Following Healey, I look at planning as relational in that it is situated within the evolving, 
complex, socio-spatial interactions in urban areas. Although Healey (2007) builds on the work 
of Amin (2002, 2004) and Massey (2005) on relational geography17 in developing her ‘relational’ 
planning perspective, she has also drawn on ideas of sociological institutionalism.  
 
Emerging from the subfield of organization theory, sociological institutionalism provides a wider 
perspective about institutions. For sociological institutionalists18, culture is seen “as a network 
of routines, symbols or scripts providing templates for behaviour” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 947-
948). Aside from moving beyond the traditional notions of institutions as rigid structures, this 
viewpoint opens up a window towards understanding how ordinary interactions and oft-
overlooked routines affect institutions and actors. 
 
Relating sociological institutionalism to planning praxis means looking at how the elements, 
activities, and encounters embedded in the planning process gain meanings and become 
norms. This is necessary as social processes, which filter experiences and systems of 
meanings, contribute to the construction of knowledge (Healey, 2007b). The assigned 
meanings are in turn shaped by existing social contexts, dominant power relations, and 
planning goals, among others. It is within practices such as that of strategic planning team 
where forms of knowledge interact, “are filtered, and arranged into arguments, justifications 
and concepts of cause and effect” (Healey, 2007b, p. 27). This approach follows Giddens’ 
(1984) argument in his structuration theory on the power of active agents to influence structures 
and vice versa. Healey (1997) provides a good link between the sociological institutionalism, 
planning practice and Giddensian ideas. 
Giddens theory of structuration… emphasizes that individuals are neither fully 
autonomous nor automatons. Powerful forces are all around us, shaping our lives, and 
                                            
16 In Chapter 3, I expound on these ideas of Healey on relational planning and sociological institutionalism.	
17 Amin (2002; 2004) and Massey (2005) both see the interactions that occur in specific social or nodal 'sites' as 
complex and embedded in past trajectories and wider contexts. 
18 Healey (2007a) distinguishes sociological institutionalists from other theorists of ‘new institutionalism’ by 
explaining their epistemological differences. The latter adheres to “rationalist notions of individual actors, with 
interests and preferences, who operate in institutional contexts which provide opportunities for, or inhibit, their 
projects, and who engage in a variety of transactions with different kinds of costs to prosecute their interests 
(Healey, 2007a, p. 66).  This framing uses tools of economics and game theory to examine and predict possible 
outcomes of various choice situations (Healey, 2007a).	
35 
 
presenting both opportunity and constraint. But structure is not something outside us.  It 
is not an ‘action space’ within which we operate... How we act in structured situations 
not only ‘makes a difference’; our actions constitute (instantiate) the structural forces. 
We make structural forces as we are shaped by them. (Healey, 1997, p. 49) 
 
In other words, the processes and corresponding relations derived from multiple interactions 
influence how institutional actors and structures produce meanings and practices relevant to 
planning and policy-making. By subscribing to institutionalist stance, the post-dualist lens then 
situates planning issues like urban informality as embedded in contrasting interests, 
transactions, costs, rules, norms and broader social contexts in an urban area. When tied to 
urban socio-spatial relations, the post-dualist lens argues that space is produced (Lefebvre, 
1991; Massey, 2005), hierarchized (Lefebvre, 2006), relational (Healey, 2007b; Lemanski & 
Marx, 2015) and embodied in ideas (Kelly, 1997) of multiple players. My point of departure, 
therefore, moves beyond looking at the congested spaces occupied by informal vendors as 
mainly an outcome of locational utility (Janelle, 1969), spatial mismatch (Duffhues & Bertolini, 
2016), and urban agglomeration or ‘disfunctionalities’ (Scott & Storper, 2015). Rather, I view 
them as part of multi-faceted and socially constructed trajectories and processes (Healey, 
2007b), which may be questioned, challenged, and modified.  
 
Concomitantly, the post-dualist framing calls into question the long-standing approach to 
informal economic activities. In particular, there is a need to turn a critical gaze on the order-
oriented vision of the city, which promotes a neat and regimented physical environment without 
looking into the complex socio-spatial relations. The tolerant and accommodating policy 
epistemologies on street vending seem to tread this path of moving beyond approaches that 
perpetuate the dualistic framing of economic activities. 
 
Aside from conceptual considerations, the post-dualist view captures the increasing institutional 
recognition that informality is normal (OECD, 2009; World Bank, 2013b) and here to stay (CLEP 
& UNDP, 2008; Lyons, 2013; Roever, 2016). This indicates a realization of how the formal-
informal practices are engrained in different structural processes and agency expressions. In 
street vending literature, this appreciation becomes apparent in notions of ‘adaptive resistance’ 
(Musoni, 2010), ‘managed informality’ (Batréau & Bonnet, 2016) and ‘informal governance’ 
(Roever, 2016), where resistance and governing norms blur the formal-informal divide. 
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In terms of spatial dimension, the idea of ‘transient space’ (Flock & Breitung, 2016) represents 
a post-dualist position. Transient space refers to the openness and fluidity of spaces, where 
“[t]he dynamics between street vendors and state agents show how people, goods, rules, and 
regulation are in continuous change, incessantly constituting space anew” (Flock & Breitung, 
2016, p. 166). Transient space signifies the spatial hierarchy in policy enforcement, as 
discussed in the previous section, which shows that spaces are layered, fluid and contingent 
on structural factors and human agency. When linked to urban planning, this entails going 
beyond the usual purpose and character of city zoning and land use plan, which typically maps 
out areas for settlement, commercial, transport and institutional use, among others. In this 
regard, it is crucial to explore what de Souza (2006) calls ‘urban reform-oriented’ planning. By 
urban reform, he refers to the Brazilian experience where 
“…professional planners utilize land use management tools for purposes such as 
identification and classification of specific spaces according to their social situation and 
public interest (for instance, zones corresponding to areas which need upgrading and 
tenure regularization, zones of special interest for environmental protection, and areas 
where land is kept vacant due to speculation).” (de Souza, 2006, p. 337) 
 
In this framework, the participation of ordinary citizens is an integral dimension of the planning 
process. This contradicts the technocratic vista, which often looks at planning instruments as 
too technical to merit active citizen involvement. This planning approach is worth exploring in 
light of a post-dualist contention on the need to situate informal vending as embedded in 
economic structuring as well as socio-spatial relations of various stakeholders. This can build 
on the lessons from accommodating policy instruments and tolerant practices, discussed in the 
previous section. In sum, these emerging notions pertaining to urban governance and planning 
indicate that a dualistic framework is inherently deficient in the midst of a complex web of 
structural constraints, socio-spatial relations and different agency expressions.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explained the different notions about informality using three theoretical 
approaches – the structural approach, neoliberalism, and the structuration theory. In answering 
the question identified at the beginning of this section - how conceptual discourses and policy 
perspectives on informality relate to each other, I have shown how various authors and policy 
perspectives view informality in a structuralist and dualistic manner. In relation to the thesis 
questions, I have demonstrated the importance of looking at formal systems, informal 
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mechanisms, and their interface by employing conceptual lenses. I have thus illustrated the 
need to examine how both the structural forces and individual/organizational agents shape 
informal practices.  
 
Based on the analysis of worldwide cases on state policies on informal vending, I have shown 
how the structure-agency nexus can support a nuanced understanding of the government 
approaches to informal vending. By classifying these approaches into policy epistemologies, I 
have drawn attention to the relationship of policy models to images of informality and the role 
of structure-agency interaction in producing and reproducing policy orientations.  
 
Finally, I have argued on the need to embrace a post-dualist lens, which underscores that the 
structure-agency nexus is a useful analytical tool in examining the inherent relations between 
formal and informal activities. I have laid out the conceptual underpinnings of post-dualist lens 
which include the following: the enmeshed approach to informality, the structurationist view of 
the structure-agency relations, the relational and institutionalist planning perspective. As an 
example, I have cited how the presence of overlapping policy epistemologies and spatialized 
policy enforcement mechanisms amplifies the need for a post-dualist approach. I discuss in 
Chapter 6 and 7 the presence of overlapping policy epistemologies with layered and spatialized 
enforcement mechanisms in Baclaran. In the next chapter, I expand the discussion on how 
informality is linked to planning and governance.  
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CHAPTER 3. INFORMALITY, PLANNING AND GOVERNANCE:            
BUILDING THE LINKS AND THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1. Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I touched on the different conceptions of informality and the policy 
epistemologies on street vending. In this chapter, I deepen the discussion on how informality 
is linked to planning and governance. I explain in Section 3.2 how informality is embedded in 
planning praxis as the latter influences and defines informal practices. I then argue that planning 
is a governance dimension involved in managing co-existence in shared and contested spaces. 
Since the appropriation of urban spaces entails relational issues, I also discuss the importance 
of discourses on power. I then present key concepts relating to informality, planning and 
governance. These themes have informed my analytical tools in answering the thesis questions 
I laid out in Chapter 1. In Section 3.3, I tackle major concepts and practical issues surrounding 
grassroots collective action and agency. The discussion situates in the literature the different 
strategic, short-term, and organized schemes undertaken by informal actors to engage or avoid 
state regulation. Here, I stress the importance of examining how urban informal actors, street 
vendors in particular, exercise their sense of agency and wield political power that can influence 
planning and policy-making. In Section 3.4, I summarise the key insights emerging from the 
literature review. More importantly, I discuss in that section the thesis’ conceptual framework, 
which is informed by the research questions explained in Chapter 1. While the conceptual 
framework is a critical aspect of this thesis, its key premises flow from the discussion of salient 
ideas and cases in the literature review. I thus place this section at the end of the chapter.  
 
3.2. Informality and Planning 
In the last few decades, a trend toward a more inclusive process that reaches out to different 
stakeholders has gained recognition. This participatory engagement arguably constitutes what 
Smith (2009) calls democratic innovations, which refer to institutions that depart from traditional 
institutional architecture and promote direct engagement with citizens through institutionalized 
forms of participation. The appreciation of participatory process resonates with calls for 
planning to respond to the increasing complexity of urban spaces. Dovey (2012), for instance, 
stresses the need for reflexive policies that mirror and accommodate processes of informality.  
This is the great challenge for the urban planning profession: how to move towards a 
model that accepts unpredictability and informality without surrender to the ravages of 
39 
 
market-led ideology? How to plan for the eradication of poverty in a manner that does 
not kill the vitality, productivity and adaptability that sustains lives? (Dovey, 2012, p. 365) 
 
Since dealing with informality is a planning dilemma, it is important to see how they relate to 
each other. The planning literature is replete with references to informality. Some scholars are 
critical of the role of planning in informal arrangements.  Yiftachel (2006) laments how planning 
contributes to the “stratification of informalities” by legitimizing certain activities (“whitening”) 
and criminalizing others (“blackening”). Seen in this manner, some forms of informality become 
the realm outside what is prescribed (Castillo, 2006) while others are recognized as acceptable. 
Thus, even the prescribed procedures entrench what is designated as informal. As Roy (2009, 
p. 10) argues, informality “is not a set of unregulated activities that lies beyond the reach of 
planning; rather it is planning that inscribes the informal by designating some activities as 
authorized and others as unauthorized”. Porter (2011, p. 116) echoes this view asserting that 
“[i]nformality is not “outside” formal systems, but is instead produced by formal structures and 
always intimately related to them”. If planning is inherently involved, deliberately or otherwise, 
in the inscription, stratification and intensification of informality, it then has a key role in 
approaching the phenomenon in a manner, as Dovey (2012) suggests, that does not kill the 
vitality, productivity and adaptability of informal practices19.  
 
In relation to the importance of adaptability, other authors have emphasized the fluid and 
connected processes in relation to informality and planning. Innes et al. (2007) use informality 
to mean planning strategies that are neither prescribed nor proscribed any rules with planners 
often operating in the interface between the formal and the informal (Innes, Connick, & Booher, 
2007). Friedmann (2005, p. 194) talks about planning cultures characterized by a degree of 
informality, which he describes as “a category of activity that results from the interweaving of 
the formal and informal and of the legal and the illegal and criminal”. These insights indicate 
that while Yiftachel (2006) and Roy (2009) underscore how planning contributes to informality, 
Innes et al. (2007) and Friedmann (2005) essentially say that informal practices are embedded 
in planning itself. This is relevant to this thesis since if planning, as an integral aspect of formal 
governance processes, is riddled with informal arrangements it is critical to determine whether 
                                            
19 While Roy (2005) offers some useful tips on how policy-makers can better deal with informality, her suggestions 
mainly pertain to informal settlements. In the case of informal vending, I examine in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 how the 
points raised by Yiftachel (2006) and Roy (2009) happen in relation to planning and the formal-informal interface 
in contested public spaces. 
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such nature of planning facilitates or undermines the interface of formal systems and informal 
mechanisms. The next section frames how planning is linked to governance. 
 
3.2.1. Planning and Governance 
In relation to the previous insight on the embeddedness of informal practices in planning 
process, Healey’s (2003) conception of planning as a governance project is critical. As a 
governance project, planning deals with the dilemmas of co-existence in shared spaces 
(Healey, 1997, 2003, 2007b). By governance20, she refers to “the processes by which societies, 
and social groups, manage their collective affairs” (Healey, 2003, p. 104) “…for public 
purposes, wider than the purposes of individual agents…” (p. 17). For her, planning exercises 
become interventions aimed at “framing the rules for managing co-existence in shared spaces” 
(Healey, 1997, p. 113), which influences how and with whom resources are generated and 
distributed.  
 
Gleeson and Low (2000) have a similar view on the relationship of planning and governance. 
For them, planning is “a domain of urban governance—that part of governance concerned with 
the provision of services to a city—and an approach to urban governance which seeks effective, 
equitable and democratic steering of the state apparatus for the benefit of citizens” (Gleeson & 
Low, 2000, pp. 4-5). Although Healey (1997, 2003) and Gleeson and Low (2000) both link 
planning to governance, the latter’s view is more focused on state-centred service provision. 
Even if Healey (1997, 2003) does not explicitly link planning as a way to manage informality, 
her ideas of planning encompass informal activities and are thus more relevant to this thesis. 
Her framing of planning as a governance project concerned with issues of coexistence in 
shared spaces is pertinent to this thesis as informal vending is a practice that coexists in shared 
and/or contested urban areas. Her concept of governance is also broad enough to consider the 
collective action initiated by non-state actors. This means that even the informal mechanisms 
by vendor groups aimed at promoting public purposes can be considered as a legitimate 
                                            
20 I recognize the diverse perspectives on the evolution of governance praxis. For one, Healey (2007b) writes that 
the shift from government to governance paradigm is prompted by 1) neoliberalism’s emphasis on reducing the 
role of formal government in society and encouraging a more active participation of non-government agencies, 
civil society and individuals in the economy; and 2) social democratic programs promoting citizen engagement 
with democratic processes through participation, empowerment and political inclusion. On other hand, Cajvaneanu 
(2011) traces the genealogy of governance to the notion of private government, systems theory, cybernetic model, 
and economic models such as neo-corporatism and neo-institutionalism. In this section, the discussion mainly 
revolves around the importance of governance to urban informality. 
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governance engagement. In other words, Healey’s (1997, 2003, 2007b) ideas are relevant as 
they link planning to informal practices (as part of the dilemma in coexistence in shared spaces) 
and recognize informal mechanisms collectively pursued by vendor associations as a 
governance undertaking. 
 
Healey’s (1997) awareness of how power influences rules of social relations and human actions 
indicate the value of looking at planning as a complex process filled with conflicting interests, 
iniquitous arrangements and hierarchical structures. This is seen in the presence of policy 
epistemologies on informality (Section 2.1.4) and different collective actions and state 
engagements by informal groups (Section 3.2.3) in various contexts.  
 
3.2.2. The Importance of Power 
Viewing planning as a process filled with partnerships and conflicts requires a discussion on 
power. Power has been viewed as ingrained in every form and level of relations. Different 
theorists offer diverging ideas about power relations. But why is power relevant to informality, 
planning and governance? Healey (1997) offers an explanation. 
The[se] multiple dimensions of potential social division, and the inequalities that are 
generated through them, raise enormous problems for efforts in managing co-existence 
in shared spaces, as the potential social diversity is substantial. Consultative strategies 
for developing local policy often flounder on conflicts of interest, the power of dominant 
interests or the realization that those actively involved in a consultative process in fact 
represent a minority interest. (Healey, 1997, p. 118) 
  
Healey (1997) broadly presents how power affects governance of co-existence in shared 
spaces. It would help at this point to dissect this general description by explaining some basic 
concepts of power.  
 
Several years before Dahl (1957) wrote his famous book (Who Governs?) on community power 
in the United Sates, he had defined power in this manner: “A has power over B to the extent 
that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957, p. 202). Following 
this line, Polsby (1963, p. 55) argues that power can be examined by looking into “who 
participates, who gains and who loses, and who prevails in decision-making” (p 55). In this 
framing, power is seen as a zero-sum equation where those who are able to participate and 
eventually prevail emerge as the powerful. This relates to Healey’s (1997) consultative 
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strategies and formal processes. This thesis, however, goes beyond the formal spaces and 
looks into informal players and their arrangements, which may not necessarily be part of the 
formal consultative forums.  Dahl (1957) and Polsby’s (1963) conception of power is therefore 
deficient when applied to the issues in this thesis. 
 
Contrary to Dahl (1957) and Polsby’s (1963) unidimensional and capacity-oriented view of 
power, for Foucault (1978), power is everywhere and never wielded by individuals, groups or 
institutions. 
Power is everywhere: not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
everywhere… power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain 
strength we are endowed with; it is the name one attributes to a complex strategic 
situation in a particular society. (Foucault, 1978, p. 93) 
 
He also views power beyond its nefarious connotations. 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 
‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In fact power 
produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. 
(Foucault, 1979, p. 194) 
 
Foucault’s (1978) notion of power as ubiquitous and multi-faceted shatters the traditional zero-
sum equation and is crucial to acknowledging the multiple forms and sources of power. This 
would have been a critical vantage point where the thesis can recognize how different formal-
informal actors with their diverse practices produce, strengthen, and resist power. As he further 
argues, “[w]here there is power, there is resistance… and consequently, this resistance is never 
in a position of exteriority in relation to power.” (Foucault, 1978, p. 95). This indicates a non-
linear notion of power. Yet, it becomes problematic when one considers his assertion that power 
is not possessed nor shared by anyone21. This means that his conception of power is unclear 
with respect to the role of agents. If this lens is employed in this thesis, I need to grapple with 
how power shapes and/or is influenced by formal and informal actors engaged in various 
arrangements to pursue their own interests, promote collaboration or resolve conflicts.   As 
                                            
21 This assertion contradicts the idea of Talcott Parsons, Hannah Arendt, and Nicos Poulantzas, among others, 
that “power is specifically a property of the social community, a medium whereby common interests or class 
interests are realised” (Giddens, 1979, p. 89). It is therefore easy to echo Garland’s (1990) contention that 
Foucault’s (1978) idea of power is not a property or an instrument that classes or individuals can simply employ. 
Rather, it constitutes “the various forms of domination and subordination and the asymmetrical balance of forces 
which operate whenever and wherever social relations exist” (Garland, 1990, p. 138). 
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Gaventa (2003, p. 5) asserts, “[i]n situations of clear oppression or domination, an easier way 
of assessing ‘power over’ would be more useful than deconstructing notions of agency”.  
 
It is equally hard to understand how and from whom resistance to an oppressive system arises 
if one goes back to Foucault’s (1978) framing of power and resistance. It is quite a challenge 
applying this to structurally-influenced and agent-initiated acts of resistance in formal and 
informal arrangements. A notion of power that takes into account the role of structures and 
agents is therefore more useful for this thesis. Giddens is among those who link power and 
agency. He sees power “both as transformative capacity… and as domination...” (Giddens, 
1979, p. 91). In talking about its transformative capacity, Giddens refers to the stream of thought 
that views power in terms of the conduct of agents.  
Action depends on the capability of the individual to ‘make a difference’ to a pre-existing 
state of affairs or course of events. An agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the 
capability to ‘make a difference’, that is, to exercise some sort of power. (Giddens, 1984, 
p. 14) 
 
Meanwhile, his treatment of the domination aspect of power pertains to its structural quality. 
Giddens (1979) stresses here the layers of structural factors that may constrain the agents’ 
capacity and/or intensify the systems of domination. In this conception, he emphasizes the 
significance of ‘resources’. 
Resources are media through which power is exercised, and structures of domination 
reproduced...  Resources are the media whereby transformative capacity is employed 
as power in the routine course of social interaction; but they are at the same time 
structural elements of social systems, reconstituted through their utilization in social 
interaction. (Giddens, 1979, pp. 91-92) 
 
With Giddens’ (1979; 1984) recognition of the role of agents and structures, his framework is 
able to consider both the local forms of power and the larger societal structures (Gaventa, 
2003). This is important to the thesis as the relations of players in both formal and informal 
arrangements are shaped by collective and individual agents as well as structural factors.   
 
Another author who recognizes the importance of structure and agency to the conception of 
power is Lukes (2005). He refutes Dahl (1957) and Poslby’s (1963) notion of power by asserting 
that power must be understood both in terms of who participates and who does not. For Lukes 
(2005, p. 12), power “is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity (it may never be, and never 
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need to be, exercised)” and one “can be powerful by satisfying and advancing others’ interests”. 
In focusing on power-as-domination conundrum, he argues that power has three faces, namely 
a) public face, which mainly refers to Dahl (1957) and Polsby’s (1963) concept of power; b) 
hidden face, which is the ability of a person or group – consciously or unconsciously – to create 
or reinforce barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962); and c) 
insidious face, through which the relatively powerless have come to internalize and accept their 
own condition, and thus might not be aware of nor act upon their interests in any observable 
way (Gaventa, 2011). Lukes’ (2005) conception of power is critical to the thesis’ discussion of 
players, policies, practices and governing relations in the formal-informal interface in contested 
vending spaces. It can shed light on how formal laws and informal rules in vending spaces are 
developed and sustained by different actors. His three-dimensional view can also help in 
examining how the players engage in collaborative partnerships and/or manage conflicts and 
changes.   
 
In an effort to understand power in relation to social change, Gaventa (2011) builds on Lukes’ 
(2005) ideas in developing what he calls forms of power. For Gaventa (2011), power consists 
of visible, hidden and invisible forms. The definitions of these forms, which echo Lukes’ (2005) 
public, hidden, and insidious faces of power, are in Table 3.1, on page 45. Gaventa’s (2011) 
reiteration of three-dimensional view of power is necessary for the thesis’ aim to examine both 
the collaborative and conflictive aspects of governing relations in contested vending spaces. In 
particular, Gaventa (2011) and Lukes’ (2005) emphasis on the ability of insidious or invisible 
form of power to influence or shape people’s preferences demonstrates that power relations 
and struggles do not only manifest in conflict situations but rather can be observed even in 
seemingly smooth relations or in the prevention of conflicts. In this thesis, this implies digging 
deeper into how and by whom collaborations are managed, and/or conflicts addressed, in 
governing contested vending spaces.  
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Table 3.1: Forms and Spaces of Power 
Forms of Power 
 
1. Visible forms of power are contests over interests which are visible in public spaces or 
formal decision-making bodies. Often these refer to political bodies, such as legislatures, 
local government bodies, local assemblies, or consultative forums. However, they can 
equally apply to the decision-making arenas of organizations and even of social movements 
or other spaces for collective action. 
 
2. Hidden forms of power are used by vested interests to maintain their power and privilege 
by creating barriers to participation, by excluding key issues from the public arena, or by 
controlling politics ‘backstage’.  They may occur not only within political processes, but in 
organizational and other group contexts as well, such as workplaces, NGOs or community-
based organizations. 
 
3. Invisible forms of power involve the ways in which awareness of one’s rights and interests 
are hidden through the adoption of dominating ideologies, values and forms of behaviour by 
relatively powerless groups.  This is referred to as the ‘internalization of powerlessness’ in a 
way that affects the awareness and consciousness of potential issues and conflicts, even 
by those directly affected. 
 
Spaces of Power 
 
1. Closed spaces are where elites such as politicians, bureaucrats, experts, bosses, 
managers and leaders make decisions with little broad consultation or involvement. These 
often involve issues like trade, macro-economic and finance policies, military policies, etc. 
which have a great deal of impact on peoples’ lives but which are considered off-limits for 
public participation. 
 
2. Invited spaces are new opportunities for involvement and consultation, usually through 
‘invitation’ from various authorities, be they government, supra-national agencies or non-
governmental organizations.  These may be regularized, that is they are institutionalized and 
ongoing, such as we find in various legally constituted participatory fora, or more transient, 
through one-off consultations. 
 
3. Claimed spaces range from ones created by social movements and community 
associations, to those involving natural places where people gather to debate, discuss and 
resist, outside of the institutionalized policy arenas. 
 
Source: Gaventa, 2011 
 
Gaventa (2011) also moves beyond the faces/forms of power and expounds on the spaces of 
power, which refer to the opportunities, moments and channels where citizens can act to 
potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions and relationships affecting their lives and 
interests. He describes the spaces of power as closed, invited and claimed, as shown in Table 
3.1. Gaventa’s (2011) forms and spaces of power can complement Lukes’ (2005) faces of 
power in the thesis’ analysis of how formal and informal arrangements are developed and 
sustained and who are able and unable to influence these processes and outcomes. For 
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instance, it is important to determine how, and to what extent, the closed, invited and claimed 
spaces are created in both formal and informal processes in governing and appropriating 
contested vending spaces. This illuminates how players and their practices are able or unable 
to maximize existing venues for participation and how they are able to create their own 
opportunities for state engagement and management of vending spaces22. Finally, these 
aspects of power can also help in analysing the implications of the formal-informal interface for 
urban planning processes where power relations are inherently embedded. 
 
3.2.3. Discourses on Urban Governance 
Debates on urban development and socio-spatial relations have emphasized the importance 
of various players in shaping policies and planning processes. In urban political economy 
literature, the local governments and business groups act as the main actors in forming the 
urban regime’s ‘governing coalition’ (Stone, 1989). The notion of ‘growth machine’ echoes this 
prominent role of government units and private sector players in achieving economic growth 
(Logan & Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1976; 1993). While urban regime and growth machine 
frameworks acknowledge how these leading groups collaborate to attain certain agenda, they 
are silent on the conflicts in governance processes and on how other actors take part in policy-
making.  
 
This is where Minnery’s (2007) conception of urban governance is crucial as an analytical tool. 
Treating urban governance as a process, Minnery (2007) considers the civil society/community, 
along with the state and the private sector, as key actors in policy-making. He sees the 
collaborative and conflictive relations as part of urban governance23. He defines it as “the 
processes of direction-setting, policy making and implementation that incorporate the roles and 
responsibilities of government, the private sector and civil society in urban settings, as well as 
the partnerships and conflicts amongst them” (Minnery, 2007, p. 333). 
 
Minnery’s (2007) attention to conflict as an element of governance is important in recognizing 
power dynamics and antagonistic relations within and among the formal-informal players. This 
                                            
22 This point relates to Honwana’s (2008) notion of strategic and tactical forms of agency, which is discussed in 
Section 3.3 below. 
23 This resembles Harvey’s (1989) earlier recognition of the conflictual aspect of urban governance, a process 
where the power to organise space and urban life comes from various social agents.	
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conception speaks to Healey’s (1997) view of the planning-governance nexus as a complex 
process filled with conflicting interests and hierarchical structures. In this sense, it challenges 
the governance orthodoxy model, which “views that the relationships amongst the major 
stakeholders are mainly cooperative and consensual, captured in the common use of the terms 
‘partnerships’ or collaborative networks” (Minnery, 2007, p. 327). Besides, there are other 
salient aspects captured in his definition. As Roitman (2014, p. 465) explains, these include 
1. The understanding of governance as a process, therefore in constant change; 
2. The notion of a direction set by process, which involves objectives and goals identified 
that might be explicit or implicit; 
3. The identification of a multiplicity of actors that can be organized in three main groups: 
public sector, private sector and civil society; 
4. The understanding that governance involves not only good relations, agreements and 
partnerships amongst actors, but also difficult relationships, disagreements and 
conflicts. The latter also need to be addressed to achieve the objectives and goals 
set.  
 
Despite Minnery’s more inclusive view about the players in urban governance, similar to 
Stone’s and Molotch’s models, he seems primarily concerned with formal processes. Since 
informal activities and relations are a key subject in this thesis, it is crucial to pay attention to 
DiGaetano and Strom’s (2003) notion of institutional milieu as “the complexes of formal and 
informal political and governmental arrangements that mediate interactions among the 
structural context, political culture, and political actors” (Digaetano & Strom, 2003, p. 363). For 
DiGaetano and Strom (2003), an institutional milieu is composed of institutional bases and 
modes of governance. Institutional bases or formal institutional arrangements refer to the 
governmental bodies/agencies, political parties, interest group organizations, and partnerships 
that provide visible form to urban governance through rules and organization. Modes of 
governance, on the other hand, are the informal arrangements that define the governing 
relationships among and within formal institutions implicated in urban politics (DiGaetano & 
Strom, 2003). 
 
The institutional milieu, particularly the modes of governance, can complement Minnery’s 
(2007) urban governance in describing and examining the micro-level interactions between 
formal and informal arrangements. For instance, the discussion on the role of street vendors 
and their interaction with state authorities demonstrates this analytical imperative. Although 
Minnery’s (2007) urban governance and Strom and DiGaetano’s institutional milieu depart from 
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the usual elite-oriented players, their frameworks still look at governance processes from the 
perspective of those who govern. Thus, while they recognize the formal, informal, multi-level, 
fragmented interactions within and among various players, community participation is regarded 
as a dimension of governance. Yet, as Chatterjee (2004, p. 69) points out, participation “has 
one meaning when it is seen from the standpoint of those who govern, i.e., as a category of 
governance. It will have a very different meaning when seen from the position of the 
governed…” Even Minnery (2007) has also acknowledged the tendency of state actors to view 
civil society/community participation as a tool for legitimacy. 
 
One implication of recognizing the limits of dominant network-driven and formal urban 
governance prisms is the need to pay attention to Chatterjee’s (2004) argument on the role of 
grassroots players, which he labels ‘political society’. Drawing on the Indian context, he defines 
political society as those groups, organized into associations, who “transgress the strict lines 
of legality in struggling to live and work. They… accept that their activities are often illegal and 
contrary to good civic behaviour but they make a claim to a habitation and a livelihood as a 
matter of right” (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 40).  Chatterjee’s insight is important in recognizing the 
perspectives of those who are governed24. He further argues that the way the state engages 
with political society groups is different from how it deals with civic organizations.  
In dealing with them [political society], the authorities cannot treat them on the same 
footing as other civic associations following more legitimate social pursuits. Yet state 
agencies and nongovernmental associations cannot ignore them either, since they are 
among thousands of similar associations representing groups of population whose very 
livelihood or habitation involve[s] violation of the law. These agencies therefore deal with 
these associations not as bodies of citizens but as convenient instruments for the 
administration of welfare to marginal and underprivileged population groups. 
(Chatterjee, 2004, p. 40) 
 
In describing the grassroots players outside the state and the private sector, which are 
commonly put under the broad civil society umbrella, Chatterjee draws attention to the often 
unrecognized and unaccepted spaces of engagement and structures of power, as explained in 
Section 3.2.2 above. Political society then echoes one key argument in other grassroots agency 
writings such as in Hobsbawm’s (1959) city mob, Friedmann’s (1987) urban proletariat, 
Kaufmann’s (1997) grassroots democracy, Kerkvliet’s (2009) everyday politics, and Bayat’s 
(2013) quiet encroachment of the ordinary, which are all discussed in Section 3.3 below. They 
                                            
24 The implications of this attention to grassroots players are examined in Chapters 7 and 8.  
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emphasize the importance of spontaneous and/or organized initiatives of marginalized groups 
to earn a living and improve their social well-being. They likewise acknowledge the urban 
subaltern populations as a potent political force. 
 
The preceding discussion thus unveils how the conversations on the players in urban political 
economy, particularly on the policy-making and planning processes, must go beyond the 
dominant actors who have the capacity to engage in formal and informal processes which 
shape or influence recognized decision-making spaces. While Minnery’s urban governance and 
DiGaetano and Strom’s institutional milieu are useful in unpacking the players and processes 
within formal institutions, Lukes’ and Gaventa’s arguments on power relations along with 
Chatterjee’s insight on political society call for attention to other engagement spaces, including 
informal channels created by marginalized groups such as street vendors. In the Philippines, 
such attention to the role of grassroots actors is captured in Quimpo’s (2005) ‘contested 
democracy’ and in the work of Shatkin (2000, 2007, 2008) on informal settlements and urban 
governance. Quimpo (2005) particularly acknowledges the role of poor Filipinos in the historical 
struggle for independence from colonial invaders and in the continuing fight of marginalized 
communities for social justice. Meanwhile, Shatkin (2008) recognizes how popular movements 
have helped maintained the vibrancy of neglected urban spaces in Metro Manila.  
 
Based on the foregoing insights, I contend that the post-dualist framework, as explained in 
Chapter 2, is able to address the issues pertaining to the multi-actor involvement in various 
engagement spaces. For instance, the post-dualist enmeshed view of the formal-informal 
relations provides spaces for interrogating the processes and players concerned. Its 
institutionalist and relational stance, meanwhile, requires attention to the evolving, complex, 
socio-spatial interactions, planning processes, transactions, costs, rules, norms and broader 
social contexts in an urban area. Mindful of the key points laid out in this section, I therefore 
see post-dualist lens as a reflexive analytical tool in examining relations of players in the formal-
informal interface.  
 
To summarise, I have established in this section the links among informality, planning and 
governance. I have presented the embeddedness of informality in planning and how the latter 
influences and may entrench informal practices. I have situated planning as a governance 
50 
 
dimension involved in governing co-existence in shared and contested spaces. In this regard, 
I have also explained why the discourse on power is critical to this thesis. Finally, I have 
discussed key issues surrounding urban governance, policy-making and planning. While I 
recognize the value of Minnery’s urban governance, DiGaetano and Strom’s institutional milieu, 
I also consider Lukes’ and Gaventa’s framing of forms of power as well as Chatterjee’s view on 
political society as important insights in analysing the players, policies, practices and governing 
relations in contested vending spaces. I posit that the post-dualist lens is a reflexive conceptual 
tool that resonate with these insights and can analytically respond to the issues raised in this 
section. In what follows, I review key writings on collective action, agency, and informal vendors’ 
practices. These themes are crucial to examining grassroots practices and informal 
mechanisms in contested vending spaces.  
 
3.3. Grassroots Collective Action and Agency: Concepts and Experiences 
Despite the incremental changes in policies affecting informal actors with some laws 
accommodating informal livelihoods, informal spaces are still generally viewed as an aberration 
to prescribed planning system, lying outside its ambit of control. The interaction of government 
officials and informal vendors, for example, is often contextual and contingent on spatial 
location as urban spaces are nestled in multiple layers of control and regulation.  This is where 
grassroots collective action becomes crucial. Collective action happens when more than one 
individual is required to contribute to an effort in order to achieve an outcome (Ostrom, 2004). 
The succeeding paragraphs present ideas on collective action and agency. These ideas are 
helpful in analysing the shared activities undertaken by informal vendor associations. 
 
3.3.1. Collective Action and Agency 
In an insecure working environment, informal actors’ collective action may at times take the 
form of Kerkvliet’s (2009) everyday politics. Everyday politics involves “people embracing, 
complying with, adjusting and contesting norms and rules regarding authority over, production 
of, or allocation of resources and doing so in quiet, mundane, and subtle expressions and acts 
that are rarely organized or direct” (Kerkvliet, 2009, p. 232). Kaufman’s (1997) conception of 
grassroots democracy as the ability to appropriate spaces and manage their own economic 
and political lives also speaks to informal workers’ daily collective action practices. Grassroots 
democracy enables people in their communities and workplaces to control their lives and 
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livelihoods through grassroots mobilization and the development of community forms of popular 
democracy (Kaufman, 1997). Kerkvliet’s (2009) everyday politics and Kaufman’s (1997) 
grassroots democracy capture how informal vendors engage with state agencies and manage 
their own collective affairs.  
 
Everyday politics describes how vendors wrestle with government policies in various ways. Its 
recognition of the diversity of schemes is important to the situation of informal hawkers. As will 
be evident in Section 3.3.3, vendor groups have been able to design multiple schemes to deal 
with the rules governing their workplaces. For its part, grassroots democracy makes sense 
when informal vendors initiate organising work and take part in democratic political processes 
to fight for their rights and push for social inclusion policies. Even the ability of vendor 
organizations to devise and sustain their informal mechanisms in managing spaces is a 
manifestation of a vibrant grassroots agency and collective action. Yet, while collective action 
enables vendors to engage with state regulation, evidence from some global South cities 
(Osella, 2014; Piliavsky, 2014; Routray, 2015) indicates that some grassroots practices are 
more clientelistic than democratic. As I will discuss in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, although Baclaran 
hawkers cooperate with some NGO-affiliated vendor organisers to push for some social 
inclusion agenda, they also engage in patronage political relations in sustaining their self-help 
mechanisms to gain access to and control over contested streetscapes.  
 
One critical element in everyday politics and grassroots democracy is the exercise of human 
agency. For Giddens (1984, p.9), agency “concerns events of which an individual is the 
perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, 
have acted differently. Whatever happened would not have happened if that individual had not 
intervened”.  Investigating this sense of agency or what Lofland et al. (2006) call ‘agentic 
conception’ is crucial to attaining a better understanding of human behaviour as humans are 
influencing their social settings. 
 
Honwana (2008) offers a more nuanced view of agency, one which may depict how informal 
vendors live their daily lives. Building on de Certeau’s (1984) notion of strategy and tactic,25 
                                            
25 For de Certeau (1984, pp. 35-36), strategy is “the calculation or manipulation of force relationships that becomes 
possible as soon as a subject with will and power… can be isolated… [E]very ‘strategic’ rationalization seeks first 
of all to distinguish its ‘own’ place, that is, the place of its own power and will, from an environment”. On the 
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Honwana (2008) coins strategic and tactical agencies26. Strategic agency requires a basis of 
power, mastery of the larger picture, and some comprehension of the long-term consequences 
of actions (Honwana, 2008). Actors resorting to tactical agency, on the contrary, must 
constantly manoeuvre events and turn them into opportunities (Honwana, 2008). This 
demarcation between strategic and tactical agency is essential to understanding informal 
players’ collective action as they navigate their way through the precarious social, political and 
economic conditions. 
 
As the previous paragraphs demonstrate, it can be argued that the people’s sense of agency 
is what drives them to initiate and engage in collective action. In informal hawking, any 
organizational activity takes shape and, in the long run, gains sustainability due to a strong 
sense of agency and collective action. While these two may always be found in any setting, the 
extent of their depth and effects may partly be defined by the social contexts. This is where 
Honwana’s (2008) strategic and tactical delineation makes a lot of sense. As discussed in 
Sections 2.3 in the previous chapter, structural forces and human/social agents interact to 
shape and reproduce informal arrangements. In this thesis, these collective action and agency 
concepts help in framing how different actors develop and get involved in various processes 
and in identifying the factors and forces that influence their actions.  
 
Leading to the next section, these forms of collective action and agency are captured by 
experiences of street vendors. But before delving into the cases on vendors’ collective action, 
the definitions and attributes of street vendors are presented below. 
 
3.3.2. Informal Vendors  
As explained in Section 1.1, informal vending is a major planning concern as most hawking 
activities occur in public areas. This becomes more critical in developing countries where 
limited public spaces are shared, if not contested, by a number of stakeholders. McGee et al. 
(1970) define street vendors as people who offer goods or services for sale from public spaces, 
primarily streets and pavements. Bhowmik (2005) describes a street vendor as “a person who 
                                            
contrary, “a tactic is a calculated action determined by the absence of locus… It takes advantage of ‘opportunities’ 
and depends on them… build up its own, and plan raids” (de Certeau, 1984, p. 37). 
26 This conception bears some semblance to Lukes’ (2005) ‘context-bound’ and ‘context-transcending’ ability of 
power. The first is maximized when resistance or obstacles to power are minimized; the latter is greater when 
resistance and obstacles the power can overcome are greater (Lukes, 2005).	
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offers goods for sale to the public without having a permanent built-up structure from which to 
sell” (Bhowmik, 2005, p. 2256). They may be stationary in the sense that they occupy space 
on the pavements or spaces or mobile in the sense that they move from place to place by 
carrying their wares on push carts or in baskets (Bhowmik, 2005). I adopt Bhowmik’s 
description of street vendors as it is broad enough to capture the different types of hawkers – 
from mobile to stationary – with the primary objective of selling goods to the public.  
 
Two ideas explain the emergence of street vending. One views vending as a job borne out of 
the desperate need to survive (Kimwell, 2004). This perspective sees street hawkers as poor 
and marginalized people who try to make a living. The other idea holds that people engage in 
vending activities by choice. Grice (1988) cites three motivations why some people prefer 
vending as a form of employment: a) to obtain a higher income; b) to achieve greater social 
and economic mobility; and c) to gain personal autonomy. In terms of its viability as a livelihood, 
Lubell (1991, p. 99) argues that street trading will continue “as long as other sources of urban 
employment lag behind populations and labour force increases, and that the government will 
continue to experience the tensions arising from the necessity to combine control and 
accommodation”.  
 
Street vending has positive and negative effects. One positive feature of street vending is its 
ability to make the cost of living relatively low by providing cheaper goods and services 
(Guerrero, 1975; Lubell, 1991). They also contribute to the formal sector growth by retailing the 
latter’s products; thereby making them affordable for the low-income groups. Hawkers also 
perform welfare functions by providing employment opportunities (Guerrero, 1975). With 
respect to negative impacts, some problems associated with street hawking include the 
following: occupying urban spaces in a disorderly manner; causing traffic congestion; promoting 
unfair competition with formal retail shops; attracting pickpockets and other threats to peace 
and order Lubell (1991), and improper health and hygiene practices among food vendors 
(Kimwell, 2004).  
 
In terms of trade relations, Mintz (1959, cited in McGee & Yeung, 1977, p. 22) claims that 
vending involves two types of exchange. One is the horizontal exchange where the goods are 
consumed by much the same class as the producers. The other one, the vertical exchange, 
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generates consumption by a class different from that of the producers. McGee and Yeung 
(1977) write that many studies in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and Asian countries 
reveal that petty traders are engaged in horizontal exchange of goods. In the urban area, 
hawkers are generally involved in vertical exchange either selling urban-produced goods or 
foodstuffs from the countryside (McGee & Yeung, 1977). 
 
3.3.3. Street Vendors: Their Conditions and Engagement with the State  
In the preceding section, I defined street vendors and explained the good contributions and 
negative effects of informal vending on society. In this part, I provide an overview of street 
vendors and their organizations across different contexts. Before presenting some cases, the 
next paragraph briefly discusses the significance of informal groups’ socio-political 
engagement. 
 
With their sheer presence and volume, informal players have gained scholars’ interest in 
examining how they affect the socio-political processes in urban areas. Hobsbawm (1959, p. 
110), for instance, considered city hawkers as part of his notion of ‘city mob’, which refers to a 
pre-political “movement of all the classes of the urban poor for the achievement of economic or 
political changes by direct action – that is by riot or rebellion –but as a movement which was 
as yet inspired by no specific ideology”. He argued that the mob as ‘social phenomenon’ has 
tended to give way to the industrial working class. Castells (1983; 1985), meanwhile, stresses 
how informal settler groups challenge the dominant cultural values and political institutions and 
establish political legitimacy based on popular mobilization. Friedmann (1987) notes the 
political significance of urban proletariat (informal actors) who lack skills and are excluded from 
most of the benefits of society. For his part, Bayat (2013, pp. 14-15) calls the politics of the 
informal actors as the ‘nonmovement of the urban dispossessed’, which represents the 
“discreet and prolonged ways in which the poor struggle to survive and to better their lives by 
quietly impinging on the propertied and powerful, and on society at large”. While the authors’ 
terminologies and degree of emphasis on socio-political significance of informal groups vary, 
their ideas essentially capture the ability of these actors to occupy urban spaces and influence 
socio-political processes to advance their cause. This recognition relates to some studies 
showcasing how informal actors’ political power is manifested in different contexts. In what 
follows, I present the vendors’ conditions and their engagement with state agencies in various 
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countries. After discussing the vendors’ engagement experiences, I sum up some points 
relevant to the thesis. 
 
3.3.3.1. Asian Region 
In Bhowmik’s (2005) review of street vendors’ situation in selected Asian cities, he noted that 
in Bangladesh (Dhaka), some hawkers bribe local authorities just to gain tolerance; but this is 
not an assurance of a smooth relationship with the abusive government officials. In Vietnam, 
there is a challenge for organizing work among the vendors (Bhowmik, 2005). In Sri Lanka 
(Colombo), vendor organizations deal with hostile policies by partnership with local government 
and/or by corrupt practices such as bribery (Shuaib, 2007). 
 
In Indonesia (Yogyakarta), street hawkers formed cooperatives to make the vendors legal 
under a formally recognized organization and to provide a savings and loan service to its 
members (Timothy & Wall, 1997). The cooperatives offer members low-interest loans and pays 
interest on funds deposited. The association also act as a legal liaison between the vendors 
and the municipal government (Timothy & Wall, 1997).  
 
In some Philippine cities, vendors have gained some political recognition, although local 
administrators do not provide for operational needs (Bhowmik, 2005). In Cebu City, the power 
of vendors’ coalition has contributed to tolerance of street hawking despite the presence of anti-
vending national and local laws. One challenge, however, is the need to transcend vendors’ 
reliance on a charismatic leader and develop professional management to ensure transparency 
and accountability (Etemadi, 2004). In Caloocan City, vendors resort to a spectrum of strategies 
– from formal to extra-legal – to deal with state authorities and gain access to vending spaces 
(Recio, 2010).  
 
3.3.3.2. Latin American Region 
A regional study in six cities - Bogotá (Colombia), Lima (Peru), Caracas (Venezuela) and Sao 
Paolo (Brazil), Santiago (Chile) and Mexico City – found that street traders have established 
thousands of associations in the region to facilitate their work and defend their interests in the 
political arena (Roever, 2006). Vendor organizations’ roles include resolving conflicts among 
members, coordinating with other groups, and serving as interlocutors with local government 
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officials. For Roever (2006), this vast number of organized vendors indicates low barriers to 
grassroots collective action and a potential for consolidating political voice.  
 
In a separate study, Mexico City vendors’ act as negotiators or deal-makers and as managers 
of social assets (Peña, 1999). In another instance, Bogotá (Colombia) government’s 
engagement with vendors takes the form of token participation27 (Hunt, 2009). Vendors’ 
negotiation with the state was valued for its educational quality, participatory nature, and the 
legitimacy it lent the government (Hunt, 2009). 
 
3.3.3.3. African Region 
In a study in Senegal, Ghana, Tanzania and Lesotho, Brown et al. (2010) note that traders and 
market associations fall into two groups: the formal associations recognized by the authorities, 
such as management committees and trade unions; and the informal kinship, religious or other 
social networks which derive their power outside the formal political or administrative process. 
They emphasize that while both groups offer a means for civic engagement with institutions 
and local authorities, the organizations often focus on self-help and fail to maintain long-term 
influence (Brown et al., 2010). 
 
Meanwhile, in South Africa (Johannesburg), Hlela (2003) questions the accountability of vendor 
groups that seem to wield substantial power on who is able to trade in the city’s strategic 
location. The group determines the rental which “favours more affluent traders, who might also 
be more organized, at the expense of those who are poorer and less organized” (Hlela, 2003, 
p. 2). This case unmasks the undemocratic and rent-seeking side of informal groups. It shows 
the heterogeneity of street vendors and the power relations within informal organizations. 
 
Further, a comparative study of hawkers’ associations in Ghana, Zambia, Mozambique and 
Malawi, found that the relations of recently-established local organizations with the local 
governments are largely confrontational (War on Want et al., 2006). This situation shows the 
importance of adopting advocacy and self-help tactics amid the hostile local governments 
(Brown et al., 2010). 
                                            
27 It is a kind of participation where citizens are allowed to hear and be heard but they “lack the power to ensure 
that their views are heeded by the powerful” (Arnstein, 1969, p. 217). 
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Aside from the national and local initiatives, Brown et al. (2010) document the crafting of the 
1995 Bellagio International Declaration of Street Vendors, a statement calling for coordinated 
action to support street traders and demanding policies that protect their rights. In 2002, this 
declaration led to the formation of StreetNet, an international association of street vendors with 
nearly 300 organizations in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Brown et al., 2010). 
 
The foregoing cases illustrate several insights. First, street vendor organizations are present 
from local to international levels. Relating to the previous section, this proves that informal 
hawkers have a strong sense of agency, collective action, and the power to network with other 
associations. Second, the accounts reveal the multiple roles that vendor groups play in their 
own contexts. They act as self-help groups, negotiate or mediate conflict among their members 
and engage state authorities in their effort to gain recognition as legitimate workers. Third, the 
lack of organizing and abuse perpetuated by erring government officials remain an enduring 
problem in many places. Among those that have organizations, a key issue is the accountability 
within the associations (Etemadi, 2004; Hlela, 2003). Accountability problems complicate the 
vendors’ precarious conditions, especially among the poorer members (Hlela, 2003). Minnery 
(2007) also raises accountability in questioning whether the incorporation of non-state actors 
into policy-making making and implementation necessitates going beyond the traditional 
mechanisms for authority, legitimacy and accountability among non-state actors involved in 
urban governance. In Chapters 6 and 7, I will show how accountability problem exists within 
state institutions and the relationships between vendors and local officials. Fourth, for organized 
vendors that have engaged with state agencies, two issues are noteworthy. One is the reality 
of falling into the trap of token participation as experienced in Bogotá Colombia. The other 
challenge has to do with engaging governments that have a different view about informal 
vending. For some, confrontation is seen as the way to deal with the situation.  
 
The foregoing insights are critical in examining the collective action practices in Baclaran. In 
the remainder of this chapter, I recapitulate the main points that have emerged from the 
preceding literature review and explain the thesis’ conceptual framework. 
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3.4. Tackling the Formal-Informal Interface: Key Ideas in the Literature and the 
Conceptual Framework 
Based on the foregoing literature review, I sum up here the key ideas and present the thesis’ 
conceptual framework. First, the conceptions of informality have evolved - from a highly 
dualistic to an enmeshed understanding of the formal and informal economy. In this regard, I 
argue that the informal and formal sectors are part of a single economic continuum with 
relations in many aspects of production, consumption and exchange. I therefore use the 
informal sector/economy and formal sector/economy labels as a heuristic device to analyse the 
arrangements arising from the dualistic framing. Admittedly, this dichotomous view has shaped 
urban planning perspectives and governance practices for a long time. 
 
Second, most discussions of formal-informal concepts – whether seen as a dichotomy or a 
spectrum - are viewed from a structuralist perspective. Many of these structuralist-oriented 
discourses focus more on the economic and political dimensions and less on socio-spatial 
aspects. To address this gap, I employ the relational lens, as part of the thesis’ post-dualist 
framework, in analysing the formal-informal processes and transactions. As noted in Section 
2.4 in the previous chapter, this relational standpoint is grounded in Healey’s (2007b) relational 
planning, which in turn builds on the work of relational geographers - see Amin (2002; 2004) 
and Massey (2005) – who see the interactions that occur in specific social or nodal 'sites' as 
complex and embedded in past trajectories and wider contexts. In examining socio-spatial 
issues, I also echo Healey’s (2007b) and Lefebvre’s (1991) argument about the constant 
interaction of material experiences, intellectual prisms, and cultural expressions in producing 
space. 
 
Third, a spectrum of policy epistemologies exemplifies the state approaches to informal 
vending: hostile, tolerant, and accommodating. Structural dimensions and agency expressions 
influence how each policy orientation operates. For instance, the formal rules prohibiting street 
vending often hinge on the dualistic view of informality issues and on the state’s desire to 
enforce order. The tolerant political atmosphere, meanwhile, stems from factors like vendors’ 
ability to devise engagement strategies amid the lack of clear national policies on informal 
vending. As will be evident in Chapters 6 and 7, these insights have informed the thesis in 
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assessing the factors that affect the policy environment in the study area. They also serve as 
crucial inputs in developing the thesis’ post-dualist conceptual lens. 
 
Fourth, the literature has pointed out that planning is not only involved in the inscription, 
stratification and intensification of informality, but that informal practices are embedded in 
planning itself. Thus, if planning, as an integral aspect of formal systems, is riddled with informal 
arrangements it is critical to determine whether such nature of planning facilitates or 
undermines the formal-informal interface. I will explain in Chapters 6 and 8 how planning is 
implicated in the issues arising from socio-spatial relations in Baclaran’s contested vending 
spaces. 
 
Fifth, the writings on grassroots collective action and street vending recognize the political 
significance of informal actors. From Castells’ (1983) urban populism and Friedmann’s (1987) 
urban proletariat to Bayat’s (2013) non-movement of the dispossessed, the reviewed cases 
show the presence of organized street vendors - from local to international levels. These groups 
function as self-help groups, negotiate or mediate conflicts among their members, and engage 
state authorities in their effort to gain recognition as legitimate workers. I will tackle in Chapters 
6, 7 and 8 how these issues are relevant to vendor organizing in Baclaran. 
 
I build on these insights in developing the thesis’ conceptual framework. A number of premises 
drawn from the literature review have informed my understanding of informality and planning. I 
view urban informality as a planning issue as the latter affects how informality is defined and 
managed (Roy, 2009; Yiftachel, 2006).  I adopt Healey’s (2007b) contention that planning is a 
governance dimension concerned with managing co-existence in shared spaces and the 
relations in collective action. This emphasis on relations in collective action is linked to my 
reading of informal organizations in urban spaces. I argue that informal vendor organizations 
are non-market agents of collective action as they implement mechanisms to address urban 
‘disfunctionalities’ (Scott & Storper, 2015) and manage hawking spaces with or without state 
support. By non-market agents of collective action, I draw from Scott and Storper’s (2015, p. 8) 
contention that “market logic alone is congenitally incapable of regulating the urban commons 
in the interests of economic efficiency and social wellbeing”. Thus, “non-market agencies of 
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collective action typically emerge to keep the urban land nexus28 in some sort of functioning 
workable order” (Scott & Storper, 2015 p. 9). These agencies are local in character and/or they 
exist at higher levels in the governance hierarchy. For instance, land use regulation is 
undertaken mostly (though not exclusively) by local institutions like formal government units 
and various civil associations (Scott & Storper, 2015). I consider vendor organizations as part 
of local civil associations that enforce collective action mechanisms to pursue goals that are 
not purely economic-driven or market-oriented.  In Chapters 7 and 8, I will discuss how Baclaran 
vendors’ collective action practices go beyond market-oriented goals.   
 
Given these conceptual considerations, I contend that urban informality, as a planning and 
governance concern, is addressed through the formal systems and informal mechanisms. The 
literature affirms this as evidenced by policy epistemologies and vendor organizations’ array of 
collective action initiatives, which are presented in Sections 2.3 and 3.3, respectively. What is 
lacking, however, is an examination of the interface between formal systems and informal 
mechanisms since the literature has mainly touched on each of these as separate entities. I 
focus on this research gap. Figure 3-1 on page 61 captures how the thesis’ main elements 
relate to each other. It shows how the formal-informal interface - as the research gap - is 
examined through the chosen governance dimensions using the post-dualist lens. 
 
By formal-informal interface, I adopt Hansen and Vaa’s (2004, p. 9) notion of the interface as 
the “encounters between entities or processes that are governed by different rules; the 
outcomes may be neutral, implying non-recognition or accommodation, or they may entail 
conflict or cooperation”. These engagements occur in public places and courtrooms, 
spontaneous and planned encounters, households and networks, and may include individuals 
or groups, practices, beliefs, and institutions (Hansen & Vaa, 2004). In unpacking the formal-
informal interface in contested vending spaces, I look at five governance dimensions. These 
include a) players, b) policies, c) practices, d) governing relations, and e) planning implications. 
The selection of these governance dimensions has emerged from the insights and issues in 
the literature.  
                                            
28 Urban land nexus refers to an interacting set of land uses that show how “the social and economic activities of 
the city condense out into a differentiated, polarized, locational mosaic” (Scott & Storper, 2015, p. 8; see also 
Scott, 1980; Roweis & Scott, 1978)  
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Figure 3-1: Tackling the Formal-Informal Interface: A Conceptual Framework 
 
With respect to the first governance dimension - players, many studies have documented how 
vendor associations function and how they engage government agencies in instances where 
policies prohibit vending. But there is a dearth of evidence on how other stakeholders (e.g. non-
organized vendors, civil society groups, and private sector) relate to each other in governing 
and appropriating contested vending spaces. One way to tackle this void is to identify and 
examine the key actors, their roles and relations that drive the processes within, as well as the 
interface between, formal systems and informal mechanisms. I will particularly discuss in 
Chapter 6 how state agencies (and their officials), the informal organizations, and other 
stakeholders interact with each other. I will also present the issues arising from the competing 
interests and the unequal socio-spatial relations of these players.  
 
In analysing the second dimension – policies, I build on the discussion on policy epistemologies 
in examining how state laws and programs are implicated in informality issues. As already noted 
above, I will examine in Chapter 7 the factors, issues and implications of government policies 
on informality and street vending in Baclaran. 
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Moving on to the third dimension – practices, I address here the scant literature discussion on 
the socio-spatial aspects of the formal-informal interface. Thus, I employ the relational lens, as 
an aspect of the thesis’ post dualist framework, in examining the practices of key actors, 
particularly how vendors have been able to gain access to and control over vending spaces. In 
Chapter 7, I will explain how contested vending spaces also serve as sites for political 
organizing, street-level corruption, and state-informal vendors’ engagement, among others. I 
will also illustrate how the different stakeholders make these events happen, how they give 
meaning to such activities and how these practices impact on the formal-informal interface in 
contested vending spaces.  
 
For the fourth dimension, I use governing relations to refer to systemic arrangements and micro 
socio-spatial modes of engagements that lie beneath the rules, interactions, norms, and actions 
in Baclaran. I address here how the previous two dimensions are linked to the larger structural 
dimensions of informality and the evolving agency expressions of Balaran vendors. I will tackle 
in Chapter 8 four governing relations that shape the formal-informal interface in contested 
vending spaces. These relations include a) disjunctive urban governance; b) strong kinship 
ties; c) clientelist political relations; and d) grassroots democratic entanglements. In examining 
each of these, I recognize the multilayered and overlapping processes and outcomes arising 
from the entwined relations.  
 
In the fifth dimension – planning implications, I pay attention to how the formal-informal 
interface, as manifested in the first three dimensions, influences and is affected by urban 
planning. In Chapter 8, I will show how four critical implications can inform planners in 
understanding the links between the formal-informal interface and planning processes. These 
implications are a) the post-dualist approach to informality; b) the agglomeration of land uses; 
c) the links between gentrification, informality and globalization; and d) the need for inclusive 
urban governance. 
 
Finally, as already explained in Chapters 1 and 2, I employ the post-dualist lens as a conceptual 
analytical tool in examining these four interrelated governance dimensions. As expounded on 
in Section 2.3.4 of Chapter 2, the post-dualist lens is rooted in the enmeshed view of informality, 
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the structurationist framing of structure-agency nexus, and the relational-institutionalist 
approach to planning. I also take into account the value of Minnery’s (2007) urban governance, 
DiGaetano and Strom’s (2003) institutional milieu, Chatterjee’s (2004) insight on political 
society and Lukes’ (2005) and Gaventa’s (2011) framing of forms of power in analysing the 
players, policies, practices and governing relations in contested vending spaces. As already 
noted in Section 3.2.3, I construe that the post-dualist lens is a reflexive conceptual tool that 
can accommodate these complementary ideas on urban governance and power relations.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown how informality is linked to planning and governance. I have 
touched on debates on power and the key issues surrounding urban governance, policy-making 
and planning. While I recognize the value of Minnery’s (2007) urban governance, DiGaetano 
and Strom’s (2003) institutional milieu, I also consider Lukes’ (2005) and Gaventa’s (2011) 
framing of forms of power as well as Chatterjee’s (2004) view on political society as important 
insights in analysing the players, policies, practices and governing relations in contested 
vending spaces. I posit that the post-dualist lens is a reflexive conceptual tool that resonate 
with these insights and can analytically respond to the issues raised in this chapter.  
 
To situate grassroots agency, particularly by vendors, I have presented key concepts and cases 
on collective action and street vendors’ engagement with governments in select global South 
cities. These themes, along with the issues presented in Chapter 2, have informed the 
development of the thesis’ Conceptual Framework. In this framework, I have explained the five 
governance dimensions and reiterated the importance of the post-dualist lens as the thesis’ 
conceptual analytical tool. In the succeeding chapter, I explain the thesis’ methodological 
framework, which further elaborates the key elements in the research design. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCHING INFORMALITY: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 has shown how urban informality is a complex 
research arena where the formal policies intersect with informal arrangements and socio-spatial 
relations. Thus, this thesis requires a systematic yet reflexive design, which can capture the 
various accounts that may appear contentious and puzzling.  In this chapter, I present the 
thesis’ overall research design. I first clarify the thesis’ ontological and epistemological stance 
on the nature of the problem under study. I then present the detailed methodology with the 
corresponding research strategy and case study design. Following this, I discuss the collected 
information, the data gathering methods, and the sampling techniques. Then, I explain the 
strategies employed to get in touch with the research participants during the fieldwork. Finally, 
I describe the steps for data processing and analysis. 
 
4.2. Ontology and Epistemology 
The literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 has pointed out how diverse views have shaped the 
discourses on the causes, consequences, and dynamics of informality. While the disciplinal 
divide has arguably influenced the different perspectives, it is unclear how ontological and 
epistemological standpoints have affected the on-going debates around informality.  In this 
context, I begin with explaining what ontological and epistemological traditions guide this 
research and how they impact on the topics under study. 
 
In this thesis, I espouse a critical realist ontological position and a constructivist epistemological 
stance. Ontologically, critical realism posits that there is a ‘real’ world out there independent of 
human perceptions and theoretical abstractions. It rejects the notion that one “can have any 
objective or certain knowledge of the world” and affirms “the possibility of alternative valid 
accounts of any phenomenon” (Maxwell, 2012, p. 5). Mental states and attributes (e.g. 
meanings, interpretations, and intentions) are part of the real world and interpreted using 
concepts and frameworks (Maxwell, 2012). Thus, while I subscribe to critical realist ontology, I 
employ a constructivist epistemology. Constructivist epistemology asserts that the 
understanding or knowledge of the world is a construction of personal perspectives and 
standpoints (Barth, 1987; Frazer & Lacey, 1993; Maxwell, 2012) that are situated in social 
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contexts and relations. As Frazer and Lacey (1993, p. 182) frame it, “Even if one is a realist at 
the ontological level, one could be an epistemological interpretivist … our knowledge of the real 
world is inevitably interpretive and provisional rather than straightforwardly representational”. 
Maxwell (2012) also contends that it is possible for researchers to adhere to critical realist 
ontology while adopting constructivist epistemology. He notes that this position has gained 
widespread acceptance as an alternative to naïve realism and radical constructivism, which 
refutes the existence of any reality apart from our constructions. 
 
These ontological and epistemological perspectives have five key implications. First, I view the 
thesis’ knowledge contribution as one among the many possible approaches to understanding 
the research problem. Second, analysing the formal-informal interface in governing contested 
vending spaces implies acknowledging the presence of this interface, which is situated in the 
social contexts of the study area, prior to and independent of the thesis’ conceptual abstraction. 
Third, examining the formal-informal interface means going beyond the superficial 
manifestations of the issues under study. This requires analysing the key factors and forces 
that generate and sustain the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces. In this 
regard, a list of governance dimensions, aimed at surfacing the factors and forces, was 
presented in the Conceptual Framework in Section 3.4. Fourth, with respect to research 
positionality and reflexivity, I acknowledge that the way of seeing employed in this thesis is 
shaped by my own conceptual views and contextual realities. My personal and social 
circumstances as a young Filipino researcher who was born and raised in the global South 
have deepened my familiarity with the issues surrounding urban informality. My past experience 
working with social movements, including urban poor groups, in the Philippines has influenced 
the analytical lens I have deployed in this research.  To an extent, this experience has enabled 
me to embrace Haraway’s (1991) notion of ‘embodied objectivity’, which involves ‘seeing’ from 
the standpoint of the ‘subjugated’, not because oppressed people are ‘innocent’ but because 
“in principle they are least likely to allow denial of the critical and interpretative core of all 
knowledge…” (in Watson, 2003, p. 404). Besides my earlier professional engagement, my 
current positionality as a researcher affiliated with an Australian university has afforded me the 
access to resources, which puts me at a certain position of privilege in relation to some 
participants of this study. Given the complexity of the factors and forces shaping the formal-
informal interface, I also recognize that the knowledge production in this research is informed 
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by the social contexts and perspectives of the stakeholders - government officials, street 
vendors and other players – who participated in the research as informants. With these 
considerations, I believe that the critical realist ontology and constructivist epistemology provide 
the reflexivity I need in examining the issues under study and in situating my own subjectivities 
in the research process. Fifth, while I recognize the importance of generating knowledge 
through data derived from people’s experiences and understandings of identified issues, I also 
employ initial theoretical lenses against which empirical patterns, outliers, and nuances are 
examined. Based on an iterative process, the preliminary conceptual constructs may change 
or new sets of mental framings may emerge. Thus, I deploy retroductive and abductive 
approaches to data analysis and theoretical abstraction, which are accepted analytical tools in 
critical realism (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 1997).  
 
Retroductive inference requires the researcher to go beyond what is empirically observable by 
asking questions about and developing concepts relevant to the phenomena being studied 
(Meyer & Lunnay, 2013). It allows the investigator to have assumptions or a priori knowledge 
which enables her/him to clarify, question, and move beyond the prerequisites for initial 
theoretical frameworks (Meyer & Lunnay, 2013). In other words, retroductive process treats the 
theoretical premise as a take-off point for explaining certain phenomenon, say, the formal-
informal interface as in the case of this thesis. 
 
In contrast to retroductive approach, the abductive inference begins with findings that fall 
outside the initially identified theoretical frame/s. It “rests on the cultivation of anomalous and 
surprising empirical findings against a background of multiple existing sociological theories and 
through systematic methodological analysis” (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012, p. 169). In this 
thesis, it entails explaining the findings on the formal-informal interface that have never been 
fully captured and/or problematized in the same way by relevant theories on informality. 
Accordingly, the different thematic information on views of government officials, vendors, and 
other stakeholders also served as critical components in the analysis. In a similar vein, the 
theoretical constructs, as developed in the thesis’ conceptual framework, informed the coding 
and analysis of key findings and the development of emerging conceptual precepts. The 
retroductive-abductive process is reflected in Section 4.3.6 (Data Analysis) below. 
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4.3. Research Design 
To contextualize the discussion in this chapter, I reiterate that the thesis probes into the 
question ‘How can the interface of formal systems and informal mechanisms to govern and 
appropriate contested vending spaces be explained?’ As essential components of this main 
inquiry, I tackle five sub-questions below: 
1. Who are the key players that drive formal systems and informal mechanisms, as well as 
their interface, in governing and appropriating contested vending spaces?  
2. Under what government rules do these players use streets and assert their claims?  
3. What practices and norms do informal vendors observe in relation to street use and 
informal vending? 
4. What relational logics and entrenched arrangements influence the governing processes 
and interactions of the different players?  
5. What are the implications of the formal-informal interface for urban planning processes, 
particularly in the context of governing and appropriating contested vending spaces? 
 
In designing the research methodology, I ensured that the thesis satisfies the key attributes of 
qualitative research. These include 1) covering the contextual conditions within which people 
live; 2) representing the perspectives of the people in a study; 3) contributing insights into 
existing or emerging concepts that may help to explain human social behaviour; 4) striving to 
use multiple sources of evidence rather than relying on a single source alone (Yin, 2011). In 
producing a context-dependent knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2006), I deployed case study as the 
strategy of inquiry. I dwelt on the views of different players - government officials, vendors, non-
government organizations, private sector groups, academics and experienced development 
workers. As Section 4.3.4 below will show, I also utilized various data collection methods.  
 
4.3.1. Research Strategy 
I employed case study as a strategy of inquiry. Case study is a research design encompassing 
research question development, data collection technique selection, data analysis and 
generalization to theory (Morrison, 2004). It is the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ 
questions are being posed about a contemporary set of events over which an investigator has 
little or no control (Yin, 2014).  Case study is also appropriate for this research as it is consistent 
with the thesis’ ontological and epistemological grounding. As Yin (2014) explains, while much 
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case study is oriented towards realist perspective, which assumes the existence of reality 
independent of the observer, it can also accommodate epistemological positions, which 
acknowledge multiple meanings with findings that are influenced by the investigator. 
 
While case study has received criticism on its supposed inability to produce scientific 
generalization, Yin (2014) points out that case studies are generalizable to theoretical 
propositions and not to populations or universes. That is, a case study does not represent a 
sampling unit and the researcher’s goal is to shed light on some theoretical concepts or 
principles - analytic generalization (Yin, 2014). This analytic generalization may anchor (a) on 
corroborating, modifying, rejecting, or advancing theoretical concepts referenced in the design; 
or (b) new concepts that arose from the completion of case study (Yin, 2014).  In this thesis, 
analytic generalization is informed by ideas and theories in the literature review, the conceptual 
framework, and the collected data. At the same time, the thesis’ case study aims to cultivate 
“concrete, context-dependent knowledge” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 224) on the formal-informal 
interface in contested vending spaces, situated in one research setting. 
 
I used a single-case (embedded) design focusing on one geographical location that satisfies 
the criteria for study area selection. Three criteria guided the selection of the study area: the 
magnitude of informal vending activity; the informal mechanisms for governing vending spaces; 
and the vendors’ engagement with state authorities. (In Chapter 5, I will discuss the case study 
area). I applied a single-case embedded design as it tackles more than one unit of analysis. As 
Yin (2014) clarifies, embedded case studies occur when within a single case the study may 
involve more than one unit of analysis. In this thesis, the formal-informal interface in contested 
vending spaces serve as the main unit of analysis. The intricacies within the formal systems 
and informal mechanisms, and how they impact on the interface, represent other units of 
analysis.  
 
4.3.2. Case Study Selection Criteria 
As noted above, three criteria guided the selection of the study area: the magnitude of informal 
vending activity, the informal mechanisms employed to govern and/or use vending spaces, and 
the vendors’ engagement with state authorities. The magnitude of informal vending activity 
pertains to the presence of informal vendors occupying public spaces such as streets, 
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easements, sidewalks, transport terminals, and parking lots. The literature shows the 
importance of the magnitude of street vending in describing how different players appropriate 
urban spaces, particularly in the context of conflicting interests (Peña, 1999; Hlela, 2003; 
Etemadi, 2004; Setšabi & Leduka, 2008; Oriard, 2015; Tucker, 2016). I build on these findings 
in interrogating other unexamined issues on the formal-informal interface in governing and 
appropriating contested vending spaces.  
 
The second criterion pertains to the informal mechanisms for governing vending spaces. These 
mechanisms have received much attention from scholars like Peña (1999), Hlela (2003), 
Etemadi (2004), Shuaib (2007), and Setšabi & Leduka (2008), among others. These authors 
looked at the mechanisms that street hawkers have employed to sustain the informal practices 
in vending spaces. While the literature demonstrates the importance of the informal 
mechanisms to understand how an urban space is governed, there is a gap in employing a 
theoretically-informed analysis of the links and tensions between informal mechanisms and 
state-led interventions. Therefore, it served as a critical take off point for the selection of the 
case study area. 
 
The vendors’ engagement with state officials is the third criterion in choosing the case study 
area. It refers to the different strategies or approaches that informal vendors employ to engage 
with state officials and gain access to and control over vending spaces. While past studies 
documented the activities and relations between vendors and government officials (Etemadi, 
2004; Setšabi & Leduka, 2008), there is a gap in problematizing the connections between 
governing relations and formal planning processes.  
 
Given these criteria, Baclaran was chosen as the case study area. Baclaran is situated on the 
borders of two cities - Pasay and Parañaque - in Metropolitan Manila, Philippines. In terms of 
the magnitude of vending activity, Morelos (2011) writes that Baclaran is one of the biggest 
street vending sites in Metropolitan Manila. In August 2013, the Parañaque local government 
conducted a clearing operation affecting around 3000 hawkers (Josue, 2013). Baclaran also 
met the second criterion as it is home to many individuals engaged in flea market and hawking 
activities. These groups employ informal strategies to sustain their vending practices. With 
respect to state engagement, Baclaran vendors have devised various approaches as part of 
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their efforts to fight off evictions and gain access to vending spaces (Morelos, 2011). In this 
vein, the relational dynamics equally deserve a scholarly inquiry as Baclaran’s location – being 
on the geo-political boundaries of two cities – may create complex arrangements between 
vendors and state officials. 
 
Two previous studies have also looked at Baclaran as case study area. The first – a Master 
thesis undertaken in 1996 – focused on the socio-economic benefits of street vending in 
Baclaran (Valladolid, 1996). The second research – a PhD thesis completed in 2013 - was a 
sociological account of the Filipino devotion to the Our Lady of Perpetual Help (Sapitula, 2013a) 
housed in the Perpetual Help Shrine – popularly known as the Baclaran Church. I draw some 
insights from these two studies in examining the issues of street vendors in Baclaran. 
 
4.3.3. Collected Data 
I gathered primary and secondary data to answer the research questions. I collected five sets 
of information, namely:  
1) Relevant literatures on the topics under study; 
2) Regulatory and institutional laws, programs, written agreement, and plans (both at the 
local and national scales) on street use and informal vending; 
3)  Written and verbal organizational policies and agreements among government officials, 
vendor groups, and other stakeholders (private sector, non-government organizations 
or NGOs) that are relevant to street use and informal vending; 
4) Actual practices of government officials, vendors and other stakeholders affecting the 
vending space governance; 
5)  Perceptions of government officials, vendors and other stakeholders on the formal-
informal interface in contested vending spaces. 
 
These data sets illustrate how formal and informal approaches simultaneously exist and are 
appropriated by different stakeholders. They reveal issues arising from the formal-informal 
interface in governing and appropriating contested vending spaces. In the next section, I 
explain how these data were collected using various methods and sampling techniques. 
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4.3.4. Data Gathering Methods and Sampling Techniques 
The research fieldwork took place between May 2015 and February 2016 in Baclaran vending 
area. Before the fieldwork, a scoping activity was done in February 2015 to gather preliminary 
information about the area. Baclaran is located on the borders of Pasay and Parañaque, two 
component cities of Metropolitan Manila. In what follows, I narrate how I utilized different data 
gathering methods and sampling techniques. 
 
4.3.4.1. Document Review 
Collating secondary information from national and local government offices and NGOs was an 
important step before reviewing the documents. Gathering the first set of materials happened 
during the scoping activity in February 2015. This continued in the succeeding months. I 
collected the documents by visiting university libraries and government offices in-charge of 
developing and implementing formal systems pertaining to informal economy and street 
vending. Collated documents include laws, programs, plans, and agreements that are relevant 
to urban informal economy, informal vending and street use.  
 
The secondary data provided a direction in answering the thesis questions and helped me 
design and revise the interview and FGD guide questions. The materials shed light on formal 
policies and programs relevant to the role of government agencies in governing vending 
spaces. Some documents also present historical accounts on structural factors that contributed 
to informality issues in the Philippines. These accounts, for instance, discuss how colonial 
regimes affected the Philippine economic policies, migration, and urbanization patterns.  
 
4.3.4.2. Interviews 
Interviews proved to be effective in generating experiences and perceptions of various 
stakeholders on processes, structures, and issues affecting street use and informal vending. 
The respondents were divided into seven clusters: 1) national government officials; 2) local 
government officials; 3) members and leaders of organized vendors; 4) unorganized vendors; 
5) NGO leaders; 6) individuals representing the private sector; and 7) academics and 
development workers.  
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In terms of sampling, I employed purposive, quota, and snowball approaches. Purposive 
sampling was done by choosing samples in a deliberate manner (Yin, 2011) to gain “broadest 
range of information and perspectives on the subject of study” (Kuzel, 1992, p. 37). This 
entailed purposively selecting individuals who could provide in-depth information on a particular 
issue and/or contrary evidence or opinions related to the topic to avoid having a bias or any 
appearance of it (Yin, 2011). In this thesis, interviewees were selected through purposive 
sampling from government agencies, vendor organizations, private sector groups and NGOs.  
 
In addition, I used quota sampling, non-proportional quota sampling in particular, which requires 
non-randomly selecting people and enables representation of smaller groups (Trochim, 2006). 
A grid (see Table 4.1, below) guided the non-random selection of quota participants. This grid 
contains attributes relevant to selection of quota, purposive and snowball sampling 
respondents.  
Table 4.1: Sampling Grid 
 Government 
Officials 
Vendors Other Stakeholders 
 National/ 
Regional 
Local (City/ 
Barangay29) 
Member of 
vendors’ group/s 
Un-
organized 
vendors’ 
Private 
Sector & 
Individual 
residents  
Non-
government 
Organizations 
Scholars/ 
Academics 
Male        
Female        
 
For government officials, the minimum quota was at least one representative of each office 
whose tasks are relevant to informal economy and street vending. For vendors, the minimum 
quota was at least one male and one female member of each vendor group. The same number 
served as quota for non-organized vendors. For other stakeholders, at least one representative 
of NGOs and private sector groups involved in activities affecting of vending spaces in Baclaran 
was used as the minimum quota. 
 
The selection of variables in the sampling grid (Table 4.1) stems from two considerations. First, 
the participants’ biological sexual identity is a crucial factor in surfacing multiple views and 
contextual understandings of issues being studied. As Harding (2004) reminds, aside from 
men’s perspectives, women’s unique experiences are critical to address the imbalance in 
                                            
29 Barangay is the smallest political administrative unit in the Philippines. It has formal village-level government 
structure, with elected executive and legislative officials. 
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interpreting realities and producing knowledge. Women’s views are also important as women 
represent a significant number in street trading (Brown, 2006a). It is important to note, however, 
that although biological sexual identity has been a major criterion in the selection of 
respondents, such that there were 45 male participants and 37 female participants, the 
gendered dimensions of urban informality were not part of the thesis’ research questions. Thus, 
the analysis did not dwell on deeper gendered (particularly women-oriented) issues pertaining 
to Baclaran street vending. Second, three major stakeholder groups were identified. These are 
government officials, vendors, and other stakeholders. Government officials involved in the 
implementation of formal systems governing the vending spaces explained institutional issues 
and contexts that affect how the statutory rules operate. The recognition of the layers and 
intricacies within the bureaucracy provided a holistic view of the formal systems. Thus, 
government officials were grouped into national and local categories. While the national leaders 
described the wider policy perspectives, the local bureaucrats discussed the contextual issues 
as they constantly deal with informal players. 
 
Similarly, informal vendors have varying degrees of involvement in the development and 
execution of informal mechanisms to govern vending spaces. When I became familiar with the 
spatial distribution and group affiliation of vendors, I conducted interviews with unorganized 
vendors whose location are far from the stalls of the previous respondents. It was done to 
ensure that interviewees came from different vending locations (Pasay vs. Parañaque 
jurisdiction) and to capture the views of those who have no organization. I also took into account 
the religious affiliation - Christian and Muslim vendors - in choosing the respondents. This was 
crucial in capturing the processes and tensions in governing vending spaces.   
 
The third group of stakeholders consisted of private sector groups and individuals including 
residents and NGOs that are affected by informal vending and/or have worked with government 
institutions and Baclaran street vendors. Individual academics and researchers who have 
studied issues pertaining to informality, planning and governance are also part of this last set 
of informants. 
 
Given the variety of respondents identified above, I also used snowball sampling to complement 
the first two sampling strategies. Through snowball approach, I contacted new interviewees 
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who were suggested by previous respondents.  This technique enabled me to get a clearer 
picture of other stakeholders based on the knowledge of the previous respondents. As Yin 
(2011) notes, this sampling strategy can be acceptable if it is purposeful, not done out of 
convenience, and if there are reasons for choosing the subsequent interviewees. To address 
this concern, the snowball sampling was guided by the same grid used for the quota sampling. 
 
A total of 82 individuals became part of the series of individual and group interviews - 37 
females and 45 males. While most interviews were done with individual respondents, in six 
instances (twice with government officials and four times with vendors) the participants 
requested for group interviews as they did not have other available time for one-on-one 
conversation. Table 4.2 below reflects the sectoral and gender profile of the interviewees.  
 
Table 4.2: Summary of Sectoral and Gender Profile of the Interviewees 
 Government 
Officials 
Vendors Other Stakeholders TOTAL 
 National/ 
Regional 
Local (City/ 
Barangay 
Member of 
vendors’ 
group/s 
Un-
organized 
vendors’ 
Private Sector 
& Individual 
residents  
NGOs Experts  
Male 5 10 7 4 8 3 8 45 
Female 7 9 5 7 6 0 3 37 
TOTAL 12 19 12 11 14 3 10 82 
 
For each interview, a list of guide questions helped in ensuring that the results of the 
conversation were relevant to the thesis. Except for a few interviews with some government 
officials where I used English, all other interviews were conducted in Filipino. I did not encounter 
any issue with language and/or local cultural contexts in talking to the participants since I am 
from the Philippines and familiar with the practices and customs in the country.  I had also 
interviewed street vendors and government officials in previous research projects. I followed 
the ethical procedures by The University of Queensland in conducting the interviews. A digital 
recorder was used to document the interviews. Each recording was then transcribed in Filipino 
and only relevant quotes were translated into English.  
 
4.3.4.3. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
FGDs assume that an individual’s attitudes and beliefs are not shaped in a vacuum and that 
people often need to listen to others’ opinions and understandings to form their own (Marshall 
& Rossman, 2006). Aided by guide questions, FGDs helped in surfacing vendors’ common and 
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different viewpoints in the same conversation.  For the sampling, I employed the non-random 
quota method to get representatives from organized and unorganized vendors. The justification 
presented in Table 4.1 sampling grid was similarly applied to these two categories of hawkers.  
 
The FGDs enabled me to talk to vendors whose diverse views are shaped by their socio-
economic conditions, organizational affiliation, and vending locations, among others. Three 
FGDs took place involving vendors who were not part of the interviews.  Each FGD had different 
set of participants. FGD participants, who were identified through snowball approach, 
comprised the following: 1) members and leaders of vending groups; 2) unorganized vendors 
with varied religious affiliations; and 3) unorganized Muslim vendors.  
 
A total of 8 vendors – 5 females and 3 males – took part in the first FGD. Of the 8 participants, 
6 were Christians and 2 were Muslims. In the second discussion, 7 unorganized vendors 
participated – 5 males and 2 females. In this FGD, 4 of the participants were Christians and 3 
were Muslims. After conducting two FGDs – the first with vendors who have recognized leaders 
and the second with unorganized ones, I realized that while there were Muslim vendors who 
took part in these two discussions, they were a minority in both discussions. It appeared crucial 
to get the Muslim perspectives30 as many vendors and barangay officials claimed that their 
numbers have continued to rise and that they have concerns different from Christian hawkers. 
Thus, a third FGD was convened with Muslim vendors as the participants. Six unorganized 
Muslim vendors got involved in this last FGD – 4 males and 2 females.  
 
Apart from the organizational and religious affiliations of the vendors, I ensured that the vending 
locations of the FGD participants were not in the same area. This helped in tackling issues 
related to variation in vending locations. FGDs were documented through note-taking. In one 
instance, the participants agreed on using digital recording to document the discussion. Photos 
were also taken during the activities after gaining consent from the vendors. Two field 
assistants, who are professional community organizers, assisted in convening the FGDs. 
 
                                            
30 Although religious divide (Christian and Muslim) was a crucial element in the selection of vendor respondents, 
this was not the case among other stakeholders (government officials, private players, NGOs, academics) who 
are predominantly Christian. Thus, I did not include religious affiliation as a general criterion in the selection of 
other stakeholders. In the case of one barangay where the residents and local officials are Muslims, Muslim 
representation was a key criterion in recruiting participants for in-depth interviews and FGDs. 
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4.3.4.4. Observation 
I conducted a series of site and people observations to document and examine how the vendors 
behave in their respective vending spaces, how they enforce the recognized norms, and how 
they interact with one another and with other stakeholders. The observations took place in 
various places at different times to capture the practices and routines that are relevant to the 
formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces. The process followed what Marshall and 
Rossman (2006) suggest as a systematic procedure. In the first few weeks I went to the case 
study area with general areas of concern to cover. After certain patterns and relationships 
emerged through field notes, these themes were compared against preliminary interview and 
FGD results. The results of initial observations also informed some interviews and FGDs. After 
determining some preliminary themes, I came up with more focused observation checklists. 
Using these instruments, observations focusing on specific themes were undertaken to 
examine the patterns and nuances that were initially identified. Some of these themes were a) 
how the vendors interact with street-level bureaucrats and formal stallholders; b) how evictions 
are carried out; and c) how vending affects pedestrian and vehicular traffic. 
 
During the fieldwork, observation activities entailed varying degrees of involvement on my part. 
In observing street spaces, situations, and events, a passive attitude was the strategy. 
Meanwhile, paying attention to people, their activities and interactions, entailed a more active 
role in that I was conversing with some vendors to clarify certain things. For example, when I 
witnessed an eviction enforced by local authorities during an observation activity, I talked to 
some vendors about the schedule of the eviction, whether this was a regular event, and what 
reasons were cited by the officials. There were also instances when I gained the consent of 
vendors to occupy their hawking spaces and observe their activities. While keeping track of the 
practices and interactions, I was also speaking to the vendors and asking them to tell stories 
about their daily routines, aspirations, and the wider prevailing conditions. 
 
In broad terms, the observations generated information on the following: 1) how the formal 
systems operate on the ground; 2) who implement the formal systems and how they deal with 
issues arising from the latter; 3) how informal mechanisms and de facto arrangements function; 
4) who implement the informal mechanisms; 5) the interactions among vendors and other 
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stakeholders; and 6) the empirical visual evidence on the vending practices including how 
vending is done, the products that vendors sell, and the buyers, among others. 
 
Aside from these themes, I was able to capture specific events that are critical to how formal 
regulation, strategies for partnership and negotiation, and mechanisms for collaboration, 
conflict management and accountability among different players are carried out. For instance, 
I saw how several evictions were enforced, how vendors protected their spaces against 
authorities and encroachment of fellow vendors. I was also able to record the number of 
vendors on different streets at various periods in a year.  
 
Field notes, observation checklists and digital camera were used as instruments in capturing 
images and events in the research setting. In every observation, field notes were recorded in 
my fieldwork journal while the photos were saved in a password-protected laptop. In instances 
when it was hard to jot down the observation highlights, I did the note-taking a few hours after 
the actual observation was done. Photographs were taken to capture the scenes, events, 
spatial arrangements, and specific images such as the volume of vendors, vending stalls, 
products sold, and pedestrian and vehicular traffic, among others. 
 
4.3.4.5. Life-history 
In contextualizing the policy and planning issues related to informality and how they affect the 
lives of individual vendors, I utilized life-history as the final method for gathering primary data. 
Watson and Watson-Franke (1985) define life-history as “any retrospective account by the 
individual of his [or her] life in whole or part, in written or oral form, that has been elicited or 
prompted by another person” (p. 2, authors’ italics). In this thesis, this entailed chronicling the 
life-histories of seven vendors – 5 women and 2 men, with different backgrounds and who 
became part of the conducted interviews. Besides recounting the narratives, I observed the 
different activities of these hawkers at various days in a week. In three instances, the vendors 
welcomed me into their residences.  
 
While I acknowledge the difficulty in generalizing information derived from life-history accounts, 
the narratives helped me better understand the daily activities and struggles of street vendors, 
the responses they employ to deal with their problems, their arrangements with other 
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stakeholders to occupy the streets, and the power relations influencing their everyday lives. In 
this way, this method generated “nuanced accounts that subvert established knowledge” 
(Lewis, 2008, p. 562). In selecting the respondents for this method, I considered the following: 
gender, age, duration of being a vendor, ethnic background, location of vending stalls, and 
involvement in vending groups. Three transcribers helped me encode the recorded life-
narratives of the chosen vendors. 
 
4.3.5. Strategies for Contacting the Participants 
With respect to specific steps undertaken to get in touch with the participants, Figure 4-1 below 
demonstrates how I identified and selected the respondents for the interviews, FGDs and life-
history. I started identifying the respondents through the document review where I focused on 
1) the government agencies involved in the implementation of formal systems; 2) the vendor 
organizations employing informal mechanisms in contested vending spaces; and 3) academics 
who have studied informal vending issues in relation to planning and governance.  
 
 
Figure 4-1: Respondent Selection Flowchart 
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Based on the list of agencies and organizations, individuals representing these groups - agency 
heads or organizational leaders, formed the first set of interviewees. Once interviewed, these 
respondents then served as sources for contacting new set of participants via snowball 
sampling approach. After getting in touch with the identified persons, I asked for their consent 
to be part of the research as interviewees. 
 
The list of names referred by the first set of interviewees and who agreed to take part in the 
research constituted the second batch of interviewees. For both the national and local 
government respondents, the interviewees were identified based on the predetermined list of 
offices whose legal mandates have to do with informal economy, street use, and informal 
vending. I also used snowball purposive sampling by asking for the recommendations of 
officials who were already interviewed about other agencies whose functions are also relevant 
to planning, informal economy, and street vending. A series of visits and conversations with 
officials of these suggested offices was conducted.  
 
In terms of getting access to vendors, three factors were crucial. First, the referrals from 
barangay officials were important as most street hawkers were suspicious of individuals who 
collect information about vendors and their activities. I also got in touch with the individuals 
identified by the previously interviewed leaders. The second factor was the timing of interviews. 
In Baclaran, Wednesdays, Saturdays and Sundays31 are considered as peak days for selling. 
The interviews with vendors were done outside these days and most conversations took place 
at their stalls or pwesto. Finally, in instances when it became difficult to go to the case study 
area and talk to vendors due to a number of evictions conducted by the government, the role 
of veteran community organizers who are familiar with the political dynamics in Pasay and 
Parañaque was critical. They assisted in gaining access to officials and vendors who are not 
affiliated with known leaders in the area.    
 
With respect to identifying the respondents for the private sector, I utilized two approaches – 
purposive sampling and snowball purposive technique. For managers and stall owners in 
shopping malls in Baclaran, purposive sampling was done by identifying all the commercial 
                                            
31 These are the days when many people troop to Baclaran. Wednesday is locally known as ‘Baclaran Day’ due 
to the weekly day-long Novena, which according to a church leader attracts roughly 120,000 devotees. During 
weekends, buyers and commuters also roam around the Baclaran streets. 
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shopping establishments in the area which are affected by and/or in close proximity to vending 
spaces. I sent out formal letters to mall managers and interviewed those who agreed to be part 
of the research.  
 
For other individuals such as formal stall owners, private residents, property owner, private 
employees and jeepney drivers, snowball purposive sampling was employed. Besides sub-
group representation, I ensured that the residential/property or employment areas of the 
interviewees are located either in Pasay or Parañaque.  
 
When it comes to NGOs, I identified the participants after doing a series of field visits and 
interviews with vendors and barangay officials who provided information about NGOs in the 
area. Three NGO leaders were interviewed. They represent the Redemptorist Church (more 
popularly known as ‘Baclaran Church’), a Muslim Religious Group, and the Baclaran Vendors’ 
Development Cooperative.  
 
Finally, getting the views of academics and experienced individuals is important in making 
sense of certain information that seems tricky at a glance. I spoke with two planning academics 
– one is an expert on land use planning, the other on institutional planning – to solicit their ideas 
on issues surrounding planning and urban informality. Two other scholars, one on community 
organizing in the Philippines and the other on religious practices in Baclaran -  shed light on 
collective action initiatives vis-à-vis informal vendors’ conditions and agency. 
  
In order to gain a more textured and sectoral insights about street vending organizing and local 
politics in the study area, I first interviewed some personal contacts who in turn referred me to 
other urban poor leaders and political organizers. Thus, I was able to conduct a series of 
conversations with veteran vendor organizers, urban poor community organizers, local political 
operators and urban poor leaders.   
 
4.3.6. Data Analysis  
The data collection methods employed in the thesis - document review, interviews, focus group 
discussions (FGDs), observation, and life-history - served as a triangulation strategy to 
strengthen the validity of the findings. Figure 4-2 on page 81 illustrates how the data gathering 
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techniques, which were divided into three stages, complemented each other in validating the 
collected data. The diagram also shows how the data were examined.  
 
 
Figure 4-2: Data Gathering Process and Analysis 
 
The Stage 1 focused on document review which yielded information and themes relevant to 
answering the research questions. Guided by the retroductive inference, the initial themes 
generated through the document review informed the revision of instruments such as the 
interview and FGD guides and the broad observation checklist. This phase provided preliminary 
and limited answer to sub-questions 1 to 4 as the document review was able to identify some 
players and explain their roles and governing relations in the formal-informal interface. 
 
The Stage 2 generated primary data through the first set of interviews, observations and FGDs. 
Using the Nvivo software, the data were categorized into themes represented by Nvivo nodes. 
Some of these themes include vendors’ collective action, conflicts and tensions between 
players, and eviction episodes, among others. The identified themes emerged from the thesis’ 
Retroductive
Inference
Retroductive
Inference
Abductive
Inference
Retroductive
-Abductive
Inference
Desktop 
Research
Document 
Review
Inputs to
Interview 
Guide
FGD Guide
Observation 
broad 
checklist
Stage 1
Interviews
Focused 
Observation
Clarify & 
validate findings
Seek further 
explanation
Analysis of 
Qualitative 
Data
Stage 3
Retroductive-
Abductive
Inference
Document 
Review
Preliminary 
Analysis of 
Qualitative Data
Interview 
Guide
Observation 
checklist
Life-history
Interviews
FGDs
Observation
Outputs
Qualitative 
Data
Themes captured 
by existing theories
Emerging themes 
not captured by 
theories/concepts
Stage 2
Legend
Stages Data gathering methods
Analytical approaches
Outputs Data gathering tools
82 
 
conceptual framework and the synthesizing concepts from the literature review. As the data 
analysis continued, new themes – e.g. planning approaches, seasonal dimensions of street 
vending, and financial problems of hawkers - were added based on the emerging issues and 
topics.  
 
Retroductive and abductive approaches guided the classification and examination of ideas. As 
explained in Section 4.1, the retroductive approach treats the theoretical premise as the take-
off point for finding sound explanation on certain phenomenon (e.g. formal-informal interface in 
this thesis) while the abductive inference begins with analysing the findings that are outside the 
realm of the identified theoretical frame/s.  
 
After clustering the emerging themes, the Stage 2 continued with another round of document 
review and chronicling of life-history accounts. The clustered themes developed from this phase 
were compared against the results from these two methods. This comparison validated and 
contextualized the themes and ideas through the retroductive-abductive process, which served 
as the preliminary analysed data. The processed information from the Stage 2 provided 
answers to the sub-questions 1 to 4 and served as inputs for tackling the main question and 
the sub-question 5. The analysed data also guided the development of a more focused 
observation checklist and guide questions for in-depth interviews. When these instruments got 
finalized, the Stage 3 began. 
 
The last stage (Stage 3) dealt with focused observations and another round of interviews to 
clarify and validate the initially examined information and to seek further explanation on the 
established as well as the emerging themes. Encoded field notes from observations were 
processed using the Nvivo software. In this phase, focused observations meant paying closer 
attention to themes and issues that surfaced through the previously conducted observations, 
interview, and FGDs.  Besides these data gathering activities, it was in this final phase when I 
repeatedly coded the new data, identified and modified analytical themes, and examined the 
patterns, nuances, and issues in the established themes. Retroductive and abductive 
approaches guided this process of coding and analysis. Using the examined data, the Stage 3 
enabled me to answer the main research question (formal-informal interface) and the five sub-
questions.  
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4.4. Conclusion 
I this chapter, I have explained the thesis’ methodological framework beginning with the 
ontological and epistemological stance. I have touched on the case study design, the needed 
data, the data collection methods, the sampling techniques, and the data analysis process. In 
explaining these different aspects of the research design, I have begun unfolding the complexity 
of documenting the many accounts from various stakeholders in the chosen study area. The 
succeeding chapters tackle these dimensions of the research. In the next chapter, I discuss the 
thesis’ case study area focusing on its location and contextual issues. 
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CHAPTER 5. BACLARAN’S BROADER CONTEXTS AND SOCIO-SPATIAL FUNCTIONS 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I emphasized the role of case study in producing analytic generalization 
and context-dependent knowledge. To understand the conditions in which the collected data 
are rooted, I explain in this chapter the broader contexts that shed light on the formal-informal 
interface in contested vending spaces. I first present the historical and structural issues that 
have influenced the Philippine political economy and urbanization patterns.  After discussing 
the larger picture, I dwell on the main characteristics of Baclaran, the case study area, as an 
urban informal vending site. In the final section, I discuss the implications of key themes, which 
emerge from the structural issues in the Philippines and Metropolitan Manila, for Baclaran 
condition. 
 
5.2. The Philippine Political Economy and Urbanization Patterns: A Historical Gaze 
In informality literature, urban informal practices are seen as situated in territories that contain 
geographically extensive and transnational linkages (Bunnell & Harris, 2012; Donovan, 2008; 
Tucker, 2016). These cross-border connections are rooted in historical trajectories, which 
shape urban relations (Oriard, 2015; Ortega, 2016; Shatkin, 2008). Similarly, the street vending 
literature shows how urban policies hinge on broader national and international trends (Hlela, 
2003; Hanser, 2016; Tucker, 2016) and historical issues (Coquery-Vidovitch, 1991; Oriard, 
2015; Recio et al., 2017). These spatial and historical connections are important in the 
Philippines where colonialism has maintained an enduring impact on property relations (Ortega, 
2012), urban development design, and planning policies in former colonial centres (Caoili, 
1988).  
 
With these considerations, the subsequent section narrates how the larger historical issues and 
socio-spatial relations in the Philippines have influenced Metropolitan Manila, the country’s 
primary urban region within which Baclaran is historically and politically embedded. Its intention 
is not to provide a holistic historical account; rather, it aims to present key junctures – events, 
policies, issues – that have influenced the Philippine political economy and Metropolitan 
Manila’s socio-spatial evolution. 
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5.2.1. Colonial Urbanization Patterns and Socio-Spatial Relations 
Manila, the core city of the Philippines’s primary metropolitan region, is considered today as 
one of the world’s densest places. People attach traffic congestion, pollution, and chaotic 
spatial patterns when they describe the city. Novelist Dan Brown even calls it ‘the Gates of Hell’ 
in his 2013 Inferno book. These descriptions are far from the grandiose title ‘the noble and ever 
loyal city’, which Manila gained from Spanish King, Felipe II, in 1574. So, how has Manila’s 
historical evolution influenced the Philippine political economy and the country’s urbanization 
patterns? 
 
Since its establishment as the Spanish colonial capital in 157132, Manila had witnessed for over 
300 years how the foreign invaders altered the country’s land ownership and property relations. 
One strong Spanish influence on the Philippines was the change in land tenure where private 
ownership of land and monetary exchange emerged as an important system (Constantino, 
1975; Cushner, 1976; Serote, 1991). Subsistence cultivation and land use gave way to 
production for exchange and market purposes as a new agricultural pattern (Cushner, 1976).  
This change from communal to private land ownership resulted in social class formation 
composed of lessors, small farmers, sharecroppers, landless labourers and landlords. The 
landowning class later on controlled the economic and political power while peasants and 
sharecroppers experienced land dispossession through various colonial impositions (Caoili, 
1985, 1988; Constantino, 1975; Cushner, 1976). Many native residents lost their lands to 
powerful religious orders33 (Cushner, 1976; Duldulao, 1998) because of tribute tax and forced 
labour (Duldulao, 1998). Moreover, bandala or the compulsory sale of agricultural products to 
government, often at prices lower than market rates, impelled rural dwellers and landless 
labourers to move to Manila and its suburbs resulting in an accelerated urbanization (Caoili, 
1985; 1988).  
 
As Manila generated urban migration, the local economy became connected to international 
trading system through the galleon trade, where Manila functioned as a way-station for 
gathering of silks and other Asian luxuries for shipment across the Pacific (Reed, 1967). By the 
                                            
32 Spanish conquistador Miguel Lopez de Legazpi occupied Manila after he won savage battles against the natives 
in 1571 (Constantino, 1975; Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016). 
33  Cushner (1976, p. 35) even noted that by the eighteenth century “the religious orders had become the largest 
single group of landed estate owners” due to the unwillingness or “inability of Spanish laymen to engage in 
agricultural pursuits”. 
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19th century, the country became part of the world capitalism when the European free trade 
induced Spain to open the Philippines to world trade (Caoili, 1985; Francisco & Arriola, 1987). 
Although there were changes in the rural communities because of high demand for cash crops, 
the Philippine urban areas, primarily Manila, remained the loci of change (Reed, 1967).  
 
When landless farmers flocked to Manila and its suburbs, they built settlements near 
commercial district and cigar factories (Doeppers, 1998). While many of them ended up as 
workers in cigar factories (Reed, 1967), some engaged in what is currently regarded as informal 
work.  In particular, people living in Creekside neighbourhoods outside Intramuros34, notably 
the Sampaloc suburb, served as launderers for Intramuros residents (Doeppers, 1998; 
Ocampo, 1992). There were also tinderas (retail shopkeepers) in the 1890s in Manila’s Tondo 
and Sampaloc districts (Doeppers, 1998). Their retail shops, which were located adjacent to or 
in the silong or open space below the house (Doeppers, 1998), resemble the contemporary 
informal home-based retail practices in urban settlements in the country. Even Chinese sari-
sari stores35 were ubiquitous features of urban landscape in the middle of the nineteenth 
century (Reed, 1967).  
 
The foregoing account shows how the introduction of private land ownership, the peasants’ 
land deprivation, forced labour, tribute tax and bandala led to migration and urbanization in 
Manila and neighbouring areas.  It also illustrates how some activities, which are considered 
today as part of urban informal economy, existed during the Spanish occupation. At the same 
time, the colonial political economy hinged on internationally-oriented agricultural production. 
This reliance on international market continued under the American occupation.  
 
When the Americans from the United States hijacked in 1898 the short-lived Filipino 
independence under the first Philippine Republic, they came upon a deeply unequal society. 
The collaboration between the new colonizers and the local elites led to a centralized and 
oligarchic political system, where big landlords were controlling the agricultural lands since 
agrarian reform was confined to friar lands (Francisco & Arriola, 1987). The free trade 
                                            
34 Intramuros (Latin for within walls) was Manila’s 1.2 square kilometre walled city, which served as the political-
administrative and religious seat of power during the Spanish regime (Cushner, 1976). 
35 Sari-sari (a Tagalog term for variety) stores are home-based retail shops that offer a range of household goods 
and food products. Currently, it is considered as a form of informal petty trade practice.	
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institutionalization in the country in 1909 through the Payne-Aldrich Act had placed large 
landholdings in the hands of local and American businesses. This kept the Philippine 
agricultural sector export-oriented and made the country a supplier of raw materials and a 
consumer of finished products (Francisco & Arriola, 1987).  
 
As the development in the rural areas continued to be oriented towards the urban and 
international demands, Manila maintained its primate city status. The Americans developed a 
masterplan for Manila following Daniel Burnham’s ‘City Beautiful’ model. Beyond the glittering 
façade of Burnham’s plan, however, the social inequities in the Philippines had merely turned 
the city into “a symbol of the failures of American rule” (Shatkin, 2006, p. 585). Even the grand 
features of the plan had not been realized as the World War II ruined the old Manila.  
 
A few years after the war, the Philippines gained independence from the United States of 
America (USA) in 1946 ending the 381 years of colonial occupation. Throughout the almost 
four centuries of foreign rule, Manila sustained its rank as the country’s foremost city (Reed, 
1967). This dominant urban status of Manila, along with other fundamental issues, would 
persist as the young independent nation began charting its own destiny. 
 
5.2.2. Confronting the Continuing Problems: Post-War to Present-day Metro Manila 
The destruction of Manila during the World War II led to suburban exodus and expansion of the 
metropolis as more rural migrants moved to the city (Flieger, Koppin, & Lim, 1976; Ortega, 
2016; Pascual, 1966). The post-war urban migration caused by rural unrest36, 
underdevelopment and people’s desire for better job opportunities had strained the capacity of 
local governments in Manila and its adjacent areas - now dubbed as Metro Manila (van 
Naerssen, Ligthart, & Zapanta, 1996).  Local governments had to address urban congestion, 
poor housing condition, inadequate water supply, health and sanitation problems, and public 
transport management (Caoili, 1985).  
 
                                            
36 Some factors that contributed to the rural unrest had to do with the expulsion of the Democratic Alliance (a party 
of socialist and communist leaders) which forced some leaders to go underground and embraced a rebel cause 
against the State. The World War II had also compelled many rural folks to migrate to the city due to the loss of a 
huge number of farm carabaos (water buffaloes), “which were either killed for food or were casualties of fighting” 
(Alcazaren et al., 2011, p. 61). 
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In spite of these challenges, Metro Manila kept its primacy so that by 1975 it accounted for 
12.4% of the country’s population and 47.4 percent of industrial employment (Pernia, 
Paderanga Jr, & Hermoso, 1983). By 1980, its 5.9 million populations were close to eight times 
larger than the country’s second largest urban centre (Pernia et al., 1983). As part of the 
nation’s central industrial region, Metro Manila’s dominance arguably resulted from the 
government’s economic policies. In fact, between the late 1940s and 1970s the region 
benefited from the state’s import-substitution policy and the return to export promotion (Pernia 
et al., 1983).  
 
As Metro Manila areas enjoyed locational-economic advantages and grappled with intense 
urban migration, the traditional elites continued to control the country’s political and economic 
power in a clientelist and particularistic political atmosphere.  This condition fostered 
dependency on the USA-influenced Philippine economic policies even after the 1946 liberation 
(Caoili, 1985). Additionally, the wealthy landed class began investing in Metro Manila’s growing 
economy. The intense urbanization also led to the growth of new classes – industrial labour, 
the intelligentsia, and the middle class – who influenced the political environment (Shatkin, 
2007). This was the broader context when Ferdinand Marcos, Sr. began his regime. 
 
When the Marcos administration moved from import substitution to export promotion, it 
considered the spatial dimension of development. There was an emphasis towards 
geographical diversification and export-oriented agricultural sector outside the country’s central 
industrial region (Pernia et al., 1983). Yet, this regionalization policy was often overwhelmed by 
reconcentration as decision-making processes took place at the centre (Alcazaren et al., 2011). 
Reconcentration manifested in forming the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) in 1975, which 
consolidated 17 cities and towns under one government agency in-charge of planning and 
policy-making (Caoili, 1985; Shatkin, 2007). Established to address rapid urbanization and 
growth in Metro Manila, it was viewed as part of political manoeuvres to consolidate the regime, 
carry out a foreign-funded national development plan, and neutralize political opponents and 
radical groups (Ruland, 1985).  
 
Reconcentration and consolidation of power permeated down to Metro Manila’s 
neighbourhoods. Months after Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, the government 
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established neighbourhood organizations (barangays) throughout the country. Portrayed as 
instruments for citizen participation, delivery of basic services, and agents of development, 
barangays became the Marcos regime’s “grassroots eyes and ears” (van Naerssen et al., 1996, 
p. 174) to exert control over urban poor communities37, which were potential source of 
subversive elements and social unrest (Bello, Kinley, & Elinson, 1982; Ruland, 1985).  
 
As Marcos consolidated political power, he enforced his ‘modernist’ approach (Shatkin, 2006) 
and ‘Western-style’ development (Ruland, 1985) through authoritarian measures, patronage 
ties, and corruption. Yet, the systemic government corruption, human rights violations, military 
abuses, rising poverty, and the growing political disenchantment gradually hounded the 
dictator’s reign (Ruland, 1985). His employment of competent technocrats was not enough to 
arrest the worsening economic conditions manifested in the country’s ballooning debt. The 
killing of Benigno ‘Ninoy’ Aquino, Jr., a prominent opposition leader, further fuelled the growing 
resistance from student movements, faith-based groups, labour unions, middle class, and 
disenchanted corporate sector, among others. In February 1986, the series of mass actions 
protesting the fraudulent presidential election results eventually culminated in Marcos ouster. 
New political-economic players came to the fore with their respective interests.  
 
In the post-Marcos Philippines, rich landed families have adeptly used their wealth to 
perpetuate themselves in national and local government posts (Shatkin, 2008). This contributed 
to a system of ‘booty capitalism’, where “powerful business class extracts privilege from a 
largely incoherent bureaucracy” (Hutchcroft, 1998, p. 20). Elite domination has continued to 
date as the nation becomes integrated into globalization and the state embraces neo-liberal 
policies characterized by privatization, deregulation, liberalization, and debt repayment (Bello, 
Docena, de Guzman, & Malig, 2004). In this globalization era, the government’s role is to 
develop the capital city as a ‘global city’ that can attract foreign investments, generate jobs 
(Ortega, 2012), and convince their citizens to believe in the “power of global integration to 
transform their societies” (Shatkin, 2006, p. 581).  
 
                                            
37 In Chapter 7, I discuss the effects of this Marcos political strategy on the contemporary urban governance in 
Baclaran’s contested spaces. 
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Towards this end, infrastructure and social investment has remained concentrated in Metro 
Manila and its surrounding regions. This time, Metro Manila acts as 1) the command and control 
centre for the country’s integration into the global economy; 2) the centre for consumption; 3) 
an area for tourist trade; and 4) a city of labour export (Shatkin, 2006). Given the new roles of 
the country’s primary metropolis, the national government is seen as a mere facilitator for 
creating business-oriented and investment-friendly regions for the global market (Ortega, 2012; 
Porio, 2016; Shatkin, 2008). This drive towards neoliberal-oriented agenda has produced a 
bifurcated space “between the privately planned ‘global city’ for the middle and upper classes 
and the neglected and marginalized spaces of the rest of the population” (Shatkin, 2006, p. 
600). In his work, Shatkin (2008) explains that this socio-spatial pattern emanates from ‘bypass-
implant urbanism’, a condition where  
“… private developers have been granted considerable power to reengineer cities to 
create new spaces for production and consumption, and to facilitate the flow of people 
and capital between these spaces, by `bypassing' the congested arteries of the `public 
city' and `implanting' new spaces for capital accumulation that are designed for 
consumerism and export-oriented production. (Shatkin, 2008, p. 388) 
 
In terms of institutional design, bypass-implant urbanism stems from the ‘privatization of 
planning’ where the government passes on to the private sector “the power over and 
responsibility for the visioning of urban futures and the exercise of social action for urban 
change” (Shatkin, 2008, p. 388). Shatkin (2004) also links this privatization trend to external 
factors such as the economic impacts of globalization, the new real estate market, the 
accessibility of funding from international capital, and the influence of foreign planners and 
architects.  
 
Mega-projects offering agglomeration of corporate investment, residential use, and recreational 
activities represent the bypass-implant urban development. Spaces of these projects are 
carefully planned and strictly regulated to prevent ‘informalization’ and distinguish them from 
the neglected ‘public’ city in Metro Manila (Shatkin, 2008). Ortega (2016) considers these 
mega-projects as urban gentrification in the neo-liberal age. Apart from the active role of private 
corporations, this gentrification necessitates a struggle against urban informality, which pertains 
to urban poor’s informal settlements (Ortega, 2016) and self-initiated economic activities.  
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Thus far, I have presented in the preceding discussion the historical trajectory that has 
influenced the Philippine political economy and Metro Manila’s urbanization patterns. How have 
these dynamics affected Baclaran? Before tackling the implications of the issues explained 
above, in the next section I touch on Baclaran’s historical past and its present socio-spatial 
characteristics. 
 
5.3. From Colonial to Global Era: Baclaran through the Years 
Baclaran comes from the Tagalog word ‘baklad’ which is a native instrument for fishing. Before 
the Philippine government launched a massive reclamation project near this coastal area, 
Baclaran was a small fishing village famous for its baklads and dubbed as the “bakladan”, which 
later on became “baclaran”. While Barangay Baclaran is part of the political and administrative 
jurisdiction of Parañaque City, the area occupied by many street vendors also covers some 
barangays in the neighbouring Pasay City.  
 
In this study, Baclaran (see Figure 5-1, on page 92) refers to the area occupied by informal 
vendors, which traverses one barangay in Parañaque (Barangay Baclaran) and five barangays 
in Pasay (Barangays 77, 78, 79, 145 and 146). In terms of land area coverage, barangays in 
Pasay are far smaller than those in Parañaque. The total land area of Pasay’s five barangays 
is 21.7 hectares while Parañaque’s Barangay Baclaran covers 69.8 hectares. As I will discuss 
below, this difference in barangay land area coverage has an impact on control over contested 
vending spaces. In terms of population size, the 2015 Philippine census reveals 9,921 residents 
in five barangays in Pasay and 28,385 dwellers in one barangay in Parañaque. Baclaran’s 
location on the boundaries of two cities provides an opportunity to compare how the local 
governments deal with informal vending in their territories.  
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Source: Metropolitan Manila Map - http://www.retireinthephilippines.info/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/metro-manila-map.gif 
 
Figure 5-1: Location of Baclaran (The Case Study Area) 
 
Historically, Baclaran was part of arrabales settlements, which constituted the towns within the 
fifteen-mile radius of Manila’s Intramuros (Cushner, 1976), the Spanish colonial capital for over 
300 years. In particular, Pasay was part of a large land estate surrounding Manila. When the 
Americans from the United States occupied the Philippines, they introduced subdivisions and 
established the Pasay Estate, covering the areas of San Andres (Manila) to Baclaran. Beyond 
the areas reserved for the wealthy, one American realtor described the Pasay Estate’s 
haphazard pattern as “slums” (Alcazaren et al., 2011). Until now, the remnants of this Estate 
manifest in large parcels of individual gated lots with big houses in the midst of poor slum-like 
communities. 
 
Location of Baclaran
vending district
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After the colonial period, Pasay and Parañaque became part of what is now Metropolitan 
Manila. It happened in 1975 when then President Ferdinand Marcos formed the Metro Manila 
Commission (Caoili, 1988; Shatkin, 2007). Another Marcosian political strategy that has 
impacted on the current conditions of Baclaran was the establishment of neighbourhood 
organizations (barangays) throughout the country. Portrayed as instruments for citizen 
participation and agents of development, barangays became Marcos’ platform to exert control 
over urban poor communities (Bello et al., 1982; Ruland, 1985).  
 
In relation to Baclaran, the creation of barangays led to certain local political dynamics. In 
Pasay, Pablo Cuneta, then City Mayor and Marcos ally, requested for the establishment of 200 
small barangays. This explains why Pasay’s many barangays are undersized in land area 
compared with that of Parañaque’s.  Cuneta reasoned that since the Presidential Decree for 
establishing barangays did not specify particular number and size, “[t]he more barangay 
captains [chairs] named, the better to please more [local] political leaders. More importantly, in 
line with the national policy of rendering financial aid to each barangay, more of them meant 
more national government subsidy pouring into coffers of Pasay City” (Duldulao, 1998, p. 55). 
This astute move enabled Cuneta to choose his political ward leaders as barangay officials. In 
the long run, it has nurtured deeper political patronage relations in smaller spatially partitioned 
barangays. In Pasay, the little involvement of barangays in governing vending spaces partly 
arises from the fact the vendors’ residential areas and voting registration are geographically 
dispersed in five barangays. This has allowed the city government to have full control over 
vendor leaders. 
 
It was also during the Marcos authoritarian regime when the Perpetual Shrine in Baclaran 
served as an important civic space as political dissidents sought refuge in the church 
(Hechanova, 1998; Sapitula, 2013b). When a series of mass protests ousted Marcos, Aquino’s 
revolutionary government appointed an officer-in-charge for Barangay Baclaran, treating it as 
an independent town for a short time. Then between the late 1980s and early 1990s, Baclaran 
began earning the reputation as a commercial centre for affordable garments and other 
merchandises.  
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By the mid-1990s, when the implementation of neo-liberal policies reached its peak in the 
Philippines (Bello, 2017), Chinese traders were already renting commercial stalls in Baclaran 
and competing with local entrepreneurs for spaces and customers.  It was also during this 
period when many migrants began occupying Baclaran streets as informal hawkers. One study 
notes that about 60% of Baclaran vendors were from Luzon provinces while 29% were from 
the Visayas areas (Valladolid, 1996). Towards the end the 1990s, Muslim traders and poor 
migrants from Mindanao began settling in Baclaran’s residential areas. Many of these 
Mindanaoans ended up working as sales staff in shopping malls or as street vendors. 
 
Currently, Baclaran is in the middle of major transport nodes and a mega-project dubbed as 
the Bay City, a mixed-use agglomeration of commercial centres such as the ASEANA City and 
the Mall of Asia Complex (Ortega, 2016; Rivera, 2014). This large-scale public-private urban 
development project, an outcome of Marcos land reclamation project, intends to showcase the 
area as Asia’s Broadway and promote Manila as a world-class Philippine capital (Dumlao-
Abadilla, 2015). As an urban district occupied by many poor residents and informal traders, 
Baclaran’s present location arguably fits Shatkin’s (2008) notion of ‘public city’, which is 
characterized by congested arteries and neglected spaces situated between carefully planned 
commercial areas like the Bay City. The next section expands this discussion of Baclaran 
location and relates its contemporary land use patterns to the larger Metro Manila’s socio-
spatial arrangements. 
 
5.4. Baclaran’s Socio-Spatial Functions 
Pasay and Parañaque’s official land use maps designate Baclaran as a commercial and a 
residential area. The two maps below (Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3) show this official 
classification. 
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Figure 5-2: Baclaran Area as Identified in Pasay's Land Use Map 
The Baclaran vending district is designated as a commercial zone and a 
residential area in Pasay City’s 2001-2010 Land Use Map 
Source: Pasay City Comprehensive Land Use Plan 2001-2010 
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Figure 5-3: Baclaran Area as Identified in Parañaque's Land Use Map 
 
The Baclaran vending district is designated as a commercial zone and an 
institutional area in Parañaque City’s 2001-2010 Land Use Map 
Source: Parañaque City’s Land Use and Zoning Map 2007 
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The series of observations, however, revealed that Baclaran is home to establishments with 
diverse functions. Figure 5-4 on page 98 shows that Baclaran serves as a dynamic space for 
settlement, transport, and socio-cultural activities. One of the everyday functions pertains to 
religious practices. The National Shrine of Our Lady of Perpetual Help, popularly known as 
Baclaran Church, is in Barangay Baclaran. In an interview, church leader, Francis, said that 
around 120,000 devotees visit this Catholic pilgrimage site every Wednesday. This contributes 
to the large volume of foot traffic in Baclaran. Two other Christian structures - one for Iglesia ni 
Cristo38 (Church of Christ) members and another for Protestant believers - are located in the 
area.  Aside from these churches, three Mosques stand in Baclaran, which caters to Muslim 
residents and traders. This congregation of different religious establishments close to 
manufacturing and commercial centres is one of Baclaran’s unique features. 
 
As a commercial district, Baclaran welcomes shoppers who want to buy cheap products such 
as shoes, bags, clothes, household accessories, and schools supplies, among others. Sold in 
shopping malls and wholesale centres, these goods are a source of income for informal vendors 
who have used Baclaran streets for a living.  
 
In terms of its relationship to the spatial arrangement of Metropolitan Manila, Baclaran was 
already a metropolitan transport hub even before the construction of malls in the 1990s. There 
were bus terminals for people going to and from nearby cities and provinces. In 1984, the 
completion of the Baclaran Light Rail Transit (LRT) terminal, the last South-bound station of 
Southeast Asia’s first LRT, attracted more people to the area. This LRT line runs in the south-
north direction along the west side of Manila with initial 64 cars and a capacity of 374 
passengers - 81 seated and 293 standing at normal capacity (Pacheco-Raguz, 2010). 
 
In 2014, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) data showed that 
Baclaran LRT station alone had an average of about two million passengers every month39. 
Baclaran is also close to the busiest station of the Metro Rail Transit (MRT3), which had a 
monthly average of 2, 427, 220 passengers in 2014 (DOTC, 2015).  
                                            
38 Iglesia ni Cristo or INC is an international Christian domination founded in the Philippines in 1914. 
39 Based on the DOTC 2015 data, the actual monthly average is 1, 992,102 passengers. 
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Sources: Data source – Author’s fieldwork observations; Street Map – Google Maps (2015) 
 
 
Figure 5-4: Baclaran as a Strategic Space for Multiple Activities 
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Figure 5-5: Baclaran Area and its Relationship to Metro Manila Road Networks 
The Baclaran vending area is nestled in the 
Metropolitan Manila major road network
Roxas Boulvevard as 
Radial Road 1 or R1
Taft Avenue 
Extension and 
Quirino Rod as 
Radial Road 2 or R2
EDSA as 
Circumferential Road 
3 or C3
Sources: Data source – Author’s fieldwork observations; Street Map – Google Maps (2015); 
Simplified Road Network Map – Wikipedia (2015)
SCALE BAR 
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In addition, Baclaran is nestled within three major roads considered as important in the 
metropolitan-wide transportation network. Figure 5-5 on page 99 illustrates this relationship 
of Baclaran to major road networks in Metro Manila. Two radial roads – the Roxas Boulevard 
(radial road 1) to the West and the stretch of Taft Avenue-Quirino Road (radial road 2) to 
the East – serve as key thoroughfares for public and private vehicles. A few meters up north 
is the location of Metro Manila’s busiest road – the Epifanio De Los Santos Avenue (EDSA), 
which functions as the region’s circumferential road 3 (C3). This puts Baclaran as a key 
transport channel since Metro Manila’s radial and circumferential roads are part of the 
region’s arterial road network, which connects its component cities and the surrounding 
provinces.  
 
In terms of national and international trips, Baclaran is very close to the country’s busiest 
airport – the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). Because of its proximity to NAIA and 
its reputation as home of affordable merchandises, some local officials have even proposed 
to make Baclaran a major destination for tourists who are looking for local products and 
souvenirs. 
 
Baclaran’s role in Metro Manila’s transport channels is crucial since the metropolis has been 
experiencing slow traffic at an average speed of 12 kilometre per hour (kph) during peak 
hours, which is much slower than Bangkok (21 kph) and Jakarta (26 kph) (Webster, Corpuz, 
& Pablo, 2003). This is due in part to the increasing volume of vehicles, which was over 1.5 
million or close to 30% of the country’s registered automobiles in 2006 (Pacheco-Raguz, 
2010). The government’s insufficient and erratic efforts to improve public transport have 
likewise aggravated the traffic problem. In fact, the government has not provided new high 
capacity public transit facilities (e.g. MRT or BRT) since the 1990s; while the limited road 
construction has been unable to keep pace with the volume of vehicles (Pacheco-Raguz, 
2010).  
 
Given the issues presented in the foregoing discussion, what emerging lessons could 
interweave the broader contexts with Baclaran’s situation? In the section that follows, I 
explain the implications of the historical issues and socio-economic conditions for Baclaran. 
 
5.5. Structural Issues and the Baclaran Context: Lessons and Implications 
In the first section of this chapter I narrated the evolution of the broader socio-political system 
that encompasses urban planning in the Philippines. From this brief historical account, five 
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interrelated themes have emerged as important in understanding Metropolitan Manila and 
its component areas like Baclaran. These themes include 1) the Philippine economy’s link 
to international trade; 2) Manila’s prominence as urban centre; 3) the unabated rural-to-
urban migration; 4) the unequal and elite-dominated political economy; and 5) the varied 
forms of agency and resistance. In the subsequent paragraphs, I explain the importance of 
these issues to Baclaran context. 
 
5.5.1. The Philippine economy’s link to international trade 
In Sections 5.1 and 5.2 above, I showed how the colonial Philippine economy became linked 
to international trading system through the Spanish galleon trade and the American export-
oriented economic paradigm. In the post-colonial Philippines, the government started 
implementing in the 1970s a set neo-liberal policies40 under Marcos’ authoritarian regime 
(Ofreneo & Habana, 1987). In the succeeding decades, the Philippine government has 
adhered to the rhetoric of globalization and economic neoliberalism reached its apogee in 
the mid-1990s (Bello, 2017). While neo-liberal policies have attracted foreign investment 
since the 1970s, they have similarly restrained livelihood opportunities for majority of the 
urban residents41 (Balisacan, 1995; Ofreneo & Habana, 1987). This problem intersects with 
the continuing urban migration and a decrease in urban formal sector jobs. Thus, “people's 
dependence on street economy enterprises and their integration of these services into their 
daily lives evidence” (Milgram, 2009, p.23) prove that such practices have become parts of 
the wider urban economy.  
 
In Baclaran’s adjacent areas, as in many other global South cities, the interplay of global 
neo-liberal trends and urban informality involves the private investment-driven change in 
land values and the proliferation of new urban master plans involving face-lifted city centres, 
shopping malls, and luxurious hotels (Hansen, Little, & Milgram, 2013; Shatkin, 2004, 2008).  
These two phenomena manifest in the Bay City, a mega urban project across Baclaran 
where privatization of planning (Shatkin, 2008) and gentrification against informality (Ortega, 
2016) are carried out. The bias against informal livelihoods is likewise seen in how the 
government, in its effort to project Manila as a global city, has repeatedly evicted Baclaran 
                                            
40 Neo-liberal policies aim to reduce tariffs, deregulate the economy, and privatise government enterprises 
(Bello, 2017). 
41 This situation has similarly occurred in Cairo (Egypt) where the local and national governments’ efforts to 
modernize and globalize often place limitations on urban informal livelihoods (Elyachar, 2005). Also, 
MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000) documented how transnational informal economic traders, 
composed of Congolese immigrant traders in Paris (France), operate in the fissures of global systems by 
maximizing how the world economy works without completely playing by its rules. 
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vendors when there are international visitors or when the government hosted international 
events such as the Asia Pacific Economic Conference in 2015. Evictions are tackled in detail 
in Chapter 7. 
 
5.5.2. Manila’s prominence as urban centre 
As the country’s premiere trading and political-administrative centre, Metro Manila’s 
prominent status should be situated as part of state interventions. From being the Spanish 
colonial capital, American site for masterplan design and Marcos’ central industrial region to 
its current role as the Philippines’ foremost globalizing metropolis, Metro Manila has 
remained an attractive destination for those who look for better employment. Besides the 
locational advantage, the country’s urban-oriented and market-driven agricultural production 
has maintained Metro Manila’s dominant status. From the colonial regime until the 
globalization era, the Philippine agriculture has been oriented towards urban consumption 
and market exchanges. As a result, Metro Manila’s adjacent areas including Baclaran have 
accommodated business enterprises as well as job seekers.  
 
An implication of Manila’s prominent urban status is the need to link informal economic 
activities in Baclaran to the larger metropolitan and national socio-economic trends and 
policy interventions. As several authors have shown, even migrants during the Spanish 
regime embraced urban informal work to earn a living (Reed, 1967; Ocampo, 1992; 
Doeppers, 1998). Situating Baclaran informal vending and Metro Manila’s position in the 
country’s urban hierarchy can therefore provide a broader perspective on urban informality. 
This is further explored in the succeeding chapters where urban informality and planning 
processes are analysed.  
 
5.5.3. The unabated urban migration 
The street vending literature shows that migration is a major factor of urban informality 
(Musoni, 2010; Swider, 2015; Weng & Kim, 2016). In Metro Manila, urban migration began 
when the Spanish impositions of tribute tax, forced labour, compulsory sale of local products 
and land dispossession impelled landless peasants and sharecroppers to flock to Manila 
and its suburbs. The aftermath of World War II coupled with rural unrest and 
underdevelopment continued this rural exodus pattern.  
 
In the post-colonial era, migration has persisted due in part to the state’s failure to implement 
agrarian reform (Bello et al., 2004) and the lack of livelihood opportunities in rural areas 
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(Perez, 2015). By government account, eight out of ten Filipinos will be living in cities and 
urban agglomerations by 2030 (Tirona, 2013). In 2010, 37% of migrants moved to Metro 
Manila and its two neighbouring regions (Philippine Statistical Authority, 2010, cited in 
Perez, 2015). As I pointed out in Section 5.2, this unabated migration to Metro Manila is 
seen in how Baclaran serves as an economic space for poor migrants, where in 1996 almost 
90% of street vendors came from the provinces (Valladolid, 1996).  
 
5.5.4. The unequal and elite-dominated political economy 
Another theme has to do with the country’s highly unequal and elite-dominated political 
economy. This entrenched elite influence has generated scholarly studies where authors 
have described the Philippine case as a form of ‘cacique democracy’ (Anderson, 1988), ‘elite 
democracy’ (Bello & Gershman, 1990; Stauffer, 1990), ‘anarchy of families’42 (McCoy, 
1993b), and ‘booty capitalism’ (Hutchcroft, 1998). As explained Section 5.2.1 above, elite 
domination originated from the social formation during the Spanish regime and perpetuated 
through American occupation until the post-colonial era. The landed capitalists, for instance, 
dominated the manufacturing sector when the government implemented the import 
substitution policy in the 1950s-1960s (Rivera, 1994). The long tradition of political influence 
on state institutions and access to resources enabled these landed capitalist families to 
shape government policies (Rivera, 1994) and urban development in Metro Manila. 
 
As van Naerssen et al. (1996) underscore, the landed elites in Manila have had strong 
impact on the urban management system as many of them were able to strengthen their 
power base. From their land resources, the rich families diversified their economic base by 
taking part in urban activities such as construction industries, banking, real estate, shipping, 
land transportation and communication (Simbulan, 1965). Another enduring effect of elite 
domination on urban planning is what Shatkin (2008) has termed ‘privatization of planning’, 
which results in an urban pattern divided into the neglected ‘public city’ and carefully planned 
consumerist spaces.  In this socio-spatial pattern, Baclaran can arguably be considered as 
a public city near a strictly planned and regulated commercial area. Baclaran’s socio-spatial 
patterns are therefore never insulated from elite influence in national and regional planning. 
 
                                            
42 Although this description has largely been associated with McCoy’s (1993) edited book with the same title, 
it was Fox (1959) who first used the phrase ‘anarchy of families’ to portray the broader Filipino society.  
104 
 
5.5.5. Varied forms of agency and resistance 
Beyond elite power, the last important idea that links structural issues and Baclaran’s local 
context pertains to the varied forms of agency and resistance from below. In discussing 
grassroots resistance, it helps to revisit Quimpo’s (2005) critique of some scholars’ 
predisposition to paint the Philippine society as elite-dominated. He explains that elite-
centred perspective suffers from one-sided and top-down view. Quimpo (2005, p. 242) thus 
argues for a ‘contested democracy’ framework, which claims that “colonial and postcolonial 
elite rule constitutes a single continuous seam in Philippine politics yet contends that they 
are not the only important thread”. He then stresses the importance of acknowledging the 
Filipinos’ historical struggle for independence from colonial invaders and the continuing fight 
of marginalized communities for social justice. In planning literature, this democracy-from-
below approach resonates with insurgent citizenship (Holston, 1998), insurgent planning 
(Miraftab, 2009), and disjunctive democracy (Caldeira & Holston, 1999). These notions 
emphasize the need to examine how grassroots resistance and agency expressions, though 
embedded in broader social structures, contribute to urban socio-spatial relations and 
radical planning processes. 
 
Van Naerssen et al. (1996), for instance, explain that the struggle of Metro Manila urban 
poor organizations and their partner NGOs represents an ‘urban management from below’. 
In similar vein, Pinches (1992) examines how one Manila informal settlement resists class 
degradation while Shatkin (2004) emphasizes how some Metro Manila community 
associations and NGOs were able to influence city-building processes by employing legal 
means or undertaking mass action to resist informal settlers’ eviction or stop urban 
development interventions. His recognition of the strength of popular movement to make 
‘public city’ more resilient (Shatkin, 2008) is also a departure from the usual structuralist and 
elite-centred approach. This attention to people’s capacity to resist and exercise agency is 
crucial in explaining how various actors in Baclaran like street vendors are able to occupy 
contested streetscapes and oppose or appropriate government decision-making and 
planning processes.  
 
5.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented the historical trajectory and the socio-spatial relations that 
have influenced the Philippine political economy and urbanization patterns.  By discussing 
the structural issues, I have provided the broader context which is useful in situating 
Baclaran as a site for the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces. Five key 
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themes have emerged as critical: the Philippine economy’s link to international trade, the 
unabated rural-to-urban migration, Manila’s prominence as urban centre, the unequal and 
elite-dominated political economy, and the varied forms of agency and resistance. These 
themes emphasize the importance of situating the local conditions in the broader historical, 
geographical, socio-political dimensions and agency expressions of urban relations. They 
serve as an important milieu in examining the different stakeholders in Baclaran. The 
chapter that follows discusses these multiple players. 
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CHAPTER 6. PLAYERS IN INFORMALITY: ROLES AND RELATIONS  
 
6.1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, I explained the historical and contemporary issues that have 
shaped the Philippine political economy and urbanization patterns. Building on such 
contextual milieu, I address in this chapter the thesis sub-question 1: who are the players 
that drive the formal systems and informal mechanisms, and their interface, in governing 
and appropriating vending spaces? In answering this query, I consider the players as a 
governance dimension following the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3.  
 
In the Philippines, scholars have examined the roles of the state, private sector, elite 
families, and community associations in urban development (Caoili, 1988; Shatkin, 2007; 
Alcazaren et al., 2011). In the previous chapter, I noted how the privatisation of planning 
and the global-city imaging emerge from the interplay of government and corporate interests 
(Shatkin, 2008; Ortega, 2016). Yet, grassroots agency and resistance have likewise 
produced contested spaces for the marginalized urban population (Milgram, 2013; Recio, 
2016; Shatkin, 2007). NGOs have similarly played as policy champions in pushing for the 
interests of the urban poor (Etemadi, 2004; Milgram; 2009; 2013; Porio, 2002; Recio, 2010; 
2013; 2015). These accounts demonstrate the roles that various players perform in 
Philippine urban socio-spatial relations.  
 
The discussion below examines the different players involved in informality. In the first two 
sections, I discuss the government institutions, which are classified into national agencies 
and local units. In the third and fourth sections, I analyse the non-state players at the local 
level. They are divided into two groups: 1) the NGOs and private sector and 2) the grassroots 
players. In the final section, I summarise the analytical threads that flow from the discussion. 
 
6.2. National Government Agencies (NGAs) 
As explained in Chapter 3, street vending is considered part of the informal economy. This 
implies that state interventions in economic activities considered as informal affect the 
conditions of vendors. Thus, this section analyses five NGAs that deal with informal 
economy or informal workers based on their institutional mandates. These NGAs include 
the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), the Presidential Commission for the 
Urban Poor (PCUP), the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), the Department of 
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Labour and Employment – Bureau of Workers with Special Concerns (BWSC), and the 
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)43.  
 
Five analytical threads flow from examining the institutional roles and the issues that these 
agencies face in fulfilling their mandates. These are 1) the limited engagement with 
grassroots players; 2) the institutional fragmentation; 3) the unresponsive tools and 
processes; 4) the dualist and developmentalist approach to informality; and 5) the complex 
local political dynamics. These issues serve as a national backdrop that partly explains why 
and how local powerful players dominate the socio-spatial relations in Baclaran. 
 
6.2.1. Limited Engagement with Grassroots Players 
As the government’s socio-economic planning agency, NEDA’s role in shaping plans that 
respond to informality issues is crucial. In 2003, the NEDA – Social Development Committee 
approved the Philippine Country Program for the informal sector. The program seeks to 
institutionalize interventions for the informal sector actors through local governments. It 
identifies street hawkers as a beneficiary and sees improvement in application for hawking 
permits as a success indicator and tags informal sector groups as key partners.  
 
In reality, however, NEDA mainly involves NGOs in its meetings. As Miguel, a senior NEDA 
staff, narrated, 
[I]n the social sector, we have a Multisectoral Committee on International Human 
Development Commitments that monitors the key [international] commitments of the 
Philippines [like] the Millennium Development Goals… But [these consultations are 
done] through NGOs... [Their involvement] serves as representation from the 
people’s organizations… [which] are too many and scattered. 
 
Such limited grassroots engagement also happens within the PCUP. This seems a paradox 
since the Commission was created in 1986 to address rampant evictions and human rights 
violations against the urban poor. As the state’s link to the urban poor, the PCUP’s role is 
critical in addressing vendors’ issues. However, Baclaran hawkers are unaware of the 
existence of the PCUP and its mandate. The PCUP’s limited engagement stems from how 
it has solely focused on urban poor’s shelter-related issues. As PCUP senior official, Noriel, 
explained,  
Right now, we do not have much sectoral engagement with informal sector workers… 
At first, I thought the PCUP was too focused on land and housing [issues]. Then I 
                                            
43 While the MMDA is a regional entity, it is lumped together with the NGAs as it operates under the Office of 
the Philippine President and supervises Metro Manila, dubbed as National Capital Region to emphasize its 
national importance.  
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realized, every time I would observe our consultation activities, the common issues 
that the urban poor leaders bring up have to do with provisions on [land title] 
proclamation and community mortgage program. It turns out that jobs and livelihoods 
are only part of their peripheral agenda. I’m not sure though if there is a problem in 
facilitation process for them to articulate these [employment and livelihood concerns].  
 
The statement above indicates that the inability to go beyond shelter issues partly stems 
from the nature of the PCUP’s partner urban poor groups, which are primarily concerned 
with housing issues. This minimal role of PCUP in addressing issues beyond housing 
requires contextualizing. In its early days, the Commission employed former anti-Marcos 
activists as community organizers in informal settlements in Metro Manila and other parts of 
the country. They engaged in political organizing around land tenure, land speculation and 
infrastructure issues in informal settlements (Karaos, 1995). The organizing initiatives soon 
generated resistance from local governments and business interests, which eventually 
resulted in weakening of PCUP’s original mandate (Shatkin, 2004). Recently, the agency 
was stripped off its task as the clearing house for all evictions involving urban poor.  
 
Besides NEDA and the PCUP, the NAPC similarly finds it hard to reach out to grassroots 
workers. The NAPC’s main mandate is to monitor the government’s poverty-related policies 
and programs. It has 14 councils representing the sectors identified in Republic Act 842544, 
the law that created NAPC. Workers in the informal sector, which includes street vendors, 
are among the NAPC sectors. Belen, a member of the Workers in the Informal Council 
(WISC), described their role as a “bridge between the sector and the government agencies”. 
 
As informal workers’ representative in the government, Belen feels there is much to be 
desired in involving grassroots associations: “That is one aspect where we are deficient. 
What usually happens is, in my case, I could give an update to my local organization and to 
the federation where I belong. But it’s not inclusive”. The resource constraint adds to the 
WISC’s inability to talk to many informal economic workers like vendors. “We have PhP 1 
million (US 20,000) annual budget for the quarterly meetings. We spend the money on the 
meetings”, Belen explained. For her, there is no money allocated for leaders who wish to go 
to communities and interact with other workers.  
 
Taken together, the limited grassroots engagements of the NGAs cast doubt on how their 
initiatives, which should benefit the informal workers, are able to reach the intended 
                                            
44 In Chapter 7, I examine this law and other legal instruments concerning informal workers. 
109 
 
populations and get them engaged in the programs. This problem is exacerbated by 
institutional fragmentation. 
 
6.2.2. Institutional Fragmentation  
While fragmentation hounds most institutions, it is more challenging for NAPC since it should 
oversee all the government anti-poverty interventions. Cynthia, official of the BWSC (which 
is a NAPC partner agency), shared her observation: “It is like they [NAPC] are not functioning 
as expected. They seem to pass on to us [the burden of overseeing the WIS]. Supposedly, 
as the oversight [agency] of [anti-poverty programs], they should be on top of anything. That 
is their mandate”. Glenda, a senior BWSC staff, feels that the NAPC has “constraints in 
terms of power”. But, how is this manifested?  
“…[T]hey [NAPC] are lacking in terms of coordinating with other agencies. As the 
implementing agencies, we merely implement what we have and in terms of projects. 
So, we cannot impose on other agencies... So, they [NAPC] should be steering [the 
process] …” (Cynthia) 
 
Cynthia’s reading of the NAPC situation is crucial because she sees it as someone who 
experiences fragmentation in her own agency – BWSC. The BWSC emerged in 2010 from 
the integration of the DOLE’s Bureau of Rural Workers and Bureau of Women and Young 
Workers. It got involved with informal workers when the latter’s issues were lodged under 
the Bureau of Rural Workers. The informal vendors fall under its clients as workers with 
special concerns. For Cynthia, tackling the informal work issues is a challenge as the DOLE 
focuses on the formal employment. 
[T]he mandate of the DOLE is for the formal [workers]. We started paying attention 
to informality when we became the lead convenor at the NAPC [WIS Council] … But, 
if you will look at the structure of the DOLE, it is [about formal] labour standards and 
regulations. 
 
In addition, the BWSC grapples with all other issues that fall under its ‘special concerns’ 
designation. As Cynthia recounted, 
If you look at [other DOLE Bureaus such as the] Bureau of Labour Relations, their 
name says that they concentrate on labour relations … When it comes to our Bureau, 
it became focused on the people - Bureau of Workers with Special Concerns… 
[E]very concern that falls outside the [DOLE] regular program is brought to us. It’s 
like we are the catch basin of [all workers] with special issues. 
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The insights above indicate how developmentalism45 informs DOLE’s approach to 
informality and how the interventions are an add-on, rather than, an integral aspect of 
comprehensive policies and programs. They also highlight the government’s reactive and 
fragmented interventions. Thus, the program implementation becomes very challenging. As 
Cynthia lamented: “It is really difficult considering their increasing number… Then the LGUs 
[local government units] have different ordinances. There is no single national policy.”  
 
The preceding discussion reveals the institutional fragmentation and the potentially 
overlapping mandates among NGAs involved in informal workers. Thus, it is crucial to ask: 
What dimensions of informality are addressed by anti-poverty programs? Which agencies 
are accountable? These questions echo Lemanski and Marx’s (2015) concern on the 
effectiveness and accountability of overlapping institutions in addressing poverty. They also 
indicate the need for tools with which government processes can be critically assessed. This 
lack of appropriate tools is also an issue.  
 
6.2.3. The Unresponsive Tools and Processes 
As discussed in Chapter 2, how the state views informality impacts on the conditions of 
informal workers. More so, when the latest estimate indicates that 75% of Philippine labour 
force is employed in informal economy (World Bank, 2013). It thus becomes problematic 
when NEDA as the government’s leading socio-economic planning agency has no adequate 
tools to examine the issues of informal workers. “Our economic model is really capturing the 
output of formal sector, national income accounts… If that is informal - unlicensed, 
unregistered, unregulated – I don’t know what the basis will be”, NEDA staff, Miguel, 
admitted.  
 
As a result, the precise figures on informal workers are still a problem and the country’s 
development plan remains unresponsive to informal sector issues (Casanova-Dorotan, 
2010). Failure to develop effective tools might also affect the government’s efforts to address 
poverty as the number of poor people increases when poverty measure becomes more 
sensitive to the conditions of the most impoverished (Martinez, 2015). 
 
                                            
45 Building on Robinson (2006), I refer to developmentalism as a policy model that largely pays attention to 
economic and poverty-related dimensions of informality without considering the broader socio-spatial and 
political aspects. 
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The same problem afflicts the BWSC’s process of reaching out to their beneficiaries.  It’s 
DOLE Integrated Livelihood and Emergency Employment Program (DILEEP) program 
requires informal workers to be organized, a challenge for many unorganized vendors. 
BWSC’s Glenda clarified their reason.  
Yes, that [having an organization] is our requirement. [Otherwise], we would have a 
hard time when it comes to monitoring if they are individually [accommodated]. 
Sometimes you can’t locate them. For instance, the vendors, you cannot track them 
down unless they are organized [whereby] you can go to a leader to ask about them.  
 
While it is crucial for informal workers like vendors to organize their ranks, the justification 
above reflects Chatterjee’s (2004) point on how state agencies approach social problems 
from the standpoint of those who govern. Insisting on using unresponsive processes reveals 
how and why government institutions rarely comprehend the complex conditions and 
relations among informal workers. In Scott’s (1998, p. 303) words, “[s]tate simplifications ... 
strip down reality to the bare bones so that the rules will in fact explain more of the situation”. 
In relation to BWSC’s condition, organizing, as will be discussed below, is particularly trickier 
when linked to local politics. One thing clear though is that the inadequate tools and rigid 
process never exist in a vacuum. They are linked to certain ways of approaching informality. 
The next section turns to this concern. 
 
6.2.4. The Dualist and Developmentalist Approach to Informality 
In revisiting the policy approaches to informality, the discussion in Chapter 3 emphasized 
how a dualist (formal-versus-informal) approach favours what is accepted as ‘formal’. Yet, 
this bias occurs amid poverty and inequality where the formal employment is unable to 
absorb many poor workers. Inevitably, state decision-makers resort to developmentalism as 
a complementing approach. As noted in Section 6.2.2 above, developmentalism is seen 
here as a model that largely pays attention to economic and poverty-related dimensions of 
informality without considering the broader socio-spatial and political aspects (Robinson, 
2006). 
 
The combined dualist-developmentalist approach frames some of NGAs’ informality 
interventions. First, placing WIS Council within NAPC - the state’s leading anti-poverty 
agency - is proof of a developmentalist drive. Second, the BWSC’s principal program for 
informal workers – DILEEP - primarily aims to generate jobs and reduce poverty. Its major 
component - the KABUHAYAN - is a grant-assistance for livelihood capacity-building. Third, 
as the previous section amplified, NEDA has been unable to account for informal workers’ 
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contribution because it only focuses on the formal sector. Instead, the agency’s intervention 
is linked to poverty-reduction. As Miguel further explained,  
The assistance for the informal economy is an objective pursued to address poverty 
since we have a 25-40 percent poverty incidence… Many of the informal settlers (sic) 
would not be able to access the employment opportunities in the formal job search. 
The next approach would be informal livelihood, microenterprise, microfinance. 
 
In sum, the NGAs approach to informality emanates from economistic poverty-intervention 
perspective without necessarily understanding the socio-spatial and political relations that 
shape the appropriation of urban spaces. Planning academic, Fredo, believes this 
unresponsive approach comes from the state’s hostile view of informality. “[T]he official 
attitude towards the informal sector is it is an outlaw. It has to be eliminated. That is the 
official attitude”. The usual intervention thus pertains to formalization of the informal, which 
is partly hinged on the desire to control and incorporate populations into state regulated 
system (Watson, 2003). As a result, the unresponsive NGA interventions tend to see 
informal workers as mere instruments for implementing welfare programs for the 
impoverished groups (Chatterjee, 2004). Compounding these issues, the NGAs also 
complain about how the local political dynamics undermine their policies and programs. The 
next section analyses these dynamics.  
 
6.2.5. Complex Local Political Dynamics 
The BWSC and the MMDA constantly deal with local governments in implementing their 
mandates. Both view the complex local politics as a major concern. One issue pertains to 
patronage politics. “It’s a big problem… The number one issue is if in one LGU the local 
officials do not belong to the same political party... What usually happens, to avoid trouble, 
we accommodate the constituents of the mayor and the constituents of another [official from 
the rival party]”, BWSC’s Cynthia revealed. This problem complicates the DILEEP 
implementation. Glenda gave an example. 
We have a lot of cases where the LGU is our accredited co-partner in implementing 
the livelihood program... [We only need] a Sanggunian (Local Council) Resolution. 
That Resolution does not get signed [by the local officials] because they [Mayor and 
Vice Mayor] do not get along. So, there were cases where the implementation got 
totally terminated…  
 
This BWSC’s account shows how the informal workers should hurdle local political dynamics 
to avail of government programs. The implications of local dynamics are also reflected in 
how the MMDA oversees urban spaces. As the agency tasked to supervise Metro Manila 
transport and traffic management, the MMDA has direct role in governing streets including 
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vending spaces in Baclaran. Peter, an MMDA official, described how local politics comes 
into the picture.  
If there is interface [between main thoroughfares and local streets], we closely 
coordinate [with local governments] because we are also mindful of their constituents. 
They [local governments] have special arrangements that we do not know about… In 
Baclaran, for instance, Wednesday is Baclaran day; perhaps there is day and time 
consideration. If there are special arrangements, we are allowing them… for political 
considerations.  
 
Even if the MMDA recognizes local arrangements, the agency intervenes when it feels that 
the public interest is at stake. “They [vendors] are there, they were allowed [by local 
governments]. We will just evict them if they are on major thoroughfares or if the space they 
occupy is a critical area, a connecting thoroughfare,” MMDA official, Gina, clarified. Here, 
the MMDA construes eviction46 of vendors as a way to clear main roads of obstructions, a 
common state intervention even in other global South countries (Gibbings, 2013; Hanser, 
2016).   
 
In Baclaran, the MMDA and the local governments observe certain protocol on evictions. 
“They [local governments] police their own locality; they have their own task force. But in 
some cases, they ask for our help. That is part of our relationship with the LGUs”, Gina 
shared.  Jason, a local official, confirmed this arrangement: “We can request for MMDA’s 
assistance but there has to be a letter signed by our Mayor. The policy now is that the MMDA 
cannot simply intervene in certain LGUs without the permit from the Mayor47”.  
 
This arrangement echoes what the literature has shown on local authorities’ layered and 
calculated mechanisms to manage contested spaces. In Baclaran, it is apparent in the 
politics of buck-passing. As planning academic, Manuel, explained,  
 There is always the factor of the local government when MMDA came in to do its 
sidewalk clearing operation… [T]he local government - either the city hall or the 
barangay - allowed the vendors to locate themselves there when they should have 
not been located there or failed to provide a space for them, an alternative space… 
[I]mplicitly, it was easy to let MMDA do that [eviction] because of course they would 
take the heat... They can always put the blame on another level of government... 
 
                                            
46 In Chapter 7, I deepen the discussion on MMDA’s role in a series of evictions.   
47 I discuss the legal dimension of this issue in Chapter 7. 
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These insights reveal an issue that comes with decentralization policy48. They reflect the 
dynamics of local politics and the varying interests of social groups in the Philippines 
(Shatkin, 2007). In what follows, the roles of local governments are analysed.  
 
6.3. Local Government Units (LGUs) 
Pasay and Parañaque cities have different policy orientations on street use and informal 
vending in Baclaran. Yet, three patterns emerge from how the LGUs deal with vendors: 1) 
the discretionary power of the local executives; 2) the role of Barangays in spatial hierarchy 
in policy enforcement; and 3) the depoliticized planning approach to informality.  
 
6.3.1. Discretionary Power of the Local Executives  
In Pasay, the Ordinance No. 1890 (Series of 2000) prohibits street vending. Its Section 1 
reads: “No person or entity shall sell, peddle, vend and obstruct, in any manner whatsoever, 
any street… in Pasay City”. To enforce this policy, the Mayor has assigned an office, albeit 
without any legal document, to monitor vending activities. Dubbed as Mayor Total Clean 
Team or MTCT, this office ensures that vendors do not obstruct vehicular and foot traffic.  
 
“Our focus is on illegal vending and the obstruction on city streets and sidewalks… We have 
monitoring [teams]. They monitor the daily activities [of vendors]. There are about 13-14 
[monitoring] groups”, local government staff, Jason, shared. To ensure that vendors do not 
block the traffic, the MTCT designates spaces or line beyond which the vendors are 
unauthorized to sell. The authority to identify spaces and draw a demarcation line has made 
the MTCT a powerful local player. While Jason claims that the authority to oversee city-
streets is passed on to barangay officials, this hardly happens on the ground. As barangay 
leader, Danny, claimed, “… [W]e don’t actually meddle in [issuing verbal] permit [to vendors] 
because it is a common practice that a president of the vendors directly coordinates with the 
MTCT…" Bernardo, another barangay leader, echoed this sentiment, “That [consultation] is 
a problem; they [MTCT] never consult [with us] … We don’t interfere...If you’ll think of it, that 
[vending space] entails taxes, which we should collect”.  
 
Bernardo’s statement reflects how the regulatory power over space is linked to financial 
transaction, whether it is done legally or otherwise.  Legally, Pasay’s Treasury Office collects 
money from vendors daily – PhP 5.00 (US$ 0.11) for a 1-x-1-meter space and PhP 10.00 
                                            
48 In Chapter 7, I tackle decentralization in relation to broader issues.	
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(US$ 0.22) for 1-x-2-meter stall. The Treasury uses the City’s Market Code (Ordinance No. 
4090, Series of 2008) as basis for taxing vendors even if they are considered illegal. The 
Code’s Section 20 states, 
“A cash receipt shall be issued to talipapa49 vendor or space occupant which shall be 
torn in half, one half to be given to the vendor or space occupant and the other half 
to be retained by the City Treasurer’s duly authorized representative who shall remit 
the same to the Office of the City Treasurer.”  
 
Besides the treasury collection, the MTCT remits the payments from vendors when the latter 
reclaim their products that were confiscated during evictions. As Jason recounted, “There is 
payment – PhP 1000 (US$ 22) per item… They [vendors] must get an order of payment, 
remit the fee to the City Treasury. Once they have a receipt, they go to our office for the 
release order”.  
 
Apart from the legal taxation, there are collectors who are accountable to some politicians. 
“There is one group here in Pasay, here in our area, [it is] the MTCT… Obviously, those 
assigned by the City [government] to supervise [the vendors] benefit from it,” Bernardo 
shares. Lian, a staff of the city government, explained how this occurs. 
Redento: Do vendors have to pay to their leaders? 
 Lian: Yes, they pay. [Then] they [leaders] bring it to the city hall… The collected 
money moves around. [It is remitted] to the leaders, police, [and] the city hall.  
 
Lian’s account shows how the MTCT’s role goes beyond spatial regulation. The office is 
also involved in the illicit financial collection. In Parañaque, the Mayor’s Office plays an 
equally critical role in regulating street use for vending and in illicit financial collection. In 
contrast to Pasay, several Parañaque Ordinances - No. 03-13, Series of 2003; No. 13-10, 
Series of 2013; No. 13-12, Series of 2013; No. 13-16, Series of 201350 - legally recognize 
street vending in certain roads near Baclaran Church.  
 
These ordinances specify the streets covered, the amount charged per vending stall, and 
the period for the flea market (October 15 to January 6 annually). The ordinances also 
require the creation of Baclaran Flea Market Committee. Since the Mayor heads the 
Committee, his office plays a crucial role in managing Baclaran spaces and vendors. While 
the City Treasury collects a legal arkabala51 from the vendors throughout the year, some of 
                                            
49 Talipapa is a Filipino term for small market that offers wet and dry goods. 
50 These City Ordinances empower the City government to allow the use of city streets in Baclaran as flea 
markets (tiangge) and/or vending areas for agro-industrial fair under certain conditions.  
51 Arkabala is a Spanish term for excise duty.	
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Mayor’s personnel reportedly benefit from a separate collection scheme. As city government 
staff, Krisha, recalled, “Before, the Mayor’s personnel earned from the vending spaces. One 
meter-size [space] has a corresponding amount… There was a portion that went into the 
city treasury and a portion that did not…” 
 
The payment comes from the PhP 1000 (US$ 19.88) fee per stall, which the Ordinance 
requires without specific size. This has led to arbitrary fees. As formal stallholder, Nancy, 
recalled, “I was compelled to rent two vending spaces... Last year, I paid PhP 7,000 (US$ 
139.17) [for the] two-meter-by-two-meter-space… The city hall has personnel who collect 
the payment... [W]e don’t know where the PhP 7000 rent was remitted to [because] there 
was no receipt… Every year, there was no receipt…”  
 
Church leader, Francis, expressed a similar sentiment, “As far as I know, there is no receipt. 
That’s difficult [because] there is no official [receipt]. Where does it [collection] go? It does 
not go to the public coffer… There is big money [involved]; [that’s] big corruption”. Nancy 
and Francis’ statements reveal the arbitrary system not just in the payment scheme but also 
in the selection of vendors. The fact that Nancy was allowed to rent a space even if she is 
already a formal stallholder indicates how the vague provisions in the ordinances have 
empowered the Mayor’s personnel. Allen, a local official, confirmed this.  
… [T]here is another group that does not recognize the authority of anyone – the 
Mayor Action Team... [To put up a Flea] market, there should be organized vending 
tents [in 2013]. What they did was simply to allow vendors to occupy all vacant 
spaces. They never provided tents. [What they did] was illegal since they collected 
money without issuing receipts. Based on the Ordinance, there must be a receipt and 
everything should go to the public coffers…” 
 
While the ordinances have provided the broad provisions for street use at certain time of the 
year, the narratives above demonstrate the power of the City Mayor and his personnel, 
something that also occurs in Pasay, to control the rules governing the use of contested 
Baclaran vending spaces. Yet, contrary to Pasay’s MTCT, which uses an ordinance critical 
of vending to govern the city’s public spaces, the Parañaque Mayor’s personnel employs a 
legal instrument supportive of vending to control the access to spaces. The paradox lies in 
the ability of these players to deploy formal state apparatus to generate their own informal 
rules and relations.  
 
This has three implications. First, the local executives’ immense authority has contributed to 
the emergence of the illicit financial collection, as discussed above, and has entrenched 
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local officials’ ties with hawker leaders, which will be examined in the latter part of this 
Chapter. Second, the reshaping of rules arguably contributes to a spatial hierarchy in policy 
enforcement, which also occurs in other global South cities as examined in Chapter 3. Third, 
the Mayors’ discretionary power reveals the political dimension of informality, which has 
discouraged local planners from engaging the hawkers. The last two issues are tackled next. 
 
6.3.2. Barangays and the Spatial Hierarchy in Policy Enforcement 
Barangays in both cities primarily deal with conflicts involving vendors. As Barangay official, 
Brando, revealed: “Once they [vendor leaders] are unable to address the tensions among 
their members, they approach the barangay. They say, ‘[Barangay] Chair, I could not resolve 
this [conflict], I would refer this problem of vendors to you”. If the problems pertain to criminal 
activities, the barangay officials refer them to the police. 
 
In other cases, barangay officials go beyond their usual troubleshooting role. In one Pasay 
barangay, officials passed a resolution that allows vending on some parts of Taft Avenue 
and EDSA Rotunda as a livelihood project. As described in Chapter 5, this Taft Avenue-
EDSA interchange is a crowded space where the MRT3 and LRT1 stations converge. The 
MMDA and the MTCT put this area under their supervisory jurisdiction. In this context, 
passing a local regulation is not merely about implementing a barangay livelihood initiative. 
It represents staking a claim to a highly-coveted streetscape. This is evident in how barangay 
official, Bernardo, justifies the resolution. 
“[In our area], there were more hawkers [from other places]. When we called their 
attention, they had already set up [their vending items]. So, what else could we do? 
We passed a resolution stating that if it [vending] is within the vicinity of our barangay, 
they [the vendors] should be our constituents. We do not say they need to register 
[as our residents]. But, of course, we need to prioritize our constituents”.  
 
This assertion of authority over a contested street also occurs in another barangay in Pasay, 
where there is an informal agreement between barangay officials and a big shopping mall. 
Moises, mall executive, shared: “They [barangay] have a monthly financial support… It’s like 
they [barangay] have a salary [to police the mall vicinity] … [W]e allow some of them 
[vendors] in front [of the building]; but only a very few of them… We talk to the barangay. 
[Then] they go here to get their monthly financial support”. Barangay official, Danny, 
confirmed their role in getting rid of vendors during mall hours: “We can only act [on vendors] 
if there are complaints. Look at the shopping mall [vicinity], there are no vendors. It’s 
because that’s their [mall] complaint; there should be zero-vendors”.  
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Moreover, officials in one barangay in Parañaque collect local taxes from street vendors 
through their own arkabala. For official, Allen, their ascendant role in managing hawkers 
comes from the geographical reach of their barangay, which is bigger than the adjacent 
barangays, and from their daily interactions with vendors. 
From a peace and order [standpoint], it is difficult if many [barangays] are involved... 
In Pasay, it is the city government, not the barangays, which handles the vendors… 
Here in Baclaran [Parañaque], they [vendors] should first deal with the barangay. [It 
is] because here vendors recognize us as we deal with them every day; whereas, the 
city government [personnel] only visit occasionally.  
 
There is more to the frequent barangay-vendor interactions. Their relationship entails 
contradictions and tensions. For one, the barangay passed Ordinance No 17 (Series of 
2003) prohibiting “all kinds of obstruction on all Barangay roads/streets within [its] territorial 
jurisdiction…” Further, its Resolution No 19-0827-S-2011 supports a Church-led campaign 
to save Baclaran streets from “public nuisance and impairment of rights of individual to 
access an orderly and peaceful environment”. While these statements never mention 
informal hawking, they allude to vendors as part of the road obstruction.  
 
Despite issuing the policies above, the barangay still allows vendors to sell on the streets. 
Thus, church leader, Francis, asked, “If they [barangay] have ordinances, why are there 
many vendors?” Local official, Allen, offered an explanation.  
We have ordinances [on vending] but we do not implement them. [We say], it’s up to 
you [vendors]; you may put up [stalls] because that’s your livelihood. [We realized], if 
there is no livelihood, the crime rate goes up. There’s a lot of hold-up and housebreak 
incidents…  
 
The statement shows compassion. Yet, selective empathy steers this approach as the 
Barangay picks between the ‘illegal ambulant’ and the ‘legitimate’ vendors. As Andy, another 
official, clarified, “The illegal vendors, those we call ambulant are those who occupy any 
vacant space… [I]f there is clearing operation they just run…. The legitimate [vendors] are 
those who inherit [the vending spaces] from their parents, [who] were the old vendors 
before.”. This implies that the Barangay protects the ‘legitimate’ vendors when there is 
eviction. 
 
Nelson, a leader of one non-government organization in Baclaran, believes there is a bigger 
issue: “The problem here, it may be difficult to say but we know that the barangay earns 
from it [street vending]”. Allen admitted being part of the issue. 
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There is so much corruption... On my part… if I ask for something it’s not for me. For 
example, we ask from the establishment owners; [we would say], can you sponsor 
our uniforms? Then, they would give us willingly. But if you [stallholders or vendors] 
are not my friend, why would I ask you [to give me something] ... Many [vendors] want 
to give me [money] but I refuse.  
 
The foregoing discussion illustrates how the local regulation of street spaces and informal 
vending is contingent, layered, and relational. This is seen in how barangay officials have 
devised their formal and informal arrangements to lay a claim to contested public spaces 
within their jurisdiction. It shows how different schemes – formal or informal – to promote 
varying interests thrive in insecure political environment and unequal socio-spatial relations. 
This echoes Illy’s (1986) observation in Manila about interest aggregation at policy 
enforcement stage, where the power constellations of the actors involved distorted street 
vending regulations. These complex power relations also affect the local planning approach.  
 
6.3.3. Depoliticized Planning Approach to Informality 
The complex relations discussed above have discouraged the City Planning and 
Development Offices (CPDOs) in both cities from engaging the vendors in formal planning 
processes.  As planning official, Kaye, expressed, “There are different dynamics in the local 
government. You have ideal plans; yet, because of political dynamics, you cannot implement 
[the plans] … Right now, they [city officials] circumvent the laws just to accommodate them 
[vendors]. Therefore, they [vendors] become more confident to squat on the streets”. So, 
what does the CPDO do? Kaye categorically answered, “I do not meddle”. 
 
The statements above raise two planning issues. First, it assumes that ideal plans are never 
compatible with local political dynamics. What then underlies this assumption of mismatch? 
The ideas guiding the Philippine planning practice and education have mainly originated 
from Western thoughts and trends (Endriga & Nierras, 1983; Viloria, 1990). The normative 
planning ideals are thus shaped by Western modernist rationality. Local planning academic 
Fredo’s view of government approach to informality captures this dilemma: “[T]he official 
attitude towards the informal sector is it is an outlaw. It has to be eliminated. That is the 
official attitude… because in the first place they [government officials] are influenced by the 
foreign literature”. 
 
Local politics, on the other hand, have evolved from the complex blend of historical 
colonization, highly unequal political economy, and diverse socio-cultural practices. This has 
led to an ensemble of local political arrangements that is not totally receptive to the logic of 
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Western standards. These clashes between Western-inspired ‘ideal plans’ and local politics 
resonate with what Watson (2003, p. 395) calls conflicting rationalities, a situation where 
there is a great gap “between the notion of… ‘proper living environments’ espoused by the 
municipality, and the nature of the rationality guiding the actions… of the other parties 
involved”. Failure to recognize the gaps between the conceptual origins of planning ideals 
and the contextual issues confounds planners when they deal with issues that fall outside 
the borders of conventional planning paradigms. Inevitably, this generates a detached 
attitude - apparent in Kaye’s statement above - that refuses to engage with the complex 
processes and outcomes of political dynamics. 
 
Second, the detached attitude partly emanates from how planning in the Philippines is 
viewed as a technical process where local planning offices have no decision-making powers 
(DILG, 2008) as they need to follow the decisions of the elected officials. Inevitably, planning 
staff shy away from processes they see as highly political.  This results in a depoliticized 
and technical approach to informality issues. Thus, the Comprehensive Land Use Plans 
(CLUPs) in both cities never mention the vendors in Baclaran. In Pasay, the CLUP merely 
identifies Baclaran area as part of Pasay’s original settlement that requires urban 
redevelopment. In Parañaque’s CLUP, Baclaran is simply marked off as a commercial area 
with congestion and traffic issues.  
 
Yet, local official, Melissa, sees Baclaran vendors as a planning concern: “Yes [it’s a 
planning issue], because we don’t want that kind of urban blight. How can you showcase 
your city if you have areas that are not supposed to be like that...?” What then is the 
perceived solution? “Urban renewal may be a broad concern; but perhaps it is what our city 
needs... We have seen the decaying spots in our city… especially now that our MOA52 [Mall 
of Asia] is taking shape”, Melissa concluded. The current Parañaque Mayor, meanwhile, 
considers placing the Baclaran vendors in a flea market as the answer to vending and traffic 
issues (Ramirez, 2017). This approach to informal vending follows the usual gentrification 
model, which sees informal practices as an ‘urban blight’ ought to be removed. 
 
Gentrification lies at the core of neoliberal-oriented entrepreneurial urban governance, which 
consists of strategies pursued by local governments to entice private and/or foreign 
investments and attain economic growth from below (Harvey, 1989; Crossa, 2009; Shatkin, 
                                            
52 MOA is part of the Bay City mega-project, which was discussed in Chapter 5. 
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2011). This growth from below rhetoric is evident in Pasay’s and Parañaque’s vision-mission 
statements below, as featured on their official websites. 
A premier gateway city and world-class destination (Pasay vision) 
 
The City of Parañaque … will emerge as the primary investment and tourist 
destination in Metro Manila by creating a business and environment friendly 
atmosphere... (Parañaque mission) 
 
Gentrification is then coupled with another common approach to informality – formalization. 
As city official, Kaye, shared, “The strategy is for the informal sector to eventually become 
part of the formal sector – how they can get a permit, how they can get an SSS [Social 
Security System identification card] … [T]he one that dealt with them before was the TESDC 
[Technical Education Skills Development Council], which [caters to] the small and micro 
businesses]”. The vendors, however, were unaware of any TESDC program that has 
involved them. 
 
In sum, while local planning offices are expected to play a role in addressing urban informal 
vending, the accounts above show the depoliticized and technical view of CPDOs on street 
hawking. This depoliticized approach impels planners and local officials to resort to 
gentrification and formalization strategies as the way forward. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
however, interventions inspired by these models often fail to consider the complex needs of 
vendors. They also emanate from the neoliberal rhetoric of ‘word-class’ and business-
friendly city. 
 
Outside the government, how do non-state actors influence street use and informal vending? 
The following section touches on this. 
 
6.4. Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and the Private Sector  
NGOs that influence street use and informal vending include the Baclaran Vendors 
Development Cooperative (BVDC) and the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer 
(CMHR). For the private sector, the players are shopping malls, stallholders, and jeepney53  
drivers. Two lessons can be gleaned from examining the roles and relations of these players: 
1) the value of economic and cultural capital; and 2) the presence of collaborative and 
conflictive arrangements among contending street users. 
                                            
53Jeepney is a Philippine public utility vehicle that originated from surplus USA military jeeps after World War 
II. 
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6.4.1. Economic and Cultural Capital: Capacities and Constraints 
The BVDC’s role in Baclaran informal economy centres on providing economic resources to 
some vendors. Established in 1976 by 250 street vendors to address the usurious lending 
arrangements with loan sharks, the BVDC now requires a business permit if one wishes to 
apply. Thus, they have only accepted hawkers as associate members who can only avail of 
certain loan packages. As BVDC leader, Nelson, clarified, 
Since one purpose of the Cooperative is to uplift the well-being of the members, we 
now accept [some of] them [street vendors] as associate members… so we can 
provide [financial] capital because they do not simply disappear [from the streets] … 
But, when it comes to [access to] services such as loan, that’s where we have a 
screening [process].  
 
For old vendor, Julie, it is good to be a member: “Yes, it [Cooperative] is a big help. We have 
savings and shares in the cooperative”. Hannah, another vendor, agreed but pointed out a 
concern: “I’m a member of the Baclaran Cooperative. I pay them daily [for my past loan]. 
[But], during lean season I could hardly pay”. Besides payment issue, Myra, former street 
vendor and now a stallholder, raised another concern: “I used to be a Cooperative member; 
but I left because it is not really an association that protects [vendors’ welfare]. It’s more 
about loans, livelihood stuff. It is not focused on promoting the interests of vendors [beyond 
economic concerns]”.   
 
Mayeth, a social worker who tried organizing Baclaran vendors, explained the implications 
of Myra’s concern. 
Before, we tried to organize [Baclaran vendors] but it was difficult because the 
cooperative is strong… They reacted adversely… because our approach [to street 
vendor organizing] is [it should be seen as] a mass struggle… [We believe], they 
[vendors] must assert their rights and exert pressure on the local government to 
address their problems… Their traditional approach is not like that. They are not after 
the security of tenure… Still, the members keep paying. Yes, they have big [financial] 
asset but it’s purely economic. It is not concerned with governance; they don’t think 
about how to be political [about other issues] … The [vendors] are fine with it as long 
as they receive annual dividends. Of course, the government likes it because they 
[vendors] do not resist”.  
 
Mayeth’s explanation captures the constraint of BVDC’s economic-oriented engagement 
with vendors. It reveals the Cooperative’s limited role in the broader local political relations. 
As Nelson admitted, “We are an accredited NGO [by one barangay in Baclaran] so we attend 
their meetings... But we don’t want to interfere when it comes to implementation [of policies 
on vendors] since we know how complex the situation is”. The BVDC’s detached attitude is 
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akin to how the Pasay CPDO refuses to engage with the messy political relations behind 
street use and informal vending. The Cooperative’s apathy is in contrast with the CMHR’s 
willingness to influence decision-making despite its limited access to formal governance 
structures.  
 
The CMHR runs the Baclaran Church, a Catholic pilgrimage site with around 120,000 
devotees every Wednesday. For Francis, a CMHR official, the Church has put Baclaran on 
the map: “It [Baclaran] was an obscure village until the devotion to the Mother of Perpetual 
Help became a phenomenon. All the businesses here owe their existence to the [people’s 
devotion] to the Mother of Perpetual Help… That’s why our position [on street vendors] is 
for them to free up the roads because they owe their existence [to the church]”. 
 
Despite the Church’s socio-cultural value in Baclaran, the government rarely consults with 
the CMHR. “No, [we are not consulted]. Sometimes [we are], but it’s not a [regular] practice... 
For them [government], that’s their own jurisdiction, they are the authority,” Francis shared. 
This limited CMHR-government interaction is reflected in a CMHR Rector’s open letter54 
opposing Parañaque Mayor’s plan to turn the Redemptorist Road into a mall for street 
vendors (Morelos, 2011).  An extract from the letter reads, 
We support a permanent solution to the problem of the small vendors, but it should 
not be one that roofs and turns a national road, which is beyond the commerce of 
man, into a mall, which jeopardizes the security and access of the devotees to the 
shrine and in effect desecrates the spiritual heritage and dignity of Baclaran. We 
would like, therefore, to express our strong opposition to the continuous 
commercialization and desecration of Baclaran. 
 
In August 2011, the CMHR protested the draft Parañaque City Ordinance No 2555 which 
allows vending stalls on the streets around Baclaran Church. Its facebook and signature 
campaign slogans – End Abuses, Uphold Decent Services; Do not Vote for the Instrument 
of Abuses in Baclaran – aimed at the local officials. The online platform also shows images 
of street vendors surrounding the Church (see Figure 6-1 on page 124). 
 
After 20 days, the campaign gathered over 100,000 signatures. Besides, as mentioned 
above in Section 6.3.2, Barangay Baclaran issued a formal council resolution supporting this 
campaign. This shows that the CMHR, although seldom consulted, could oppose and 
                                            
54 The open letter was published on 24 January 2007 in one major broadsheet in the Philippines. 
55 The City Council actually passed a resolution (No. 11-074, dated 25 August 2011) asking for the consent of 
three national government agencies to allow the city government to construct a multi-level, mixed-use parking 
and commercial building in Baclaran.		
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influence decision-makers by employing civic actions, mobilizing its clout, and invoking the 
Baclaran Church’s cultural value.  
 
 
Figure 6-1: CMHR Facebook Post - ‘Clean up Baclaran, Keep it Sacred’56 
 
When linked to the broader discourses in planning and urban studies, the CMHR actions 
follow an urban revanchist intervention. Urban revanchism (Smith, 1998) is a policy model 
that seeks to restore order on city streets by taking revenge against and getting rid of the 
supposed theft of the city (Mackie, Swanson, & Goode, 2017) and the undesirable elements 
of public spaces (Huang & Xue, 2017; Smith, 1998). The CMHR campaign against informal 
vendors shows how the drive for urban revanchism might come from religious civic groups 
who feel that their faith-based practices are threatened by the socio-spatial patterns 
produced by street vending.  
 
6.4.2. Collaborative and Conflictive Arrangements in Contested Spaces 
Baclaran is home to shopping malls and individual stallholders who are legally registered to 
own or rent business spaces. These merchants offer garment products, houseware, 
jewellery, and gadgets, among others. As discussed in Chapter 5, Baclaran is also a major 
transport node where jeepneys, Metro Manila’s most popular small-scale public transport 
                                            
56 I downloaded these images from the Facebook page of CMHR’s Save Baclaran online campaign: 
https://www.facebook.com/Save-Baclaran-199761476750506/   
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operate. These private sector stakeholders share a common concern in running their 
respective enterprises – dealing with street vendors.  
 
The malls supply products to street vendors who in turn sell the goods to their customers. 
As Moises, mall executive, shared, “They [vendors] are a big help to the malls. It is like an 
ecosystem. It circulates as they buy on a wholesale [basis] then they sell it on a retail basis”. 
Old vendor, Esperanza, confirmed this arrangement: “All the supplies of these vendors are 
from them [malls]. [As an ordinary buyer], you cannot buy one item from them [malls] since 
they are wholesalers. If you’re just buying one piece, get it from the vendors outside [the 
mall] …” Apart from the supply chain circulation, malls play a critical role during evictions. 
“When there are [clearing] operations, we run to the basement floor of shopping [mall] 
because they [eviction teams] never go to that area”. Some stallholders also support 
vendors who occupy the sidewalks in front of their stores. As stallholder, Myra, shared, 
“When there are evictions we sympathize [with vendors] by giving them a space so they 
could still sell… we allow them to be inside our stall. There’s that relationship as we have 
been with them for a long time”. 
 
However, alongside the symbiotic co-existence, conflicts occur in some areas. “They [mall 
operators] really complain and get pissed off because vendors do not follow the rules,” 
Esperanza recalled. These rules come from an agreement between vendors and malls.  
“Before, they [mall operators] were the ones requesting for clearing operation. Then, 
they realized that if they do that [clearing operation], they have fewer buyers because 
these [vendors] buy from them… Then, we requested if we could go back [to our 
vending spaces]. [We said], we would widen the footpaths; we would remove the 
things that block [the paths to the malls]. (Esperanza) 
 
The mall operators’ past requests for eviction of vendors depicts their ability to use an 
accepted formal approach to address their problem. Yet, they also resort to backdoor 
negotiations with vendors, as seen in Esperanza’s account, when they feel these channels 
could benefit them. The monthly financial allowance that another mall provides to one 
barangay, as narrated in Section 6.3.2, also captures this tendency of mall operators to 
embrace and maintain illicit transactions. In other words, the malls, like LGUs, exemplify 
players who deploy both the formal and informal structures of power, or the public/visible 
and the hidden forms of power (Gaventa, 2011; Lukes, 2005). They just need to calculate 
when and how these spaces will work for them.  
 
126 
 
In addition, many stallholders also occupy the streets. Stallholder, Nancy, admitted doing 
this: “It is better that I occupy this space. This will be invaded by ambulant hawkers, anyway”. 
City government staff, Krisha, said she is aware of this: “They [stallholders] have business 
permit but they extend [beyond their stalls]”. Besides direct street encroachment, vendor 
organizer, Leo, disclosed another tactic.  
Some commercial stalls complain that the customers rarely go up to their stores 
[inside the building] since the products they sell can also be found on the streets… 
So, they see that as a problem... What we witnessed [was that] … they formed a 
network. [Their argument goes like this], ‘Ok, you [vendors] get your supplies from us 
and we will give you a share [from the sales]; we will give [the products] to you at 
cheaper prices. Sell it at your vending spaces’. So, there is that agreement. Then, 
when the vendors already trust them, they started hiring other vendors and occupied 
their spaces on the streets… [There are now] individual salaried [vendors].” 
 
As stallholders and vendors try to outmanoeuvre each other, their street presence has taken 
toll on jeepneys, which used to pass through roads leading to the Baclaran LRT-station. 
Now, jeepney routes have changed due to the heavy presence of vendors. As driver, Alejo, 
lamented, “Before, jeepneys used to pass through that area. Now, it is difficult for jeepney 
[drivers to drive through that area] because of vendors. Once you hit their products, they 
would gang up on you”.  
 
Mike, an auto-mechanic who grew up in Baclaran, could relate to Alejo’s concern: “Some 
people were actually killed [before]… How can one person fight back? Is it the fault of the 
drivers [to use the streets] considering that we’re talking about roads?” Ambulant vendor, 
Eugene, disclosed one way they get rid of jeepneys: “The jeepney [drivers] find it difficult to 
go here because of many vendors. When they [jeepneys] come near [vending stalls], the 
hawkers pierce their wheels using nails”.  
 
Some drivers have also altered their routes after getting an order from the city government 
to cut short their endpoint. Boyeth, a driver for two decades, cited two reasons: “It’s [because 
of] the cars parked [near shopping malls] … and the many vendors”. This ability of hawkers 
to alter public transport channels echoes Oriard’s (2015) argument on how vendors are able 
to produce a space57, where streets become attractive and vibrant marketplaces. 
 
                                            
57 In producing a space, Oriard (2015) contends that vendors’ entrepreneurial activities might increase streets’ 
land value and establish new spatial relations. 
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The jeepney re-routing has also affected the commuters. As Alejo shared, “… We had to let 
go of the [passengers] we can pick up until Tomas-Claudio [Avenue]… They [passengers] 
also complain… It [re-routing] costs them PhP5.00 (US$ 0.1) from that area [Tomas Claudio] 
and another PhP5.00 from this point”. Despite these adverse effects, jeepney drivers have 
not collectively acted to question the local government order. As Alejo voiced out, “[e]ven if 
we go to the City Hall, nothing will change. It’s like talking to the wind”. In the end, they 
simply follow the government order.  
 
The preceding narrative illustrates the collaborative and conflictive socio-spatial interactions 
involving malls, stallholders, and jeepney drivers as they grapple with street vendors. The 
mechanisms that malls and stallholders employ show their ability to utilise the formal and 
informal channels when these spaces benefit them. For their part, the drivers’ sentiments 
indicate how they feel marginalized in the scramble for contested spaces. Seen from a 
structural standpoint, the various schemes reveal the unequal power relations in Baclaran. 
Leo’s realization about the salaried vendors captures this reality: “When we knew about it 
[salaried vendors], we realized we’re like getting tricked… It was difficult for us [as vendor 
organizers] … [Y]ou cannot organize vendors if they have different mindsets; if they take 
order from them [stallholders] to sell. For them [vendors], it becomes all about their share 
[from the sales]”. If this is a concern for organizers, how then do vendors address it, along 
with other pressing issues, as they struggle for hawking spaces? The section that follows 
dwells on the street vendors and other grassroots stakeholders.  
 
6.5. Grassroots Players 
Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3 discussed the value of recognizing political society, which refers 
to the engagement spaces mostly created by those who are governed.  Grassroots players 
often operate in political society. Some of them use the available spaces within formal 
governance structures. Others transcend the limits of legal norms to facilitate relations that 
enable them to earn a living. In Baclaran, these stakeholders comprise the street vendors 
and grassroots intermediaries. Each of them is presented in the succeeding sections. 
 
6.5.1. Street Vendors: Their Precarious Conditions and Tenuous Ties 
 
 If you don’t allow street vendors to sell, it is tantamount to killing them. They sell to 
earn a living; their family members depend on vending. They get their food from 
vending. (Myra, a former street vendor) 
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The statement above captures the precarious claim of many urban poor on the right to 
livelihood (Evans, 2002a), a common sentiment among Baclaran vendors. Informal vendors 
began occupying Baclaran streets in the 1950s. Their number has started rising in the 
1980s. “There were only few vendors before and there were no [semi-fixed] stalls”, vendor, 
Alexander, said. At that time, street hawkers were using carts, bilao (a native rounded 
container), and small pieces of cloth to display their wares. They were on the roads near the 
Baclaran Church. “As soon as the [Baclaran church] devotees came, vendors started 
occupying the surrounding areas”, church leader, Francis, recalled. Julie, an old vendor 
leader, shared how hawkers have multiplied over time, “It’s because before we were allowed 
by the city mayor, the Mayor of Pasay… It seemed related to politics. That’s how we have 
grown in number”.   
 
Different estimates on the current number of Baclaran vendors abound. Local officials say 
there are 1000-3000. Vendor leaders peg it at 1500-2000. My own repeated calculations 
using a digital tally counter reveal over 1500 semi-fixed stalls and ambulant hawkers during 
ordinary days and almost 4000 on peak days (Wednesday, Saturday, Sunday) and during 
Bermonths58 (September-December).   
 
 
Figure 6-2: Vendors with semi-fixed stalls in front of shopping malls  
 
Vendors put up semi-fixed kiosks (see Figure 6-2 above) or roam around four Baclaran road 
networks: Taft Avenue Extension, Harrison-Quirino Avenue, Redemptorist Road, and Roxas 
                                            
58 On ordinary days, vendors earn between PhP 100.00 (US $2.17) and PhP 500.00 (US $10.9). On peak 
days, their average income is over PhP 500.00 (US $10.9) a day; a while few of them earn around PhP 
3,000.00 (US $65.22). The Bermonths season is examined in Chapter 7. 
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Boulevard Service Road. They sell clothes, shoes, housewares, toys, gadgets, street-food, 
fresh fruits and vegetables, among others (see Figure 6-3 below). As vendors occupy 
streets, they generate an urban environment that makes people think they are a 
homogenous group with common needs. Yet, as what has been observed in other contexts 
(Etemadi, 2004; Bhowmik, 2005; Yatmo, 2008; Crossa, 2009; Recio, 2010), Baclaran 
vendors are heterogeneous with diverse interests, issues, and relations. They have various 
ways of creating a sense of belonging. 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Baclaran Street Products 
 
Religious affiliation is a way by which vendors classify themselves: Christian and Muslim. 
Since Baclaran is a Christian-dominated urban district, Muslim hawkers’59 growing presence 
leads to behavioural biases. As local official, Lian, expressed: “I don’t want to generalize 
[about Muslims vendors], but some Muslims are messy. After they had eaten [something], 
they would simply litter anywhere”. Barangay leader, Allen, echoed a similar view “… [T]he 
Muslim [vendors] have different beliefs and views... Some have gotten used to the city life 
but most find it hard to cope…” Sapitula (2013b) writes about the Christian-Muslim dynamics 
in Baclaran. He cites class and religious factors as vital elements in the ‘hierarchized 
conviviality’60 between Christians and Muslims in Baclaran. The quotes above from Christian 
local officials reflect this hierarchized conviviality.  More importantly, the narratives, which 
                                            
59 Most Muslim traders in Baclaran are Maranaos, a Muslim ethnic group in Mindanao. They migrated to Metro 
Manila to seek better socio-economic prospects and escape violent rido encounters in their area. Rido is a 
family feud resulting in killings of relatives of involved parties. The influx of Muslim vendors appears to be a 
recent phenomenon since a mid-1990s study (Valladolid, 1996) indicated a small portion of hawkers who 
migrated from Muslim provinces. The Muslim traders have apparently increased across time. 
60 It refers to an urban social stratification which results from the processes of ‘othering’ identities and groups 
that do not conform to standards imposed by the dominant forces (Sapitula, 2013b). 
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associate disorder with rural migrants, frame structural inequalities as a question of culture 
(Hunt, 2009) and a spatial issue for everyday governance (Tucker, 2016). 
 
In terms of mobility, two types of vendors occupy the Baclaran spaces. The first consists of 
ambulant vendors who use bilao, carts, steel panels, and plastic bags (see Figure 6-4 
below), which they easily pack up when there is eviction. Dubbed as ‘haging’ or ‘sniper’61, 
these vendors have no organization. While some are constantly mobile, others occupy 
certain ‘territories’ they have marked using electric posts, building facades and street lines.  
 
 
Figure 6-4: Ambulant hawkers in Baclaran 
 
 
Figure 6-5: Vendors under the LRT1 Rail Track 
                                            
61 Haging or sniper is further examined in Chapter 7.	
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The second group comprises hawkers who have semi-fixed stalls62. They can be considered 
organized in that they have leaders who coordinate with local state officials. Equipped with 
informally-granted permit from the local government, many of their kiosks (see Figure 6-2 
on page 128) are informally-built while some were installed as part of government livelihood 
programs. In some areas, the construction of semi-fixed stalls has left only about two-meter-
wide space (see Figure 6-5 on page 130) for the pedestrians and slow-moving vehicles. The 
congested space is under the LRT Baclaran station. 
 
Mobility is also linked to security of vending spaces63. The itinerant hawkers are less secure 
than those with temporary kiosks who have political ties. No less than the city mayor is their 
key ally. As Jason, a local government staff, narrated: “If there is a vendor who is a relative 
of a Barangay official; that official will go to the Mayor. Then, the Mayor will instruct us to 
allow [the vendor/s]. We cannot do anything. It’s the instruction of the Mayor”.   
 
In some instances, local political leaders who helped the Mayor during elections play an 
important role64. “Political leaders at the barangay level gain confidence and political 
leverage because of their direct contact to the Mayor”, Jason continued. But how do vendors 
capitalize on this leverage? Vendor leader, Julie, answered, “I list down all their [fellow 
vendors] names. Now, if the Mayor asks for it, [I could say] ‘look, here it is; you can check if 
s/he is lives here based on their [voter] registration...’ It is not really for the Mayor; but he 
has a coordinator”.  
 
For some vendors, this channel to the city mayor has become a ‘protocol’. Catalina, a vendor 
leader, even said there is no need to coordinate with national government agencies: “No, 
because that means we will by-pass the local [officials]. They might get angry and stop us 
from occupying the streets. We need to go to them first. That’s the protocol. The situation 
would be worse off for us if they get angry”.  
 
So, how exactly do vendor leaders get in touch with the city officials? Old vendor, Hannah, 
explained: “If the city hall needs to talk to us, then we [vendor leaders] get together. The 
                                            
62 A vendor typically owns one stall. The exceptions to this are the leaders and old vendors who have occupied 
the streets and sidewalks since the 1980s and acquired more than one stall over the years. 
63 In Section 7.3.1, Chapter 7, I discuss in detail how vendors occupy the streets. 
64 In Section 6.5.2.1 in this chapter, I present the role of local political leaders.	
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MTCT informs us about the meeting. Then the nine of us [leaders] will meet up and go there 
[to the city hall]”. The meeting often takes place before an impending eviction.  
Before they [vendors] put up a stall [on the streets], they inform the barangay and our 
office. But the agreement is once there is a need to demolish [the stall]; they will have 
to remove it… even on a short notice. We inform the [vendor] leaders; then our staff 
will inform the stall [owners]… and their vendors. It is just a verbal [agreement]; we 
tell them ‘yes, you may vend but you have to follow the rules’. (Jason) 
 
As previously discussed, the MTCT authority to formulate verbal agreement on street use 
for vending and on what can be considered negotiated evictions65 is not stipulated in the 
City Ordinance on hawking. The MTCT, therefore, shapes its own rules, and build relations 
with the vendors. For some stakeholders, this situation breeds more issues. Church leader, 
Francis, shared his concerns, “… we are not against vendors per se… We know that they 
need to earn a living. But, what about the [absence of] order? That’s what we are against – 
the absence of order. Then, there is corruption. Who benefits from that? Who is able to 
maintain power?”  
 
Hector, an academic who has worked with vendor organizations, offered an answer. 
“… those things happen because there are parties who want to maintain the 
situation… [T]he government is the main player who does that… Why? Isn’t that a 
divide-and-rule [strategy]? They know that once the urban poor gets organized, they 
[erring state officials] will fall; so, their strategy is to disrupt the process. It’s divide-
and-rule [strategy]… [T]hey initiate and nurture it.  
   
Belinda, a vendor organizer, recalled how a local government undermined Baclaran 
vendors’ organizing efforts. 
“They [local government] did a divide-and-rule strategy. [In Baclaran], they appointed 
new leaders to be able to control the vending spaces. If you’re an ordinary member, 
you would simply follow even if it’s difficult. You must obey otherwise you would not 
have an income… One leader was asserting her leadership. She was still the 
president but they could not come up with decisions. The local government was 
disrupting the organizational process”.  
 
The foregoing account illustrates how vendors began occupying Baclaran streets, the 
fractional groupings among their ranks, and their insecure conditions66. Similar to how they 
have nurtured fragile alliances with malls and stallholders, the discussion depicts how some 
hawkers have built tenuous and unequal power relations with local officials. Two other 
                                            
65 Evictions are examined in Chapter 7.  
66 In the next chapter (Chapter 7), I examine the practices and strategies they have undertaken to cope with 
the precarious situation.	
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grassroots players help vendors grapple with Baclaran’s precarious environment. They are 
examined in the following section.  
 
6.5.2. Grassroots Intermediaries: Barriers to and Bridges of Change 
In informality literature, Tucker (2016) has chronicled the role of political intermediaries 
known as punteros in Paraguayan border economy. In India, Routray (2014) has 
documented how the intermediaries, locally called pradhans, simultaneously embrace 
solidarity, patronage, and exploitation of the urban poor. In the Philippines, my previous 
studies (Recio, 2010; 2014; 2015) have shown how advocacy groups act as intermediaries 
in advancing the rights of street vendors. 
 
Intermediaries serve as conduits between marginalized groups and the more powerful 
actors like state officials. They often link local struggles with the broader socio-political milieu 
(Kritsanaphan & Sajor, 2011) and enhance the urban poor’s social capital (Routray, 2014). 
They can include academics, politicians, journalists, and NGOs (Evans, 2002b; Lee, 1998). 
In this thesis, intermediaries are confined to those who connect Baclaran vendors to power 
and governance structures. Dubbed as grassroots intermediaries, these agents, who are 
embedded in the larger socio-political structures, consist of local political leaders and vendor 
organizers. In the analysis below, I show how these intermediaries could undermine and/or 
introduce change in Baclaran’s unequal socio-spatial relations.  
 
6.5.2.1. Local Political Leaders 
Local political leaders, also called political operators, are typically part of the electoral 
machinery of local government officials or politicians vying for state positions. They 
sometimes occupy appointive positions in city or barangay bureaucracy. Some act as 
volunteer Barangay Intelligence Officer and Barangay Intelligence Support who gather 
information on the electoral support of politicians in barangays. They help strengthen the 
latter’s political base during election season. In exchange, some Barangay Intelligence 
Support ask their political patrons to allow some people they endorse to sell on the streets.  
 
Jenny, a vendor and a Barangay Intelligence Support, admitted that she is able to identify 
individuals who can occupy sidewalks for vending. As Barangay Intelligence Support, she 
can facilitate the release of confiscated products after an eviction. “If someone’s products 
got confiscated, we can get them back. They [vendors] just need to approach a Barangay 
Intelligence Officer who is part of our network”.  
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Local official, Jason, acknowledged the presence of the channel created by local leaders 
and related it to the increasing number of Muslim vendors.  
Some of them got involved in politics. [They have become] barangay leaders, political 
leaders of the Mayor… So, that’s the problem. It’s because they use the political 
leverage. We are trying to be non-partisan in the [Ordinance] implementation. But 
because of some people within the city hall, we are less strict with the vendors 
because they are also our voters. 
 
Jess, a political leader for local politicians, confirmed this arrangement.  
We got in touch with leaders of Muslim residents who got evicted from their 
settlements. We helped them register as barangay residents in Pasay. This 
assistance forged a relationship between political operators and Muslim leaders who 
have later on capitalized on their increasing population as an electoral leverage with 
politicians vying for government positions.  
 
Armed with this political influence, the Muslim leaders have gained concessions from local 
officials such as an access to vending spaces for Muslim residents. The same strategy has 
occurred in Parañaque. As city official, Krisha, explained, “Since many vendors have been 
there for a long time, they got [their voter’s] registration there. Their purpose is to have a link 
to the barangay, to the city [government].  
 
Lastly, there have been instances when political leaders link up with vendors to undermine 
the latter’s collective initiatives. As vendor organizer, Leo, shared, 
We were still coordinating with the [Parañaque] Mayor. But they were already doing 
something, [which was an] underground [move], involving other vendors. But their 
leaders were not vendors; they were political operators. They slowly disbanded [the 
vendors’] federation. They would say there will be clearing operation. During the 
clearing [operation], the political operator would intervene. [S/he would say], ‘these 
[vendors] are [our] political allies. Do not disturb their area’. The vendors witnessed 
that and [they thought] these [political operators] have power. Some vendors began 
to cling [to the operators]. 
 
The insights above illustrate how local political leaders capitalize on their access to hierarchy 
of power by serving as intermediaries between the powerful and the marginalized. While 
they may have helped vendors gain access to streets, they also feed on the latter’s insecure 
conditions. They operate in the ‘realm of calculated self-interests’ (Osella, 2014) by using 
the socio-political capital and benefits to satisfy certain wishes of their political bosses, 
respond to the urgent needs of the marginalized, and advance their own interests. This 
echoes Routray’s (2014) observation on how some intermediaries employ skills and 
knowledge to gain power and respect in a neighbourhood. At other times, however, these 
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intermediaries, like Baclaran’s local political operators, are denounced as money-makers 
and cunning manipulators. 
 
6.5.2.2. Vendor Organizers 
Besides local political leaders, the vendor organizers’ role needs to be examined to 
understand the complexity of relationships among different groups and the nature of 
collective action in Baclaran. While political leaders are tied to state officials and politicians, 
vendor organizers are part of informal workers’ groups and advocacy NGOs pushing for 
reform-oriented socio-economic agenda for hawkers. 
 
Belinda, a vendor organizer and former head of NAPC-WISC, shared their approach. 
 [Our approach] was issue-based organizing because we were focused on 
strengthening each sub-sector [within the informal economy]. We wanted them to 
articulate their own issues because they know better. We don’t want to represent 
them. We would only facilitate their representation… We touched base with them… 
Then they [started] joining us [in WIS Council meetings] and even in rallies. [There 
were] 48 organizations, [which] we got registered at SEC [Securities and Exchange 
Commission] and DOLE so they could be [recognized] as workers’ associations.  
 
When series of evictions occurred, Belinda was at the forefront of mediating work. “They 
[Baclaran vendors] became more active [during the evictions]. We had media coverage… 
We were on the streets until 2:00 AM when there were demolitions… My approach then was 
to bring in the [national] agencies such as the DOLE, the PCUP, the DSWD [Department of 
Social Welfare and Development]”. Besides linking up with NGAs, Belinda facilitated 
dialogues with city governments. Leo, another vendor organizer, backed Belinda’s account. 
When we started, they [vendors] had different groups. They said they wanted to form 
a [vendors’] federation for the whole Baclaran area… We challenged them to continue 
forming the federation and we supported them in dealing with the barangay and city 
governments… [We focused] on what we call social dialogue, social insurance, social 
protection... security of workplace... There’s nothing about politics. 
 
Leo’s point on politics refers to how they avoided confronting the political leaders in 
Baclaran. As he clarified, “What I did before, I told them ‘whatever discussion you have with 
others, it’s different [from our talks]. Let’s concentrate on our agenda. I won’t meddle in your 
negotiations with them”. This avoidance stems from the entrenched patronage relations in 
the area. Maura, long-time vendor organizer, described how she experienced dealing with 
the political relations in Baclaran. 
It became a matter of life and death depending on the area. I remember, before in 
Pasay area, our group was being monitored… Some vendors even whispered to us, 
‘Maura, please take care, some eyes are watching you’. That’s the situation”.  
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Leo and Maura’s concerns are linked to the divide-and-rule strategy of local political leaders 
and their bosses, as discussed in the sections above, which has led to the collapse of one 
vendors’ federation. Still, as organizer, Leo, put it, “there is something to build on”. 
 
The internal dynamics in the vendor organizers’ institutional affiliation contributed to the 
decline of reform-oriented collective action in Baclaran. As Belinda noted, “After our term [at 
NAPC-WIS Council], they [new leaders] had focused on other things they wanted to pursue”. 
This change in priority reflects the wider sentiment within many Philippine labour unions, 
which focus on formal employees. Belinda and Mayeth, members of two of the country’s 
largest trade union federations, have been struggling even within their own labour groups to 
justify their engagement with informal workers.  In Belinda’s words, “They [labour unions] 
support the informal sector but on a project-based arrangement”.  
 
The preceding discussion points out how vendor organizers serving as intermediaries 
engaged government units to push for vendors’ welfare. They capitalized on existing formal 
spaces and create new paths for state engagement. Yet, the local power relations and the 
internal dynamics within their groups proved too much to sustain their efforts. 
 
6.6. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have answered the thesis sub-question 1: who are the players that drive 
the formal systems and informal mechanisms, and their interface, in governing and 
appropriating vending spaces? In addressing the question, I have considered a key insight 
in Chapter 3 - the conversations on the players in governance should involve the standpoint 
of those who govern and those governed. I have thus examined four groups of actors 
involved in informality. The first two groups are government institutions clustered into 
national agencies and local units.  The last two are non-state players at the local level - the 
NGOs and private sector actors and the grassroots players. 
 
Five national agencies are involved in interventions concerning informal economy. They face 
several issues in performing their mandates:  1) the limited engagement with grassroots 
players; 2) institutional fragmentation; 3) the unresponsive tools and processes; 4) the 
dualist and developmentalist approach to informality; and 5) the complex local political 
dynamics. One thread that runs through these concerns is the importance of policy 
epistemology (Roy, 2005) and spatial positionality (Lemanski & Marx, 2015) of those 
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charged with addressing informality. As evident in the accounts above, national government 
officials have articulated broad interventions that not only perpetuate the formal-informal 
dichotomy as a solution to informality issues but are also inattentive to local contexts. As a 
result, the presence and power of NGAs, except for MMDA’s past eviction operations, are 
hardly felt in Baclaran.  
 
Meanwhile, the players at the local level are entangled in messy socio-spatial relations.  The 
roles of city governments depict how the discretionary power of local executives has enabled 
the Mayors’ personnel to dominate the appropriation of Baclaran streets. They employ legal 
instruments that are critical (Pasay) or supportive (Parañaque) of street vending. They 
define their own rules on street use and have taken advantage of vendors’ vulnerable 
conditions. In addition, the analysis of local government players has unveiled a depoliticized 
planning approach to informal vending. Land use plans in both localities are notably 
inattentive to Baclaran vendors. This concern resonates with Webber’s (1963, p. 54) point 
on the need for planners to avoid “some deep-seated doctrine that seeks order in simple 
mappable patterns, when it is really hiding in extremely complex social organization…” More 
importantly, such depoliticized approach puts premium on gentrification, a core dimension 
neoliberal agenda of attracting investments.  
 
Beyond the government institutions, the accounts on NGOs and private sector players have 
shown their capacity to collaborate and contend with vendors. They can advance their 
sectoral interests at the expense of marginalized hawkers. Yet, the narratives of the less 
influential jeepney drivers show how they feel marginalized in the scramble for Baclaran 
spaces. These indicate that in Baclaran’s hierarchical socio-spatial relations, those who 
have the economic and cultural capital still emerge as the more powerful actors.  
 
The hierarchy is likewise seen in tenuous ties involving grassroots players. They build 
relations that generate engagement channels and/or employ the spaces afforded by state’s 
formal rules. On the one hand, some organized vendors and local political leaders are 
entangled in fragile political ties with local officials. Their link to the Mayor’s Office rests on 
one agenda: temporary access to streetscape.  While this may appear particularistic for 
outsiders, it is the raison d'être for many vendors. On the other hand, the narratives by 
vendor organizers capture the potential of hawkers, when organizing assistance is 
sustained, to resist and break the cycle of uncertain relations. They formed a federation, 
joined rallies, and attended meetings with NGAs and LGUs. Alas, their collective action 
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encountered fierce resistance from political leaders and local officials. These powerful 
players undermined the vendors’ attempt at formal governance engagement.  
 
In sum, I have identified the actors involved in informality and analysed their roles and 
relations. I have also examined the different factors that have shaped and/or strained the 
interventions and relations, whether through institutional mandates or daily interactions, of 
those entangled in informality and street vending. In the subsequent chapter, I analyse how 
the state rules and everyday practices have influenced and/or evolved from the relationships 
of these players. 
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CHAPTER 7. APPROPRIATING CONTESTED VENDING SPACES:   
 STATE RULES AND STREET NORMS 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The various players discussed in Chapter 6 have multiple and competing interests in 
Baclaran streetscapes. Two questions arise from the need to understand how these players 
get entangled in cooperation, co-optation, and contestation in defending their stakes on the 
streets. First, under what government rules do these players use streets and assert their 
claims? Second, what practices and norms do street vendors observe in relation to street 
use and informal vending? These queries represent the thesis sub-questions 2 and 3, 
respectively. In answering the questions, I argue in this chapter that the conflicting state 
rules and the varied socio-spatial practices represent how the formal-informal interface play 
out on the ground.  
 
I arrange this chapter as follows. First, I analyse the conflicting state policies that govern 
street use and informal vending. The discussion of policies follows the thesis’ framing of 
policy epistemologies, which was laid out in Chapter 2. These epistemologies comprise the 
hostile orientation, the tolerant atmosphere, and the accommodating environment. After this 
section, I explain the practices and norms that Baclaran hawkers have undertaken to 
appropriate streets for informal vending. These practices include the haging occupancy, the 
engagement with evictionist regulatory regime, the Bermonths routine, and the multiple 
finance-generating schemes. In the concluding section, I discuss how various state rules 
and street norms constitute a formal-informal interface.  
 
7.2. State Rules Governing Street Use and Informal Vending 
Using my notion of post-dualist lens, I analysed in Chapter 2 how state rules on informal 
vending in various global South cities constitute three policy epistemologies – the hostile 
orientation, the tolerant atmosphere, the accommodating environment. These 
epistemologies animate the Philippine legal instruments and political arrangements that 
govern street use and informal vending. As the succeeding sections will show, however, the 
nexus of structural dimensions and agency expressions shapes the development, content, 
and enforcement of state policies and political arrangements. 
 
The Philippine legal system - a blend of Anglo-American common law, Spanish civil code, 
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and Malay customary laws67 (Villanueva, 1990) - treats the country’s 1987 Constitution as 
its fundamental law. International treaties68 to which the state is a signatory and the 
legislative enactments are likewise regarded as legal instruments. Although Presidential 
Executive Orders and Proclamations, local ordinances, and decisions of government 
agencies are not strictly considered laws, they have the force and effect of the law (Santiago, 
1983). In this chapter, therefore, aside from the Constitution and Republic Acts legislated by 
the Philippine Congress, executive orders, ordinances and other governmental resolutions 
are part of the policy discussion. 
 
7.2.1. The Hostile Legal Orientation  
As early as 1924, policy makers in Manila had already issued an ordinance prohibiting street 
vending (Illy, 1986). Current policies that are critical of informal vending underscore two 
salient arguments on street use. First, they treat streets as a public property where 
commercial activities are prohibited. Second, they consider streets as primarily a mobility 
channel for automobiles and pedestrians. These views are reflected in two Supreme Court 
(SC) decisions, one Republic Act, two agency resolutions, and two local ordinances. 
 
In one SC ruling (General Register No. 93654, 6 May 1992), the court decided in favour of 
a resident-petitioner in Caloocan, a component city of Metro Manila, to have a talipapa (flea 
market) and the vendors removed from their vending space. The SC argues that the permit 
granted by the local chief executive is illegal since the street is a public property where 
commercial activities are prohibited. As a public property, streets should be used by all 
people. In another decision (General Register No. 97764, 10 August 1992), the SC sided 
with a police-general serving as Metropolitan Traffic Command Superintendent, who 
petitioned for the removal of street vendors in Baclaran, Parañaque City. Like its earlier 
decision, the SC claims that streets are not for commercial activities, an argument affirmed 
by the Philippine Civil Code, which regards streets as a public property that cannot be used 
by a few individuals or groups69.  
                                            
67 In the southern Philippines, there is a partial application of Islamic law to the Filipino Muslims (Villanueva, 
1990). 
68 Although there may be provisions in some Philippine government-ratified international treaties that impact 
on informal workers (e.g. International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights), some Philippine 
NGOs invoking these provisions have faced the enforceability issue. In the literature, Watts and Fitzpatrick 
(2017) point out the philosophical and practical limitations of rights-oriented international treaties. In the 
Philippines, Magallona (2010) discusses the legal issues surrounding the enforceability of similar international 
covenants. Given these discursive and practical issues, I deliberately did not include the international treaties 
in this chapter.	
69 Besides the Civil Code, the SC decisions looked at the old Local Government Code or LGC (Batas 
Pambansa Bilang 337 of 1983) and not into the 1991 LGC, which lays down important provisions on the use 
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The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), police, and local officials often cite 
the SC decisions in asserting that streets cannot be used for vending. Besides the SC ruling, 
Republic Act 7924 (known as the MMDA Charter), two MMDA resolutions (02-28 and 02-
40) and two local ordinances in Metro Manila regard street vending as transport and traffic 
management concern. Section 3.b of the MMDA Charter, a provision on the agency’s 
mandated duties, captures this logic.  
“[The scope of MMDA services shall involve] transport and traffic management which 
include the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies, standards, programs 
and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure 
requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient 
movement of persons and goods…” (Underscoring supplied) 
 
The MMDA Legal Services Division has cited the underlined phrase as its basis for evicting 
street vendors (Recio, 2010). With this mandate, the MMDA issued in 2002 two resolutions 
pertaining to street use. Resolution No. 02-28 authorizes the MMDA and the local 
governments to clear the sidewalks, streets, and other public places in Metro Manila of all 
illegal structures and obstructions. The Resolution treats street vending as an obstruction.  
Meanwhile, MMDA Resolution No. 02-40 lays down the rules and procedures for disposing 
items confiscated during MMDA’s clearing operations.  
 
At the local level, the Pasay City local council enacted Ordinance No. 1890 (Series of 2000) 
that prohibits street hawking. It considers vending as an obstruction and provides measures 
on the confiscation of goods and penalty for those who will violate the Ordinance. In 
Caloocan, the City’s New Traffic Management Code (Ordinance 0391, Series of 2005) 
endorses the preceding MMDA resolutions. Its Section 120 echoes the MMDA policy on 
street use. 
“The use of streets… and other public places in Caloocan City for commercial and 
personal purposes are hereby prohibited. Such prohibited acts include but not limited 
to the following: a. Vending or selling of foods, magazines… shoes and other 
footwear, and/or any other items…” 
  
The foregoing legal provisions emphasize the importance of everyone’s access to and 
unrestrained movement on streets as a mobility channel. The policies sound inspiring in 
their aim at promoting public order, efficient transport, and orderly physical space. From a 
                                            
of streets for vending and other socio-cultural activities. Section 7.1.3 in this chapter presents the 1991 LGC. 
By invoking the power of the Philippine Civil Code over the LGC, the two SC decisions emphasize the role of 
streets as a public property. The SC has thus framed the legal question as a property issue rather than an 
institutional jurisdiction question, which is relevant to decentralization as expounded on in Section 7.2.3.  
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structural standpoint, however, there is a class dimension to this bias for physical order.  In 
the Philippine socio-political structure, the elite sees informal hawking as primarily having 
adverse effects on traffic and sanitation, and since the bureaucracy is part of the elite 
structure, this view is reinforced and transformed into public policy (Illy, 1986). Inevitably, 
the fixation with physical order reaffirms past Philippine laws, which narrowly equated 
planning with public works, infrastructure development (Santiago, 1983) and urban design 
(Endriga & Nierras, 1983).  
 
Further, linking the provisions of the above-cited policies to the broader issues that afflict 
Philippine cities unmasks their dualist and decontextualized character. As poverty, 
unemployment, and intense urban migration issues continue to force poor people to 
embrace informality, violent encounters70 between law-enforcing authorities and the 
struggling street vendors often define the policy implementation. The account below is a 
typical narrative.  
During the time of [former MMDA Chair] Bayani [Fernando], some people who 
probably had nothing to eat fought back [when there were evictions] … There was 
someone who died and some vendors got violently hit [by the authorities]. (Chris, 
street vendor since 1979) 
 
Amid the violent encounters, interest aggregation (Illy, 1986) at the enforcement stage, as 
mentioned in Chapter 6, can distort policies depending on the power constellations of the 
actors involved. In MMDA case, it found itself confronting some powerful forces in Metro 
Manila who filed legal cases and successfully challenged the agency’s authority over public 
spaces (Gomez, 2014)71. Paradoxically, it was the series of legal drawbacks at the hands of 
the wealthy private groups and individuals that prompted the MMDA to stop the violent 
evictions against vendors.  This shows how the powerful players can influence both the 
content, as pointed above, and the enforcement of policies affecting informal vendors. In 
other instances, the policies get thwarted on the ground by a set of tolerant arrangements, 
which seek to accommodate vendors amid a hostile legal atmosphere.  
 
                                            
70 Violent encounters are further tackled in Section 7.3.2. 
71 Three separate legal cases involving a gated community’s homeowner’s association, a lawyer, and an 
advertising company obtained Supreme Court verdicts in 2000, 2005 and 2009, respectively. While the legal 
suits revolved around different issues - street closure, vehicular parking, and sidewalk clearing - the decisions 
emphasize the MMDA’s lack of legislative and police power over Metro Manila’s public spaces (Gomez, 2014).	
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7.2.2. The Tolerant Political Arrangements  
In Chapter 3, I briefly mentioned how some local officials in the Philippines tolerate street 
hawking despite the presence of anti-vending policies. Previous studies have analysed the 
tolerant arrangements in various Philippine cities: Manila (Illy, 1986), Cebu (Etemadi, 2004), 
Baguio (Milgram, 2009), and Caloocan (Recio, 2010; Recio & Gomez, 2013). Although there 
is no written policy that the local governments in these cities have issued to tolerate vending, 
the attitude and the ensuing arrangements have effectively replaced the legal rules.  In this 
section, I explain how three lessons emerging from these scholarly works resonate with the 
conditions in Baclaran. 
 
One key message that past studies emphasize is the inherent link of informal vending to 
poverty and unemployment. Recognizing this link is perhaps the most critical factor that 
compels local officials to tolerate vending. As local official, Allen, reasoned out, “… some 
people say sidewalks are for people. Yes, that’s right. But if you compare how sidewalks are 
used for walking with how [vendors] use them to feed their families, which one is more just? 
That’s their livelihood. So, I indirectly tolerate vending on the sidewalks, not on the main 
streets”. Andy, another local official, echoed this view: “We don’t have any objection to 
[street] vendors because it [hawking] is their livelihood. They have families to support; they 
have financial loans. [We are okay with vending] as long as they maintain order and they 
don’t obstruct [vehicular] traffic”.  
 
For Francis, a Church leader who criticizes the congestion generated by vending, poverty 
and unemployment serve as his rallying point to support informal hawkers: “There are really 
poor among vendors. It [vending] is their job. They send their kids to school by selling 
sampaguita flowers, foods, fruits, etc. Well, they can be allowed to vend on Wednesdays 
and Sundays”. 
 
Moving on to the second factor that generates a lenient approach, earlier findings have 
identified the power of building political leverage through organizing or networking initiatives. 
In Baclaran, political leverage is built through illicit financial transactions, electoral 
engagement, daily acts of ‘goodwill’ with barangay leaders, and fictive kinship ties with city-
level politicians. In Chapter 6, I presented how illicit collection and electoral engagement 
occur in Baclaran. With respect to goodwill acts, vendor leader, Esperanza, explained how 
it works.  
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If you want a trouble-free life [on the streets], you need to create a ‘legal’ conduit as 
a go-to channel. If you display arrogance to Barangay [officials], where would you 
go? [You need to] give them [officials] something [they can spend] on coffee even if 
they don’t ask for it. That’s how it is. Occasionally, [you should] visit them; give them 
something… You probably don’t realize it but we kneel [before local officials] so we 
can sell.    
 
Meanwhile, creating fictive kinship goes beyond doing occasional visits. The ties are 
considered deeper and are publicly recognized. This reflects in how old vendor, Catalina, 
views the reason for local officials’ tolerant behaviour: “How can the officials reproach 
vendors when their leaders have contacts [within the city government]? In fact, veteran 
vendor leader, Julian, is a kumpare72 of one official so it’s impossible that they won’t get the 
consent. Julian facilitates the process”. Beyond individual brokering, community leader, 
Alexander, revealed how their networking is legitimized in public events: “When we celebrate 
special occasions, we invite government officials. For instance, when we install Sultans we 
invite governors, the President, the Vice President. When we proclaimed the Sultan of 
Pasay, senators, mayors and governors gathered together at Cuneta Astrodome to witness 
[the event]”. A huge public gathering like this impresses upon politicians the power of Muslim 
votes. As political adviser, Billy, explained, “There are mediators from a big faction of 
Muslims who negotiate with the Mayor. Yes, they use [their number] as a voting bloc. [They 
would say], ‘if you remove the vendors in Baclaran, the Mayor may lose [in the elections]’. 
 
As a result, the tolerant atmosphere is seen in the creation of Pasay’s Mayor Total Clean 
Team or MTCT, whose primary function as discussed in Chapter 6 is to police street 
vending. This MTCT role in regulating vending despite having a city ordinance prohibiting 
hawking illustrates how the political leverage has practically thwarted an official policy. In 
the neighbouring Paranaque, Barangay Baclaran’s recognition of what local officials call 
‘legitimate’ vendors, comprised of hawkers who have been occupying the streets for 
decades, represents a tolerant attitude. 
 
If the first two lessons pertain to recognizing poverty and building political leverage, the last 
factor relates to what can be considered a socio-temporal dimension of a tolerant approach 
to informality – street vending during the Bermonths73. From a calculated consent, local 
                                            
72 Kumpare is a male sponsor or godparent in Filipino Catholic rituals like baptism, confirmation or marriage. 
It comes from the Spanish word compadre.  
73 Bermonths refers to the Christmas-New Year Season in the Philippines. It covers September to December, 
hence Bermonths, and the first half of January. In Section 7.2.3, I address this in more detail as part of key 
practices on the ground. The discussion here underscores its importance as an aspect of a tolerant 
atmosphere. 
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officials arguably exhibit total accommodation of vendors during Bermonths. Apart from the 
consumerist rush, the Bermonths period signifies a season of giving and compassion.  
 
This rhetoric becomes a convenient excuse for local officials, especially when coupled with 
messages treating vendors as their less-fortunate fellows, to justify what they call as the 
‘open season for vendors’.  As city planner, Kisha, recalled, “Before, the MMDA was really 
strict in policing vendors [in Baclaran]. But there came a point when vendors appealed to 
our Mayor during Christmas season. So, the Mayor talked to the MMDA. He said, ‘let’s allow 
them since it’s Christmas time so our vendors can earn [some money]”. This influence of 
socio-cultural values on policy-makers’ behaviour echoes Illy’s (1986, p. 75) observation 
that regulation enforcement in Manila’s vending policies is shaped by “the extent to which 
social values permeate the implementation process and dilute the degree of compliance”. 
As socio-cultural values blend with economic vulnerability, the hostile legal environment and 
the consumerist rush during Christmas season, the Bermonths season appears to represent 
a socio-spatial ordering that recognizes vending as a legitimate employment. In the next 
section, some local policies even legally acknowledge vending during Christmas season. 
Yet, as Section 7.2.3 will demonstrate, the vendors’ access to streets is just one aspect of 
their routine during the Bermonths. 
 
7.2.3. The Accommodating Policy Environment: Contexts and Constraints 
Policies supportive of informal hawkers and their use of streets for vending promote three 
themes: a) the state responsibility to ensure full employment of its citizens, b) the right of 
grassroots organizations to participate in different aspects and levels of governance, and c) 
the authority of local governments to allow street use for vending and other socio-economic 
activities. With respect to employment agenda, the 1987 Philippine Constitution requires the 
government to address the condition of the Filipino poor, which arguably include informal 
economic workers. The Article XIII, Section 1 provides  
“The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect 
the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political 
inequalities and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and 
political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall regulate the 
acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments”. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
Section 9 in the same article orders the government to promote adequate employment 
opportunities, urban land reform, housing and basic services for under-privileged citizens in 
urban centres. Meanwhile, Section 16 stipulates the right of the people and their 
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organizations to participate in all levels of socio-political and economic decision-making. 
These Constitutional provisions are upheld in subsequent national laws. The country’s 1991 
Local Government Code or LGC (Section 16) mandates local governments to promote 
economic prosperity, social justice, and employment of all citizens. Sections 106 and 107 
enable people’s organizations and non-government organizations to get involved in local 
development councils through local special bodies.  
 
In 1997, the enactment of Republic Act 8425, known as the Social Reform and Poverty 
Alleviation Law, paved way for the legal definition of workers in the informal sector. The law 
defines workers in the informal sector as “poor individuals who operate businesses that are 
very small in scale and are not registered with any national government agency, and the 
workers in such enterprises who sell their services in exchange for subsistence level wages 
or other forms of compensation". The law demands the creation of workers in the informal 
sector council as one of the basic sectoral councils in the National Anti-Poverty Commission, 
the coordinating and advisory agency for the implementation of the country’s social reform 
agenda. Street vendors are counted as a subsector within the workers in the informal sector 
council. 
 
Aside from creating a council for informal workers within the National Anti-Poverty 
Commission, another state agency, the National Economic Development Authority, has 
officially recognized informal economic workers through its Social Development Committee 
Resolution No. 2, Series of 2003. This resolution approved the Philippine Program for the 
Informal Sector, which seeks to institutionalize programs and policies for informal economic 
workers by putting up Informal Sector Office in local governments. The program identifies 
street hawkers as a beneficiary. In its success indicators, the program demands a “marked 
improvement in the delivery of programs and services…such as those in licensing and 
application for business/hawking permits” (Emphasis added). 
 
These national policies have gained some support at the local level. In Paraňaque City, the 
Mayor issued in 2002 Executive Order (EO) 02-04, which created a Task Force to protect 
the city’s informal workers and to initiate programs that respond to their needs. The following 
year, the city’s Legislative Council passed Ordinance No 826 (Series of 2003) as EO 02-
04’s legislative version. In Mandaluyong City, the Mayor issued EO 002 (Series of 2002), 
which formed the Local Informal Sector Office in the city. Like Paraňaque’s Task Force, this 
147 
 
office is charged with implementing Local Action Plan to advance the welfare of 
Mandaluyong’s informal economic workers.  
 
Beyond legal provisions that seek to address employment and recognition of informal 
economic workers, several policies authorize street use for vending. For one, the Local 
Government Code’s Section 21 (a) clarifies the powers of local governments on closure and 
opening of local roads within their jurisdictions.  
(a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily 
close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, 
however, that in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at 
least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an 
adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.  
 
In paragraph (d) Section 21, the Local Government Code empowers local governments to 
temporarily close and regulate local roads for vending:  
(d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted ordinance, temporarily 
close and regulate the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public 
place where shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets, or shopping areas may be 
established and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of 
commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public.  
 
These provisions get expanded in EO 452, an order that former President Fidel Ramos 
issued in 1997. EO 452 outlines national guidelines to “ensure the security of registered 
vendors in the workplace”. The EO demands the creation of an Inter-Agency Council on the 
Security of Registered Vendors, which is tasked to formulate and implement policies and 
programs to ensure vendors’ security in the workplace. It requires each city and municipality 
nationwide to establish a registration and permit distribution system to protect vendors’ rights 
and the consumers’ welfare. 
 
Moreover, EO 452 demands vendors’ participation in identifying viable workplaces.  
“The city or municipality, in consultation with vendors, the affected community 
and other sectors or groups, shall identify and designate viable workplaces, and 
design a system of assigning spaces to registered vendors. Workplaces include 
markets, vacant areas within the vicinity of markets and other vacant public spaces which 
may be designated as allowable vending sites.” (Section 4, Emphasis provided) 
 
Besides creating an opportunity for vendors’ participation in local planning, an agenda that 
other abovementioned policies also uphold, EO 452 can be an important tool to spatially 
integrate vending activities into local urban landscape. Alas, the provisions of EO 452 have 
not been realized up until now.  
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Despite the inability of the national government to enforce EO 452, some local governments 
have enacted local ordinances that support street use for vending.  In Parañaque, street 
vending near Baclaran Church is legally recognized through a series of Ordinances - No. 
03-13, Series of 2003; No. 13-10, Series of 2013; No. 13-12, Series of 2013; No. 13-16, 
Series of 2013. These ordinances empower the city government to allow the use of city 
streets in Baclaran as flea markets (tiangge) and/or vending areas under certain conditions. 
The Ordinance No. 13-10 creates the Baclaran Flea Market Committee, which is tasked to 
undertake the following: a) determine the qualified stallholders; b) determine the schedule 
for vending activities; c) determine the design of the vending stalls; d) adjudicate problems 
arising from the occupancy of vending stalls or tiangge spaces.  
 
Outside Metro Manila, Naga City passed Ordinance No. 92-026, which specifies the city 
government’s own definition of street vendors and requires the latter to register and acquire 
permit from the Mayor’s office. Vendors are provided with identification card that contains 
full name and complete address, place where they may sell, classification of the products 
they sell and prescribed vending place and time.  
 
The preceding discussion shows how national and local policies acknowledge informal 
economic workers as participants in governance and planning processes. For instance, RA 
8425 is essential as it legally recognizes informal sector and street vendors. It identifies the 
agencies that should implement programs for the informal workers. However, based on the 
experiences of some leaders representing the informal economic workers, there are 
challenges in implementing these policies. In my earlier work (Recio, 2010), I identified four 
institutional issues afflicting the implementation of the policies discussed above. First, the 
assigned agencies do not fully understand what specific programs should be implemented 
and how they can be effectively carried out. Second, the competency of some local 
government officials and employees is deficient when it comes to fulfilling their institutional 
mandate. This echoes Shatkin’s (2000) concern over how local governments struggle in a 
decentralized system due to resource constraints such as personnel and funding, problems 
that have historically beset Philippine local governments (Santiago & Magavern, 1971). 
Third, while some government officials are supportive of the SRA programs, there is a lack 
of sustained interventions especially when former champions of the programs have left the 
government sector. Fourth, the supportive policies coexist with laws that prohibit street use 
for informal vending. The conflicting policies have generated institutional ambivalence in 
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policy enforcement. For instance, one Metro Manila vendor leader narrated how some 
Barangays used to pass ordinances allowing the vendors to sell within their jurisdiction. But 
when the MMDA evicted the vendors invoking the Supreme Court decisions discussed in 
Section 7.1.1, most barangay officials got intimidated and stopped giving permit to street 
vendors. As a result, barangay policies on street vending have become arbitrary. 
 
Beyond the institutional concerns, some broader contextual issues have undermined the 
enforcement of the well-meaning policies. In this regard, it helps to situate the enactment of 
the policies presented above in the wider political and historical contexts. All the 
aforementioned laws were legislated or issued during the heyday of what some Filipino 
political analysts call the EDSA Republic74, which is characterized by elite-dominated 
political system, acute inequality, and neoliberal-oriented socio-economic policies coinciding 
with democratization and decentralization projects. The 1987 Constitution, a product of the 
EDSA uprising against the Marcos regime, enshrines the rhetoric of participatory 
democracy, decentralization, and popular empowerment. As the preceding discussion has 
shown, the subsequent national policies – the Local Government Code, RA 8425, EO 452 
– and various local ordinances espouse these democratic principles.   
 
When seen from a historical trajectory of Philippine economic policies, the efforts to advance 
these ideals coincided with the promotion of neoliberalism, which was a globally ascendant 
ideology when EDSA revolt occurred (Shatkin, 2000; Bello, 2017). As a result, while 
democratization and decentralization became vital aspirations in the aftermath of the 
struggle against the authoritarian and highly-centralized Marcos regime, these also played 
an important tool for the government to adopt an urban development framework that 
epitomizes the World Bank's new policy agenda. An important element of this new agenda 
pertains to decentralised urban poverty alleviation and localized provision of services amid 
the aggressive drive to attract private and foreign investments (Porio, 2016; Shatkin, 2004; 
Viloria, 1990). This move dovetailed with how the aestheticized and depoliticized reading of 
urban informality’s self-help dimension became popular among international policy-makers 
and got incorporated into neoliberal doctrine of minimal state (van Ballegooijen & Rocco, 
2013). 
 
                                            
74 Bello (2017), in particular, has called the post-Marcos Philippine democratic government as EDSA Republic, 
which is an offshoot of the series of peaceful protests that toppled in 1986 the dictator Ferdinand Marcos, Sr.  
The anti-Marcos protests took place on Metro Manila’s main thoroughfare – the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue 
or EDSA. 
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It is no wonder then that while the policy narrative of the national government revolves 
around participatory democracy and decentralization, much of the responsibility is passed 
on to local governments. The provisions in the Local Government Code, EO 452, and the 
NEDA’s informal sector program exemplify the transfer of burden to LGUs through 
decentralization policy. Decentralization, however, is filled with complex issues. As argued 
in Chapters 5 and 6, elite families have entrenched themselves in local governance 
processes utilizing the formal and informal structures of power. In Chapter 6, I analysed how 
local government units – barangay and city – have been able to play with state policies, 
enforce their own rules, and preserve unjust relations with street vendors. Thus, while the 
discussion above has captured how some LGUs have enacted ordinances to support 
informal economic workers, they represent the exception among many local governments 
in the country. Many LGUs also face the dilemma of addressing informal workers’ needs 
amid the drive to attract investors by gentrifying contested urban spaces.   
 
In sum, although it is crucial to recognize the accommodating atmosphere that some policies 
provide, the preceding discussion has presented the importance of linking these legal tools 
to the larger issues of neo-liberal policies, poverty alleviation, and decentralization. 
Understanding these broader connections, along with institutional issues, affords a nuanced 
discussion of the factors that undermine the purportedly supportive policy instruments. 
These participatory legal tools would have been a key channel to promote inclusive urban 
governance75 as an aspect of decentralization. As it is, the well-intentioned laws enacted to 
support informal workers like vendors became a tool to enforce a neoliberal agenda of 
abandoning major state responsibilities using the rhetoric of democratization and 
decentralization.  
 
Decentralization is particularly problematic in a context where local governments have 
proven co-opted by entrenched powerful families (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Porio, 
2002; 2012) and mired in resource constraints. Enforcement of policies supportive of 
informal workers thus becomes discretionary for many local governments. These issues 
partly explain why national government agencies find it hard to deal with local politics as 
they confront institutional fragmentation and inadequate tools and processes, issues which 
were discussed in Chapter 6. So, how do these interlocking problems manifest on the 
ground? This is tackled next.  
                                            
75 In Section 8.3.4 of Chapter 8, I discuss the need for inclusive urban governance. 
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7.3. Street Norms in Appropriating Contested Vending Spaces 
In this section, I focus on the socio-spatial practices and norms that vendors have 
undertaken and/or institutionalized to gain access to and control over the contested vending 
spaces in Baclaran. These include the haging occupancy, the engagement with evictionist 
regulatory regime, the Bermonths routine, and the multiple finance-generating schemes.  
 
7.3.1. The Haging Occupancy  
While doing an interview with organized vendor, Rowena, an ambulant hawker suddenly 
passed by in front of her stall, which prompted Rowena to say: ‘Oh, he is one of the haging’. 
Intrigued by this vernacular label, I asked what she meant by haging.  
Haging, because they are on their own. They survive by getting along with us who 
are veteran [vendors] here. We just allow them if they don’t block the path [to our 
space] … But they are stubborn. When there is an order from above to vacate the 
space, we leave. But the haging are persistent; they still sell”.  (Rowena) 
 
A few meters away from Rowena’s stall, in another part of the vending area, other hawkers 
call haging ‘sniper’.  “They are the sniper, those who occupy whatever vacant spaces are 
available. If there is eviction, they pack up their products and run”, explained Barangay 
official, Andy. While haging76 or sniper contextually represents the unorganized itinerant 
vendors in Baclaran, even the leaders of organized vendors started out as haging. As vendor 
leader, Chris, recalled, “… this was not my vending space before. I was near the [Baclaran] 
Church, on the left side. We were always on the run. There was constant risk of getting 
caught”.  In other words, haging exemplifies the way hawkers have occupied Baclaran 
spaces: calculating, dodging, negotiating, persisting, resisting, and segregating. The 
succeeding paragraphs examine this haging occupancy – a multifaceted access to and 
control over Baclaran’s contested spaces. 
 
Haging occupancy involves several mechanisms by which vendors have been able to 
appropriate the streets. First, family members participate in securing and managing vending 
spaces, a phenomenon similarly seen elsewhere in the global South (Swider, 2015; Batreau 
& Bonnet, 2016). Relatives serve as helpers and receive daily salary ranging from PhP 150 
(US$ 3.26) to PhP 300 (US$ 46.52) with free food and lodging. Some vendors support 
schooling for their younger relatives who help them in the stall. Old vendor, Julie, is one of 
                                            
76 A local dictionary defines haging as words or things that are not clearly heard (Almario, 2010). Arguably, this 
definition resonates with the precarious condition of Baclaran vendors. 
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them: “I support my grandchildren and my nieces… She [niece] had no job. No one could 
send her to school. I told her ‘help me here; I’ll support your schooling’. 
 
When opportunities change and their earnings increase, vendors ask their relatives to 
manage the original pwesto77 while they establish command over new spaces. If they 
succeed in gaining new grounds, other family members will run the separate vending spaces 
using their own financial capital. Some old vendors have thus obtained more than one 
vending space. One of them has secured seven pwesto, six of which were acquired for her 
children.  
 
Baclaran residents are familiar with this arrangement. As church leader, Francis, narrated, 
“… they control the spaces like their own territories. You cannot simply join their network. 
The old vendors are being replaced by their children. They do not give up their spaces”. This 
option to operate within and through thick personal networks is common in situations of 
poverty and marginalization (Watson, 2003). Old vendor, Esperanza, gave a poignant 
reason: “If you’re the first who occupied a space, you need to protect it. There have been 
arrests and evictions; but you’re still there. For me, nobody can own that space. But you 
cannot simply give it to others. You have endured a lot just to protect it. You would really 
fight to death for it.” This earned sense of entitlement relates to the second aspect of haging 
– tenure duration.  
 
As vendors occupy the streets, their long presence, termed here as tenure duration, 
strengthens the claim to vending spaces. In their own work, Swider (2015) and Tucker 
(2016) call this earned sense of entitlement as de facto right and acquired rights, 
respectively. In Baclaran, tenure duration helps old vendors gain a degree of recognition. 
As narrated in Chapter 6, one barangay distinguishes between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegal’ 
vendors where the former refers to the old hawkers who started vending in Baclaran in the 
1980s. Tenure duration also counts in asserting leadership role. Referring to how they chose 
their leaders, female vendor Sheila said: “Because they were the first to occupy the streets 
here; they have stayed the longest”. This respect matters in initiating collective action. 
 
The third haging aspect pertains to vendors’ self-governance efforts. In one section of 
Baclaran, hawkers consider themselves as organized and recognize nine old vendors as 
                                            
77 Pwesto is a Filipino term for vending space, which may be in the form of a semi-fixed stall, a mobile wooden 
cart or any improvised container of goods. 
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their leaders. They observe certain responsibilities in managing their spaces. Table 7.1 
below summarises the delineation of duties, which revolves around daily access to and 
management of vending spaces. There is no mechanism aimed at long-term plan or more 
secure occupancy. The readiness to follow ‘self-demolition’ order and to re-occupy spaces 
after evictions reveals the organized vendors’ provisional access to streets. In this sense, 
they are no different from unorganized ambulant hawkers.   
 
Table 7.1: Vendors' Responsibilities in Managing Spaces 
Vendor Leaders’ Responsibilities Individual Vendors’ Responsibilities 
§ Ensure that their member-vendors are 
within their assigned spaces; 
§ Ensure that areas occupied by their 
members are clean and orderly; 
§ Resolve conflicts among members; 
§ When conflicts remain unaddressed 
after their intervention, refer the 
concerned parties to barangay officials; 
§ Enforce the City Hall order to voluntarily 
demolish (‘self-demolition’) vending 
stalls; 
§ Participate in vendor-related meetings 
convened by the City Hall or other 
offices; 
§ Ensure that the money needed for 
‘pakikisama’ is regularly collected. 
§ Maintain cleanliness in their vending spaces; 
§ Sell or rent out their pwesto or stalls; 
§ Identify and procure the products from 
chosen supplier/s; 
§ Enter contracts with individual lenders; 
§ (If eligible) Join the development cooperative 
in the area; 
§ Participate or develop a self-help financial 
scheme (locally called paluwagan); 
§ Manage their hired vendors; 
§ Protect their stalls from any incursions 
§ Re-occupy their spaces after evictions; 
§ Contribute to regular financial collection. 
Source: Based on interviews with vendors and their leaders 
 
Despite vendors’ efforts to self-govern, the previous paragraph depicts the shaky foundation 
of vendors’ collective action, which hinges on access to vending spaces. This raises haging 
occupancy’s fourth dimension – tenuous political ties. Section 6.2 (Chapter 6) and Section 
7.1.2 in this Chapter have illustrated how vendors are entangled in different layers and forms 
of political ties -  illicit financial collection as part of pakikisama (getting along or being 
congenial), occasional visits to barangay officials, and fictive kinship. These have enabled 
them to gain access to streets and allow relatives and new entrants to occupy vacant 
spaces. One critical point that requires emphasis in relation to haging occupancy is how 
building political ties has normalized illicit fees, locally dubbed as lagay.  
Our leaders take care of the [illicit] collection. That’s how it is here on the streets. 
Collection is part of their responsibility. (Nelly) 
 
[Illicit] collection has been there since the time when my parents-in-law [were still on 
the streets]. We are aware of it. We just get along since we are able to earn a living. 
It is not a problem. (Oliver) 
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From the statements above, it appears that vendors have taken illicit fees, which are by no 
means legally sanctioned, as part of their normal transaction costs.  But how do vendors 
ensure that the collection reaches the corresponding parties? Old vendor leader, Hannah, 
has a direct answer: “Our continued presence in Baclaran is proof that the money goes to 
the respective people”. This mutual understanding is not unique to Baclaran. In Kolkata, 
India, vendors have the same illicit arrangement with state officials (Bose & Mishra, 2013). 
 
Apart from tenuous ties to local officials, vendors - especially the unorganized ambulant 
ones - nurture a good relationship with formal stallholders. When hawkers have already 
established their presence on the streets, stallholders negotiate with them to maximize the 
use of pwesto and avoid misunderstanding. As presented in Chapter 6, despite these 
collaborative arrangements, conflicts still occur. The tensions stem from the stallholders’ 
sense of entitlement as they pay formal fees; they feel aggrieved when vendors block off 
the entrance of their stalls. 
 
Tensions intensify when new players arrive in Baclaran. As Hannah shared, “We have 
become too crowded here. When [local governments] in Divisoria and Quiapo [in Manila] 
had a crackdown on street vendors, they [evicted hawkers] moved here”. Besides hawkers 
from other informal vending districts in Metro Manila, migrants from Mindanao provinces go 
to Baclaran. “Every December, many Muslim migrants are here… They are just here for the 
entire December. By January, they go back to their provinces [in Mindanao]”, Maricel, a 
Muslim vendor, said. These new occupants can be considered as transient migrants since 
they go back to their provinces after the peak season. Such provisional and transience 
occupation of porous spaces in Baclaran represent haging occupancy’s fifth dimension.  
 
While transience characterizes many migrants, not everyone returns to their places. A lot of 
them stay in Baclaran as stall-helpers. Others stake their own claim to streets as ambulant 
hawkers. They roam around the streets and display their goods using improvised containers. 
The strategy of these itinerant vendors epitomizes haging occupancy’s last attribute – 
mobility. Vendor Eugene shared how mobility has worked for him: “I don’t have any 
association. Here, what matters is how you endure the problems [on the streets] … They 
[local officials] are unable to collect fees from us [since] we come and go”. Because they are 
constantly on the move, they draw little attention from authorities and can use the streets 
without coordinating with any stakeholders. Mobility allows Baclaran hawkers to avoid fines, 
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something similarly observed in Bangkok (Batreau & Bonnet, 2016), and/or elude police 
confrontation, as in the case of Mexico City’s nomadic vendors dubbed as toreros (Crossa, 
2009). More importantly, mobility enables them to thrive on the streets by evading the state’s 
watchful gaze. Thus, as Crossa (2009) puts it, mobility becomes a practice of power. In 
Baclaran, this is seen in how ambulant hawkers who have no organization or political 
affiliation are able to persistently occupy the streets amid the exclusionary socio-spatial 
relations. 
 
To sum up, haging occupancy captures the tenacious and resilient presence of vendors. 
They rely on family members, tenure duration, self-governance schemes, and tenuous ties 
to consistently appropriate the streets. Those unable to secure a strong grip on Baclaran 
spaces resort to transient and mobile strategies. Indeed, these mechanisms hardly suit a 
neat description of socio-spatial control. This is inevitable in a contested environment where 
players simultaneously collaborate and compete to maintain their access to coveted spaces. 
Haging occupancy thus demonstrates the uneven distribution of economic precarity (Tucker, 
2016) and spatio-political uncertainty where hierarchy and marginalization persist even 
among those already on the fringes of society. In this unequal and uncertain setting, how do 
vendors cope with the ever-present threat of eviction? 
 
7.3.2. Engagement with Evictionist Regulatory Regime 
In characterizing urban poverty, Wratten (1995) sees state intervention as a source of urban 
poor’s vulnerability. They “experience the state in negative ways – as an oppressive 
bureaucracy which attempts to regulate their activities without understanding their needs” 
(Wratten, 1995, p. 4). In street vending, this adverse state engagement manifests in the 
constant threat and experience of eviction (Brown & Rakodi, 2006; Lata & Walters, 2016; 
UN Habitat, 2009), which deprives hawkers of access to economic spaces.  
 
In this section, I argue that the interplay of broader socio-economic problems, local political 
dynamics, contending state policies, and continuing grassroots agency has produced a 
regulatory environment where eviction plays a central role.  Dubbed as evictionist regulatory 
regime (ERR), ERR deploys eviction as a legitimate state apparatus to impose order. As 
ERR’s primary target, vendors typically resist eviction. Over time, however, they have 
learned to deal with it. The subsequent paragraphs problematize how vendors have faced 
three eviction episodes and reveal how eviction goes beyond promoting physical order.  
 
156 
 
In the early 1980s, old Baclaran vendors recall how they used to play a cat-and-mouse game 
with the police who would drive them away. Since there were fewer vendors and the 
sidewalks were still spacious they could easily walk to a safe place. Besides the 1980s’ 
experience, vendors remember three other eviction episodes that have affected their 
activities. Table 7.2 below reflects these episodes and the key attributes that the vendors 
associate with them.  
 
Table 7.2: Eviction Episodes in Baclaran 
 
Source: Based on interviews with vendors and government officials 
 
The table above shows how the characteristics of evictions and the hawkers’ responses 
have evolved across the three episodes. Vendors refer to two periods when they talk about 
forced evictions that the government initiated to remove all street obstructions. The first one 
occurred in 1990 when Oscar Orbos was the Secretary of the Department of Transportation 
and Communication or DOTC (now called Department of Transport or DOTr). At that time 
vendors had to play hide-and-seek with the police and DOTC personnel, who pursued 
random evictions.  
 
After that period, the vendors encountered another series of forced evictions when Bayani 
Fernando78 headed the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) from 2002 to 
2009. The MMDA’s street clean-up aimed at managing the traffic and promoting public 
                                            
78 Fernando was a Mayor of Marikina, Metro Manila’s component city, where he enforced strict polices to 
promote clean and orderly streets. 
Eviction 
Episodes
Lead Agency Period Characteristics Vendors’ Responses
DOTC-led
operations under 
Secretary Oscar 
Orbos
DOTC and 
Police 
Department
January-
December  
1990
• Random clearing 
operations;
• Unselective.
§Run from the police
MMDA-led 
operations under 
Chair Bayani
Fernando (BF)
MMDA 2005-2009 • Random clearing 
operations;
• Unselective
• Sometimes covered by the 
media;
• Violent
§Run from the police;
§Resist eviction;
§Organize vendors;
§Negotiate with the MMDA;
§Negotiate with national and local 
governments.
Post-BF 
operations
MMDA; Police;
Local
governments
2010-
present
• Negotiated;
• Sometimes random; often 
announced prior to 
clearing operations;
• Selective.
§Run from the police;
§Organize vendors;
§Negotiate with local 
governments;
§Voluntarily demolish the semi-
fixed stalls.
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safety. As MMDA official, Peter, explained, “Vendors are unruly. Let’s admit it… How many 
people have [their valuable possessions] snatched [out of their hands]? How many have 
been molested on foot bridges because of the presence of vendors?” Peter’s argument 
follows Kelling and Coles' (1996) “fixing broken windows” theory of law and order which, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, claims that “small, highly-visible forms of urban disorder” (Bromley, 
2000, p. 12) result in proliferation of blight spots and crime activities. Thus, the MMDA-led 
eviction also sought to solve criminal activities associated with the presence of hawkers. 
Yet, “…during that period [MMDA clearing operations], criminal incidents like pickpocketing 
and burglary escalated as more people were unable to earn a living”, shared Barangay 
official, Allen. Ironically, the intent to stop crime in one area led to offenses elsewhere.  
 
During Fernando’s reign, evictions became violent. One hawker leader depicted how the 
situation looked like.  
It was totally free of vendors [during Bayani’s time]. We were always on the run as 
the MMDA truck was on standby looking for people to arrest. My fellow vendor leader, 
Chris, got arrested. He didn’t get back his cart full of school supplies worth PhP 50, 
0000 (US $ 1000). It was terrible. If you would attempt to get hold of just a piece of 
notebook, they would take it from you. It was like a war zone. We were like engaged 
in a war.  
 
Some Muslim [vendors] fought against the MMDA [personnel]. Even Muslim women 
got involved in the confrontations… Then the Mayor thought they had to coordinate 
with the MMDA to address the conflict because some people already got killed. 
(Hannah) 
 
The preceding account shows the conflictive nature of eviction. Another character of conflict 
blends well with the ERR - its ability to generate new conditions and arrangements. As 
Nicholls and Uitermark (2016, p. 6) contend, "a conflict is more than a collision of pre-given 
actors, views, and interests. Conflicts constitute actors and create new conditions of 
possibility, driving forward changes in the physicality of cities, how they are perceived, and 
how they are governed”. When linked to informality, Crossa (2009) narrates how 
exclusionary policies against Mexican street vendors do not necessarily lead to 
fragmentation of social networks. Instead, the networks transform over time as excluded 
groups recast and reclaim their right to the city and create representational spaces of 
resistance (Crossa, 2009).  
 
In a similar vein, while evictions demonstrate the clash of interests and exercise of authority, 
they also generate new forms of socio-spatial relations. As hawkers got more indebted to 
money-lenders for failing to sell, they began talking to each other about their conditions. 
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They negotiated with the MMDA and other national government agencies. Some leaders 
engaged in political organizing to promote social protection. Others joined political rallies of 
organizations that promised to help them deal with the MMDA clearing operations. Most of 
them, however, established ties with local political leaders and city officials. Two accounts 
from vendor leaders illustrate the changing arrangements.  
Many things happened [after the violent evictions]. Before, when you were caught 
bribing state officials, you would be arrested. So, we did not do it as we were afraid. 
Now, we have learned how to act, how we can show our appreciation to state officials 
[who allow us to vend]. We have realized that this is how we can survive… You need 
to follow to avoid troubles. Otherwise, it is very difficult. (Esperanza) 
 
We return to our respective spaces [after evictions] … They [MTCT operators] are 
here every day; they monitor us… I tell my members, ‘why do you get angry when 
you are scolded? Isn’t it better that the Mayor allows us to vend? Before, it was very 
hard for us. We often got arrested; no one could sell here… It’s better now that the 
Mayor is nice to us’. (Julie) 
 
The descriptions above show how MMDA’s violent evictions have altered vendors’ coping 
mechanisms. This has become apparent in the subsequent series of evictions. 
 
The third eviction episode represents the current situation. While the MMDA still monitors 
the streets, local governments enforce evictions. In Pasay, the Mayor’s Total Clean Team 
(MTCT) regulates the vendors. When there are big national and international events (e.g. 
the Philippines’ hosting of the 2015 APEC Leaders’ Meeting), the MTCT convenes the 
vendor leaders and instructs them to vacate the streets. The leaders then ask their members 
to voluntarily demolish their stalls and put them back up once there is a resumption order 
from the city hall.  
 
Despite the agreement between some vendor leaders and the city government, as 
discussed in Section 7.2.1, ambulant peddlers, who are not part of the discussions, still roam 
around the area to earn a living. This tenacious presence of ambulant vendors explains why 
a persistent coping mechanism is to run from the police. As Table 7.2 on page 156 shows, 
this has consistently figured in the three episodes. To date, the unorganized ambulant 
vendors who feel incapable of building political ties resort to hide-and-seek strategy to deal 
with evictions. Indeed, vendors’ responses depend on their capacity to organize and engage 
in negotiations with government officials.  
 
159 
 
 
Figure 7-1: Vendors fix up their wares to ensure they are within the designated line 
 
Moreover, there are instances when negotiation is not an option. In both cities, eviction is a 
norm right after elections, especially when a new set of officials takes control of the local 
government. “During the turnover of power, eviction is a normal event to show that new 
people are now in power… It is for the vendors to acknowledge the new regime”, local 
official, Allen, said. But why the need to resort to eviction? Allen was quick: “It’s for 
corruption… for collection”. As local officials employ eviction to introduce regime change, 
ERR acts as a political tool to extract illicit fees from hawkers.  
 
Lastly, government authorities conduct clearing operations upon the request of irritated 
stallholders. “They usually call up and send us a formal letter requesting for clearing 
[operations] against vendors”, shared Barangay official, Andy. These operations usually 
target the unorganized ambulant vendors who have no political connection to local officials. 
This unveils how eviction is tied to property ownership and relations, as discussed in Section 
7.1.1. This concerns the character of streets as public property and their proximity to 
privately-owned spaces.  
 
When tackling property issues, Krueckeberg (1995, p. 307) stresses that properties are 
more than objects or possessions but “a set of relationships between the owner of something 
and everyone else’s claim to that same thing”. That is, one person’s right to use or profit 
from a property maybe at the expense of someone’s or everyone else’s claim about the 
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same thing (Krueckeberg, 1995). Thus, eviction needs to be examined within the framework 
of property hierarchy and political relations (van der Walt, 2009). This framing is critical to 
understanding the vendors’ struggle in contested streetscapes. Since the access to vending 
spaces entails relational rights (Porter, 2011), deprivation of such equally indicates relational 
issues, particularly property relations in the age of neoliberal globalization. In the scramble 
for urban space, Harvey (2008) has emphasized how global capitalism tends to elevate 
property rights as a central concern and relegate other rights to a secondary status. These 
secondary rights might involve urban poor’s right to work (Tucker, 2016).  
 
Viewed in this light, the ERR becomes an expression of property relations – an assertion of 
private property owners’ control and state authority over streets versus informal vendors’ 
access to economic spaces. Alas, in a political environment where state officials are 
entangled in multiple relations – from legal contracts to patronage ties - this property relation 
turns into a question of the structures of power. Those who are more powerful get to 
determine when eviction is needed, how it will be carried out, and who will be affected.  
Eviction, therefore, is never a neutral legal enforcement process flowing from abstract 
principles (Brown, 2017b; van der Walt, 2009). It goes beyond promoting order and becomes 
an expression of property relations, power structures, and hierarchy of rights.  
 
Thus far, it is clear how the ERR involves key aspects, which have shaped the conduct and 
consequences of evictions. First, the ERR emerges from the state’s desire to enforce order 
and promote public safety. It was seen in how the DOTC and the MMDA, agencies charged 
with transport and public order, had initially led the eviction drives. Second, its conflictive 
dimension has generated new relations and arrangements. Vendors’ varied responses and 
ensuing relations with local officials have resulted from this ERR dimension. Third, the ERR 
has become a political tool for locally ascendant players to assert authority over contested 
spaces. Fourth, the ERR is an expression of property and power relations where private 
stallholders’ right to commercial shops and the state’s authority over public property trump 
the hawkers’ access to their livelihood spaces.  
 
As the conduct and consequences of evictions evolve, the vendors’ responses have equally 
changed. They have learned how to engage with the ERR. These are reflected in three 
eviction episodes. As vulnerable actors facing constant eviction threats, their engagement 
with the ERR is embedded in the larger struggle for access to contested spaces. This 
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engagement contributes to the overlapping and fluid governing relations, which are 
discussed in Chapter 8.  
 
7.3.3. The Bermonths Routine: A Socio-Spatio-Temporal Nexus of Informality 
Street vending literature yields mixed empirical insights on how temporal factors impact on 
hawking practices. In China, tighter regulation occurs on national events like the Spring 
Festival (Flock & Breitung, 2016). In Mexico, the authority grants temporary permits during 
romerías (peregrinations) or special occasions like Christmas, Easter, and Mexican 
Independence (Crossa, 2009). While these are crucial accounts, they mainly focus on how 
seasonal events affect the state-vendor regulatory arrangement. In what follows, I 
problematize how a period known locally as Bermonths, which spans from September to 
December (often until the first half of January), entails denser interactions and complex 
financial transactions (both licit and illicit). The Bermonths routine, I argue, constitutes an 
interplay of socio-spatio-temporal factors, which generate three concerns: congestion, 
consent, and conflict. Each of them is explained below.  
 
Every year, Baclaran vendors look forward to Bermonths, their peak earning season. “Every 
December we expect to earn over half of our financial capital”, vendor Nora told, adding that, 
“…we can invite our relatives to put up a stall beside our vending space and tell them to 
remit us a certain amount”. Thus, Baclaran becomes very congested as hawkers multiply to 
serve up buyers they expect to shop for Christmas and New Year celebrations. 
 
My repeated site visits (February 2015 to February 2016) produced a snapshot dataset on 
the volumes of vendors at various time periods. While the peak and lean seasons differed 
depending on the goods being sold, the generated dataset sustains the interview results on 
the importance of Bermonths.  The graph (see Table 7.3 on page 162) illustrates the number 
of hawkers in four periods in 2015. It shows that the Bermonths quarter (4th quarter) has the 
highest volume of vendors. Ambulant hawkers’ number reached almost four times of the 
average volume in the first three quarters. As mentioned in Section 7.2.1 above, many of 
these itinerant vendors come from other informal hawking districts in Metro Manila and some 
provinces in Mindanao. They coordinate with vendor leaders and occupy the areas with 
relatively wider streets. After the Bermonths, most of these transient migrant vendors return 
to their respective provinces. 
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Table 7.3: Volumes of Vendors across Different Periods79 
 
 Source: Author’s data collected during fieldwork 
 
Meanwhile,  
Figure 7-2, on page 163, depicts the typical spatial scenarios on Baclaran streets during 
December. The pictures were taken at Redemptorist Road (left) and beneath the LRT-
Baclaran Station on Taft Avenue Extension (right). In some areas, vendors occupy the entire 
stretch of the roads which are closed off to vehicular traffic.  
                                            
79 The figures were generated using a digital tally counter. The number of vendors varied throughout the year. 
The day and time also affected the volume of vendors. Wednesdays, Saturdays and Sundays are peak days 
for vending. Vendors with semi-fixed stalls stay at their occupied areas throughout the day when there is no 
eviction; while ambulant vendors troop to the streets from late afternoon until mid-evening. Thus, while the 
days for counting varied (Feb 19 – Thursday; May 20 – Wednesday; Sept 15 – Tuesday; Dec 24 – Thursday; 
Jan 17 – Sunday), the timing of counting for all the dates was done from late afternoon (4:30pm) until mid-
evening (8:45pm). The graph’s data on the lowest number of vendors, which was in May 2015, validates the 
interview data. Both vendors and barangay officials attributed this to the minimal sales during April, May, and 
June. Although some vendors enjoy higher profit by selling school supplies in time for the school opening every 
June, most claimed that this quarter is a lean season since customers spend on tuition expenses. It is also 
during this rainy season when fewer people go to Baclaran due to the intermittent weather. 
1st	Quarter 2nd	Quarter 3rd	Quarter 4th	Quarter
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Total 1695 1506 1825 3821
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
163 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-2 Busy Bermonths - Baclaran Vendors Interacting with Customers 
 
Besides the appeal of high return, the consent from local governments has made Bermonths 
an ideal season for vendors. For state officials, the Bermonths period is an occasion to allow 
vendors to occupy the streets out of humanitarian considerations. Thus, eviction never 
occurs during this period. Bigay bangketa (free sidewalk) is how hawkers call this seasonal 
consent80. In Parañaque, as discussed in Chapter 6 and Section 7.1.3 above, the city 
government even passed several ordinances to legally allow street use for Baclaran flea 
markets (tiangge) under certain conditions from October 15 to January 6 annually. The 
Bermonths period, therefore, comes with social and institutional acceptance of informal 
vending.  
 
Beneath this seemingly supportive atmosphere lies an array of conflictive relations among 
different players. In one section of Baclaran, a group of stallholders remember Bermonths 
as a time when they got fed up and banded together. As mentioned above, it has been a 
yearly routine of Parañaque City government to allow selected vendors to put up stalls on 
Baclaran streets. Two ordinances (No. 03-13, S-2003 and No. 13-10, S-2013) support this 
move. In 2013, Parañaque Mayor Edwin Olivarez issued vending permits to chosen 
vendors. They gained access to spaces at the centre of the Redemptorist Road, which was 
                                            
80 Apart from the Bermonths, some vendors revealed that local officials tolerate vending a few weeks before 
regular elections, which happen every three years.  
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closed off to vehicular traffic. Since the hawkers paid for the vending area, they maximized 
the use of spaces by putting up high stalls. This earned the ire of formal stallholders whose 
shop facades were clogged by the improvised stalls. Stallholders complained about their 
meagre income due to vendors. Some even incurred losses that year. The formal 
stallholders then reportedly filed a legal case against the City Mayor.  
 
The legal case is a common tale among stallholders. However, the Parañaque Municipal 
and Regional Trial Courts’ written response to my formal query about the case denies that 
a legal complaint was filed against the local chief executive. With this information, an 
assessment of one local leader, Allen, offered an explanation to what happened. “The 
supposed legal case against the Mayor was a hoax… He [Mayor] simply used it to decide 
against his political leaders/operators who allowed the December 2013 incident to happen… 
[H]e could then turn down the request of his allies without losing their support”. In December 
2014, while the Mayor did not authorize the setting up of improvised stalls at the middle of 
the road, it was still full of ambulant vendors.  
 
Aside from the stallholders, even some street vendors complained about Bermonths. “There 
were too many vendors [last December 2015]; so, the income was not that good. [It was] 
unlike before [when] there were only few hawkers”, vendor Hannah expressed. Besides 
declining sales and the increasing number of vendors, hawker, Maricel, cited another 
concern “Sometimes, there is traffic congestion”.  
 
For some vendor leaders, the low sales and traffic jams are minor worries. They are more 
concerned with keeping their end of the bargain, which arises from the Bermonths’ character 
as a ‘season of giving’. This means the collection of cash gifts for government authorities. 
On top of the regular ‘pakikisama’ money, vendor leaders ask their members to give an 
additional amount to officials who help them sustain their access to the streets. “During 
Christmas [season], we need to get along with many people. When it’s [December] 24 or 
25, there’s like a queue… They would say, ‘Julie, where is our ‘Christmas gift?’ Then they 
would hand in an envelope… The police, the MMDA… even those who are not assigned 
here in Baclaran”, vendor leader, Julie, shared.  
 
This is a serious issue for some vendor leaders whose members fail to remit a share. City 
government employee, Lian, has often observed this concern.  
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Not all vendors give a share [to the collection]. You would pity some [vendor] leaders 
as they must shell out additional amount from their own income to make up for the 
shares of their members… Some of them want to give up their role [as a leader]. They 
also understand their members who are unable to pitch in due to the low income.  
 
The preceding account examines the Bermonths routine beyond its seasonal appeal when 
the vending sales are at peak and state tolerance forbids eviction. The narratives show how 
the influx of vendors and buyers generates intense competition over congested spaces. In 
addition, the arrangements around illicit fee collection negate the humanitarian rhetoric of 
local officials. Thus, amid congestion and calculated consent, conflictive interactions among 
various players persist. The vendors appear to have accepted these contradictory elements 
of Bermonths. Similar to haging occupancy and the ERR engagement, the Bermonths 
routine has become part of their precarious and resilient conditions. In the next section, this 
resilience manifests in the way vendors deal with financial constraints.  
 
7.3.4. Multiple Finance-generating Mechanisms  
In its 2015 State of Asia Pacific Cities Report, the UN Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (UN-ESCAP) points out how informal status, irregular income, and 
uncertain conditions have prevented informal entrepreneurs from gaining access to formal 
credit institutions. Instead, informal workers depend on relatives, friends, product suppliers, 
and local moneylenders (UN Habitat & UN ESCAP, 2015). In this section, I examine how 
Baclaran hawkers resort to multiple finance-generating mechanisms, which echo and 
expand the restraints and recourses that the UN-ESCAP has identified. As the paragraphs 
below will show, these mechanisms are intimately linked to the practices and issues 
presented above. 
 
In the context of economic distress and socio-spatial uncertainty, Baclaran vendors engage 
in several arrangements to gain financial capital and/or grow their small enterprises. Some 
ambulant hawkers who want to avoid shelling out cash capital resort to hango (harvest) 
system. Hango is a consignment agreement between hawkers and their suppliers where the 
former can pay for the corresponding amount of the goods after a day of vending. As fruit 
juice vendor, Frederic, shared, “One good thing about vending in Baclaran is the hango 
system. [Under hango], we can sell without necessarily thinking of financial capital. In the 
morning, we obtain our goods from the suppliers and pay them in the evening”.  
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For vendors who need capital, which ranges from PhP 3,000 (US$ 64.00) to as high as PhP 
300,000 (US$ 6400) depending on the products, five options are possible. Section 6.4.1 in 
Chapter 6 and Section 7.2.1 above already mentioned the first two, which pertain to the 
credit window from the Baclaran cooperative and family assistance, respectively. 
Unfortunately, these mechanisms have their limitations. The credit cooperative, as explained 
in Section 6.4.1, only assists those with semi-fixed stalls who have been registered as 
associate members. As ambulant hawker, Nora, expressed, “The Cooperative only reaches 
out to those who have stalls because they are easily monitored…” Meanwhile, family 
assistance, besides being exclusive to relatives or friends, relies on the economic capacity 
of the lending individuals.  
 
The third mechanism is paluwagan, a mutual-savings scheme. During the peak season 
(Bermonths), when most vendors earn more than the usual income, paluwagan is a way to 
put aside some extra profits they can use during emergency situations and lean months. 
The daily share ranges from PhP 50 (US$1) to PhP 1000 (US$20). Some vendors initiate 
paluwagan even after the peak season. “For us, it’s all-year-round because it augments our 
capital”, vendor, Nelly, noted. Others are cautious to join paluwagan due to eviction and 
poor sales. 
When there are evictions, we often stop the paluwagan. (Sheila) 
 
During the lean season, we don’t join any paluwagan as we are unable to put aside 
any savings… Even the person who keeps the money does not want to initiate since 
s/he must shoulder the contribution of some members if it is someone’s turn to collect 
the money. (Maricel) 
 
This concern has prompted some hawkers to give paluwagan a new name.  
We don’t call it paluwagan (to ease); [rather] it is pasikipan (to burden) because when 
you are unable to contribute you would get nagged and hear foul words... Most of 
those who join have money… Some vendors simply give P50 (US$ 1) daily… Others 
shell out PhP 500 (US$ 10) to PhP1000 (US$ 20) … So, as the contribution increases 
it becomes pasikipan... where the small vendors are disadvantaged. (Nora) 
 
The fourth recourse for the financially-strapped is to get in touch with local lenders and loan 
sharks. The usual interest rate is 20% each month and the repayment period ranges from 
three to four months depending on the agreement between the lender and the borrower. For 
some hawkers, the high interest rate and the daily payment exacerbate their financial woes. 
“When we are unable to vend, like now when the streets are flooded, we cannot pay the 
loan sharks. That’s a major problem for us. Sometimes, we don’t even have an income to 
buy rice”, vendor, Rosie, shared. Despite this, many vendors still cling on to loan sharks.  
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Poor sales force us to borrow from the loan sharks. Otherwise, we will run out of 
stocks. We can’t vend if we don’t borrow. (Sheila) 
 
I always tell [the loan sharks] to visit me every day so I could pay. I don’t renege on 
my debts from 5-6 lenders (loan sharks) because they have helped me raise my 
children. (Esperanza) 
 
Amid the absence of formal micro-credit institutions and the limited reach of the Baclaran 
cooperative, the statements above show how the presence of loan sharks, notwithstanding 
the usurious arrangements, has helped vendors survive the precarity of street life.  Local 
creditors have devised specific loan arrangements to cope with the uncertain condition of 
vendors. 
The loan sharks ask the vendors to have a guarantor if they know that the borrower 
has unstable income… [Guarantor] is usually a person who has been a long-time 
borrower of the loan sharks. If the borrower is unable to pay the debt, the guarantor 
has to shoulder it. (Nora) 
 
Besides asking for guarantors, the loan sharks take advantage of the peak earning season 
(Bermonths). 
During Christmas season, there is what we call balikan (quick return), where the [loan 
sharks] lend out PhP 100, 000 (US$ 2000) payable within December. The interest 
[rate] varies depending on the agreement. But, [vendors] usually are able to return 
the full amount within a month or before December ends. (Catalina) 
 
In other words, instead of waiting for the usual three to four months, balikan allows the loan 
sharks to recover their money plus the 20% interest in a shorter time. In turn, vendors are 
able to procure additional stocks in preparation for the expected influx of customers. Yet, 
the availability of credit windows at times leads to multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness. 
After their first loan, with interest of course, some vendors would ask for additional 
amount. That’s added interest. When poor sales hit them, they would be unable to 
repay the full amount in due time. So, they would get indebted… There are also cases 
where [vendors] would borrow from another creditor to pay for the previous loan from 
another lender… So, it becomes a double burden. They hardly realize that they get 
over-indebted because the interest rates keep rising. (Mary Jane) 
 
Worse, the debt obligation gets saddled by evictions. “During Bayani’s time [as MMDA 
Chair], we could not sell [due to evictions] … and there was no food to eat. It was harder if 
you’re selling shoes as you need to pay daily [to creditors]. If you miss a day, you need to 
double your payment the next day”, vendor, Nora, recalled.  
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In the face of over-indebtedness, some vendors are compelled to give up their primary asset. 
As Nancy explained, “When they [vendors] now have two debt obligations. They would look 
for a third lender until they are forced to give up their vending space because many [loan 
sharks] run after them”. Barangay official, Brando, claimed that what Nancy shared is a 
common problem. 
The usual complaint we receive has to do with loans - vendors who have not paid 
their loans… This morning I was listening to a complaint involving PhP 200 000 (US$ 
4000) loan. The problem is the borrower has already run away. S/he just abandoned 
her/his vending space. We found out s/he owes money to nine lenders. These lenders 
all want to use her/his space to vend.  
 
This recourse to use their claimed vending spaces represents the hawkers’ fifth mechanism 
to generate money and/or pay their debts: vendors sell or rent out their claimed spaces. 
Barangay official, Allen, confirmed this arrangement: “Yes, they are able to ‘sell’ and rent 
out the streets and sidewalks. We know that these things happen but we could not stop them 
since the agreement is mostly verbal”. 
 
The common rental agreement period ranges from one to two years. Depending on the size 
and location of the vending space, the fee ranges from PhP 40,000 (US$ 702) to PhP 
300,000 (US$ 6,383). Even though Allen noted that their Barangay refuses to honour any 
sale or rental arrangement, in other barangays the agreement becomes valid when the two 
parties sign on a written agreement in front of vendor leaders and barangay officials. Some 
local officials are even asked to sign on the document. 
They [involved parties] must agree – the renter or buyer, the seller, and the lender. 
The [vendor] leader is just a witness so when vendors are able to repay, they can 
reclaim [the vending spaces] … It couldn’t be based on verbal [agreement] alone. 
There is a legal [procedure]. It goes through the barangay. Barangay [official] must 
sign it [agreement]. The [vendor] leader acts as a witness. It’s difficult [if there’s no 
witness] since we’re talking about their livelihood. (Esperanza).  
 
The roles of barangay officials in ‘legitimating’ hawkers’ agreements echoes Marx’s (2009) 
account of how local councillors in three South African cities act as witnesses to land 
transactions in informal settlements. In additions, the ability of vendors to sell and rent out 
their claimed spaces signals recoding of spaces (Oriard, 2015) which involves 
reconfiguration of public use and other social relations it entails. Yet, I argue that the 
Baclaran situation deviates from how Oriard (2015) views hawkers’ commodification of 
public space in Tepito (Mexico) for the sake of maximising the profit of street businesses. 
Baclaran hawkers do not occupy or claim a space simply to subject it to market’s speculative 
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logic or buy time to increase its value. Rather, my conversations with Baclaran vendors 
indicate that they only sell or rent out their spaces in situation of economic distress.  
 
To summarise, the preceding account has shown the multiple finance-generating 
mechanisms that street vendors employ to cope with economic constraints. These 
mechanisms include the hango consignment scheme, membership with a cooperative, 
family assistance, paluwagan mutual-savings, getting loans from local lenders, and selling 
and renting out of claimed vending spaces. Aside from the issues that come with each 
scheme, the foregoing discussion has demonstrated how the mechanisms are linked to the 
previously examined issues such as precarious street presence, evictions, and seasonal 
sales. Finally, while formal micro-credit institutions are never felt in the area, the findings 
reveal how barangay officials get involved in legitimating informal arrangements among 
vendors, lenders, and renters or buyers of claimed vending spaces. How then does this 
street-level entanglement of formal players and informal mechanisms contribute to the 
thesis’ broader discourse on the formal-informal interface? The remainder of this chapter 
turns to this question.  
 
7.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have addressed the thesis sub-questions 2 and 3: Under what government 
rules do the players, discussed in Chapter 6, use streets and assert their claims? What 
practices and norms do street vendors observe in relation to street use and informal 
vending? In problematizing the first question, I have employed the thesis’ framing of policy 
epistemologies, which follows the notion of post-dualist lens laid out in Chapter 2. These 
epistemologies comprise the hostile orientation, the tolerant atmosphere, and the 
accommodating environment.  
 
I have shown how the hostile policies treat streets as a public property which should primarily 
function as a mobility channel for automobiles and pedestrians. Commercial activities like 
vending are thus prohibited. With respect to tolerant political atmosphere, I have illustrated 
how the interplay of economic issues (poverty and unemployment), cultural values 
(Christmas season appeal) and agency expressions (building political ties) underpin the 
lenient arrangements. Intersecting with the hostile policies and tolerant arrangements is a 
set of laws and programs that vendors can use in advancing their welfare. Yet, in the 
analysis I have unveiled the constraints of the accommodating policies by linking them to 
the broader issues of neoliberal-oriented policies and decentralization problems. As it is, the 
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well-intentioned laws became a tool for the national government to abandon some of its 
responsibilities using the rhetoric of democratization and decentralization. Enforcement of 
policies supportive of informal workers thus becomes discretionary for many local 
governments, which have proven co-opted by entrenched powerful families and mired in 
resource constraints. 
 
Thus far, these analytical insights unpack how the formal-informal interface, as presented in 
Chapter 3, operates in the realm of policy-making and enforcement. The different factors 
influencing the tolerant arrangement and the accommodating policies exemplify the complex 
interaction of ‘formal’ procedures and ‘informal’ norms. To an extent, the factors shaping the 
policy epistemologies also resonate with issues around informal economy and legal 
pluralism (Brown, 2017c) as they emanate from political relations, power structures and the 
complex institutional setting. Compounding this policy environment are routinized practices 
that hawkers have undertaken to constantly appropriate the streets for vending.  
 
In response to the second question, I have examined four practices – the haging occupancy, 
the engagement with the evictionist regulatory regime, the Bermonths routine, and the 
multiple finance-generating mechanisms. I have employed the notion of haging occupancy 
to capture the vendors’ precarious and resilient access to hawking spaces. Under haging 
occupancy, hawkers rely on family members, tenure duration, self-governance schemes, 
and tenuous ties to constantly appropriate the streets. Those unable to secure a strong grip 
on Baclaran spaces resort to transient and mobile strategies. Indeed, these are concrete 
manifestations of agency amid the uncertain policy environment and unequal socio-spatial 
power relations.  
 
The hierarchical relations are also seen in how vendors deal with evictions. Examining three 
major eviction episodes, I have coined the evictionist regulatory regime or ERR to describe 
the state-vendor regulatory relationship, which primarily revolves around eviction. 
Compelled by the lack of alternative employment and persistent poverty, vendors have 
engaged with the ERR’s multi-faceted dimensions. They have devised various strategies – 
participation in formal dialogues and rallies, building of political ties with local officials, and 
tenacious street presence. As shown in the analytical discussion above, the ERR arises 
from the interplay of broader socio-economic problems, local political dynamics, the 
contending state policies, and the continuing grassroots agency.  
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Meanwhile, in the discussion of the Bermonths routine I have tackled how vendors remain 
vulnerable even if state authorities tolerate informal hawking. Competition over congested 
spaces and illicit fee collection amplify the contradictory elements of the seasonal norms. 
These issues on congestion and illicit fee similarly manifest in vendors’ various finance-
generating mechanisms.  I have highlighted the problems that constrain vendors as they 
initiate paluwagan mutual-savings, borrow from local lenders, and sell or rent out claimed 
vending spaces. As I have demonstrated, these constraints are intimately linked to vendors’ 
struggle for economic security and engagement with the policy environment.   
 
In sum, I have demonstrated in this chapter how the policies and practices on street use and 
informal vending are embedded in the larger socio-economic contexts (presented in Chapter 
5) and the complex socio-spatial relations of various players (examined in Chapter 6). I have 
thus presented how the entanglement of state rules and street norms represents the formal-
informal interface with uneven effects on different stakeholders. In the following chapter, I 
broaden the analysis of this entanglement by dwelling on the governing logics that shape 
the roles and relations (presented in Chapter 6) and the policies and practices, which are 
presented here. 
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CHAPTER 8. UNPACKING THE FORMAL-INFORMAL INTERFACE:        
 GOVERNING RELATIONS AND PLANNING IMPLICATIONS 
 
8.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 5, I examined the broader structural factors and agency expressions within which 
Baclaran’s socio-spatial evolution is embedded. Manifestations of the interrelatedness of 
such factors become apparent in Chapters 6 and 7 where the multiple players’ relations and 
state rules-street norms nexus are analysed, respectively. In this chapter, I stitch together 
some key arguments in the three previous chapters by answering the thesis sub-questions 
4 and 5: What governing relations influence the formal-informal interface in Baclaran’s 
informal vending and street use? What are the implications of the formal-informal interface 
for urban planning processes, particularly in the context of appropriating and governing 
contested vending spaces? In addressing these two questions, I first tackle each governing 
relation and examine how it plays out in Baclaran. In the discussion, I refer to the conceptual 
findings presented in the literature review chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) and empirical results 
in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. In the second part of the chapter, I analyse the implications of the 
formal-informal interface for urban planning processes. In the last section, I sum up the key 
themes covered in the chapter. 
 
8.2. Governing Relations in Contested Vending Spaces 
By governing relations, I refer to the broader systemic arrangements and micro socio-spatial 
modes of engagements that lie beneath the rules, interactions, norms, and actions in 
Baclaran. The analysis of empirical findings has unveiled a mosaic of four governing 
relations that shapes the formal-informal interface in Baclaran’s contested vending spaces. 
These include 1) the disjunctive urban governance; 2) the strong kinship ties; 3) the 
clientelist political relations; and 4) the grassroots democratic entanglements. In examining 
each of these, I recognize the multilayered and overlapping processes and outcomes arising 
from the entwined relations. As they get entangled, the interactions and the accompanying 
tensions manifest in the previously presented roles and relations of multiple players, state 
policies, and street norms. Thus, I occasionally refer to some accounts presented in the 
earlier chapters to emphasize certain points.  
 
8.2.1. Disjunctive Urban Governance  
In the previous two chapters (Chapters 6 and 7), I problematized the relations between the 
local state officials and grassroots actors in Baclaran. In this section, I build on Minnery’s 
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(2007) notion of urban governance and Healey’s (1997, 2007b) conception of planning-
governance nexus, which are both analytically consistent with the thesis’ post-dualist lens, 
in examining how the ruptures in local governance processes contribute to the formal-
informal interface or how the formal regulatory framework is implicated in urban informality. 
I refer to the interplay of these ruptures as disjunctive urban governance. In developing the 
idea of disjunctive urban governance, I draw inspiration from Caldeira and Holston’s work 
on disjunctive democracies in which they contend that historically-specific factors and 
trajectories of existing democracies are always a “mix of progressive and regressive 
elements, uneven, unbalanced and heterogeneous” (Caldeira & Holston, 1999, p. 692). 
Thus, I refuse to view the disjunctive governance practices as signs of incomplete process 
towards attaining an ideal type of governance and democracy, often based on global North 
ideas (Tucker, 2016). Rather, I situate the disjunctions within the context-specific 
governance agenda, economic conditions, and socio-spatial power relations. 
 
Three points of disjunction emerge as critical in unpacking the governing relations in 
Baclaran. The first concerns the conflicting rationalities (Watson, 2003) between the local 
governments’ planning agenda and Baclaran stakeholders’ aspirations. On the one hand, 
the Comprehensive Land Use Plans in Pasay and Parañaque embrace a city-image that 
promotes an orderly and ‘world-class’ urban space. This depoliticized planning approach, 
as argued in Chapter 6, follows a neoliberal economic thrust and promotes gentrification 
with little regard to local socio-economic needs of the marginalized groups. Barangay official 
Allen’s remark captures the disjunction: “What would you rather have – a beautiful city, an 
orderly place? But, what the hell has happened to your residents? They have become hold-
uppers, thieves. The agenda to have an orderly place is hard due to the complex 
conditions…” Even local planning staff, Krisha, admitted the presence of this complexity. “I 
think it’s really hard to remove the vendors [from the streets]. Their market is there; they 
really fight for it”.  
 
On the other hand, other Baclaran stakeholders have different views on how vending should 
be managed. The statements below represent their views. 
My only prayer to God… is to have financial capital and a stable vending space so 
we don’t have to constantly run… We would provide space to pedestrians but we 
should not be evicted. (Nora, female ambulant vendor) 
 
The best thing to do is to simply regulate them [vendors]. If you’re going to relocate 
them to far sites, they would just return like what happened to others who were 
transferred to remote areas. (Lito, barangay official) 
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I would rather see vendors selling on the streets than stealing something from other 
people… If I were to implement a plan, I would stop the vehicular traffic on the area; 
the commuters can just walk [around Baclaran] …” (Brando, local official) 
 
My personal view on that [managing vending] is let’s just close off this area [Baclaran 
LRT] to vehicular flow. Then, install additional security mechanisms since Baclaran 
is known for snatching incidents. Let’s also regulate and legalize [vending]. When you 
legalize it, they [vendors] will pay taxes. (Moises, mall manager) 
 
The sentiments above reveal the players’ various interests and policy positions on informal 
vending. They depict the everyday aspirations of vendors and the long-term proposals of 
barangay leaders and mall operators. So, do their ideas inform local governance processes? 
This draws attention to another disjunctive dimension.  
 
The second disjunction pertains to the presence of formal participatory legal provisions in 
urban governance alongside the informal multi-scaled structures of power. As expounded 
on in Chapters 6 and 7, the Philippine Local Government Code and other national laws 
provide spaces for involvement of street vendors and other grassroots actors in local 
governance. Yet, as the previous two chapters have also pointed out, these ‘participatory’ 
mechanisms have hardly promoted grassroots engagement in city-level formal governance 
processes that concern Baclaran vending issues. Local planning academic, Louie, cited a 
reason why participation has failed to take root. 
The problem is it's not a habitual practice… or there's no consistency and not 
necessarily because they [local officials] don't want people to participate but because 
it is also tedious. So, costly [and] tedious… [The] local government should spend a 
little more budget then assign some people to be responsible for participation 
exercises. 
 
The experience of Melissa, local government staff, confirms Louie’s assessment about the 
need to invest in participatory engagements.  
We don’t want a messy process, so we tried to engage [with some vendors] … I tried 
to talk to them. I conducted FGDs and meetings for several weeks. I was thinking we 
could organize some groups and put up a cooperative that can help in their financial 
sustainability. But after three weeks of consultations, no one was attending the 
meeting. There’s a lot of problems. So, my official told me ‘let’s just leave them aside 
if they don’t want to listen to us’. Of course, we also have other things to do.   
 
In the context of resource constraint and a local economic growth-oriented planning 
approach, the lack of sustained engagement with vendors indicates that even though 
democratic legal codes exist their civil component remains severely impaired (Caldeira & 
Holston, 1999). In Baclaran, this civil component represents the mechanisms that can 
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enable hawkers to exercise their rights and enhance their capacity to form associations that 
engage in local governance processes. In lieu of formal engagement spaces, informal 
channels drive the relations of street vendors with the city mayors and their personnel. As 
argued in Chapters 6 and 7, these channels ironically deploy legal instruments and enable 
the city mayors’ staff to enforce hierarchical and devious schemes against the hawkers.  
 
The paradox in the previous paragraph resonates with the third disjunction: how the 
Philippine government’s democratization-decentralization project intersects with the local 
governance processes dominated by elite families. As discussed in Chapter 7, the Philippine 
Constitution and several other laws (e.g. Local Government Code of 1991, Republic Act 
8425) promote democratization and decentralization agenda. For instance, the Local 
Government Code’s Section 106 provides venue for people’s organizations to participate in 
governance through local special bodies and sectoral representation. When linked to the 
problem of deep-rooted elite families, locally known as political dynasties, it is easy to 
understand how this participatory instrument is barely realized. Political dynasty refers to 
having “members of the same family occupying elected positions either in sequence for the 
same position, or simultaneously across different positions” (Mendoza, Beja Jr, Venida, & 
Yap, 2013, p. 1). In the Philippines, poverty entrenches political dynasties as powerful 
families feed on poor people’s vulnerability to patronage relations and manipulation to sell 
their votes (Mendoza et al., 2013).  
 
So, how does political dynasty manifest in Baclaran? In Parañaque, the Mayor and the 
Congressman are brothers with their father (a former Mayor) serving as Chair of one 
barangay and another sibling sits as a Barangay Council Member (see Figure 8-1 on page 
176). In Pasay, the Mayor and the Congresswoman81 are siblings with two relatives 
occupying seats at the City Council. These officials also rely on a civic group that carries 
their last name: Calixto Forever Movement. Run by their relatives, the group was created in 
the late 1980s when their father was the Pasay’s appointed local executive. Some vendors 
admitted they were able to get semi-fixed stalls since they are members of Calixto Forever 
Movement. Besides the city-level dynasty, in at least three Baclaran barangays, the current 
Chairs are children or relatives of former officials.  
 
                                            
81 The congressional district-city mayor combination in both cities produces the most potent dynastic 
permutation as it blends the local executive power with the access to national resources (de Dios, 2007). 
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Figure 8-1: One family holds four government positions in Parañaque 
 
Such entrenched ‘political dynasty’ is part of the wider socio-spatial context where political 
operators broker the relationships between local officials and hawkers and where vendor 
organizers attempt to introduce reform-oriented engagement. In explaining how local 
powerful families in two Metro Manila cities are able to consolidate their control over local 
politics, Porio (2012) has used the ‘networked governance’ lens. Under the networked 
governance, elite families have controlled the structures of power by mobilising the 
strategies and discourses of decentralisation-democratization through engagement with 
marginalised groups, consultation with the private sector, and selective network-building 
with local bureaucracy and civil society players (Porio, 2012).  In Baclaran, the city hall-
vendor relationship primarily rests on deploying legal instruments - both critical (Pasay) and 
supportive (Parañaque) of street vending – and the local bureaucracy in strengthening the 
informal structures of power. This somehow indicates how the institutional milieu (DiGaetano 
& Strom, 2003) operates in the context of unequal power relations. To a great extent, this 
also reflects how the elite players utilize the multiple faces, forms, and spaces of power 
(Lukes, 2005; Gaventa, 2011) to advance their interests and co-opt, if not thwart, any 
potential resistance from street vendors.  In Chapters 6 and 7, I discussed how this is 
manifested in the spatial hierarchy in policy enforcement, the evictionist regulatory regime, 
and illicit financial collection. As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, these practices 
are also rooted in a disjunctive urban governance.  
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8.2.2. Strong Kinship Ties 
As shown above, powerful families are well-entrenched in local governance. But the 
influence of family relations extends beyond formal state institutions. McCoy (1993a) has 
even noted how single families have dominated Philippine labour unions, Christian 
denominations, and a Communist party. In this section, I analyse how kinship ties shape the 
governing relations among vendors, their leaders, and local state officials. The succeeding 
paragraphs explain how these occur in Baclaran. 
 
As briefly mentioned in Chapter 7, family members assist hawkers in daily vending activities. 
In this setup, the working family members typically live with the host relatives who in turn 
provide modest daily wage and free meals.  While helpers have no form of social insurance, 
in some cases the host relatives send their young helpers to school. This mutual 
dependency deepens as vendors struggle to protect their insecure work spaces. Often, old 
hawkers who have a sense of entitlement derived from tenure duration (as explained in 
Chapter 7) pick their family members as the rightful ‘heir’ to their livelihood source. When 
they see vacant spots near their areas, vendors ask their relatives to occupy the spaces. 
 
Apart from its role in the management and control of vending spaces, the kinship bond is a 
critical aspect of the broader migration phenomenon. For migrants who moved to the cities 
searching for better economic opportunities, relatives provide the much-needed support in 
a new environment. Hannah, an old vendor who arrived in Metro Manila in the 1980s, shared 
how she started out. 
Before I moved here [current vending space], I had been assisting my cousin in selling 
fruits... I asked her to help me acquire my own [vending] cart… Then she said, ‘If you 
want, I could give you one cart’. But, I was still her seller… I was just earning PhP 
50.00 (US $ 1) a day… When I was able to save up, my cousin said, ‘You could have 
your own [vending] cart. I’ll provide you with mangoes [to sell]. You just have to pay 
for the capital’. So, I paid for everything. I spent PhP 500 (US$ 10) at that time to 
have my own cart.   
 
Hannah’s account is a typical story among Baclaran vendors. As similarly observed in other 
global South cities (Flock & Breitung, 2016; Lyons & Snoxell, 2005), family ties help migrants 
build and nurture social capital, which allows them to survive in big cities and enter petty 
trading activities. Since enhancing social capital entails engaging with other players, family-
based ties also impinge on political relations.  
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This is exhibited in two ways. In terms of grassroots association, the nature of collective 
action revolves around recognized leaders whose followers are mostly their own relatives. 
The structure of many vendor groups veers away from the usual organizational 
arrangements of grassroots organizations in the Philippines. Their leaders are not chosen 
through elections. Those who first occupied Baclaran streets act as heads in their zones. 
Most vendor leaders began their hawking activities in Baclaran in the early 1980s.  
 
Moreover, blood relations are a significant factor in the succession of leadership. Vendors 
recounted at least two instances where relatives succeeded leadership posts of old leaders 
who had passed away. When a veteran woman leader died, her nephew took charge as the 
new head. In another case, after the death of a male leader the members acknowledged his 
sister as their new official.  
 
Another expression of kinship-oriented political relation is seen in the way vendor leaders 
establish and strengthen their connections with political players. They use their number as 
a leverage with politicians or incumbent local government officials who periodically seek 
political support during elections. Here, vendors mobilize their ‘kinship network’82 (McCoy, 
1993a) in which they form a broader working coalition of allies bonded by blood, rituals, and 
fictive familial associations. As tackled in Section 7.1.2 in Chapter 7, this strategy results in 
a political atmosphere where local officials tolerate street vending.  
 
To maintain their political clout, the leaders ensure that their relatives or members who are 
vendors get registered as official voters of Pasay or Parañaque. They also meet with local 
officials. During the meeting, the vendor leaders invite their members and some political 
organizers to remind the officials of the votes they could gain once they allow their members 
to occupy the streets. Vendor leader, Chris, recounted how he once met with an official.   
I have nephews who were sleeping on sidewalks... They used to rent a place. When 
the new barangay officials evicted them from their vending spaces… they couldn’t 
afford to rent [a place] … I helped them out… I asked the new Barangay Chair to 
allow them to return to their [vending] spaces. He asked how many of them are voters 
… I said, ‘there are 18 [voters] and I have them registered in your barangay’.  
 
Moreover, while vendors use their family ties as a political clout, they often remain loyal to 
their kinship bonds. As vendor organizer, Maura, recalled, “Vendors are always very close 
                                            
82 Although McCoy (1993a) uses it to describe a strategy of elite families to strengthen their political alliances, 
I argue that even grassroots players like vendors employ kinship network to engage with powerful forces.  
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to each other because they belong to a clan… So, they tend to be parochial… They could 
engage in [political] organizing but at the end of the day, they still stick to one another”. This 
was evident in a Muslim community in Baclaran where vendors who are related to each 
other once vied for the barangay-level government post. Despite this, the kinship ties seem 
to be more important than the political contestation. The statement of Alexander, a 
community leader, succinctly captures the nature of kinship relations vis-à-vis the electoral 
contest. 
No, there is no ill feeling. We are still together. It’s just politics. Your relative is a family 
member. Your fellow Muslim is a brother. Politics will soon pass.  
 
To sum up, kinship ties are enmeshed in relations involving 1) the management and control 
of vending spaces, 2) the urban migration and informal vending, and 3) the political leverage 
with local officials. In the first two aspects, vendors arguably tap into their claimed spaces of 
power (Gaventa, 2011), which have enabled them to use contested territories and 
accommodate their migrant relatives. Their political leverage, meanwhile, has allowed them 
to maximize the invited spaces of power (Gaventa, 2011) where statistical warm bodies 
count. This echoes Chatterjee’s (2004) insight on how the vendors as part of the ‘governed’ 
seek ways to engage the state. In the next section, another way of engaging with state 
officials is examined.  
 
8.2.3. Clientelist Political Relations 
In the face of disjunctive urban governance and strong kinship ties, clientelism83 or 
patronage relation also influences how some vendors relate to local officials, particularly at 
the city level. Clientelism refers to the “structuring of political power through networks of 
informal dyadic relations that link individuals of unequal power in relationships of 
exchange… [where] power is vested in the top individual (the boss, sovereign, or head of 
clan) ...” (Brachet-Marquez, 1992, pp. 93-94). The street vending literature has extensively 
examined clientelism as a common engagement channel between state officials and 
hawkers amid hostile policies (Crossa, 2009), corrupt bureaucracy (Donovan, 2008), 
economic distress, and strong grassroots agency (Cross, 1998; Oriard, 2015; Weng & Kim, 
2016).  
 
In the Philippines, social scientists have analysed how clientelism has influenced the 
country’s political system (Landé, 1965; Neher, 1985; Quimpo, 2005; Teehankee, 2013).  In 
                                            
83 The subsequent sections use clientelist politics and patronage relations interchangeably.  
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the context of urbanization, clientelism is characterized as a particularistic, non-
programmatic, and non-ideological system of exchange (Nowak & Snyder, 1970). As urban 
areas experience changes and growth, clientelism relies on political machine, which 
employs short-term material inducements to secure cooperation (Quimpo, 2005). Against 
this backdrop, the discussion below examines how clientelism compounds the governing 
relations in Baclaran as it intersects with the disjunctive urban governance and strong 
kinship ties. 
 
As I have implicitly shown in the previous chapters, clientelism manifests in several ways. 
First, the way many hawkers control vending spaces without any clear-cut guidelines except 
for their personal or political connections to local officials reveals a thread of clientelist 
arrangements. As seen in Chapters 6 and 7, old vendors who have gained a reputation as 
local leaders maintain a degree of patronage relations with city government authorities. This 
sense of entitlement has enabled them to allocate certain spaces to their relatives84, friends 
or individuals who approach them with referrals from certain local political patrons. Yet, this 
arrangement lacks tenure security, as urban poor leader, Anselma, has argued below.  
The question remains: Is that stable? Is there a long-term [agreement]? As I see it, 
their association won’t progress since there is no assurance of tenure… They only 
gain a semblance of stability because Mayor Calixto is still in power. But, there is no 
assurance… Even if they talk to the Mayor [about long-term plans], he might simply 
say, ‘Until I’m the Mayor, you’ll be on the streets’. But, it’s now Mayor’s last term [in 
office]… So, they are like a wild vine on an unstable wall, which can fall off anytime.  
 
Besides tenure issue, clientelism affects the daily lives of vendors through the illicit financial 
collection. Vendors pay to their leaders who in turn remit their daily collection to assigned 
collectors by local government authorities. The accounts in Chapter 7 (under haging 
occupancy and Bermonths) described how vendors have accepted illicit fees as part of their 
uncertain presence on the streets.  
 
The electoral arrangement between vendor leaders and local authorities also shows how 
clientelism is embedded in the exercise of democratic rights. As explained in the previous 
section, vendor leaders who act as the political patriarchs of their families and vendor groups 
ensure that their relatives or members get registered as official voters of Pasay or 
                                            
84 In clientelism literature, familial relations are often linked to patronage ties. As the previous section (8.3) has 
shown, kinship bonds are embedded in clientelist relations. Yet, I separate them to emphasize how kinship 
ties help vendors utilize their claimed spaces of power (Gaventa, 2011) by managing contested vending 
spaces and handling migration concerns. 
	
181 
 
Parañaque. Inevitably, local officials consider the vendors as a force to reckon with if they 
wish to win in elections. As local official, Allen, expressed, 
Due to political considerations, they [local officials] ignore the [presence] of vendors 
on the streets. Even those who enacted the [anti-vending] ordinance ignore their 
presence… Why don’t they directly confront the vendors? Because, [if they do that] 
they [vendors] won’t vote for you in the next elections. 
 
In addition, Baclaran’s election-oriented clientelism capitalizes on political machine (Nowak 
& Snyder, 1970; Quimpo, 2005) which finds expression in vendors’ role as Barangay 
Intelligence Officer and Barangay Intelligence Support of some local officials. As explained 
in Chapter 6, these two positions are part of the political machinery of their respective bosses 
during the 45-day campaign period and on the Election Day itself. Barangay Intelligence 
Officer and Barangay Intelligence Support, in return, can ask their bosses to allow the 
individuals they endorse to sell on the streets.  
 
So, how did the clientelist arrangements develop and what have sustained the tight 
relations? While the overlapping issues associated with disjunctive urban governance and 
kinship ties have somehow contributed to clientelism in Baclaran, two other regulation-
oriented factors have deepened the patronage relations of vendors and government 
authorities.  
 
The first factor is the hostile legal environment. UN-Habitat (2016) has paid attention to how 
the failure of rigid and ineffective legislation to reflect reality and recognize the inventiveness 
of informal workers can force citizens into corruption to gain access to basic services. In 
Pasay, a local ordinance declares street vending as illegal. In Parañaque, although there 
are ordinances that allow vending on certain streets at a given period in a year, these do not 
grant the hawkers with long-term legal identity. Due to the unfriendly policies, vendors who 
rely on vending for economic survival, or consider it as a viable business, resort to backdoor 
channels and patronage connections to earn tolerance from the local authorities. The 
unfavourable laws thus serve as hawkers’ Damocles sword that local officials use to threaten 
them. While the daily illicit financial collection and informal channels persist, local officials 
can anytime evict hawkers by invoking the anti-vending legal instruments. 
 
The local government’s usual recourse to eviction is part of the second factor that compels 
the vendors to cling on to patronage relation - the state’s ability to resort to violence. As 
presented in the evictionist regulatory regime (Section 7.2.2 in Chapter 7), the series of 
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violent clearing operations have prompted the street vendors to build informal ties with the 
city mayor. One salient case pertains to how the violent evictions85 disrupted an organizing 
initiative of a vendors’ group.  Prior to the MMDA-led evictions, some vendor leaders in one 
section (Pasay area) were beginning to form an organization of Muslim and Christian 
hawkers.  
We were forming an association before… We had regular financial contribution, 
which we pooled together… It’s a Muslim-Christian [group]. We even had an office… 
But it became hard when we had to endure evictions. I didn’t even know where to 
sell… So, when the MMDA came in, we got very fragmented.  (Julie, vendor leader) 
 
The association also had some degree of structure; there was a set of officers and regular 
meetings of members. There were negotiations between vendors and local government 
units. In a sense, these vendors were pursuing collective action for long-term organizational 
development. Unfortunately, the series of clearing operations deprived the vendors of the 
space to make a living and sustain the organizing work. This led to the slow demise of their 
association86.  
 
Because of their eviction experience, hawkers began establishing relations with local 
government officials and political operators. This has enabled the local officials to engage 
street hawkers using a set particularistic agenda like the access to streets, electoral support, 
and illicit fees. Subsequently, a closer relation, albeit one that anchors on clientelism, has 
persisted. To an extent, this state capacity to resort to violence echoes the power of coercion 
in promoting clientelism (Quimpo, 2005). Put another way, the local officials (and their 
political leaders) deploy the public visible face of power (Lukes, 2005) to compel vendors to 
embrace clientelism - a hidden face/form of power (Lukes, 2015; Gaventa, 2011) – where 
they can perpetuate the unjust relations.  
 
Intersecting with the entrenched clientelism, strong kinship ties, and disjunctive urban 
governance is a set of grassroots practices that has similarly influenced the governing 
relations in Baclaran. The next section examines this theme.  
 
                                            
85 These evictions occurred during Bayani Fernando’s reign as Metropolitan Manila Development Authority 
(MMDA) Chair from 2002 to 2009.  
86 At that time, other hawkers in Metro Manila also suffered from the MMDA’s violent clearing operations. The 
Katipunan ng Maraming Tinig ng mga Manggagawang Impormal or KATINIG KA (Coalition of the Many Voices 
of Informal Workers), a nationwide coalition of informal workers with a large following from street vendors in 
Metro Manila, endured a significant setback in its organizing efforts. KATINIG KA failed to sustain its organizing 
efforts since the streets are not only vendors’ livelihood spaces; these also serve as an important terrain for 
political work and organizational building.  
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8.2.4. Grassroots Democratic Entanglements 
The diverse relations and practices, discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, reveal how Baclaran 
hawkers have resorted to collective action to confront poverty and hostile state rules. Yet, 
alongside these grassroots responses, an array of parochial intents and collective action 
barriers exists. It is thus conceptually and empirically inappropriate to call vendors’ collective 
schemes as purely resistance strategies. It amounts to romanticizing, if not misrepresenting, 
their complex political and socio-spatial practices. I therefore situate the multiple 
expressions of vendors’ agency as part of what I call grassroots democratic entanglements, 
which possess progressive and regressive democratic elements and even conflicting 
motives or routines.  
 
Grassroots democratic entanglements are grounded in two strands of scholarly literature, 
which both adhere to the structurationist and institutionalist framing of the thesis’ post-dualist 
lens. One is the literature on grassroots agency - presented in Chapter 3 – in which one 
running thread underscores the contingent and context-oriented nature of grassroots 
initiatives. I specifically draw from Honwana’s (2008) strategic and tactical agencies, 
Kaufman’s (1997) grassroots democracy, Chatterjee’s (2004) politics of the governed, 
Kerkvliet’s (2009) everyday politics, Musoni’s (2010) adaptive resistance, and Bayat’s 
(2013) non-movement of the dispossessed. 
 
The other stream of thought stems from Quimpo’s (2005) contested democracy, discussed 
in Chapter 5, and Caldeira and Holston’s (1999) disjunctive democracy (as discussed in 
Section 8.2.1 above). While Quimpo has emphasized the importance of grassroots struggle 
in Philippine history, Caldeira and Holston have pointed out how actually-existing 
democracies in the global South are diverse, uneven, and contain contradictory elements. 
Grassroots democratic entanglements thus look at how grassroots actions could constitute 
resistance and coping strategies while being attentive to factors that impede collective action 
in a democratic context. These are explained below. 
 
8.2.4.1. Vendors’ Responses to Structural Conditions and Socio-spatial Relations 
In explaining people’s responses to political and economic realities, Katz (2004) makes a 
nuanced distinction between reworking, resilience and resistance. Although these three are 
interwoven, she argues that reworking refers to practices that alter the conditions to 
generate more workable lives while resilience pertains to pragmatic acts that enable people 
to survive amid difficult circumstances. Katz (2004, p. 251) then distinguishes resistance as 
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those actions “that draw on and produce a critical consciousness to confront and redress… 
conditions of oppression and exploitation at various scales…”  This careful distinction 
resonates with the different accounts of grassroots agency by the authors mentioned above 
and elaborated in Chapter 3.   
 
In Baclaran, the vendors’ grassroots practices straddle between these acts of reworking, 
resilience and resistance. For instance, Baclaran vendors’ engagement in tenuous clientelist 
relations to earn a living arguably constitutes a form of reworking to alleviate their 
impoverished conditions amid a hostile legal environment. Undeniably, as poor people 
struggle to survive in the context of acute poverty and inequality, their activities may emerge 
simultaneously formal, informal, legal and illegal (van Schendel & Abraham, 2005). Thus, 
even Baclaran vendors’ approach to cling on to unjust relations may publicly seem docile 
and submissive, but this can form hubs of dissent and insubordination (Rabinowitz, 2014; 
Scott, 1979; 1985) in the context of exclusionary socio-spatial relations. 
 
Meanwhile, the hawkers’ haging occupancy, the engagement with evictionist regulatory 
regime, the Bermonths routine (discussed in Chapter 7), and their shared interests to use 
the streets enable them to form passive networks (Bayat, 1997). These acts appear to be a 
form of resilience. On a more strategic level, the narratives by vendor organizers in Chapter 
6 capture the potential of hawkers, when organizing assistance is sustained, to resist and 
break the cycle of patronage relations. Their intentions and actions went beyond the mere 
acts of reworking and resilience. They formed a federation, joined rallies, and attended 
meetings with national government agencies and local governments. To an extent, these 
practices represent an act of resistance, which evolved from organizing work and conscious 
political decision to do something that can change their conditions. Alas, their collective 
action encountered fierce opposition from political leaders and state officials. These powerful 
players succeeded in undermining the vendors’ attempt at addressing their issues through 
participation in formal governance structures. Still, as organizer, Leo, puts it, “there is 
something to build on”.  
 
In other words, it is hard to view the continuing presence of Baclaran vendors as a mere 
outcome of disjunctive urban governance, kinship ties, and patronage networks. Vendors 
have endured evictions, resisted legal rules, transformed Baclaran’s spatial form, and have 
grown in number despite the lack of government support. Seen from a broader standpoint, 
their presence unsettles the essentialist categories of work and urban spaces (Milgram, 
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2009) and constitutes resistance to state’s hegemonic power (Etzold, 2013). Indeed, 
acknowledging the various forms of grassroots agency and responses – whether they are 
reworking, resilience, or resistance – also underscore the intricate interworking of the 
changing structures of power (Abu-Lughod, 1990). Yet, while the accounts in Chapters 6 
and 7 demonstrate how the hawkers’ practices constitute different forms of agency and 
responses to structural conditions, there are barriers to collective action. These constraints 
are tackled in the subsequent sections. 
 
8.2.4.2. The Uncertainty of Outcome from Democratic Processes 
Amid the prevailing patronage relations, one issue that hinders collective action is the 
uncertainty of the outcome from democratic processes. In one section of Baclaran, some 
long-time vendor leaders are afraid to lose control over their ‘territories’. Street-level 
bureaucrat, Lian, explained how some leaders refuse to tackle their lack of tenure security. 
They [vendor leaders] never talk about the long-term plans because they think once 
it becomes legal and there is [formal] permit, some vendors will lose their spaces. So, 
vendors who have contacts in the city hall will directly get in touch with them to get a 
space. Now, the current [claimed] space ‘owners’ won’t allow it since they have 
protected it for a long time. They won’t allow that because if there’s a permit, [external] 
organizers will come in and they [leader] will be by-passed.  
 
Carlo, a vendor and barangay official, also shared how fellow hawkers responded to his idea 
of strategic organizing. 
We were planning to organize the vendors since the local government allows us to 
use the streets. We wanted to make it an orderly space to attract more people… But, 
the problem is their [vendor] leaders. Some of them thought that we’re proposing this 
idea because we want to replace them. They have a different interpretation.  
 
The insights above indicate how vendor leaders protect their interests by avoiding possible 
changes that long-term organizing might bring. In the face of economic constraint and 
political uncertainty, their fear is not entirely misplaced.  In another research (Recio, 2015), 
I emphasize how vendors in Intramuros (Manila) got involved in a series of democratic 
negotiations and entered into formal agreements but were unable to secure the 
implementation of the crafted official covenant. In Baclaran, the prevailing patronage ties, 
seen in Section 8.3, generates anxiety of leaders over how other players who have stronger 
ties to state officials might displace them and eventually control their vending spaces. Thus, 
although they engage in certain forms of collective action (e.g. managing and protecting 
vending spaces), the vendor leaders’ relationships with local authorities still anchor on 
clientelism. As similarly observed in Argentinean popular politics, this interface of grassroots 
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collective action and clientelism is not necessarily divergent (Auyero, Lapegna, & Poma, 
2009). It is embedded in the spectrum of poor people’s routine and non-routine problem-
solving strategies.  
 
8.2.4.3. Grassroots Fragmentation 
The reluctance of vendor leaders to develop long-term agenda is also linked to the second 
collective action barrier – fragmentation. Two things account for the persistent fragmentation 
among Baclaran hawkers. First, the presence of socio-cultural tensions, what Sapitula 
(2013b) calls hierarchized conviviality, between the Muslim and Christian vendors creates 
an atmosphere of othering. Many Christian hawkers have expressed biases against Muslim 
vendors whom they describe as ‘troublemakers’, ‘untidy’, and difficult to deal with. Even the 
relationship between the Christian and Muslim vendor leaders appears tenuous in that they 
do not regularly interact to discuss group concerns. They only meet when the city 
government calls for a meeting to talk about evictions.  
 
The other reason relates to how the hawkers suffered from the divide-and-rule strategy of 
local officials. As narrated in Section 6.5.2.1 (Chapter 6), local officials used political 
operators and enforced evictions to form a separate vendors’ group. The independent 
hawkers’ federation eventually disintegrated due to this scheme. Worse, this has made 
vendors cautious to build or join an organization. As vendor organizer, Belinda, recalled, 
There was an instance when I talked to them [Baclaran vendors]. They no longer 
want to join an association. Do you know why? They are being threatened by the 
enforcers, by local officials… They now have collectors for protection money. That’s 
the reason why they are not on ‘legal’ spaces. They are being threatened to be 
evicted from their pwesto (vending spaces).  
 
As vendors get discouraged from forming groups, the need for allies that could assist in 
rebuilding organizational ties becomes critical. Yet, as the section below will show, the NGO 
assistance is also a serious concern. 
 
8.2.4.4. The Unsustained NGO Assistance for Transformative Political Organizing 
Many NGOs in the Philippines have played crucial roles in sharing political views and 
organizing experience to urban poor communities (Shatkin, 2007). Some NGOs have also 
acted as policy champions and helped strengthen the capacity of vendors’ organizations 
(Recio, 2014). In Baclaran, however, the NGOs are mainly involved in providing financial 
support through loans and facilitating religious practices. As a result, the NGO involvement 
in organizing mainly stemmed from individual organizers who belong to external groups.  
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In the past, there were two major attempts at engaging vendors in political organizing. The 
first was initiated by community organizers from left-leaning groups. Their efforts did not gain 
traction as they resorted to the usual leftist method of organizing individuals, which 
embraces broader causes like class inequality and capitalism, among others. As local 
organizer, Jess, recalled, “Their approach was to link vending issues to ‘isms’ – capitalism, 
imperialism, feudalism… It did not work because the hawkers are more concerned with 
everyday problems of economic survival”. National government staff, Noriel, echoed the 
same sentiment on grassroots organizing: “When it comes to the nature of urban poor’s 
[engagement] in development work, their basic concerns really are the everyday meals, a 
house to live in”.  
 
The other organizing intervention came from leaders of informal workers’ associations who 
were part of the government’s National Anti-Poverty Commission Workers in the Informal 
Sector Council. This attempt at vendor organizing, which gained a momentum from 2003-
2005, focused on social protection agenda. As narrated in Chapter 6, the organizers helped 
form a federation of around 40 small groups in Parañaque area. Baclaran hawkers got 
involved in national and local social dialogues, mass demonstrations and training sessions 
to enhance their organizational skills.  
 
After more than two years of guiding the federation in Baclaran, the enthusiasm of vendors 
to take part in activities started to fizzle out. The organizers and some barangay officials 
attributed this to the aftermath of the 2004 local elections, when the city officials resorted to 
divide-and-rule strategy. As the new mayor’s political operators began recognizing new 
vendor leaders who gained the blessing of the City Hall in occupying street spaces, the 
federation got disintegrated. In 2005, the organizers had occasionally visited Baclaran 
vendors. In these instances, they found out that the hawkers’ federation was practically 
dissolved after the death of its founding president. Aside from random visits, the initial 
organizing initiatives were not sustained. The unsustained NGO interventions have partly 
led to the patronage-oriented illicit fees and kinship-oriented access to vending spaces.  
 
In sum, I have presented in the foregoing discussion how the vendors’ practices constitute 
various agency expressions in response to structural issues of poverty and rigid state rules. 
Here, it is clear how the structure-agency nexus operates in vendors’ struggle for economic 
survival. I have shown how certain actions and issues inhibit vendors’ collective action in 
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Baclaran. In situating these factors as part of the grassroots democratic entanglements, I 
posit that the different expressions of vendors’ agency are embedded in practices that 
contain progressive and regressive democratic elements. This is inevitable in an 
environment where Baclaran hawkers strive to keep their claimed spaces of power 
(Gaventa, 2011) alongside efforts to tap into the invited and hidden channels and the invited 
spaces of power. It echoes Ong’s (2011) observation on the difficulty of determining whether 
some actors and practices are on the side of power or on the side of resistance.  
 
8.3. The Implications of the Formal-Informal Interface for Urban Planning  
In this section, I explain how the foregoing discussion and the analyses in the earlier 
chapters affect urban planning. The analysis of empirical data has revealed four critical 
implications, which can inform planners in understanding the links between the formal-
informal interface and planning processes. These are 1) the post-dualist approach to 
informality; 2) the agglomeration of land uses; 3) the gentrification, informality and 
globalization; and 4) the need for inclusive urban governance. Each is tackled below.  
 
8.3.1. Planning and the Post-Dualist Approach to Informality 
In the previous chapters and the earlier sections in this chapter, I delved into how informality 
issues and planning processes are embedded in complex situations and overlapping 
relations. Messy realities like these challenge conventional planning models that may prove 
unable to capture the conditions on the ground.  This points to the need for a more 
responsive conceptual framework, which may better explain how realities have evolved over 
time. Here, it is crucial to revisit why the thesis’ post-dualist lens provides a nuanced 
analytical vantage point for urban planners.  
 
As explained in Chapter 3, the post-dualist lens emerges from three strands of academic 
thought: it follows the enmeshed reading of informality issues, builds on the discourses on 
structure-agency nexus, particularly Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory, and it is linked to 
planning by adhering to relational and institutionalist standpoint.  In brief, the post-dualist 
lens argues that structural dimensions and agency expressions underpin the interlocking 
formal and informal economic practices in urban spaces. It frames planning as a governance 
practice which manages co-existence in shared spaces and relations in collective action 
(Healey, 1997, 2007b). Planning processes are thus seen as rooted in contrasting interests, 
transactions, costs, rules, norms and broader social contexts in an urban area. It is then 
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critical to consider the trajectories of these processes as multi-faceted and socially 
constructed, which may be questioned and challenged (Healey, 2007a).  
 
Employing the post dualist lens has two practical implications. First, it moves away from the 
usual dualist standpoint, which has calcified rigid categories and mystified the intricate 
relations that underpin the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ economic activities. In unpacking these 
relations, the post-dualist lens amplifies the need to go beyond the developmentalist roots 
of state interventions and depoliticized local planning approach to informality. In concrete 
terms, this entails undertaking state interventions beyond the poverty dimensions of street 
vending and using planning approaches that engage with the socio-political nature of 
informality. Second, the post-dualist lens resonates with responsive approaches to 
informality issues. It would enable policy-makers to accommodate an ‘urban reform-oriented 
planning’ model (de Souza, 2006) in which planners examine spaces based on the broader 
social situations and public interest goals. This also implies being open to Bhowmik’s (2010) 
view of public spaces like Baclaran as ‘natural markets’87 where hawkers offer goods to the 
public. When examined out of context, many people may argue that this will aggravate 
bottleneck issues. Amid acute poverty, however, policy-makers will need to incorporate the 
‘natural markets’ lens in crafting inclusive88 laws and land use plans. In India, the ‘natural 
market’ approach has been enshrined in the country’s Street Vendors Act of 2014. This Law 
empowers Town Vending Committees to identify natural markets where sellers and buyers 
have traditionally congregated for the sale and purchase of products or services. 
 
In Baclaran case, employing the urban planning and management approaches explained 
above can enable planners to situate the spatial (e.g. integration into physical plans) and 
socio-temporal (e.g. anticipation of Bermonths’ impacts) aspects of street vending in broader 
contexts. This entails being attentive to the socio-economic issues and the layered spatio-
political relations manifested in both formal and informal structures of power. Such an 
approach is relevant to the Philippine context where land use plans simply mark off urban 
spaces based on their functional utility and relationship to local economic growth goals.  
 
                                            
87 For Bhowmik (2010, p. 13), natural markets “spring up in places where the consumers find them useful. 
Hence there will be street vendors outside railway stations and bus depots. People returning from a tiring day 
at work would rather purchase their necessities from these vendors rather than make a detour and go to the 
market situated a few kilometres away”. 
88 This is further elaborated in Section 8.2.5 below. 
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8.3.2. The Agglomeration of Land Uses 
Mixed land uses are a common feature of plans and spatial patterns in the global South. In 
Baclaran and its adjoining areas, these patterns play an important role for street vendors. In 
terms of supply chain, for instance, the warehouses of wholesalers and stallholders in 
shopping malls serve as the vendors’ product sources.  
 
Moreover, since many street hawkers live in the nearby residential areas, it is easy for their 
family members to assist or replace the working relatives when the latter need some rest. 
The proximity of their houses to the stalls is vital as vendors do not have to spend additional 
expenses for transportation to get home and ask for help from their relatives. Kaye, a city 
official, explained how it happened in Pasay. “They [vendors] were not originally from Pasay. 
They just decided to settle in our communities because they have gotten used to it; they 
ended up looking for dwelling spaces nearby”. It is also common to see relatives of vendors 
sleeping at or playing (in the case of children) around their hawking spaces. This indicates 
how vending areas have become an extension of the dwelling spaces of some hawkers.  
 
In addition, some smaller interior streets, which are not used for vending, serve as ‘parking’ 
space for the carts of vendors. One inner street, which sits in the middle of a Muslim 
community in Baclaran, is an important retreat area and storage space for Muslim hawkers. 
I call these spaces as secondary streets in relation to vending activity. Since the busier roads 
- the primary streets - are already crowded with vehicles, pedestrians, formal stalls and 
vendors, the secondary streets are crucial in supporting the vibrant interaction of different 
users in the primary roads. Besides serving as ‘storage’ areas, they function as ‘buffer 
spaces’ where vendors readily run to whenever there is eviction. 
 
Besides its economic and settlement functions, Baclaran’s transport node function in Metro 
Manila (as explained in Chapter 5) attracts many commuters and street vendors’ patrons. 
Religious activities – primarily seen in the thousands of Baclaran Church’s pilgrims – 
similarly contribute to the agglomeration of land uses. Aside from Baclaran Church, the 
mosques in the area are important for Muslim street hawkers. They are not only sites for 
worship but a place where they interact with community and vendor leaders. 
 
As a result, the land use patterns comprise four intersecting functions: a) commercial 
activities; b) settlement spaces; c) transport nodes; and d) socio-cultural functions. Street 
hawkers have capitalized on these ‘natural markets’ (Bhowmik, 2010), which are enhanced 
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by the agglomeration of land uses. Vendors have made Baclaran as part of their daily lives, 
socio-cultural environment, economic space, and spatio-political arrangements. Baclaran’s 
situation thus demonstrates that urban agglomeration89 involves an interface between what 
is often demarcated as ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ economic transactions. It illustrates how 
informal vending is never insulated from the socio-spatial patterns in the area. It is 
embedded in Baclaran’s overlapping land uses. 
 
8.3.3. Gentrification, Informality, and Globalization 
As discussed above, Baclaran’s informal vending is linked to the broader land use patterns. 
In this section, I argue that gentrification, which has received favourable attention from 
planners as a solution to informality (evident in Chapter 6), is implicated in informality and 
neoliberal globalization90. This is seen in a Baclaran section, which is administratively part 
of Parañaque. 
 
Parañaque has its own reclaimed area that is part of the Bay City project - an agglomeration 
of recreational, residential and office spaces - as presented in Chapter 5. Dubbed as ‘the 
Entertainment City’, this urban gentrification in the neo-liberal age (Ortega, 2016) boasts of 
world class hotels and gambling establishments. Before the construction of these structures, 
a Muslim community inhabited a portion of the Entertainment City’s previously vacant area, 
which is right across the Baclaran Church (Watanabe, 2008). As more Muslim residents 
arrived, the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) - the state agency tasked to develop the 
reclaimed area - declared their land occupation as illegal. In 2007, after a Regional Trial 
Court issued a ruling that favours the PRA, the government undertook series of demolitions 
against the community. In 2013, a private company who bought the land successfully 
dismantled the dwelling units and a mosque in the area. 
 
Local political operators and ward leaders then organized the dislocated Muslims who 
moved to nearby Parañaque and Pasay communities. “We got in touch with Muslim leaders 
and helped them register as barangay residents in Pasay”, narrated Jess, an organizer for 
local politicians. This assistance forged a relationship between political organizers and 
Muslim leaders who have later on capitalized on their increasing population as an electoral 
leverage with politicians vying for government positions. Armed with this political influence, 
                                            
89 Scott and Storper (2015) define agglomeration as a mechanism of sharing, matching and learning. “Sharing 
is about the dense local inter-linkages within production systems… Matching refers to the process of pairing 
people and jobs... Learning is the dense formal and informal information flows…” (Scott & Storper, 2015, p. 6). 
90 Authors like Crossa (2009), Ortega (2016), among others, echo similar observation in their own work.  
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the Muslim leaders have gained concessions, including an access to vending spaces for 
Muslim residents, from local government officials. Recently, Parañaque’s Mayor announced 
his plan to house Baclaran vendors in a flea market (Ramirez, 2017). This effort appears to 
regulate or prevent ‘informalization’ of carefully planned urban mega-projects (Shatkin, 
2008).   
 
The foregoing account depicts an ironic land use pattern in global South cities – the entwined 
relationship between gentrification and informality. While government officials see 
gentrification as a solution to informality (evident in Chapter 6); the displaced urban poor 
embrace informality as a coping mechanism against the onslaught of gentrification. This 
affirms how powerful groups are implicated in deepening impoverishment (Lawson, 2012) 
and how state interventions (e.g. land use plans) may entrench informality (Roy, 2005; 
Yiftachel, 2006). At the same time, the account shows how the gentrification-informality 
nexus occurs amid the pervasive government drive to embrace neoliberal globalization. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, as global South states aim to modernize and globalize cities, 
they often restrict urban informal livelihoods (Elyachar, 2005). In Baclaran, the narrative 
above reveals how the interplay of global neoliberal trends and urban informality involves 
the private investment-driven change in land values and a mega urban project. For some 
scholars, this entails privatization of planning (Shatkin, 2008) and gentrification against 
informality (Ortega, 2016). The bias against informal livelihoods is likewise seen in how the 
government, in its effort to project Manila as a global city, has repeatedly evicted Baclaran 
vendors (tackled in Chapter 7) when there are international visitors and/or events such as 
the one narrated in the beginning of Chapter 1.  
 
These issues affirm the importance of situating the formal-informal interface in the discourse 
on ‘worlding cities’ (Roy & Ong, 2011). Worlding refers to “diverse spatializing practices that 
mix and match different components that go into building an emergent system” (Ong, 2011, 
p. 12). Recognizing heterogeneous practices that fail to fit into the neat categories of class, 
political, or cultural categories, worlding seeks to “remap relationships of power at different 
scales and localities” (Ong, 2011, p. 12). In this sense, planners are urged to be attentive to 
how land use designs patterned after neoliberal globalization may actually reinforce informal 
practices or create spaces that they intend to wipe out. Understanding how external forces 
such as neoliberal globalization ideas intersect with local coping mechanisms and resistance 
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strategies – as a worlding practice - may inform planners and decision-makers how to devise 
a more inclusive urban governance. 
 
8.3.4. The Need for Inclusive Urban Governance 
In the last three previous chapters, I have shown how the planning-governance nexus and 
the formal-informal interface should be seen as situated in the co-existence of various 
activities and socio-political relations in shared and contested spaces. The issues and 
tensions associated with these complex interactions are further compounded by the 
persistent inequality in the use and ordering of Baclaran spaces. The prevailing socio-spatial 
and political environment in Baclaran marginalizes the rights of poor informal vendors.  The 
dominant legal instruments privilege the property rights of formal commercial stalls. 
Statutory plans hinge on neoliberal-inspired goal of strengthening local growth machines 
and gentrifying public spaces where urban informal vending takes place. Evictions and 
financial insecurity constantly threaten the vendors’ livelihood sources and socio-economic 
networks. Grassroots collective actions get thwarted by strong patronage relations and 
dominant elite families in local governments. These hierarchical and exclusionary urban 
conditions can lead to a path-dependent trajectory of inequality that is hard, if not impossible, 
to change in the long run (McGranahan et al., 2016).  
 
These grim realities are a far cry from the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal # 
11 - make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable – and its broader slogan for 
development - ‘no one will be left behind’. Amid the wide gap between an ideal urban 
scenario and the current situation in Baclaran, it is crucial for planners to heed ideas that 
question the exclusionary policies and practices in many global South cities. Lefebvre’s 
(1968) right to the city is one of such ideas. It resonates with evolving approaches on human 
rights-centred development (Diokno, 2004), inclusive urbanization (McGranahan et al., 
2016) and inclusive legal order (Brown, 2017b), among others.  
 
McGranahan et al.’s (2016) contention on the need to go beyond the World Bank’s (2013a) 
conception of inclusion in cities is critical. Questioning the World Bank’s identity-oriented 
definition of disadvantage, they adhere to empowering and equitable urban inclusion that 
addresses overt discrimination and structurally-produced disadvantages (McGranahan et 
al., 2016). Their multi-tiered inclusion mechanisms can thus inform what inclusive urban 
governance will look like. For them, the three levels of inclusion involve the following:  
a. Removing discriminatory exclusions, such as denying migrants the right to settle 
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in the city (space), buy property (markets), send their children to school or access 
health care (services);  
b. Ensuring that prevailing institutions (market regulation, service provision; space 
use) incorporate the voices and reflect the needs of disadvantaged groups; and  
c. Ensuring that the human rights of disadvantaged groups are fully met through, 
among other means, markets, services and access to spaces. (McGranahan et al., 
2016, p. 17)  
 
When linked to informality, an inclusive urban governance entails striking a balance between 
addressing the persistent informality - which is riddled with unequal and exclusionary 
relations as shown in the previous chapters – and integrating informal livelihoods into 
existing formal systems. There has to be an adequate attention to the needs, rights, and 
aspirations of the informal workers like vendors. In Baclaran, an inclusive and rights-based 
framework for urban work is vital to recognize “the legitimacy of urban informal economies, 
the scope for collective management of urban resources and the social value of public space 
as a site for urban livelihoods” (Brown, 2017b, p. 244). This resonates with ideas around 
natural market (Bhowmik, 2010) approach to street vending and the urban reform-oriented 
land use planning (de Souza, 2006), as mentioned in Section 8.3.1 above.   
 
More concretely, Brown’s (2017a, pp. 80-81) proposal to consider the ‘street as a place of 
work’ and a ‘common-pool resource’ that should “be managed for shared benefits to accrue, 
with defined ‘bundles’ of rights…” is a key step in addressing the vulnerable conditions of 
Baclaran hawkers. This view is an important approach in designing inclusive and rights-
based interventions. As Brown (2017a, 90) puts it,  
“… [U]rban public space as a ‘common-pool resource’ can provide a new framework 
of collective rights in the public domain, which would include a variety of rights – to 
work, to move through and to enjoy public space… The challenge is how to manage 
the resulting congestion and ‘tragedy of the commons’ that may occur. For street 
traders, the bundles of rights might include access to and beneficial use, but with 
conditions requiring contributions to collective management of the resource.” 
 
This approach to urban public space as a common-pool resource can guide planners and 
policy-makers in addressing the disjunctive nature of local governance in both Pasay and 
Parañaque cities. It can inform the local officials in developing an urban governance agenda 
that responds to the complex formal-informal interface in an inclusive manner. In pursuing 
an inclusive agenda, it is useful to revisit how the urban governance literatures (Chapter 3) 
stress the need to be attentive to both collaborations and conflicts in governance processes 
(Healey, 1997; Minnery, 2007). It is equally crucial to pay attention to the different forms and 
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faces of power (Lukes, 2005; Gaventa, 2011), the relations they generate, and the various 
strategies that marginalised players employ (Chatterjee, 2004). There is also a concern over 
how various people can reach a consensus in planning, a process susceptible to issues that 
come with ‘conflicting rationalities’ (Watson, 2003) and “a realm that is infused with private 
and sectional interests” (Mattila, 2016, p. 360). Even McGranahan et al. (2016) acknowledge 
that state authorities, often ‘prone to elite capture’, “are unlikely to plan for inclusive 
urbanization without pressure from below” (p.24). As evident in Baclaran, socio-spatial 
ordering of contested vending spaces is rooted in the complex and unequal power relations 
among different players. Some local government officials, politicians, and planners will 
inevitably support the existing exclusionary power relations. An inclusive urban governance 
should therefore involve different stakeholders in the processes of shaping policies and 
planning trajectories affecting informal hawkers. In Baclaran, partnerships between 
government agencies as well as NGOs, vendor groups and social movements at the local 
and national levels can result in more accountable and democratic processes as some 
national government offices have oversight functions over LGUs. Thus, while informal 
networks are key to the survival of vendors in exclusionary power relations, an inclusive 
urban governance should focus on how even the informal and unequal structures of power 
could be better brought to public control and made more legitimate (Healey, 1997; 2007b).  
 
Lastly, an inclusive urban governance entails reorienting planning education towards a more 
context-sensitive approach to informal livelihoods like street vending. A planning education, 
which is more attuned to ‘global South-East’ realities (Yiftachel, 2006; Watson, 2012), can 
challenge and transform the depoliticized attitude of local planners towards the complex 
socio-spatial relations, which underpin the formal-informal interface in contested vending 
spaces. In sum, inclusive urban governance anchors on four components: 1) the emphasis 
on the needs and rights of the marginalised players like street vendors; 2) the attention to 
conflictive and unequal power relations; 3) the recognition of the role of sustained collective 
action by vendor groups, social movements, and NGOs; and 4) the promotion of context-
sensitive planning education. 
 
8.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have answered the thesis sub-questions 4 and 5: What relational logics 
and entrenched arrangements influence the governing processes and interactions of the 
different players? What are the implications of the formal-informal interface for urban 
planning processes, particularly in the context of governing and appropriating contested 
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vending spaces? These questions pertain to the last two governance dimensions - 
governing relations and planning implications – I laid out in Chapter 3.  
 
With respect to the governing relations, I have identified four overlapping relations: a) the 
disjunctive urban governance, b) the strong kinship ties, c) the clientelist political relations, 
and d) the grassroots democratic entanglements. By explaining the causes and implications 
of each relation, I have demonstrated how institutional issues (disjunctive governance), 
socio-cultural and political ties (kinship bonds and clientelism), and grassroots agency 
(grassroots democratic entanglements) intersect and generate the complex formal-informal 
interface in governing contested vending spaces. In unpacking the interplay of the four 
entwined relations, I have shown how the governing relations are rooted in the structure-
agency nexus and the multiple forms and spaces of power. Besides issues linked to power, 
I have explored the importance of linking informality to conceptual and empirical questions 
about democracy.  
  
For the last governance dimension, I have presented four implications of the formal-informal 
interface for urban planning: a) the post-dualist approach to informality; b) the agglomeration 
of land uses; c) gentrification, informality and globalization; and 4) the need for inclusive 
urban governance. In discussing each theme, I have argued how and why the thesis’ post-
dualist lens is a sound analytical approach in examining the formal-informal interface. My 
analysis has further explained how the socio-spatial patterns and their interactions (land 
use, gentrification and informality) are linked to broader planning issues (e.g. globalization). 
Finally, I have underscored how planners can better deal with the complex formal-informal 
interface through inclusive urban governance. 
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION 
 
Street vending is a precarious urban livelihood. Many vendors suffer from harassment and 
evictions resulting from hostile state policies. Hannah’s plea, as narrated in the introductory 
chapter, exemplifies the plight of informal vendors in many global South cities. Driven by the 
need to survive, hawkers have devised informal mechanisms – from grassroots practices to 
national and international collaborative initiatives - to deal with various types of state 
regulation. I have referred to this interplay of state interventions and informal practices as 
the formal-informal interface. The governing relations that produce and evolve from the 
formal-informal interface are the key problematic of this thesis. I have thus problematized 
the question “How can the interface of formal systems and informal mechanisms to govern 
and appropriate contested vending spaces be explained?” In answering this query, I argue 
that the formal-informal interface can be explained by using a post-dualist lens in examining 
five governance dimensions – players, policies, practices, governing relations, and planning 
implications – that shape the socio-spatial interactions in contested vending spaces. Post-
dualist lens, as developed in this thesis, is a conceptual analytical framework that moves 
beyond the dichotomous view of informality. It serves as a reflexive lens in unpacking the 
conceptual prisms and policy approaches that have influenced how the formal systems and 
urban informality are understood. Thus, the thesis contributes to the theoretical discussion 
on urban informality and planning by employing the post-dualist lens in analysing state 
policies, planning interventions, street vendors’ practices, and how their interplay affects 
how local governments work and deal with informal vending. Using the post-dualist lens also 
opens up spaces for policy recommendations that are attentive to the issues surrounding 
the formal-informal interface in insecure urban employment.  
 
9.1. Key Findings and their Implications for Theorizing and Policy-making 
The dominant literature on urban informality espouses a dualist view of informal livelihoods 
like street vending (informal work as separate from formal economic activities). While this 
dualist view has influenced much scholarly and policy framing, a number of scholars have 
pointed out its constraints in responding to the complex socio-spatial relations in urban 
informality. For instance, the dualist view highlights the dichotomy between formal measures 
(government policies and programs) and the informal economic activities, which are seen 
as beyond the ambit of state control. Yet, the conceptual debates and empirical accounts 
on street vending have shown how state institutions are implicated in informality. With its 
focus on the formal-informal dichotomy, the dualist view has generated a hostile policy 
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attitude towards informal workers like street vendors. As a result, the unsupportive policy 
environment has deepened the vendors’ insecure conditions as seen in Hannah’s account. 
Given these limitations of the dualist view (as elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3), examining 
the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces demands a conceptual analytical 
framework that goes beyond the binary understanding of urban informality. My notion of 
post-dualist lens has sought to address this issue.  
 
The post-dualist lens builds on three strands of academic literature (discussed in Chapters 
2 and 3): a) the enmeshed reading of informality, b) the structuration theory, and c) the 
relational-institutionalist framing of planning. Drawing from these ideas, the post-dualist lens 
contends that examining the formal-informal interface in contested vending spaces requires 
attention to structural dimensions of informality (e.g. state policies and programs) and 
agency expressions of informal workers (e.g. vendors’ collective action and individual 
initiatives). It views planning and governance processes as relational in that they are situated 
within the evolving, complex, socio-spatial interactions in urban areas. In addressing the 
main research question, I have deployed the post-dualist lens as the thesis’ conceptual 
analytical framework and contribution to the theoretical discussion on informality and 
planning. 
 
In employing the post-dualist lens, five themes - dubbed as governance dimensions - 
comprise the analytical threads that address the thesis’ main research question: players, 
policies, practices, governing relations, and planning implications. Players refer to the 
stakeholders – government agencies and officials, unorganized and organized street 
vendors, non-government organizations, and private sector players – who are directly and/or 
indirectly involved in informality, street use, and informal vending (Chapter 6). Policies 
pertain to state laws and programs that affect street use and informal vending. Practices are 
the different mechanisms that street vendors have undertaken to govern and/or appropriate 
contested vending spaces (Chapter 7). Governing relations refer to systemic arrangements 
and micro socio-spatial modes of engagements that lie beneath the rules, interactions, 
norms, and actions in contested vending spaces. Planning implications pay attention to how 
the formal-informal interface influences and is affected by urban planning (Chapter 8). These 
governance dimensions were examined using Baclaran vending district in Metro Manila as 
the case study area. 
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Based on the Baclaran context, I have explained the formal-informal interface in contested 
vending spaces. As I mentioned in Chapter 4, while this research is informed by my own 
conceptual and contextual perspectives, the way of seeing is also contingent on the social 
contexts of the stakeholders - government officials, street vendors and other players - who 
participated in the research as informants. Thus, I acknowledge that different stakeholders 
can offer an explanation of the formal-informal interface based on their respective socio-
spatial positionality, ideologies and values, conceptual tools, institutional affiliations, and 
social contexts. As stated in Chapter 1, this is consistent with the thesis critical realist 
ontological position. In the realm of governance and planning, however, the diverse 
conceptions and interventions around the interface may result in ‘conflicting rationalities’ 
(Watson, 2003) where concerned parties have disparate notions of ideal living environments 
and diverging justifications of their practices in shared and/or contested urban spaces. One 
way to overcome the issues that come with conflicting rationalities and/or sectoral views of 
the interface is to employ the thesis’ post-dualist lens. Besides being a reflexive analytical 
tool, the post-dualist lens provides a space for an inclusive urban governance framework 
(see a longer discussion in Chapter 8) where contending players can articulate their 
problems and deliberate on potential solutions to issues arising from the formal-informal 
interface in contested vending spaces.  
 
When informal vendors occupy streets and sidewalks, it is the ensuing ‘chaos’ or congestion 
that usually catches the public attention. But the observed spatial patterns emerge from how 
different stakeholders get entangled in street use and informal vending. Understanding this 
concern partly explains how the formal-informal interface operates in contested vending 
spaces. In interrogating the players involved in informality and street vending (discussed in 
Chapter 6 to address the sub-question 1), it is necessary to understand why and how state 
agencies are implicated in urban informality. This state involvement resonates with earlier 
scholarly arguments on the need to analyse the state role in informal economy (Roy, 2005; 
Yiftachel, 2006; Xue & Huang, 2015). When linked to policy-making and planning, many 
policy recommendations identify formalization as a key approach to informal economy (ILO, 
2014; Tucker, 2016). Yet, the analysis on the constraints that the Philippine government 
offices face - limited grassroots engagement, institutional fragmentation, unresponsive 
processes, elite capture, depoliticized planning - indicates that formalization is unlikely to 
work in this kind of institutional environment. The institutional issues also underscore how 
individual agents of the state (the technocrats, employees, and street-level bureaucrats), 
their preferences, and worldviews can entrench the dualist approach to policy enforcement. 
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Formalization advocates also need to contend with how decentralization plays a critical role 
in unequal power relations. Although it is seen as a key agenda in urban governance and 
local empowerment (McGranahan et al., 2016; Porio, 2012; 2016), decentralization is an 
insufficient measure to empower marginalized informal workers in the context of strong 
discretionary power of local executives, entrenched elite capture of local governments, and 
depoliticized planning approach. Thus, there is a need to examine how the multi-layered 
forms and spaces of power (Gaventa, 2011; Lukes, 2005) may inhibit or enable vendors to 
persist in an exclusionary socio-spatial environment. In Baclaran, the analytical insights 
affirm previous empirical accounts (Piliavsky, 2014; Routray, 2014) on how local 
intermediaries - political operators and vendor organizers - could either sustain or undermine 
vendors’ collective action for democratic political organizing and engagement with policy-
making.  
 
As an instrument to control and manage public spaces, state policies shape the socio-spatial 
interactions of those involved in informal vending. The analysis of government laws and 
programs (discussed in Chapter 7 in response to the sub-question 2) illustrates how legal 
tools have evolved from the interplay of historical trajectories (Brown, 2017b), economic 
paradigms, and socio-political realities (Fernandes, 2017), which are often hostile to informal 
livelihoods of the urban poor (Illy, 1986). This shows how legal instruments can elicit 
responses from the urban poor which deepen informality. It equally stresses the need for 
scholars to examine the implications of past and contemporary socio-political arrangements 
and urban patterns in specific contexts. In Baclaran, these factors are crucial to situate the 
street vending phenomenon in the broader governing relations and unequal power 
structures that shape urban informality. 
 
The unequal power structures manifest in the practices and norms that street vendors have 
developed to engage and/or avoid state authorities (discussed in Chapter 7 to answer the 
sub-question 3). From street occupation to financial capital generation, informal hawkers 
have devised strategies to cope with state control and/or institutional neglect of their 
situation. Baclaran vendors’ haging occupancy, engagement with evictionist regulatory 
regime, Bermonths routine, and multiple finance-generating schemes depict the different 
forms of grassroots agency and calculated responses to evolving socio-spatial relations. 
These practices also illustrate that layers of marginalization exist even among those on the 
periphery of power. This analytical insight amplifies the need to recognize how informal ties 
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and norms can open up spaces for some vendors; but, in the same breath, they can push 
aside groups with less access to the power structures. 
 
In examining the governing relations (presented in Chapter 8 in response to the sub-
question 4), four intertwined themes have emerged as critical: the disjunctive urban 
governance, the strong kinship ties, the clientelist politics, and the grassroots democratic 
entanglements.  The analysis on the causes and consequences of each governing relation 
shows how understanding their links will help state officials, planners, and street vendors 
determine how the various interests get legitimized, co-opted, contested, marginalized and 
embedded in their daily socio-spatial practices and interactions. Put another way, these 
interwoven relations are more than institutional or political affiliations; they shape and alter 
urban spatial patterns. Acknowledging how the entwined governing relations transform or 
produce space (Lefebvre, 1991; Oriard, 2015) can therefore inform policy ideas around the 
right to the city, democracy, social justice, and inclusionary agenda. For instance, the 
findings indicate how legal recognition of the rights of vendors to public spaces, as the UNDP 
(2008) and ILO (2014) push for, is necessary but insufficient to solve their uncertain 
situation. Rather, it should be coupled with efforts that will end the abusive clientelist 
relations between the hawkers and local authorities/political leaders. Although some of these 
informal channels enable vendors to survive in an exclusionary environment, the dominant 
players feed into the hawkers’ vulnerable situation to maintain unjust power relations. To 
confront this system, it is crucial to create an atmosphere that sustains democratic and 
accountable grassroots organizing involving vendors. It also requires revisiting how existing 
legal frameworks that are meant to empower the poor have mainly advanced the neoliberal 
economic agenda and entrenched elite families in local governance at the expense of the 
marginalized groups. 
  
This issue on local governance relates to the last dimension: implications of the formal-
informal interface for planning (discussed in Chapter 8 to answer the sub-question 5). Urban 
planning is often viewed as a ‘neutral’, technical, and rational exercise aimed at improving 
the conditions of cities. It intends to generate ‘order’ by removing ‘disorder’ or eradicating 
things and practices labelled as unpleasant. Yet, the processes of producing order always 
operate within existing power relations where the dominant players define what constitutes 
disorder (Pratt, 2006). Similar to many global South cities, planners in Baclaran embrace a 
neo-liberal ‘world-class’ city vision. As state officials and planners promote order to make 
the areas around Baclaran attractive to local and foreign investors, informal hawkers are 
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seen as an urban blight that ought to be removed from the public space. The precarious 
conditions of Baclaran vendors are therefore embedded in planning issues like gentrification, 
agglomeration of land uses, and the neoliberal globalization.  
 
Although some planning interventions discriminate against informal livelihoods, leaving the 
socio-spatial arrangements to informal channels might also deepen the clientelist and unjust 
power relations. As a practice involved in managing co-existence in shared or contested 
spaces, planning is necessary to create an enabling atmosphere with clear governance 
structures where the marginalized players like vendors can articulate their issues and 
demands. Thus, the ideas of inclusive urbanisation (McGranahan et al., 2016) and inclusive 
legal order (Brown, 2017a) can serve as a framework for inclusive urban governance where 
planning addresses the vulnerable conditions of Baclaran vendors (Chapter 8). As explained 
in Chapter 8, however, there is a concern over how various players can reach a consensus 
in planning in the midst of issues arising from ‘conflicting rationalities’ (Watson, 2003), 
‘sectional interests’ (Mattila, 2016), and ‘elite capture’ (MacGranahan, 2016). The Baclaran 
context shows how these issues operate on the ground.  
 
To encourage, if not compel, the powerful local officials and planners to embrace an 
inclusionary approach, a sustained and democratic collective action pursued by strong 
vendor organisations in partnership with social movements91 and civil society groups should 
be a critical component of an inclusive urban governance. The complexity of grassroots 
democratic entanglements (Chapter 8) illustrates how development NGOs and the broader 
social movements can help in sustaining Baclaran vendors’ collective action for democratic 
political organising. This resonates with the notion of ‘inclusion from below’ (McGranahan et 
al., 2016, 24) where social movements play a central role “in negotiating the production and 
distribution of urban resources, and in the process creating opportunities for participatory 
models of governance”.In other words, an inclusive urban governance is not simply an 
institutional or administrative arrangement enforced and/or adhered to by government 
officials. It is an arena where contending interests meet and a terrain of political struggle for 
the marginalised vendors. As mentioned in Chapter 8, in Baclaran, partnerships between 
government agencies as well as NGOs, vendor groups and social movements at the local 
and national levels can result in more accountable and democratic processes as some 
                                            
91 While McGranahan et al. (2016) emphasize the role of social movements in shaping inclusionary processes 
and outcomes, de Souza (2006) sees their potential as ‘critical urban planning agents’ when they not only 
criticize state-led planning but also actively implement solutions independent of the state agencies. 
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national government offices have oversight functions over local governments. In this way, 
inclusive urban governance can facilitate processes where the informal and unequal 
structures of power could be better brought to public control and made more legitimate 
(Healey, 1997; 2007b) and responsive to the needs of marginalized groups.  
 
The inclusive governance agenda should strike a balance between addressing the 
persistent informality and integrating informal work into existing formal systems. Here, 
Brown’s (2017a) proposal to consider streets as places of work and a ‘common-pool 
resource’ offers a promising framework that regards “the public domain of cities as part of 
the urban land resource to which collective property rights may pertain” (p. 89). Building on 
these inclusive governance and common-pool resource ideas, five interrelated 
recommendations can inform planning and policy-making in Baclaran and other global South 
informal vending sites with similar issues. The recommendations below seek to address the 
insecure conditions of Hannah and her fellow Baclaran vendors. The proposals also hope 
to make government’s responses to informal livelihoods more sensitive to the vendors’ 
needs and self-help initiatives.  
 
9.2. Policy Recommendations 
As stated in the introduction, I acknowledge that different stakeholders – state officials, 
vendors, NGOs, stallholders, church leaders, among others - can explain in different ways 
what the formal-informal interface means to them. This recognition adheres to the thesis 
ontological position and enables the various players to inform policy-making by offering their 
views on the roots, processes, and outcomes of the formal-informal interface in contested 
vending spaces. In this manner, proposed policy recommendations and planning 
interventions will emanate from multiple accounts of the perceived and felt problems 
concerning Baclaran street vending. Yet, governance and planning processes are filled with 
conflicting motives and unequal power relations where the interests of the marginalised are 
often ignored. Prevailing institutions (e.g. service provision, space use) should, therefore, 
incorporate the voices and reflect the needs of disadvantaged groups to promote inclusive 
urbanization (McGranahan et al., 2016). In this regard, the five recommendations identified 
below build on the perspectives of different stakeholders and recognize the issues of the 
vulnerable players. 
 
The first proposal is an intervention at the national level where a Magna Carta for Workers 
in the Informal Economy has been filed at the Philippine Senate and the House of 
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Representatives. Since the government is currently deliberating on the proposed legislation 
with various lobby groups, it is critical to conduct a series of policy dialogues on how Brown’s 
(2017a) notion of public space as a common-pool resource and Bhowmik’s (2010) idea of 
‘natural markets’ can inform the provisions on informal vending. The discussions can then 
tease out policy-enforcement mechanisms arising from Brown’s and Bhowmik’s ideas and/or 
from context-specific issues in Baclaran and other urban informal vending sites in the 
Philippines. 
 
The second policy recommendation pertains to the formation of an inter-agency committee 
of national government offices - MMDA, PCUP, NEDA, BWSC, NAPC, among others - and 
local government units. This recommendation stems from the need to have an enabling 
institutional environment for inclusive governance. The inter-agency committee can address 
the institutional issues (identified in Chapter 6) faced by the government agencies. The 
committee can likewise harmonize all the government interventions involving informal 
workers like street vendors.  
 
The third proposal is the establishment of the local multi-stakeholder committee. It aims to 
foster an inclusive governance at the local (city and barangay) level and to ensure that 
Brown’s (2017a) notion of common-pool resource will be supported by local stakeholders. 
The local committee should consist of representatives of Baclaran vendors, local 
government officials from Pasay and Parañaque cities, Church leaders, Cooperative 
officials, mall operators, stallholders, and NGOs advocating for the rights of informal 
workers. Similar to India’s Town Vending Committee (mentioned in Chapter 8), this multi-
sectoral committee should attend to issues in Baclaran vending district. This committee is a 
critical arena for the envisioned inclusive urban governance where civil society groups and 
vendor organizations will have to sustain their lobbying efforts and organising work to 
overcome an inevitably fierce resistance from powerful local government officials and 
detached urban planners. Through the committee, civil society groups and Baclaran vendors 
can identify specific recommendations that planning offices in Pasay and Parañaque should 
consider in developing local land use plans. One key step is to design a time-sharing of 
space (Brown, 2017a) to ensure that street use for vending will not result in congestion and 
‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968). This time-sharing design can also democratize the 
access to and control of the coveted spaces in Baclaran. 
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The meaningful representation and active involvement of Baclaran vendors is a critical factor 
in the formation and operation of the local committee. Without the significant participation of 
vendors, the local committee may be used by the more powerful groups to advance their 
interests or maintain the existing unequal socio-spatial relations. This then brings up the 
need to enhance the capacity of vendors to engage with other players, which can be 
addressed by the next proposal. 
 
The fourth recommendation seeks to strengthen grassroots collective action: sustained 
organizing work and networking at the local and national levels. This proposed intervention 
is directed at non-government organizations advocating for street vendors’ rights.  It is 
crucial to link up the Baclaran vendor groups with national organizations so the latter can 
assist the local groups in confronting the entrenched clientelist networks at the local level. 
Organizing work should also involve regular capacity-building activities on organizational 
development and urban planning processes, among others. Training sessions on these 
themes can improve the confidence of Baclaran vendors in articulating their needs and 
taking part in local governance. Being attentive to organizational dynamics should enable 
vendor leaders to reach out to unorganized hawkers whose lack of affiliation leads to a more 
vulnerable condition. This can address the issue of hierarchical relations within those on the 
margins of power. 
 
The fifth policy proposal concerns an analysis of the issues faced by Baclaran vendors. This 
situational analysis should be integrated into official planning documents. It should form a 
section of the socio-ecological profile of Pasay’s and Parañaque’s Comprehensive Land 
Use Plans. Drawing on the post-dualist lens, the situational analysis should determine how 
the conditions and needs of informal vendors are linked to and affected by the formal policy 
direction and planning trajectories of the two cities and the national government. In this 
manner, future planning interventions can address the gaps between the rigid formal policies 
and the evolving realities of Baclaran vendors.  
 
9.3. Research Limitations, Topics for Future Studies, and Reflective Insights  
Besides the knowledge contribution and policy recommendations, I acknowledge two 
limitations of this research, which can also be a take-off point for future research 
undertaking. The first has to do with the gendered dimensions of urban informal vending in 
Baclaran. As noted in Chapter 4, although biological sexual identity has been a major 
criterion in the selection of respondents to get the differing views of men and women, the 
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analysis did not dwell on deeper gendered (particularly women-oriented) issues pertaining 
to Baclaran street vending. While the gendered issues of informality were not really the focus 
of this thesis, future research may build on this theme. Urban informal economy is a highly 
gendered sector (Brown & McGranahan, 2016) and women’s concerns need attention as 
they constitute a significant number in street trading (Brown, 2006a). One emphasis can be 
on how women and men may have been differently affected by the policies, practices, and 
the unequal power relations arising from the formal-informal interface. Their access to public 
spaces can be examined in connection to the dominant social relations (Pratt, 2006) and 
the gendered dimensions of informal livelihoods (Brown & Rakodi, 2006). Some questions 
can tap into the findings of this research: ‘What are the factors that shape the differences 
between female and male vendors’ access to financial resources?’ ‘How does the proximity 
of vending spaces to residential areas strengthen and/or inhibit women’s ability to take part 
in informal vending?’, ‘How does women’s participation in street vending contribute to 
grassroots collective action?’   
 
The second limitation of the thesis concerns the inadequate discussion of urban migration 
as a vital component of informality (Musoni, 2010; Swider, 2015), particularly street vending 
in Baclaran. Urban migration is also an important planning concern, which represents poor 
people’s agency to confront their impoverished condition in the rural areas (Perez, 2015). It 
is equally linked to structural factors such as when state policies encourage socio-economic 
interventions in certain urban centres (Pernia et al., 1983). In the Philippines, eight out of 
ten Filipinos will be living in cities and urban agglomerations by 2030 (Tirona, 2013). If 
statistical trends continue, over one third of the migrants will move to Metro Manila and its 
neighbouring regions (Perez, 2015). Future studies can thus dwell on whether, and to what 
extent, the socio-spatial patterns in Baclaran are involved in the nexus between migration, 
street vending, and urban informality in the Philippines.  
 
Researching urban informality is a challenging endeavour. Its complexity is rooted in 
conceptual ambiguities and empirical nuances. During the fieldwork, after I explained my 
research to local official, Mila, she talked to her staff and quipped, “Look, he is a PhD 
researcher studying our street hawkers. Their problems are so complex. Isn’t he crazy to do 
a research on Baclaran vendors?” Indeed, the issues surrounding informality and street 
vending are tricky and filled with contradictions. Many state officials still consider hawking 
as an aberration to the neat and orderly vision of city plans. Yet, global statistics indicate 
that informality will continue to shape urban socio-spatial patterns in the future. It is therefore 
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crucial to always commune with the messy realities of informality and to ‘stay with the 
trouble’ (Haraway, 2016). In studying the formal-informal interface, I have undertaken an 
academic engagement with intricate issues and entangled relations. I hope the thesis 
findings can inform policy-makers and planners in addressing an enduring dilemma that 
local official, Allen, articulated in our conversation.  
What would you rather have – a beautiful city, an orderly place? But, what the hell 
has happened to your residents? They have become hold uppers, thieves… Then 
the homeless children have increased; you would pity them [because] they don’t have 
food and source of income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
208 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abu-Lughod, L. (1990). The romance of resistance: Tracing transformations of power 
through Bedouin women. American Ethnologist, 17(1), 41-55. 
Alcazaren, P., Ferrer, L., & Icamina, B. (2011). Lungsod Iskwater: The Evolution of 
Informality as a Dominant Pattern in Philippine Cities: Anvil Publishing, Incorporated. 
Aliaga, L. L. (2004). The Economic and Spatial Behavior of Street Markets: Santiago de 
Chile in a Context of Commercial Modernization. Manuscript - University of Texas at 
Austin Department of Sociology Population Research Center. 
Almario, V. S. (Ed.) (2010). UP Diksiyonaryong Filipino - Binagong Edisyon: UP Sentro ng 
Wikang Filipino - Diliman at Anvil Publishing Inc. 
Alva, R. J. (2014). The street vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street 
Vending) Bill, 2013: Is the cure worse than the disease? Statute Law Review, 35(2), 
181-202. doi:10.1093/slr/hmt021 
Amin, A. (2002). Spatialities of globalisation. Environment and Planning A, 34(3), 385-400.  
Amin, A. (2004). Regions unbound: Towards a new politics of place. Geografiska Annaler, 
Series B: Human Geography, 86(1), 33-44. doi:10.1111/j.0435-3684.2004.00152.x 
Anderson, B. (1988). Cacique democracy and the Philippines: Origins and dreams. New 
Left Review(169), 3-31.  
Archer, M. S. (1995). Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Archer, M. S. (2003). Structure, Agency, and the Internal Conversation. Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Institute of 
Planners, 35(4), 216-224. doi:10.1080/01944366908977225 
Auyero, J., Lapegna, P., & Poma, F. P. (2009). Patronage politics and contentious collective 
action: A recursive relationship. Latin American Politics and Society, 51(3), 1-31. 
doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2009.00054.x 
Bacchetta, M., Ernst, E., & Bustamante, J. P. (2009). Globalization and Informal Jobs in 
Developing Countries Geneva: International Labour Organization and World Trade 
Organization. 
Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. (1962). Two faces of power. The American Political Science 
Review, 56(4), 947-952. doi:10.2307/1952796 
Balisacan, A. M. (1995). Anatomy of poverty during adjustment: The case of the Philippines. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 44(1), 33-62.  
209 
 
Barangay 146 - Pasay City. (2014). Resolution No. 05 S-2014. 
Barangay Baclaran. Resolution No. 19-0827-S-2011. 
Barangay Baclaran. (2003). Ordinance No. 17, Series of 2003. 
Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee, D. (2006). Decentralisation and accountability in infrastructure 
delivery in developing countries. The Economic Journal, 116(508), 101-127.  
Barth, F. (1987). Cosmologies in the Making: A Generative Approach to Cultural Variation 
in Inner New Guinea Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Batréau, Q., & Bonnet, F. (2016). Managed informality: Regulating street vendors in 
Bangkok. City & Community, 15(1), 29-43. doi:10.1111/cico.12150 
Bayat, A. (1997). Street Politics: Poor People's Movements in Iran: Columbia University 
Press. 
Bayat, A. (2000). From dangerous classes to quiet rebels: Politics of the urban subaltern in 
the global South. International Sociology, 15(3), 533-557.  
Bayat, A. (2013). Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East: Stanford 
University Press. 
Bello, W. (2017, February 24). March, but mourn not the demise of EDSA republic. Rappler. 
Retrieved from https://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/162359-march-mourn-not-
the-demise-edsa-republic 
Bello, W., Docena, H., de Guzman, M., & Malig, M. (2004). The Anti-development State: 
The Political Economy of Permanent Crisis in the Philippines. Quezon City, 
Philippines: University of the Philippines. 
Bello, W., & Gershman, J. (1990). Democratization and stabilization in the Philippines. 
Critical Sociology, 17(1), 35-56.  
Bello, W., Kinley, D., & Elinson, E. (1982). Development Debacle: The World Bank in the 
Philippines: Food First Books. 
Bhowmik, S. (2005). Street vendors in Asia: A review. Economic and Political Weekly, 
40(22/23), 2256-2264.  
Bhowmik, S. (2010). Legal protection for street vendors. Economic and Political Weekly, 
45(51), 12-15.  
Biles, J. J. (2009). Informal work in Latin America: Competing perspectives and recent 
debates. Geography Compass, 3(1), 214-236. doi:10.1111/j.1749-
8198.2008.00188.x 
Boeke, J. H. (1953). Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies as Exemplified by 
Indonesia. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 
210 
 
Bornstein, D. (2005). How to Change the World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of 
New Ideas: Penguin Books. 
Bose, S., & Mishra, Y. (2013). Notes on street vendors in Kolkata: A review. Labor Law 
Journal, 64(3), 165-171.  
Bourdieu, P. (1990). In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology (M. Adamson, 
Trans.). Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
Brachet-Marquez, V. (1992). Explaining sociopolitical change in Latin America: The case of 
Mexico. Latin American Research Review, 27(3), 91-122.  
Bromley, R. (2000). Street vending and public policy: A global review. International Journal 
of Sociology and Social Policy, 20(1/2), 1-28. doi:10.1108/01443330010789052 
Brown, A. (2006a). Challenging street livelihoods. In A. Brown (Ed.), Contested Space: 
Street Trading, Public Space and Livelihoods in Developing Cities (pp. 3-16). 
Warwickshire, UK: ITDG Publishing. 
Brown, A. (2006b). Urban public space in the developing world - a resource for the poor. In 
A. Brown (Ed.), Contested Space: Street Trading, Public Space and Livelihoods in 
Developing Cities (pp. 17-35). Warwickshire, UK: ITDG Publishing. 
Brown, A. (2017a). Claiming the streets: Reframing property rights for the urban informal 
economy. In A. Brown (Ed.), Rebel Streets and the Informal Economy: Street Trade 
and the Law (pp. 77-93). Abingdon, UK and New York, NY: Routledge. 
Brown, A. (2017b). Emerging themes for the new legal order. In A. Brown (Ed.), Rebel 
Streets and the Informal Economy: Street Trade and the Law (pp. 239-246). 
Abingdon, UK and New York, NY: Routledge. 
Brown, A. (2017c). Legal paradigms and the informal economy: Pluralism, empowerment, 
rights or governance? In A. Brown (Ed.), Rebel Streets and the Informal Economy: 
Street Trade and the Law (pp. 19-36). Abingdon, UK and New York, NY: Routledge  
Brown, A. (Ed.) (2017d). Rebel Streets and the Informal Economy: Street Trade and the 
Law. Abingdon, UK and New York, NY: Routledge. 
Brown, A., Lyons, M., & Dankoco, I. (2010). Street traders and the emerging spaces for 
urban voice and citizenship in African cities. Urban Studies, 47(3), 666-683. 
doi:10.1177/0042098009351187 
Brown, A., & Mackie, P. (2017). Urban informality and ‘rebel streets’. In A. Brown (Ed.), 
Rebel Streets and the Informal Economy: Street Trade and the Law (pp. 1-16). 
Abingdon, UK and New York, NY: Routledge. 
211 
 
Brown, A., & Rakodi, C. (2006). Enabling the street economy. In A. Brown (Ed.), Contested 
Space: Street Trading, Public Space and Livelihoods in Developing Cities (pp. 197-
211). Warwickshire, UK: ITDG Publishing. 
Brown, D. (2013). Inferno. New York: Doubleday Press. 
Brown, D., & McGranahan, G. (2016). The urban informal economy, local inclusion and 
achieving a global green transformation. Habitat International, 53, 97-105.  
Bunnell, T., & Harris, A. (2012). Reviewing informality: Perspectives from urban Asia. 
International Development Planning Review, 34(4), 339-348.  
Cajvaneanu, D. (2011). A Genealogy of Government. On Governance, Transparency and 
Partnership in the European Union. University of Trento.    
Caldeira, T. P. R., & Holston, J. (1999). Democracy and violence in Brazil. Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 41(4), 691-729. doi:10.1017/S0010417599003102 
Caoili, M. A. (1985). Reflections on Metropolitan Manila reorganization and social change. 
Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 29(1), 1-26.  
Caoili, M. A. (1988). The Origins of Metropolitan Manila: A Political and Social Analysis. 
Quezon City: New Day Publishers. 
Capuno, J. J. (2007). The quality of local governance and development under 
decentralization. In A. M. Balisacan & H. Hill (Eds.), The Dynamics of Regional 
Development: The Philippines in East Asia (pp. 204-244). Cheltenham, UK; 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Carrieri, A., & Murta, I. (2011). Cleaning up the city: A study on the removal of street vendors 
from downtown Belo Horizonte, Brazil. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, 
28(2), 217. doi:10.1002/cjas.207 
Casanova-Dorotan, F. G. (2010). Informal economy budget analysis in the Philippines and 
Quezon City. WIEGO Working Paper, 12, 1-37.  
Castells, M. (1983). The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-cultural Theory of Urban Social 
Movements: University of California Press. 
Castells, M. (1985). From the Urban Question to the City and the Grassroots: Urban and 
Regional Studies, University of Sussex. 
Castillo, J. (2006). Urbanism of the informal: Interview to José Castillo. In C. Brillembourg 
(Ed.): BOMB. 
Chakrabarty, B. K. (2001). Urban management: Concepts, principles, techniques and 
education. Cities, 18(5), 331-345. doi:10.1016/S0264-2751(01)00026-9 
Charmes, J. (2012). The informal economy worldwide: Trends and characteristics. Margin: 
The Journal of Applied Economic Research, 6(2), 103-132.  
212 
 
Chatterjee, P. (2004). The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most 
of the World. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Chen, M., Roever, S., & Skinner, C. (2016). Editorial: Urban livelihoods: Reframing theory 
and policy. Environment and Urbanization, 28(2), 1-12. 
doi:10.1177/0956247816662405 
CLEP (Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor), & UNDP (United Nations 
Development Program). (2008). Making the Law Work for Everyone: Report of the 
Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor.   Retrieved from 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/making-the-law-work-for-everyone-vol-
1-report-of-the-commission-on-legal-empowerment-of-the-poor/ 
Constantino, R. (1975). The Philippines : A Past Revisited Quezon City: Tala Pub. Services. 
Cooper, F. (1987). On the African Waterfront: Urban Disorder and the Transformation of 
Work in Colonial Mombasa. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. (1991). The process of urbanization in Africa (from the origins to the 
beginning of independence). African Studies Review, 34(1), 1-98.  
Cross, J. C. (1998a). Co-optation, competition, and resistance: State and street vendors in 
Mexico City. Latin American Perspectives, 25(2), 41-61.  
Cross, J. C. (1998b). Informal Politics: Street Vendors and the State in Mexico City: Stanford 
University Press. 
Crossa, V. (2009). Resisting the entrepreneurial city: Street vendors' struggle in Mexico 
City's historic center. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 33(1), 
43-63. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2427.2008.00823.x 
Cushner, N. P. (1976). Landed Estates in the Colonial Philippines. New Haven: Yale 
University Southeast Asia Studies. 
Dahl, R. (1957). Decision-making in a democracy: The role of the Supreme Court as a 
national policy-maker. Journal of Public Law, 6, 279-295.  
Danermark, B., Ekström, M., Jakobsen, L., & Karlsson, J. C. (1997). Explaining Society: 
Critical Realism in the Social Sciences. London and New York: Routledge. 
Daniels, P. (2004). Urban challenges: The formal and informal economies in mega-cities. 
Cities, 21(6), 501-511.  
de Certeau, M. (1984). The Practice of Everyday Life (S. Rendall, Trans.). Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
de Dios, E. S. (2007). Local politics and local economy. In A. M. Balisacan & H. Hill (Eds.), 
The Dynamics of Regional Development: The Philippines in East Asia (pp. 157-203). 
Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
213 
 
de Soto, H. (1988). Constraints on people: The origins of underground economics and limits 
of their growth. Bevond the Informal Sector Including the Excluded in Developing 
Countries, 15-47.  
de Soto, H. (2000). The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Succeeds in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else. New York: Basic Books. 
de Souza, M. L. (2006). Social movements as ‘critical urban planning’ agents. City, 10(3), 
327-342. doi:10.1080/13604810600982347 
Department of the Interior and Local Government, Government of the Philippines. (2008). 
Rationalizing the Local Planning System: A Sourcebook. 
Department of Transportation and Communication, Government of the Philippines. (2015). 
MRT 3 Monthly Passenger Traffic per Station for Calendar Year 2014. Retrieved from 
http://www.dotc.gov.ph/images/front/Data_Sets/MRT3-
MonthlyPassengerTrafficperStationforCY2014.xlsx 
Digaetano, A., & Strom, E. (2003). Comparative urban governance: An integrated approach. 
Urban Affairs Review, 38(3), 356-395.  
Diokno, M. S. I. (2004). Human Rights Centered Development. Quezon City: The University 
of the Philippines Press. 
Doeppers, D. F. (1998). Migrants in urban labor markets: The social stratification of Tondo 
and Sampaloc in the 1890s. In D. F. Doeppers & P. Xenos (Eds.), Population and 
History: The Demographic Origins of the Modern Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo 
de Manila University Press. 
Donovan, M. G. (2008). Informal cities and the contestation of public space: The case of 
Bogota's street vendors. Urban Studies, 45(1), 29.  
Dovey, K. (2012). Informal urbanism and complex adaptive assemblage. International 
Development Planning Review, 34(4), 349-367. doi:10.3828/idpr.2012.23 
Duffhues, J., & Bertolini, L. (2016). From integrated aims to fragmented outcomes: Urban 
intensification and transportation planning in the Netherlands. Journal of Transport 
and Land Use, 9(3), 15-34. doi:10.5198/jtlu.2016.571 
Duldulao, M. D. (1998). Pasay City: Gateway to the Philippines. Philippines: Reyes 
Publishing Inc. 
Dumlao-Abadilla, D. (2015, November 3). P65-B ‘Broadway of Asia’ to rise in Entertainment 
City. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Retrieved from 
http://business.inquirer.net/201899/p65-b-broadway-of-asia-to-rise-in-
entertainment-city 
214 
 
Elyachar, J. (2005). Markets of Dispossession: NGOs, Economic Development, and the 
State in Cairo. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2016, March 18). Miguel Lopez de Legazpi.   Retrieved from 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Miguel-Lopez-de-Legazpi 
Endriga, D., & Nierras, J. U. (1983). The development of planning education in the 
Philippines. Philippine Planning Journal, 14/15, 28-38.  
ESCR-Asia (Economic Social and Cultural Rights – Asia). (2002). A Compilation of Initiated 
and Jointly-undertaken Studies of ESCR-Asia on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the Informal Sector. Quezon City, Philippines. 
Etemadi, F. U. (2004). Cebu City sidewalk vendors: Struggle for security in the workplace. 
Pilipinas: A Journal of Philippine Studies(43), 32-54.  
Etzold, B. (2013). The Politics of Street Food: Contested Governance and Vulnerabilities in 
Dhaka's Field of Street Vending. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 
Evans, P. (2002a). Political strategies for more livable cities: Lessons from six cases of 
development and political transition. In P. Evans (Ed.), Liveable Cities? Urban 
Struggles for Livelihood and Sustainability (pp. 222-246). Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Evans, P. (Ed.) (2002b). Livable Cities?: Urban Struggles for Livelihood and Sustainability. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Fernandes, E. (2017). 'Right to the city' and the new urban order. In A. Brown (Ed.), Rebel 
Streets and the Informal Economy: Street Trade and the Law (pp. 51-62). Abingdon, 
UK and New York, NY: Routledge. 
Flieger, W., Koppin, B., & Lim, C. (1976). Geographical Patterns of Internal Migration in the 
Philippines: 1960-1970. Retrieved from Manila:  
Flock, R., & Breitung, W. (2016). Migrant street vendors in urban China and the social 
production of public space. Population, Space and Place, 22(2), 158-169. 
doi:10.1002/psp.1892 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five misunderstandings about case study research. Qualitative Inquiry, 
12(2), 219-245. doi:10.1177/1077800405284363 
Foucault, M. (1978). The History of Sexuality  (R. Hurley, Trans. 1st American ed. Vol. 3). 
New York: Pantheon Books. 
Foucault, M. (1979). Discipline and Punish : The Birth of the Prison (A. Sheridan, Trans.). 
Harmondsworth, England: Penguin. 
Fox, R. B. (1959). The study of Filipino society and its significance to programs of economic 
and social development. Philippine Sociological Review, 7(1/2), 2-11.  
215 
 
Francisco, M. N., & Arriola, F. M. C. (1987). The History of the Burgis. Quezon City: GCF 
Books. 
Frazer, E., & Lacey, N. (1993). The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal-
communitarian Debate. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Friedmann, J. (1987). Planning in the Public Domain: From Knowledge to Action. Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Friedmann, J. (2005). Globalization and the emerging culture of planning. Progress in 
Planning, 64(3), 183-234. doi:10.1016/j.progress.2005.05.003 
Gandy, M. (2005). Learning from Lagos. New Left Review(33), 36-52.  
Garland, D. (1990). Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory: Oxford: 
Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gaventa, J. (2003). Power after Lukes: An Overview of Theories of Power since Lukes and 
their Application to Development. 
Gaventa, J. (2011). Understanding the Power Cube and Related Concepts Power Pack: 
Understanding Power for Social Change: Institute of Development Studies. 
Geertz, C. (1963). Peddlers and Princes: Social Change and Economic Modernization in 
Two Indonesian Towns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Gibbings, S. (2013). Unseen powers and democratic detectives: Street vendors in an 
Indonesian City. City & Society, 25(2), 235-259. doi:10.1111/ciso.12018 
Giddens, A. (1979). Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction 
in Social Analysis. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration: Polity 
Press. 
Giddens, A., & Pierson, C. (1998). Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of 
Modernity. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Gleeson, B., & Low, N. P. (2000). Australian Urban Planning: New Challenges, New 
Agendas St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin. 
Gomez, J. E. A. (2014). The Regulation of Public Space in Metropolitan Manila: Lessons of 
History and Implications of Context. (Doctor of Public Administration - Dissertation), 
University of the Philippines.    
Gottdiener, M., & Feagin, J. (1988). The paradigm shift in urban sociology. Urban Affairs 
Quarterly, 24(2), 163.  
Grice, K. J. (1988). The Institutionalisation of Informal Sector Activities: A Case of Cooked 
Food Hawkers in Singapore. University of Keele.    
216 
 
Guerrero, S. H. (1975). Hawkers and Vendors in Manila and Baguio: Institute of Social Work 
and Community Development, University of the Philippines System. 
Hackenbroch, K. (2011). Urban informality and negotiated space: Negotiations of access to 
public space in Dhaka, Bangladesh. disP - The Planning Review, 47(187), 59-69. 
doi:10.1080/02513625.2011.10654019 
Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. C. R. (1996). Political science and the three new institutionalisms. 
Political Studies, 44(5), 936-957. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x 
Hansen, K. T. (2004). Who rules the streets? The politics of vending space in Lusaka. In K. 
T. Hansen & M. Vaa (Eds.), Reconsidering Informality: Perspectives from Urban 
Africa (pp. 62-80). Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute. 
Hansen, K. T., Little, W. E., & Milgram, B. L. (2013). Introduction: Street economies in the 
urban global South. In K. T. Hansen, W. E. Little, & L. B. Milgram (Eds.), Street 
Economies in the Urban Global South (pp. 3-16): School for Advanced Research 
Press. 
Hansen, K. T., & Vaa, M. (2004). Reconsidering Informality: Perspectives from urban Africa: 
Nordic Africa Institute. 
Hanser, A. (2016). Street politics: Street vendors and urban governance in China. The China 
Quarterly, 226, 363-382. doi:10.1017/S0305741016000278 
Haraway, D. J. (1991). Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. London: 
Free Association Books 
Haraway, D. J. (2016). Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene. Durham: 
Durham Duke University Press. 
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248. 
Harding, S. (2004). Is there a feminist method? In C. Seale (Ed.), Social Research Methods: 
A Reader. London and New York: Routledge; Taylor and Francis Group. 
Hart, K. (1973). Informal income opportunities and urban employment in Ghana. The Journal 
of Modern African Studies 11(1), 61-89. doi:10.1017/S0022278X00008089 
Harvey, D. (1989). From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: The transformation in urban 
governance in late capitalism. Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, 
71(1), 3-17. doi:10.1080/04353684.1989.11879583 
Harvey, D. (2008). Right to the city. New Left Review, 53, 23-42.  
Healey, P. (1997). Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies. 
London: Macmillan. 
Healey, P. (2003). Collaborative planning in perspective. Planning Theory, 2(2), 101-123.  
217 
 
Healey, P. (2007a). The new institutionalism and the transformative goals of planning. In N. 
Verma (Ed.), Institutions and Planning (pp. 61-87): Elsevier. 
Healey, P. (2007b). Urban Complexity and Spatial Strategies: Towards a Relational 
Planning for Our Times. Routledge Ltd in conjunction with the Royal Town Planning 
Institute Institute. 
Hechanova, L. G. (1998). The Baclaran Story. Quezon City: Claretian Publications. 
Heymans, C. (1993). Towards people’s development? Civic associations and development 
in South Africa. Urban forum, 4(1), 1-20. doi:10.1007/BF03036581 
Hlela, K. (2003). Formal Policies and Informal Power: Johannesburg's Street Traders. 
Parktown Johannesburg: Center for Policy Studies. 
Hobsbawm, E. J. (1959). Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements 
in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Holston, J. (1998). Spaces of insurgent citizenship. In L. Sandercock (Ed.), Making the 
Invisible Visible: A Multicultural Planning History (Vol. 2, pp. 37-56). London: 
University of California Press. 
Honwana, A. M. (2008). Culture and Politics: War, Reconciliation and Citizenship in 
Mozambique. The Hague, The Netherlands: Institute of Social Studies (ISS). 
Huang, G., & Xue, D. (2017). Resisting the revanchist city: Tha changing politics of street 
vending in Gaungzhou. In A. Brown (Ed.), Rebel Streets and the Informal Economy: 
Street Trade and the Law (pp. 143-164). Abingdon, UK and New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Hunt, S. (2009). Citizenship's place: The state's creation of public space and street vendors' 
culture of informality in Bogotá, Colombia. Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space, 27(2), 331-351. doi:10.1068/d1806 
Hutchcroft, P. D. (1998). Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philippines Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. 
Illy, H. F. (1986). Regulation and evasion: Street vendors in Manila. Policy Sciences, 19(1), 
61-81.  
ILO or International Labour Office. (2014). Transitioning from the Informal to the Formal 
Economy. Retrieved from Geneva: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_218128.pdf 
Innes, J. E., Connick, S., & Booher, D. (2007). Informality as a planning strategy: 
Collaborative water management in the CALFED Bay-Delta Program. Journal of the 
American Planning Association, 73(2), 195-210. doi:10.1080/01944360708976153 
218 
 
International Labour Office. (1973). Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for 
Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya: International Labour Office. 
Itikawa, L. (2004). Clandestine geometries: Informal labor in São Paulo’s downtown public 
spaces. Translation of Itikawa, “Geometrias da Clandestinidade” Caminhos para o 
Centro: Estrategias de Desenvolvimento para a Regiao Central de São Paulo São 
Paulo: PMSP/CEBRAP/CEM. 
Janelle, D. G. (1969). Spatial reorganization: A model and concept. Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, 59(2), 348-364. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8306.1969.tb00675.x 
Jenkins, P. (2001). Regularising “informality”: Turning the legitimate into legal? Land reform 
and emerging urban land markets in post-socialist Mozambique. Paper presented at 
the N-AERUS Workshop - Coping with Informality and Illegality in Human Settlements 
in Developing Cities, Leuven. 
Jones, B. G. (2004). Explaining global poverty: A realist critique of the orthodox approach. 
In W. K. Carroll (Ed.), Critical Strategies for Social Research (pp. 144-158): Canadian 
Scholars’ Press. 
Josue, E. J. (2013, August 10). Edsa snarl-up festers Baclaran chokepoint solved. Manila 
Standard Today. Retrieved from http://manilastandardtoday.com/2013/08/10/edsa-
snarl-up-festers-baclaran-chokepoint-solved/ 
Kapsali, M., & Tsavdaroglou, C. (2014). The dialectic of formal and informal urban 
enclosures and the production of the common space in Greece during the ongoing 
crisis. Paper presented at the Contemporary Urban Issues Conference - Informality: 
Rethinking the Urban Istanbul, Turkey. https://www.academia.edu/9345521/  
Karaos, A. (1995). Manila's Urban Poor Movement: The Social Construction of Collective 
Identities. (PhD Thesis), New School for Social Research.    
Katz, C. (2004). Growing Up Global: Economic Restructuring and Children's Everyday Lives. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Kaufman, M. (1997). Community power, grassroots democracy, and the transformation of 
social life. In M. Kaufman & H. D. Alfonso (Eds.), Community Power and Grassroots 
Democracy: The Transformation of Social Life (pp. 1-26). London & New Jersey: Zed 
Books. 
Kelling, G. L., & Coles, C. M. (1996). Fixing Broken windows: Restoring Order and Reducing 
Crime in our Communities New York: Martin Kessler Books. 
Kelly, P. F. (1997). Globalization, power and the politics of scale in the Philippines. 
Geoforum, 28(2), 151-171. doi:10.1016/S0016-7185(97)00009-2 
219 
 
Kerkvliet, B. J. T. (2009). Everyday politics in peasant societies (and ours). The Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 36(1), 227-243. doi:10.1080/03066150902820487 
Kimwell, E. (2004). Viability of Night Markets: The Case of Pasay City. (MA Thesis), 
University of the Philippines, Diliman.    
Kloosterman, R., & Rath, J. (2001). Immigrant entrepreneurs in advanced economies: Mixed 
embeddedness further explored. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 27(2), 189-
201. doi:10.1080/13691830020041561 
Kritsanaphan, A., & Sajor, E. (2011). Intermediaries and informal interactions in 
decentralised environmental management in peri-urban Bangkok. International 
Development Planning Review, 33(3), 247-272.  
Krueckeberg, D. (1995). The difficult character of property: To whom do things belong? 
Journal of the American Planning Association, 61(3), 301-309. 
doi:10.1080/01944369508975644 
Kuzel, A. J. (1992). Sampling in qualitative inquiry. In B. F. Crabtree & W. L. Miller (Eds.), 
Doing Qualitative Research (pp. 31-44). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. 
Landé, C. H. (1965). Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics: 
Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University. 
Lata, L. N., & Walters, P. (2016). The Politics of Space in Dhaka: Informality, Power and 
Negotiations in the Everyday Life of the Urban Poor. In Refereed Proceedings of 
TASA 2016 Conference(p. 198-205). 
Lawson, V. (2012). Decentring poverty studies: Middle class alliances and the social 
construction of poverty. Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 33(1), 1-19.  
Lee, Y. S. F. (1998). Intermediary institutions, community organizations, and urban 
environmental management: The case of three Bangkok slums. World Development, 
26(6), 993-1011.  
Lefebvre, H. (1968). Right to the City. (E. Kofman & E. Lebas, Trans. and Eds.). Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Lefebvre, H. (1991). The Production of Space. Oxford Blackwell. 
Lefebvre, H. (2006). Henri Lefebvre: Key Writings. In E. Elden, E. Lebas, & E. Kofman 
(Eds.), (pp. 206-213). London: Continuum. 
Lemanski, C., & Marx, C. (2015). Introduction. In C. Lemanski & C. Marx (Eds.), The City in 
Urban Poverty (pp. 1-12). Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lewis, D. (2008). Using life histories in social policy research: The case of third sector/public 
sector boundary crossing. Journal of Social Policy, 37(4), 559-578.  
220 
 
Lewis, W. A. (1954). Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour. Manchester 
School of Economic and Social Studies, 22(2), 139-191.  
Lichbach, M. I. (1997). Social theory and comparative politics. In M. I. Lichbach & A. S. 
Zuckerman (Eds.), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (pp. 239-
276). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Ling, C., & Dale, A. (2014). Agency and social capital: Characteristics and dynamics. 
Community Development Journal, 49(1), 4-20. doi:10.1093/cdj/bss069 
Local Government Code of 1991. Republic of the Philippines. 
Lofland, J., Snow, D. A., Enderson, L., & Lofland, L. H. (2006). Analyzing Social Settings: A 
Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis (4th ed.). Belmont, California: 
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning. 
Logan, J. R., & Molotch, H. (1987). Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place. 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press. 
Lubell, H. (1991). The Informal Sector in the 1980s and 1990s. Paris: Development Centre 
of the OECD. 
Lukes, S. (2005). Power: A Radical View. 
Lyons, M. (2013). Pro-poor business law? On MKURABITA and the legal empowerment of 
Tanzania’s street vendors. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 5(1), 74-95. 
doi:10.1017/S1876404512001030 
Lyons, M., & Snoxell, S. (2005). Creating urban social capital: some evidence from informal 
traders in Nairobi. Urban Studies, 42(7), 1077-1097.  
MacGaffey, J., & Bazenguissa-Ganga, R. (2000). Congo-Paris: Transnational Traders on 
the Margins of the Law: Indiana University Press. 
Mackie, P., Swanson, K., & Goode, R. (2017). Reclaiming space: Street trading and 
revanchism in Latin America. In A. Brown (Ed.), Rebel Streets and the Informal 
Economy: Street Trade and the Law (pp. 63-76). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Magallona, M. M. (2010). The supreme court and international law: Problems and 
approaches in Philippine practices. Philippine Law Journal, 85, 1-101.  
Mandaluyong City - Office of the Mayor. Executive Order No. 002, Series of 2002. 
Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (2006). Designing Qualitative Research (4th ed.). 
Thousands Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
Martinez, A. M. (2015). A Longitudinal Approach to Measuring Income Mobility among 
Filipino Households. (PhD Thesis), The University of Queensland.    
Marx, C. (2009). Conceptualizing the potential of informal land markets to reduce urban 
poverty. International Development Planning Review, 31(4), 336-353. 
221 
 
Massey, D. (2005). For Space. London. 
Mattila, H. (2016). Can collaborative planning go beyond locally focused notions of the 
“public interest”? The potential of Habermas’ concept of “generalizable interest” in 
pluralist and trans-scalar planning discourses. Planning Theory, 15(4), 344-365. 
Maxwell, J. A. (2012). A Realist Approach for Qualitative Research: Sage Publications. 
McCoy, A. W. (1993a). An anarchy of families: The historiography of state and family in the 
Philippines. In A.W. McCoy (Ed.), An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the 
Philippines (pp. 1-32): University of Wisconsin Press. 
McCoy, A. W. (Ed.) (1993b). An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines: 
University of Wisconsin Press. 
McFarlane, C. (2012). Rethinking informality: Politics, crisis, and the city. Planning Theory 
and Practice, 13(1), 89-108. doi:10.1080/14649357.2012.649951 
McGee, T. G. (1970). Hawkers in Selected Asian Cities: A Preliminary Investigation. Hong 
Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong. 
McGee, T. G. (1973). Hawkers in Hong Kong: A Study of Planning and Policy in a Third 
World City. Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong. 
McGee, T. G., & Yeung, Y. (1977). Hawkers in Southeast Asian Cities: Planning for the 
Bazaar Economy. Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Center. 
McGranahan, G., Schensul, D., & Singh, G. (2016). Inclusive urbanization: Can the 2030 
agenda be delivered without it? Environment and Urbanization, 28(1), 13-34. 
doi:10.1177/0956247815627522 
Mendoza, R., Beja Jr, E., Venida, V., & Yap, D. (2013). Political dynasties and poverty: 
Evidence from the Philippines. Paper presented at the 12th National Convention on 
Statistics, Mandaluyong City, Philippines. 
Metro Manila Council. MMDA Resolution No. 02-28 Series of 2002. 
Metro Manila Council. MMDA Resolution No. 02-40 Series of 2002. 
Meyer, S. B., & Lunnay, B. (2013). The application of abductive and retroductive inference 
for the design and analysis of theory-driven sociological research. Sociological 
Research Online, 18(1), 1-11.  
Middleton, A. (2003). Informal traders and planners in the regeneration of historic city 
centres: The case of Quito, Ecuador. Progress in Planning, 59(2), 71-123. 
doi:10.1016/S0305-9006(02)00061-2 
Milgram, B. L. (2009). Negotiating urban activism: Women, vending and the transformation 
of streetscapes in the urban Philippines. In M. Butcher & S. Velayutham (Eds.), 
Dissent and Cultural Resistance in Asia’s Cities (pp. 110-127). 
222 
 
Milgram, B. L. (2013). Taking the street into the market: The politics of space and work in 
Baguio City, Philippines. In K. T. Hansen, W. E. Little, & B. L. Milgram (Eds.), Street 
Economies in the Urban Global South (pp. 71-92). Santa Fe: School for Advanced 
Research Press. 
Ministry of Law and Justice - Government of India. (2014). The Street Vendors Act: 
Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending. 
Minnery, J. (2007). Stars and their supporting cast: State, market and community as actors 
in urban governance. Urban Policy and Research, 25(3), 325-345. 
doi:10.1080/08111140701540745 
Miraftab, F. (2009). Insurgent planning: Situating radical planning in the global South. 
Planning Theory, 8(1), 32-50. doi:10.1177/1473095208099297 
Molotch, H. (1976). The city as a growth machine: Toward a political economy of place. 
American Journal of Sociology, 82(6), 309.  
Molotch, H. (1993). The political economy of growth machines. Journal of Urban Affairs, 
15(1), 29-53. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9906.1993.tb00301.x 
Morelos, M. (2011, August 24). Baclaran devotees take fight vs. vendors online. Philippine 
Daily Inquirer. Retrieved from http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/46765/baclaran-devotees-
take-fight-vs-vendors-online   
Morrison, T. H. (2004). Institutional Integration in Complex Environments: Pursuing Rural 
Sustainability at the Regional Level in Australia and the U.S.A. (PhD Thesis), The 
University of Queensland.    
Musoni, F. (2010). Operation Murambatsvina and the politics of street vendors in Zimbabwe. 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 36(2), 301-317. 
doi:10.1080/03057070.2010.485786 
Naga City Council. Ordinance No. 92-026, Series of 1992. 
National Economic Development Authority - Social Development Committee, Government 
of the Philippines. Resolution No. 2, Series of 2003. 
Neher, C. D. (1985). Political clientelism and instability in the Philippines. Asian Affairs: An 
American Review, 12(3), 1-23.  
Nicholls, W. J., & Uitermark, J. (2016). Introduction: Planning/resistance. Urban Geography, 
1-9. doi:10.1080/02723638.2016.1168570 
Nowak, T., & Snyder, K. (1970). Urbanization and clientelist systems in the Philippines. 
Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 14(3), 259-275.  
Ocampo, R. B. (1992). Planning and development of prewar Manila: Historical glimpses of 
Philippine city planning. Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 36(4), 305-327.  
223 
 
OECD or Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2009). Is informal 
normal? Towards more and better jobs in developing countries. Paris, France: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Ofreneo, R. E., & Habana, E. P. (1987). The Employment Crisis and the World Bank's 
Adjustment Program: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of the Philippines. 
Okello, D. (2017, August 4). Live bullets as angry vendors take dead colleague to KCCA. 
ChimpReports. Retrieved from http://www.chimpreports.com/live-bullets-as-angry-
vendors-take-dead-colleague-to-kcca/ 
Ong, A. (2011). Introduction: Worlding cities, or the art of being global. Oxford, UK: Wiley-
Blackwell. In A. Roy, & A. Ong (Eds.), Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art 
of Being Global (pp. 1-26). Chichester, West Sussex; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Oriard, L. R. (2015). Street Vending and Its Ability to Produce Space: The Case of the Tepito 
Market in Mexico City Downtown Area. (PhD Thesis), University College London.    
Ortega, A. A. C. (2012). Desakota and beyond: Neoliberal production of suburban space in 
Manila's fringe. Urban Geography, 33(8), 1118-1143.  
Ortega, A. A. C. (2016). Manila’s Metropolitan landscape of gentrification: Global urban 
development, accumulation by dispossession & neoliberal warfare against 
Informality. Geoforum, 70, 35-50.  
Osella, F. (2014). The (im)morality of mediation and patronage in South India and the Gulf. 
In A. Piliavsky (Ed.), Patronage as Politics in South Asia (pp. 365-393): Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (2004). Understanding Collective Action. In R. S. Meinzen-Dick & M. Di Gregorio 
(Eds.), Collective Action and Property Rights for Sustainable Development: The 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)  
Pacheco-Raguz, J. F. (2010). Assessing the impacts of Light Rail Transit on urban land in 
Manila. Journal of Transport and Land Use, 3(1). doi:10.5198/jtlu.v3i1.13 
Parañaque City - Office of the Mayor. Executive Order No. 02-04, Series of 2002. 
Parañaque City Council. Ordinance No 826, Series of 2003 
Parañaque City Council. Ordinance No. 03-13, Series of 2003. 
Parañaque City Council. Ordinance No. 13-10, Series of 2013. 
Parañaque City Council. Ordinance No. 13-12, Series of 2013. 
Parañaque City Council. Ordinance No. 13-16, Series of 2013. 
Parañaque City Planning and Coordinator's Office. Parañaque City Comprehensive Land 
Use Plan 2007. 
Parker, J. (2000). Structuration: Open University Press. 
224 
 
Pasay City Development and Planning Office. Comprehensive Development Plan 2011-
2013. 
Pasay City Development and Planning Office. Comprehensive Land Use Plan 2001-2010. 
Pascual, E. M. (1966). Population Redistribution in the Philippines. University of the 
Philippines Population Institute. 
Peña, S. (1999). Informal markets: Street vendors in Mexico City. Habitat International, 
23(3), 363-372.  
Perez, J. A. A. (2015). Filipinos on the Move: Current Patterns and Factors of Internal 
Migration in the Philippines.  Retrieved from http://www.popcom.gov.ph/population-
statistics/2015-07-15-01-53-05/53-download-links/268-internal-migration-and-
development-presentations. 
Pernia, E. M., Paderanga Jr, C. W., & Hermoso, V. P. (1983). The Spatial and Urban 
Dimensions of Development in the Philippines: Philippine Institute for Development 
Studies. 
Perry, G. E., Maloney, W. F., Arias, O. S., Fajnzylber, P., Mason, A. D., & Saavedra-
Chanduvi, J. (2007). Informality: Exit and Exclusion. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Piliavsky, A. (Ed.) (2014). Patronage as the Politics of South Asia. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Pinches, M. (1992). Proletarian ritual: Class degradation and the dialectics of resistance in 
Manila. Pilipinas, 19, 67-92.  
Polsby, N. W. (1963). Community Power and Political Theory. New Haven Connecticut: Yale 
University Press. 
Porio, E. (2002). Urban poor communities in state-civil society dynamics: Constraints and 
possibilities for housing and security of tenure in Metro Manila. Asian Journal of 
Social Science, 30(1), 73-96. doi:10.1163/15685310260188745 
Porio, E. (2012). Decentralisation, power and networked governance practices in Metro 
Manila. Space & Polity, 16(1), 7-27. doi:10.1080/13562576.2012.698128 
Porio, E. (2016). Prosperity and inequality in Metro Manila: Reflections on housing the poor, 
climate risk, and governance of cities. In C. B. Wungaeo, B. Rehbein, & S. Wun'gaeo 
(Eds.), Globalization and Democracy in Southeast Asia (pp. 177-197): Springer. 
Porter, L. (2011). Informality, the commons and the paradoxes for planning: Concepts and 
Debates for informality and planning. Planning Theory and Practice, 2(1), 115-120.  
Portes, A. (1983). The informal sector definition, controversy, and relation to national 
development. Review: A Journal of the Ferdinand Braudel Center for the Study of 
Economies, Historical Systems and Civilizations, 7(1), 151-174.  
225 
 
Pratt, N. (2006). Informal enterprises and street vending: A civil society and urban 
management perspective. In A. Brown (Ed.), Contested Space: Street Trading, Public 
Space and Livelihoods in Developing Cities (pp. 37-53). Warwickshire, UK: ITDG 
Publishing. 
President Fidel V. Ramos. (1997). Executive Order 452. 
Quimpo, N. (2005). Oligarchic patrimonialism, bossism, electoral clientelism, and contested 
democracy in the Philippines. Comparative Politics, 37(2), 229-250.  
Rabinowitz, D. (2014). Resistance and the city. History and Anthropology, 1-16.  
Ram, M., Theodorakopoulos, N., & Jones, T. (2008). Forms of capital, mixed embeddedness 
and Somali enterprise. Work, Employment and Society, 22, 427-446.  
Ramirez, R. (2017, April 17). Baclaran vendors to be relocated to new facility. Philippine 
Star. Retrieved from https://www.pressreader.com/philippines/the-philippine-
star/20170417/281694024650933 
Rapley, J. (2002). Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World (2nd 
ed.). Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Recio, R. B. (2010). Street Use and Urban Informal Vending: Towards a Policy Framework 
Addressing Socio-spatial Issues of Urban Informal Vending vis-à-vis the Use of 
Streets (The Case of Caloocan City). (MA Thesis), University of the Philippines 
Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines.    
Recio, R. B. (2014). Grassroots agency and social inclusion: Prospects and limits of 
collective action in urban informality. ARCHCAIRO 2014: 6th International 
Conference - Responsive Urbanism in Informal Areas (Towards a Regional Agenda 
for HABITAT III), 379-395.  
Recio, R. B. (2015). Engaging the ‘ungovernable’: Urban informality issues and insights for 
planning. Journal in Urban and Regional Planning, 2(1), 18-37.  
Recio, R. B. (2016). Evictions and urban socio-spatial relations: Evidence from a Southeast 
Asian Metropolitan Area. Refereed Proceedings of The Australian Sociological 
Association Conference, 292-299.  
Recio, R. B., & Gomez, J. E. A. (2013). Street vendors, their contested spaces, and the 
policy environment: A view from Caloócan, Metro Manila. Environment and 
Urbanization ASIA, 4(1), 173-190. doi:10.1177/0975425313477760 
Recio, R. B., Mateo-Babiano, I., & Roitman, S. (2017). Revisiting policy epistemologies on 
urban informality: Towards a post-dualist view. Cities, 61, 136-143. 
doi:10.1016/j.cities.2016.08.018 
226 
 
Reed, R. R. (1967). Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines: A Study of the Impact of Church 
and State. Manila: University of Manila. 
Republic Act No 7924, An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, 
Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor and for other Purposes 
Stat. (1995). 
Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code of the Philippines),  (1950). 
Republic Act No. 8425, An Act Institutionalizing the Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation 
Program, Creating for the Purpose the National Anti-Poverty Commission, Defining 
its Powers and Functions, and for other Purposes (1997). 
Rivera, D. O. (2014, November 12). Aseana holdings earmarks up to P3B for Parañaque 
City business district GMA News Online. Retrieved from 
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/money/companies/387748/aseana-holdings-
earmarks-up-to-p3b-for-paranaque-city-business-district/story/ 
Rivera, T. C. (1994). Landlords and Capitalists: Class, Family, and State in Philippine 
Manufacturing. Quezon City: Center for Integrative and Development Studies and 
University of the Philippines Press,. 
Robinson, J. (2006). Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Roever, S. (2006). Street trade in Latin America: Demographic trends, legal issues, and 
vending organizations in six cities. Street Vendors in the Global Urban Economy, 208-
240.  
Roever, S. (2016). Informal trade meets informal governance: Street vendors and legal 
reform in India, South Africa, and Peru. Cityscape, 18(1), 27.  
Roitman, S. (2014). Housing policies and governance in Indonesia: Top down or bottom up? 
The case of PNPM in Yogyakarta. Paper presented at the ARCHCAIRO 2014: 6th 
International Conference - Responsive Urbanism in Informal Areas: Towards a 
Regional Agenda for HABITAT III. 
Routray, S. (2014). The postcolonial city and its displaced poor: Rethinking ‘political society’ 
in Delhi. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 38(6), 2292-2308. 
doi:10.1111/1468-2427.12192 
Roweis, S.T. & Scott, A.J. (1978). The urban land question. In K. Cox (ed.), Urbanization 
and conflict in market societies. Maaroufa, Chicago.  
Roy, A. (2005). Urban informality: Toward an epistemology of planning. Journal of the 
American Planning Association, 71(2), 147-158. doi:10.1080/01944360508976689 
227 
 
Roy, A. (2009). Strangely familiar: Planning and the worlds of insurgence and informality. 
Planning Theory, 8(1), 7-11. doi:10.1177/1473095208099294 
Roy, A., & AlSayyad, N. (Eds.). (2004). Urban Informality: Transnational Perspectives from 
the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia: Lexington Books. 
Roy, A., & Ong, A. (Eds.). (2011). Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art of Being 
Global. Chichester, West Sussex; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Rukmana, D. (2011). Street vendors and planning in Indonesian cities. Planning Theory and 
Practice, 12(1), 138-144. doi:10.1080/14649357.2011.545626 
Rukmana, D., & Purbadi, D. (2013). Street vendors in Indonesian cities: The characteristics 
and activities of street vending in Yogyakarta. In N. Perera & W. S. Tang (Eds.), 
Transforming Asian cities: Intellectual Impasse, Asianizing Space, and Emerging 
Translocalities (pp. 123–136). Oxford: Taylor & Francis/Routledge. 
Ruland, J. (1985). Metropolitan government under Martial Law: The Metro Manila 
Commission experiment. Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 29(1), 27-41.  
Salazar, G. (2003). Ferias Libres: Espacio Residual de Soberanía Ciudadana. Santiago: 
Ediciones Sur. 
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Pasay. Ordinance No. 4090, Series of 2008: An Ordinance 
Adopting the Pasay City Market Code. 
Sannguniang Panlungsod - Parañaque City. Resolution No. 11-074, Series of 2011. 
Sannguniang Panlungsod of Pasay. Ordinance No. 1890, Series of 2000. 
Santiago, A. (1983). Evolution of the national planning organization in the Philippines: A 
legislative perspective. Philippine Planning Journal, 14(2), 1-27.  
Santiago, A., & Magavern, J. L. (1971). Planning law and administration in Philippine local 
government. Philippine Planning Journal, 3(1), 15-25.  
Santos, M. (1979). The Shared Space (from Portuguese edition (1975) by Chris Gerry, 
Trans.). London and New York: Methuen. 
Sanyal, B. (2010). Similarity or differences? What to emphasize now for effective planning 
practice. Crossing Borders: International Exchange and Planning Practices, 329-350.  
Sapitula, M. V. J. (2013a). Marian Piety and Modernity: A Sociological Assessment of 
Popular Religion in the Philippines. (PhD Thesis), National University of Singapore.    
Sapitula, M. V. J. (2013b). Overcoming ‘hierarchized conviviality’ in the Manila Metropolis: 
Religious pluralism and urbanization in the Philippines. In C. Formichi (Ed.), Religious 
Pluralism, State and Society in Asia (Vol. 2, pp. 138-152): Routledge. 
Schneider, F., & Enste, D. (2000). Shadow economies around the world: Size, causes, and 
consequences. IMF Working Papers, 00(26), 1. doi:10.5089/9781451844375.001 
228 
 
Scott, A., & Storper, M. (2015). The nature of cities: The scope and limits of urban theory. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 39(1), 1-15. 
doi:10.1111/1468-2427.12134 
Scott, A.J. (1980). The urban land nexus and the state. Pion, London.  
Scott, J. C. (1979). The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Subsistence and Rebellion in 
Southeast Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Scott, J. C. (1985). Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Scott, J. C. (1998). Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
Serote, E. M. (1991). Socio-spatial structure of the colonial third world city: The case of 
Manila, Philippines. Philippine Planning Journal, 23(1), 1-14.  
Sethuraman, S. V. (1981). The Urban Informal Sector in Developing Countries : 
Employment, Poverty and Environment. Geneva: International Labour Office. 
Setšabi, S., & Leduka, R. C. (2008). The politics of street trading in Maseru, Lesotho. Urban 
Forum, 19(3), 221-241. doi:10.1007/s12132-008-9033-x 
Shatkin, G. (2000). Obstacles to empowerment: Local politics and civil society in 
Metropolitan Manila, the Philippines. Urban Studies, 37(12), 2357-2375.  
Shatkin, G. (2004). Planning to forget: Informal settlements as forgotten places in globalising 
Metro Manila. Urban Studies, 41(12), 2469-2484.  
Shatkin, G. (2006). Colonial capital, modernist capital, global Capital: The changing political 
symbolism of urban space in Metro Manila, the Philippines. Pacific Affairs, 78(4), 577-
600. doi:10.3170/2008-8-18371 
Shatkin, G. (2007). Collective action and urban poverty alleviation: Community organizations 
and the struggle for shelter in Manila: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
Shatkin, G. (2008). The city and the bottom line: urban megaprojects and the privatization 
of planning in Southeast Asia. Environment and Planning A, 40(2), 383-401.  
Shuaib, A. F. (2007). A New Institutional Economics (NIE) Framework for the Urban Informal 
Sector in Colombo, Sri Lanka. (PhD Thesis), University of Queensland.    
Simbulan, D. C. (1965). A Study of the Socio-economic Elite in Philippine Politics and 
Government, 1946-1963. (PhD Thesis), Australian National University.    
Smart, J. (1986). The impact of government policy on hawkers: A study of the effects of 
establishing a hawker permitted place. Asian Journal of Public Administration, 8(2), 
260-279. doi:10.1080/02598272.1986.10800180 
229 
 
Smith, G. (2009). Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation. 
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 
Smith, N. (1998). Giuliani time: The revanchist 1990s. Social Text, 1-20.  
Stauffer, R. B. (1990). Philippine democracy: Contradictions of third world 
redemocratization. Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies, 6, 7-22.  
Stavenhagen, R. (1965). Classes, colonialism, and acculturation. Studies in Comparative 
International Development, 1(6), 53-77.  
Stone, C. N. (1989). Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988: University Press of 
Kansas. 
Stones, R. (2005). Structuration Theory. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Supreme Court of the Philippines. (1992a). Francisco U. Dacanay v. Mayor Macario Asistio, 
Jr., City Engr. Luciano Sarne, Jr. of  Kalookan City, Metro Manila, Mila Pastrana 
and/or Rodolfo Teofe, Stallholders and Representing Co-Stallholders.  Retrieved 
from http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/may1992/gr_93654_1992.html  
Supreme Court of the Philippines. (1992b). Levy D. Macasiano, Brigadier General/PNP 
Superintendent, Metropolitan Traffic Command, v. Honorable Roberto Diokno, 
Presiding Judge, Branch 62, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, 
Municipality of Paranaque, Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for Service.  Retrieved from 
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/aug1992/gr_97764_1992.html. 
Swider, S. (2015). Reshaping China's urban citizenship: Street vendors, chengguan and 
struggles over the right to the city. Critical Sociology, 41(4-5), 701.  
Teehankee, J. C. (2013). Clientelism and party politics in the Philippines. In D. Tomsa & A. 
Ufen (Eds.), Party Politics in Southeast Asia: Clientelism and Electoral Competition 
in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines (pp. 186-214). London and New York: 
Routledge. 
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. (1987). 
Timmermans, S., & Tavory, I. (2012). Theory construction in qualitative research: From 
grounded theory to abductive analysis. Sociological Theory, 30(3), 167-186.  
Timothy, D. J., & Wall, G. (1997). Selling to tourists: Indonesian street vendors. Annals of 
Tourism Research, 24(2), 322-340. doi:10.1016/S0160-7383(97)80004-7 
Tirona, M. G. A. (2013). Philippine Statement at the 46th Session of the Commission on 
Population and Development.  Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2013/country/A
genda%20item%204/Philippines_Item4.pdf. 
230 
 
Trochim, W. M. (2006). The Research Methods Knowledge Base.   
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net 
Trupp, A. (2015). Agency, social capital, and mixed embeddedness among Akha ethnic 
minority street vendors in Thailand's tourist areas. SOJOURN: Journal of Social 
Issues in Southeast Asia, 30(3), 780-818.  
Tucker, J. (2016). Contraband City: Geographies of Extralegal Work and Life in Paraguay's 
Frontier Economy. (PhD Thesis), University of California, Berkeley.    
Turner, S., & Schoenberger, L. (2012). Street vendor livelihoods and everyday politics in 
Hanoi, Vietnam. Urban Studies, 49(5), 1027-1044. doi:10.1177/0042098011408934 
UN Habitat. (2009). Global Report on Human Settlements 2009: Planning Sustainable 
Cities.  
UN Habitat. (2016). World Cities Report 2016. Retrieved from http://wcr.unhabitat.org/main-
report/ 
UN Habitat, & UN ESCAP. (2015). The State of Asian and Pacific Cities 2015 Retrieved 
from http://www.unescap.org/resources/state-asian-and-pacific-cities-2015-urban-
transformations-shifting-quantity-quality 
Valladolid, R. S. (1996). The Socio-economic Benefits of Street Hawking in Baclaran. (MA 
Thesis), De La Salle University.    
van Ballegooijen, J., & Rocco, R. (2013). The ideologies of informality: Informal urbanisation 
in the architectural and planning discourses. Third World Quarterly, 34(10), 1794-
1810.  
van der Walt, A. J. (2009). Property in the Margins. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing. 
van Naerssen, T., Ligthart, M., & Zapanta, F. N. (1996). Managing Metropolitan Manila. In 
J. Ruland (Ed.), The Dynamics of Metropolitan management in Southeast Asia (pp. 
168-206). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
van Schendel, W., & Abraham, I. (2005). Introduction: The making of illicitness. In W. van 
Schendel & I. Abraham (Eds.), Illicit Fows and Criminal Things: States, Borders, and 
the Other Side of Globalization (pp. 1-37). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Vanek, J., Chen, M. A., Carré, F., Heintz, J., & Hussmanns, R. (2014). Statistics on the 
Informal Economy: Definitions, Regional Estimates and Challenges. Retrieved from 
http://www.wiego.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/Vanek-Statistics-WIEGO-
WP2.pdf 
231 
 
Villanueva, C. L. (1990). Comparative study of the judicial role and its effect on the theory 
on judicial precedents in the Philippine hybrid legal system. Philippine Law Journal, 
65, 42-75.  
Viloria, L. (1990). Planning education: A continuing experience. Philippine Planning Journal, 
21/22, 48-54.  
Wang, D. (2003). Street Culture in Chengdu: Public Space, Urban Commoners, and Local 
Politics, 1870-1930: Stanford University Press. 
War on Want, Workers Education Association of Zambia, & The Alliance of Zambia Informal 
Economy Associations. (2006). Forces for Change: Informal Economy Organisations 
in Africa. Retrieved from http://www.waronwant.org/resources/forces-change 
Watanabe, A. (2008). The formation of migrant Muslim communities in Metro Manila. 
Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies, 22(2), 68-96.  
Watson, L. C., & Watson-Franke, M.-B. (1985). Interpreting Life Histories: An 
Anthropological Inquiry. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 
Watson, V. (2003). Conflicting rationalities: Implications for planning theory and ethics. 
Planning Theory and Practice, 4(4), 395-407.  
Watson, V. (2012). Planning and the ‘stubborn realities’ of global south-east cities: Some 
emerging ideas. Planning Theory 12(1), 81–100. 
Watts, B., & Fitzpatrick, S. (2017). Rights-based approaches and social justice. In A. Brown 
(Ed.), Rebel Streets and the Informal Economy. London and New York: Routledge. 
Webber, M. M. (1963). Order in diversity: community without propinquity. In L. Wingo (Ed.), 
Cities and Space: The Future Use of Urban Land (pp. 23-56). Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press. 
Webster, D., Corpuz, A., & Pablo, C. (2003). Towards a National Urban Development 
Framework for the Philippines: Strategic Consideration: Prepared for World Bank-
NEDA. 
Weng, C., & Kim, A. (2016). The critical role of street vendor organizations in relocating 
street vendors into public markets: The case of Hsinchu City, Taiwan. Cityscape, 
18(1), 47-69.  
WIEGO or Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing. (n.d.). Street 
Vendors and the Law.   Retrieved from 
http://www.wiego.org/informal_economy_law/street-vendors-and-law 
Williams, R. (1977). Marxism and Literature (Vol. 1): Oxford University Press. 
World Bank. (2013a). Inclusion Matters: The Foundation for Shared Prosperity. Washington, 
DC. 
232 
 
World Bank. (2013b). Philippine Development Report: Creating More and Better Jobs. 
Retrieved from 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/895661468092965770/Philippine-
development-report-creating-more-and-better-jobs 
Wratten, E. (1995). Conceptualizing urban poverty. Environment and Urbanization, 7(1), 11-
38.  
Xue, D., & Huang, G. (2015). Informality and the state's ambivalence in the regulation of 
street vending in transforming Guangzhou, China. Geoforum, 62, 156-165. 
doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2015.04.012 
Yatmo, Y. A. (2008). Street vendors as ‘out of place’ urban elements. Journal of Urban 
Design, 13(3), 387-402. doi:10.1080/13574800802320889 
Yiftachel, O. (2006). Re-engaging planning theory? Towards 'South-Eastern' perspectives. 
Planning Theory, 5(3), 211-222. doi:10.1177/1473095206068627 
Yin, R. K. (2011). Qualitative Research from Start to Finish. New York: Guilford Press. 
Yin, R. K. (2014). Case Study Research: Design and Methods (5th ed.). Los Angeles: SAGE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
233 
 
APPENDICES 
 
A. Guide Questions for Interviews with Government Officials 
 
Some notes before an interview or a focus group discussion begins. 
a. After the introduction protocol, the researcher will explain to the participant/s the 
objectives and nature of the research.  
b. He will then present the participant consent form and participant information sheet 
for the participants to review and sign before the actual interview or focus group 
begins. 
c. Once the participant/s has signed the consent form, the researcher will ask her/him 
if it is okay to digitally record the conversation. 
d. The researcher will also briefly explain the general flow of the discussion. 
 
Questions 
1. Please tell me about your current role in this organization. Please tell me about your 
responsibilities in this role.  
2. Can you share your opinion about street vending, pedicab driving and other similar 
activities in the city? 
3. Please explain the mandate/responsibilities of your office with regard to street vending?  
4. Can you discuss the government policies/programs that have to do with street 
vending? Do you think they are working? Please explain. 
5. In some areas, there are activities or rules that different groups/individuals observe. 
However, these practices/rules are not necessarily part of government laws or 
programs. We can probably call these as ‘internal protocols’ within or among groups 
involved in street vending. Do you know if there are these kinds of practices/protocols 
related to street vending? Can you share some examples? 
6. In dealing with street hawkers or in implementing government policies on street 
vending, do you also have ‘internal protocols’? If so, can you share something about 
these and how do these affect the policies on vending (e.g. are they helpful?)? 
7. I am sorry to ask a question that might be obvious for you, but sometimes it is difficult 
to understand how the government structure works, especially for people like me who 
are not familiar with the government hierarchy and programs. Can you explain how 
government policies/programs deal with ‘internal protocols’ that you just mentioned? 
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8. What can you say about the presence of these government policies alongside the 
‘internal protocols’ on street vending? 
9. Aside from your office, can you identify other organizations or offices that are involved 
in government policies/programs that have to do with street vending? Please elaborate 
more on their roles and activities (e.g. permit application, clearing operation, etc.). 
10. Can you also tell me about the organizations or offices that are involved in internal 
protocols on street vending? Can you describe their roles and activities (e.g. selling of 
goods, monitoring/policing the spaces)?  
11. In many instances, the different groups/offices interact with each other. Can you say 
something about rules and/or internal protocols that these organizations observe in 
- Building partnerships or collaborations? 
- Dealing with conflicts and tensions? 
- Addressing accountability issues (e.g. erring members, corrupt practices)? 
12. Based on your experience, what are the patterns and/or changes with respect to the 
government policies and/or internal protocols related to street vending? Can you share 
your thoughts about these patterns and/or changes? 
13. In your opinion, what are the implications of the simultaneous presence of government 
policies and ‘internal protocols’ to the following: 
- What your office/organization has been doing? 
- Use of public spaces (streets, sidewalks, parks, etc.)? 
- Urban planning/governance? 
 
B. Guide Questions for Interviews with Leaders of Vendor Organizations 
1. How long have you been a street vendor? What is your position in your organization? 
What have been the advantages of being in this position? What have been the 
challenges of being in this position? 
2. Please explain the brief history of your organization and what it currently does. How 
many members do you have? 
3. What is your opinion about street vending as a job? Can you share its advantages and 
disadvantages? 
4. Please tell me about government policies/programs that have to do with street 
vending? Can you share your opinion about these policies and programs? 
5. In some areas, there are activities or rules that different groups/individuals observe. 
However, these practices/rules are not necessarily part of government laws or 
programs. We can probably call these as ‘internal protocols’ within or among groups 
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involved in street vending. Do you know if there are these kinds of practices/protocols 
related to street vending? Can you cite some examples? 
6. Can you explain how government policies/programs deal with ‘internal protocols’ that 
you just mentioned? 
7. What can you say about the presence of these government policies alongside the 
‘internal protocols’ on street vending? 
8. Let’s talk more about the development or implementation of these government 
policies/programs on street vending? Does your organization have any role in the 
development and/or implementation of these policies/programs? To what extent has 
your role been able to influence the development and/or implementation of the 
policies/programs? 
9. Now let’s talk about the role of your organization in the development and/or 
implementation of the ‘internal protocols’. Can you say something about it? What are 
the advantages and disadvantages of these ‘protocols’? 
10. You mentioned the advantages and disadvantages of the protocol. What then are the 
protocols that should be kept? Abolished? Institutionalized? What could be the best 
compromise for all stakeholders? 
11. Aside from your organization, can you identify other groups or offices that are involved 
in government policies/programs that have to do with street vending? Please elaborate 
more on their roles and activities (e.g. permit application, clearing operation, etc.). 
12. Can you also tell me about the organizations or offices that are involved in internal 
protocols on street vending?  Please describe their roles and activities (e.g. selling of 
goods, monitoring/policing the spaces)?  
13. In many instances, the different groups/offices interact with each other. Can you say 
something about rules and/or internal protocols that these groups observe in  
- Building partnerships or collaborations? 
- Dealing with conflicts and tensions? 
- Addressing issues of erring members or corrupt practices? 
14. As one of the groups involved in street vending, please share your opinion on the 
implications of the simultaneous presence of the government policies and ‘internal 
protocols’ on street vending to the following  
- the relations of different stakeholders? 
- the use of public spaces (e.g. streets, sidewalks, etc.)? 
15. Do you have other things you would like to share in connection to the topics and 
issues we discussed? Please feel free to explain. 
236 
 
 
C. Guide Questions for FGDs with Vendors 
1. To begin with our discussion, please share something about yourself: your age, 
residence, educational attainment, number of years as a street vendor.  
2. Please share your opinion about street vending in relation to 
- Livelihood? 
- Everyday activities or routines? 
- Use of public spaces (streets, sidewalks, etc.)? 
3. Let’s discuss the issues you face as street vendors and how you have been responding 
to these issues individually and/or as a group? 
4. Please share your opinion/s about government policies/programs on street vending. 
5. In some areas, there are activities or rules that different groups/individuals observe. 
However, these practices/rules are not necessarily part of government laws or 
programs. Sometimes they contradict government policies. We can probably call these 
as ‘internal protocols’ within or among groups involved in street vending. Do you know if 
there are these kinds of practices/protocols related to street vending? Can you cite 
some examples? 
6. What can you say about the simultaneous presence of these government policies and 
the ‘internal protocols’ on street vending? 
7. Now let’s talk about your role/s in the development and/or implementation of the 
‘internal protocols’. Can you say something about it? What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of these ‘protocols’? 
8. You mentioned the advantages and disadvantages of the protocol. What then are the 
protocols that should be kept? Abolished? Institutionalized? What could be the best 
compromise for all stakeholders? 
9. Aside from your organization, can you identify other groups or offices that are involved 
in government policies/programs that have to do with street vending? Please elaborate 
more on their roles and activities (e.g. permit application, clearing operation, etc.). 
10. Can you also tell me about the organizations or offices that are involved in internal 
protocols on street vending?  Please describe their roles and activities (e.g. selling of 
goods, monitoring/policing the spaces)?  
11. In many instances, the different groups/offices interact with each other. Can you share 
something about the rules and/or internal protocols that these organizations observe in  
- Building partnerships or collaborations? 
- Dealing with conflicts and tensions? 
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- Addressing issues of erring members or corrupt practices? 
12. As one of those involved in street vending, please share your opinion on the 
implications of the simultaneous presence of the government policies and ‘internal 
protocols’ on street vending to the following  
- the relations of different stakeholders? 
- the use of public spaces (e.g. streets, sidewalks, etc.)? 
13. What other important street vending issues/practices do you want to share in this 
discussion? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
238 
 
D. Research Participants 
 
I replaced the names of research participants with pseudonyms to protect their privacy. 
Although I used the information collected from interviews and FGDs involving 102 people, 
as I mentioned in Chapter 1, the list below only contains the pseudonyms of interviewees 
and FGD participants that I quoted in the thesis. 
 
Baclaran Vendors 
 
Alexander A Muslim community leader who has a semi-fixed vending stall. He used 
to be a formal employee in a neighbouring city. He started working as a 
vendor in Baclaran in 1988. 
Carlo A Muslim official in one barangay in Baclaran who engages in street 
vending. He has been living in Baclaran since 1998.  
Catalina An old female Christian vendor who has been vending in Baclaran since 
the late 1980s. She owns a small grocery store at home. 
Chris An old male vendor who sells garment goods. He is a recognized leader 
of one group of vendors who come from one region in the countryside. 
He has been engaged in vending activities since 1979.  
Esperanza A veteran vendor leader has been in Baclaran since 1983. She is a 
recognized head of Christian vendors.  
Eugene A male ambulant vendor who used to work in a big local car 
manufacturing company since he was a child. He resorted to vending 
when he got laid off after the company shut down its operation. He has 
been an ambulant vendor in Baclaran since 1998.  
Hannah An old female street vendor who has been engaged in vending for over 
30 years. She started vending in Baclaran in 1986. She migrated to Metro 
Manila from a province to earn a living. Her husband and adult children, 
who have their own families, are also engaged in street vending.  
Jenny A female Muslim vendor who has a semi-fixed stall. She sells shoes and 
garment products. 
Julie A female vendor leader who sells school supplies and house wares. She 
has been a street vendor for more than two decades. She lives with her 
family in a barangay near her vending stall. Some of her relatives, who 
help her as salespersons, live with her family. 
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Maricel  A young female Muslim ambulant vendor. She started vending in 
Baclaran in 2006. She currently sells mobile phone accessories and 
slippers. 
Mary Jane A female Christian vendor who used to be a saleslady for a vending stall. 
She now manages her own semi-fixed stall selling shoes. She has been 
engaged in vending for more than 10 years now. 
Nelly A female Muslim vendor who has a semi-fixed stall. She has a 
recognized fellow Muslim leader. She sells shoes and garment products. 
Nora A young female Muslim vendor who has been in Baclaran for more than 
10 years. She started vending in 2000. She shares the stalls with her 
mother and sells garment products. She migrated to Barangay Baclaran 
from another Muslim community in Metropolitan Manila.  
Oliver A male ambulant vendor who lives in a neighbouring city. He goes to 
Baclaran every day to sell clothes. He has been engaged in vending 
activities for 28 years now. He started vending in Baclaran in 1988. 
Rosie A female ambulant vendor who is married to a Muslim. She started 
vending Baclaran in 2006. Before transferring to Baclaran, she was 
working in Divisoria, which is considered the biggest retail trading district 
in the Philippines. 
Rowena A woman vendor who sells bottled water, juice drinks, and school 
supplies. She migrated to Metro Manila to earn a living. She has been a 
vendor for 30 years now. She started vending in Baclaran in 1986. 
Sheila A female Muslim vendor who has a semi-fixed stall. She has a 
recognized fellow Muslim leader. She sells garment products. 
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Private Sector Groups and NGOs 
 
Alejo A jeepney driver whose final destination and terminal is in Baclaran. He 
has been a driver for more than two decades.  
Billy A property owner in Baclaran who leases out two buildings for 
commercial purposes. He has lived in Baclaran since his childhood and 
has witnessed the evolution of the area.  
Boyeth A jeepney driver whose final destination and terminal is in Baclaran. He 
has been a driver for more than two decades. 
Francis An official of a religious congregation in Baclaran.  
Mike A Christian resident of one Barangay in Baclaran. He was born and grew 
up in the community.  
Moises An assistant property manager of one shopping mall in Baclaran. He 
used to work with a private secondary educational institution. 
Myra A young female owner of formal vending stall in Baclaran. She is married 
with one child. She finished a college education but decided to engage 
in selling garment products as her past jobs was contractual lasting for 
six months.  
Nancy A female owner of a formal stall in Baclaran. She runs the stall selling 
school bags, travel luggage and other knapsacks. She has three full-
time employees – hear oldest daughter and two adult male workers. She 
used to be a street vendor before being able to rent her own formal 
commercial space. 
Nelson A leader of an NGO in Baclaran who lives in a community near Baclaran 
vending spaces. 
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Government Officials 
 
Allen He is one of the heads of the peace and order committee of one 
barangay in Baclaran where he is also a resident. He has been a staff of 
the barangay government since the early 1990s.  
Andy An official of one barangay in Baclaran. He has been in this position 
since 2013.  
Belen A member of the National Anti-Poverty Commission Workers in the 
Informal Sector Council. She has worked with grassroots women 
engaged in home-based work.   
Bernardo A property manager and an official of a Barangay in Baclaran.  
Brando A leader of one Barangay in Baclaran. Some parts of his barangay are 
a site for private stalls and street vendors. 
Cynthia An official of a national government agency in-charge of workers in the 
informal sector. She has been in this position for more than three years. 
Danny An official of one Barangay in Baclaran. He has a leader of his barangay 
for more than 5 years. Many of his barangay residents and relatives are 
engaged in street vending. 
Gina An official of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. She has 
been with this government agency for more than 10 years. 
Glenda A staff of a national government agency in-charge of workers in the 
informal sector. 
Jason An official of the city government who is in-charge of street vendors. He 
has held his current position for more than two years. He lives in a 
barangay near Baclaran.  
Kaye An official of the Pasay City Planning and Development Office.  
Krisha A division head of Parañaque City’s Planning and Development Office. 
She has been with this office for more than 10 years. She is married to 
a former resident of Baclaran. 
Leni A staff of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process. 
She is from a province in Mindanao where the government conflict with 
Muslim rebels is happening.  
Melissa  A technical staff of the Pasay City Planning and Development Office. 
She has experienced running a program for street vendors in Pasay. 
She has been a staff of the Pasay City Government since 1991.  
242 
 
Miguel A senior staff of the Philippine government’s National Economic 
Development Authority. He is part of the Social Development Unit and 
represents his office in the inter-agency committee that tackles urban-
related issues. 
Mila An official of one Barangay in Baclaran. She has worked with other local 
government units as a consultant. 
Noriel A technical staff of the Chairperson of the Presidential Commission for 
the Urban Poor. He has been in this position for more than two years.  
Peter An official of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. He has 
been with this government agency for more than 10 years. 
 
 
Academics and Development Workers 
 
Anselma A veteran community organizer in Pasay City who is familiar with the 
Baclaran vending situation. She has assisted urban poor communities in 
their struggle for land tenure. 
Belinda A seasoned organizer of workers in the informal economy. She initiated 
organizing project in Baclaran. She used to head the National Anti-
Poverty Commission – Workers in the Informal Sector Council. 
Fredo A retired professor of the University of the Philippines Diliman. He has 
written books and technical guidelines on planning and local land use 
processes, among others. 
Hector A Professor Emeritus of one university in the Philippines. He has written 
books on community organizing in the country.  
Jess An experienced organizer of urban poor communities in Metropolitan 
Manila. He has assisted many poor communities in their struggle for land 
tenure. He is currently part of the advisory committee of one official in 
Pasay City.  
Leo A leader of informal workers who initiated organizing project in Baclaran. 
He is familiar with the conditions and issues being faced by Baclaran 
vendors.  
Manuel An Associate Professor at a state university in the Philippines. He 
specializes in issues of institutional processes and planning. 
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Maura A seasoned organizer of workers in the informal economy. She used to 
head a nationwide coalition of associations of informal workers and 
vendors. She was also part of the National Anti-Poverty Commission – 
Workers in the Informal Sector Council. 
Mayeth A social worker and a veteran organizer of street vendors in Metropolitan 
Manila. She is part of a socialist national organization in the Philippines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
244 
 
E. Ethics Approval Letter 
